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I t  h a s  o f t e n  been s a i d  t h a t  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  was 
t h e  " s t o n e  in  t h e  ro ad "  of  German dem ocracy .  When a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  
p e r i o d  be tween  1919 and 1924,  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t  h a s  u s u a l l y  had one 
o f  two m ea n in g s .  In t h e  mouths of  t h e  m o d e r a t e  p o l i t i c i a n s  who 
formed t h e  e a r l y  gove rnm en ts  of  t h e  Weimar R e p u b l i c  i t  has  been  
a r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  way in  w’h i c h  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  p rob lem  han d ic a p p e d  
them i n  t h e i r  r i v a l r y  w i t h  o p p o s i t i o n  g r o u p s  of  t h e  ex treme Le f t  
and R i g h t ,  N a t i o n a l i s t  g r o u p s ,  i t  i s  c l a i m e d ,  p r o f i t e d  by b e in g  
a b l e  t o  condemn t h e  p o l i c y  of  " f u l f i l m e n t "  a s  u n p a t r i o t i c ;  w h i l e  
communists  made much c a p i t a l  out of  t h e  c h a r g e  t h a t ,  by pay in g  
r e p a r a t i o n ,  t h e  government  was c o n n iv i n g  a t  t h e  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of  
t h e  German work ing  c l a s s  by wor ld  c a p i t a l i s m .  R e p a r a t i o n  payments  
w e r e ,  on t h i s  v i e w ,  a h i n d r a n c e  t o  German democracy  b e c a u s e  t h e y  
em bar ra s sed  and weakened t h o s e  p a r t i e s  which were  most c l o s e l y  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c  W'eimar c o n s t i t u t i o n .
More r e c e n t l y  t h e  r a t h e r  b r o a d e r  a s s e r t i o n  h a s  been made 
t h a t  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  p rob lem  harmed German democracy by c o n t r i b u t ­
ing t o  t h e  e v e n t u a l  abandonment of  t h e  "Weimar c o n s t i t u t i o n .  In 
t h e  words  of  a c o n te m p o ra r y  German h i s t o r i a n ,  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  i s s u e  
was "a p s y c h o l o g i c a l  f a c t o r  e n c o u ra g in g  t h e  f o r c e s  of  l e f t  and 
r i g h t  ex t r e m ism ,  which  w i t h i n  a few y e a r s  were  t o  t h r e a t e n  t h e  
v e r y  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  German d e m o c r a t i c  r e p u b l i c .  The r e p a r a t i o n  
p o l i c y  of  t h e  A l l i e s  a f t e r  V e r s a i l l e s  must  b e a r  an i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  
of t h e  blame f o r  t h i s  deve lopment" ."^*
1,  E .  Schmacke,  Die A u s s e n o o l i t i k  d e r  Weimarer  R e p u b l i k ,  1 9 2 2 - 2 5 , 
u n t e r  Berücksich t igung . :  d e r  I n n e n p o l i t i k  , p . 62•
ii
T here  i s  t r u t h  in  b o t h  of t h e s e  c l a i m s ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  may 
be remarked in  p a s s i n g  t h a t  many o t h e r  f a c t o r s  b e s i d e s  t h e  
r e p a r a t i o n  p rob lem  a f f e c t e d  t h e  p a r t i s a n  b a l a n c e  of  power in  
t h e  e a r l y  t w e n t i e s  a n d ,  a f o r t i o r i , t h e  d e c l i n e  of  r e p u b l i c a n  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  t e n  y e a r s  l a t e r .  I t  i s ,  how ever ,  somewhat s u p e r ­
f i c i a l  t o  s t u d y  t h e  impact  of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  p rob lem  s o l e l y  
t h r o u g h  t h e  eyes of t h e  h a r d - p r e s s e d  m o d e r a te  p o l i t i c i a n s  of t h e  
e a r l y  Weimar p e r i o d  or  f rom t h e  v a n t a g e - p o i n t  of p r e s e n t - d a y  
h i s t o r i a n s  who a r e  p r e o c c u p ie d  w i t h  t h e  dem ise  of t h e  r e p u b l i c  in  
1933* The f u n d a m e n ta l  p rob lem  of  t h e  e a r l y  p o s t - w a r  y e a r s  in  
Germany was t h a t  of m one ta ry  i n s t a b i l i t y  and economic 
d i s o r g a n i s a t i o n .  These  deve lopm en ts  had an e x c e e d i n g l y  i m p o r ta n t  
i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  c o u r s e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  e v e n t s  b e f o r e  1924,  T h e i r  
l o n g - t e r m  s o c i a l  and economic r e p e r c u s s i o n s  w e r e ,  m o re o v e r ,  
p a r t l y  t o  blame f o r  t h e  l a t e r  p o l i t i c a l  weakness  of  t h e  Weimar 
R e p u b l i c .  An e x a m i n a t i o n  of  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  of  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  
prob lem t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  and economic m a l a i s e  b e f o r e  1924 i s  
t h e r e f o r e  a n e c e s s a r y  p r e l i m i n a r y  t o  any b a l a n c e d  judgment  about  
t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  in  t h e  h i s t o r y  of  
b o t h  t h e  e a r l y  and t h e  l a t e r  y e a r s  of t h e  r e p u b l i c a n  r e g i m e .
The r e l a t i v e  i m p o r ta n c e  of  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  and economic 
impact  of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  can on ly  be g r a s p e d  i f  a 
p r e l i m i n a r y  e x a m i n a t i o n  i s  made of t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which  t h e  war 
of 1914-1918 d i s l o c a t e d  t h e  German economy and s t r a i n e d  t h e  German 
f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m .  A f t e r  t h i s  e x a m in a t io n  has  been  c o m p l e t e d ,  
i t  w i l l  be p o s s i b l e  t o  i s o l a t e  t h e  impact  of  r e p a r a t i o n s
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in  t h e  pos t -w ar  per iod  by d e te rm in in g  f i r s t l y  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  
which th e y  aggrava ted  Germany’ s economic d i s l o c a t i o n ,  s e c o n d ly ,  
how much th e y  added d i r e c t l y  or i n d i r e c t l y  t o  Germany’ s i n t e r n a l  
and e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  b u rd e n s ,  and,  t h i r d l y ,  how f a r  th e y  
e re c te d  p s y c h o lo g i c a l  and p o l i t i c a l  b a r r i e r s  t o  t h e  im plementa t ion  
of an e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  by t h e  
German government.
I t  w i l l  be found t h a t ,  in t h e  t h i r t y  months between t h e  
end of t h e  war and May 1921, t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  problem, a l though  a 
w eighty  one,  did not  have  an overpowering e f f e c t  on t h e  German 
economy, t h e  German budget  and b a l a n c e  of payments ,  or  domest ic  
and f o r e i g n  a t t i t u d e s  towards  Germany’ s f i n a n c i a l  f u t u r e .  A f te r  
May 1921, however,  both  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  and p s y c h o l o g i c o - p o l i t  i c a l  
impact of r e p a r a t i o n s  became more marked; and t h e  l a t t e r  was 
almost  e n t i r e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  c a t a s t r o p h i c  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of 
German cu r rency  which occurred  in t h e  second h a l f  of 1922.  The 
tw en ty  months between t h e  occupa t ion  of t h e  Ruhr in  January  1923 
and t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of  t h e  Dawes P lan in August 1924 w i tn e s s ed  
f i r s t  t h e  f i n a l  c o l l a p s e  of t h e  German f i n a n c i a l  sys tem and th e n  
i t s  comple te r e c o n s t r u c t i o n .  The c o n n ec t io n  between t h e  
r e p a r a t i o n  problem and t h e s e  developments w i l l  be  examined w i th  
a view t o  d em o n s t r a t in g  t h a t  c o l l a p s e  was produced l e s s  by t h e  
r e p a r a t i o n  problem as such th a n  by t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a s t a t e  of 
war between F rance  and Germany, and t h a t  t h e  u l t i m a t e  r e c o n s t r u c ­
t i o n  of German f in a n c e s  was due not  t o  any m i t i g a t i o n  of Germany’ s 
r e p a r a t i o n  burden  but  t o  a f i n a n c i a l  change of h e a r t  bo th  in 
Germany and in t h e  c r e d i t o r  n a t i o n s  of t h e  w o r ld .
PART I
THE GERMAN ECONOMY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR
1THE GERMAN ECONOMY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR "
The f i n a n c i a l  and economic h i s t o r y  of  Germany in t h e  
e a r l y  p o s t -w ar  y e a r s  was in many r e s p e c t s  a c o n t i n u a t i o n  of 
developments  which began d u r ing  t h e  war of 1914-18.  Th is  does 
no t  mean t h a t  t h e  war can be d i r e c t l y  blamed f o r  t h e  German 
f i n a n c i a l  c o l l a p s e  of t h e  e a r l y  t w e n t i e s .  The f i n a n c i a l  and 
economic chaos of 1923-24 was by no means i n e v i t a b l e  a t  t h e  
end of 1918.  However, t h e  war caused economic exhaus t ion  
and maladjus tment which p e r s i s t e d  w e l l  i n t o  t h e  pos t -w ar  
p e r io d ;  and i t  exposed weaknesses in t h e  German f i n a n c i a l  
system which c o n t r i b u t e d  in  an impor tan t  way t o  t h e  e v e n t u a l  
f i n a n c i a l  breakdown. An exam inat ion of t h e  economic 
d i s l o c a t i o n  and f i n a n c i a l  weakness of p o s t -w ar  Germany must 
t h e r e f o r e  be p re faced  by a b r i e f  account  of  economic and 
f i n a n c i a l  t r e n d s  in t h e  war y e a r s .
The d i v e r s i o n  of a c o n s i d e r a b l e  p a r t  of German economic 
r e s o u r c e s  and manpower t o  t h e  t a s k  of equipping  and f i g h t i n g  a 
war reduced t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  of many s e c t i o n s  of t h e  German 
economy. Even t h e  ou tpu t  of such s t r a t e g i c a l l y  impor tan t  
e n t e r p r i s e s  as c o a l  min ing ,  t h e  i ron  and s t e e l  i n d u s t r y ,  and 
a g r i c u l t u r e  f e l l  s h a r p l y  between 1914 and 1918. Black c o a l
p r o d u c t i o n ,  which was 190 m i l l i o n  tons  in 1913 had d e c l in e d
1.
t o  l60  m i l l i o n  t o n s  by 1918. Over t h e  same p e r io d ,  ou tpu t
1. J .W#F.  T h e l w a l l ,  "Genera l  Report  on t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  and
Economic S i t u a t i o n  in Germany in December 1920",  Appendix I I ,  
pp. 58 -9 .  H. of  C. P a p e r s . 1921, Cd. 1114,  Vol.  31 , p.  589«
2of pig i ron  had f a l l e n  from 12.9 m i l l i o n  t o n s  ( 1913) t o  9*2 
m i l l i o n  t o n s  ( 1918); w h i l e  p ro d u c t io n  of c rude  s t e e l ,  which 
had been 15*3 m i l l i o n  t o n s  in  1913> had dropped t o  12.9 
m i l l i o n  t o n s  by t h e  l a s t  yea r  of t h e  w a r . 1  23* A l l  im por tan t  forms
of l i v e s t o c k ,  except  g o a t s ,  had d im in ished  in numbers between
December 1913 and December 1918, v i z ,
(Thousand head)
1 December 1913 4 December
Horses 4,523 3,493
C a t t l e 20,994 18 ,095
Sheep 5,521 5 ,382
Pigs 25,659 10 ,545
Goats 3,548 4,426
1918
The y i e ld  of major crops  a l s o  d e c l in e d  s h a r p ly  d u r in g  t h e  w ar ,
v i z (Thousand m e t r i c  t o n s )
1913 1918
Rye 12,222 8 ,035
Wheat 4,656 2,527
Bar ley 3,673 2,038
P o ta t  oes 54,121 29,941
Oats 9,714 4,769
In a l l  t h e s e  cases  d e c l i n i n g  output  was a s s o c i a t e d  w i th
f a l l i n g  p r o d u c t i v i t y  as w e l l  as  w i th  dec reased  p r o d u c t i v e  
a c t i v i t y .  This  was due p a r t l y  t o  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of such f a c t o r s  
as  t h e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of c a p i t a l  equipment and t h e  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  
of land and p a r t l y  t o  t h e  widespread  employment of u n d e r f e d ,  
i l l - c l o t h e d  and bad ly  t r a i n e d  w o rk e r s .  By 1918 t h e r e  had 
been a c o n s id e r a b l e  d e c l i n e  in  t h e  output  of c o a l
1. i b i d . ,  Appendix XV, p.  79»
2.  Supreme Economic C ounc i l ,  Monthly B u l l e t i n  of  S t a t i s t i c s .
V o l .  I ,  No. 12, p.  30» For s l i g h t l y  v a r i a n t  f i g u r e s :  
S t a t i s t i s c h e s  Jahrbuch fiür das d e u t s c h e  R e i c h . 1919>PP*79-83«
3.  F ig u re s  c i t e d  i n :  J . S .  D av is ,  ’’Recent F i n a n c i a l  and Economic
P ro g re s s  in Germany", Review of Economic S t a t i s t i c s . 1921,  
V o l .  I l l ,  p .  155* See a l s o :  S t a t i s t i s c h e s  Jahrbuch  f ü r  das
d eu t sch e  R e i c h . 1919, PP* 67-8 .
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1 2 . and iron per miner *and in th e  a g r ic u ltu r a l  y ie ld  per h ec ta re .
It i s  a ls o  noteworthy th a t  th e  p rod u ct iv ity  of th e  German railw ay
system measured in terms of a v a i l a b i l i t y  of r o l l in g  stock had
decreased considerably .'" ’ The process of d e te r io r a t io n  and
d is lo c a t io n  i s  g en era l ly  agreed t o  have been acce lera ted  by th e
N ational S erv ice  Law of 5 December 1916, which inaugurated a
period of in t e n s i f i e d  production of war m ater ia ls  through th e
in troduction  of c i v i l i a n  forced la b o u r .1 234  56* Although t h i s  law (th e
s o -c a l le d  Hindenburg Programme) c e r ta in ly  increased th e  volume of
war production , i t  only did so by impoverishing th e  German
economic system . In th e  words of a h is to r ia n  of th e  German war
economy "anything and everything th a t  seemed of any p o ss ib le
use  for war purposes -  f a c t o r i e s ,  machinery, la b o ra to r ie s  and every
kind of i n s t i t u t io n  -  was forced in to  the compass of t h i s ,  th e
5
la s t  m o b il isa t io n  of a l l  a v a i la b le  fo rce s  and was used up in i t ” .
By September 1918 th e  s c a r c i ty  of food, th e  shortage of manpower 
and th e  lack of raw m ater ia ls  and machinery were so acute in 
Germany that th e  B r i t i s h  Foreign O ff ice  regarded th e  German 
economic s i tu a t io n  as c r i t i c a l .^ *
1. i b i d . ,  1926, p. 80. Cf, G. Lflbsen, "The German Coal S itu a t io n  
and th e  Reparation D e l iv e r ie s " .  Manch e s ter  Guardian Commercial. 
Reconstruct ion in Europe. 7 September 1922, p. 427*
2. S t a t i s t i s c h e s  Jahrbuch ftir das deutsche R eich . 1919> P* 70.
3 . G. Francke, "The German Railway System a f t e r  th e  War", HGCRE.
7 September 1922, p. 405* Of. Hue (SPD), Nationalversammlung.
15 August 1919, V o l.  329, P* 2479.
4 . R e ic h s g e s e t z b la t t . 1916, pp. 1333-9* Trans, of t e x t  in R.H. 
Lutz, The F a l l  of th e  German Empire. V o l.  I I ,  pp. 99^^*
5 .  P* Umbreit, Der Krieg und d ie  A r b e i te r v e r h ä ltn is s e , p. 262: 
quoted in A .  Mend elssohn-B artho ldy , The fa r  and German 
S o c ie ty ,  p. 85*
6. Text of Foreign O ff ic e  Report: R.H.Lutz, op. c i t . , V o l . I I ,  
pp. IO6- 11.
4The i n t e r n a l  d i s r u p t i o n  of  t h e  German economy was 
matched by t h e  d i s l o c a t i o n  of Germany^ f o r e i g n  t r a d e  which 
r e s u l t e d  from th e  war.  D e s p i t e  t h e  absence  of  comple te 
f i g u r e s ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  German expor ts  d e c l i n e d  d u r ing  t h e  
war per iod  t o  w e l l  below t h e i r  1910-13 av e ra g e  of  8 .9  b i l l i o n  
gold m a r k s , T h i s  was due t o  a g r e a t  e x t e n t  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
over h a l f  of  t h e  German goods so ld  abroad in  1913 bad found 
t h e i r  market  in  A l l i e d  c o u n t r i e s . 1 2345“* Another  im p o r tan t  f a c t o r  
was t h e  p a r a l y s i s  of German sh ipp ing  caused by A l l i e d  nava l  
supremacy which s e r i o u s l y  reduced Germany*s t r a d e  wi th  overseas  
neu t ra ls . "^*  F i n a l l y ,  a l though  expor ts  of c o a l ,  m e t a l l u r g i c a l  
p ro d u c ts  and chemicals  were s t i l l  made t o  n e u t r a l  n e i g h b o u rs ,  
most of  what had in  t h e  pas t  c o n s t i t u t e d  an e x p o r t a b l e  s u rp lu s  
was almost  c e r t a i n l y  absorbed in th e  war e f f o r t .  * This  
a b s o r p t i o n  was what Wal ther  Rathenau was r e f e r r i n g  t o  when, 
as  head of Germany’s w ar - t im e  Department of  Raw M a t e r i a l s  in 
1915» he  commented upon a t r e n d  towards  economic a u t a r c h y  or 
tow ards  t h e  " p r o t e c t i o n  of raw m a t e r i a l s "  w hich ,  he  p r e d i c t e d  
h o p e f u l l y ,  would c o n t in u e  a f t e r  t h e  w ar .  * However,  w i th  t h e  
coming of peace  and t h e  c e s s a t i o n  of war p r o d u c t i o n ,  i t  was 
t o  become c l e a r  t h a t  Germany had not  become econom ica l ly
1 . M.C.S iney ,  The A l l i e d  Blockade of Germany, 1914-1916,  
pp. 20- 1 , 131.
2.  J .M. Keynes,  The Economic Consequences of  t h e  P e a c e .
pp.  I 82- 3 .
3 . M.C. S in e y ,  op. c i t . ,  pp,  125 and 270 (Appendix F ) .
4.  i b i d . ,  p .  175; C. R i s t ,  Les F inances  de G uerre  de 
1 1Allemagne.  p.  202.
5 .  R .H .Lu tz ,  op. c i t . ,  Vol.  I I ,  pp.  89-90 .
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self-sufficient but had merely been deprived of her former 
export markets, which in 1913 had absorbed about 26/£ of her total 
industrial production."^*
Although exact figures are again not available, it is 
certain that the Allied blockade reduced Germany's imports 
during the war years to a much lower figure than the 1910-13 
average of 10.2 billion gold marks. This reduction had a 
disastrous economic effect since nearly half of Germany's pre­
war imports were raw materials for manufacture and another 
third consisted of livestock and foodstuffs. To make matters 
worse, German agriculture was heavily dependent on nitrates 
imported from Chile; and German dairy cattle subsisted 
largely on imported forage. * The effects of the blockade 
were mitigated somewhat by the unwillingness of the Allies 
to offend neutrals such as Holland, Denmark, Sweden and 
Switzerland which maintained considerable trading ties with 
Germany throughout the 'war.-'1 234* However, there is ample 
evidence that a shrinkage of imports contributed substantially 
to the dearth of food and raw materials from which the German
4#
economy suffered in both the war and the post-war period.
The diversion of a great part of Germany's economic 
resources to the largely wasteful task of war production was 
likely to have an inflationary financial effect. The equipment 
used and the soldiers employed in fighting the war were paid
1. L. Grebler and W. Winkler, The Cost of the War to Germany 
and to Austria-Hungary, pp. 20-1.
2. M.C. Siney, op. cit., p. 20.
3. ibid., passim.
4. ibid., pp, 256-7; R.H.Lutz, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 107*
6f o r  on ly  by a d r a s t i c  i n c r e a s e  in  p u b l i c  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  v i z , ^ *
Bu d g e t a ry  Year E xpend i tu re




1916/17 2 8 .8
1917/18 53*2
1918/19 79.1
In o r d e r  f o r  t h i s  huge o u t l a y  t o  be t e c h n i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e ,  t h e  
normal peace - t im e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on government c r e d i t  had t o  be 
r e l a x e d .  A law of 4 August 1914 empowered t h e  Reichsbank t o  
make s h o r t - t e r m  loans  t o  t h e  government by d i s c o u n t in g  t h r e e  
months '  T rea su ry  B i l l s  and p l a c in g  t h e  proceeds a t  t h e  
governm en t ' s  d i s p o s a l  in t h e  form of  e i t h e r  Reichsbank n o te s
p
or c r e d i t  b a l a n c e s ,  * Th is  form of c r e d i t  c r e a t i o n  was 
supplemented by t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of  s e v e r a l  new i n s t i t u t i o n s  which 
were s e t  up a t  t h e  outb reak  of  war t o  c a t e r  f o r  t h e  needs of 
non-government o r g a n i s a t i o n s  and of  i n d i v i d u a l s .  The most 
im por tan t  of t h e s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  were s u b s i d i a r i e s  of t h e  
Reichsbank known as War C red i t  O f f i c e s  ( K r i e g s d a r l e h n s k a s s e n ) ,  
which were empowered t o  i s s u e  C re d i t  Vouchers (D ar lehnskassen-  
s c h e in e )  a g a i n s t  c e r t a i n  t y p e s  of  s e c u r i t y . T h e  needs of 
t h o s e  who could o f f e r  only  p e r s o n a l  s e c u r i t y  or such s e c u r i t y  as 
could not  be accepted  by t h e  War C r e d i t  O f f i c e s  were met by 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  such as t h e  War C red i t  Banks (K r ieg s k red i tb an k en )
1.  W. Lotz ,  Die deu t sche  S t a a t s f i n a n z w i r t s c h a f t  im K r i e g e .
PP. 42-73«
2.  Gesetz vom 4 August b e t r e f f e n d  Änderung des B ankgese tzes ,  
Re i c h s g e s e t z b l a t t . 1914, p .  327.
3.  D a r le h n s k a s s e n g e s e tz  vom 4 August 1914,  i b i d . ,  p.  340.
which wer© e s t a b l i s h e d  in  v a r i o u s  forms by m u n i c i p a l i t i e s ,  t r a d e
a s s o c i a t i o n s  and in s u ra n c e  companies.  * However,  t h e  amount of
c r e d i t  g r a n te d  dur ing  t h e  cou rse  of t h e  war by t h e s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s
was i n s i g n i f i c a n t  compared w i th  t h e  sums r e l e a s e d  in t h e  economy
by t h e  huge volume of government e x p e n d i tu r e  w h ich ,  in  t h e  words
of an eminent German f i n a n c i e r ,  kept  t h e  b u s i n e s s  community
2
"permanently  swimming in money".
This v i o l e n t  expansion  of  c r e d i t  i n e v i t a b l y  caused a 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  in c r e a s e  in t h e  volume of  c i r c u l a t i n g  media* The 
Reichsbank*s o b l i g a t i o n  t o  d i s c o u n t  T r e a s u r y  B i l l s  and C red i t  
Vouchers caused t h e  number of  Reichsbank n o t e s  in  c i r c u l a t i o n
t o  r i s e  from about two b i l l i o n  a t  t h e  ou tb reak  of war t o  17
■a
b i l l i o n  in November 1918."* Cred i t  Vouchers th e m s e lv e s  a l s o  
came t o  be wide ly  used as c u r r e n c y  b e c a u s e ,  a l th o u g h  t h e y  were 
n o t  l e g a l  t e n d e r ,  they  were ac c e p te d  by government i n s t i t u t i o n s  
and could be converted i n t o  n o t e s  a t  t h e  R e ichsbank .  By t h e  
end of t h e  w ar ,  9*6 b i l l i o n  of t h e  12.9  b i l l i o n  marks of 
C red i t  Vouchers which had been i s sued  were in  c i r c u l a t i o n .
Of o th e r  temporary  w ar - t im e  forms of c u r r e n c y ,  t h e  most
7 .
4.
1. J .  J a s t r o w ,  "Die O r g a n i s a t i o n  des  K r e d i t s  im K r i e g e " ,  
Archiv f ü r  S o z i a l p o l i t i k  und S o z i a l w i s s e n s c h a f t * D ec ember 
1914, V o l .  40,  p .  95 f f .
2.  H. S c h a c h t ,  The S t a b i l i s a t i o n  of t h e  Mark, pp*31-2 .  The 
e a s i n e s s  of t h e  s h o r t - t e r m  money market  in Germany 
th roughou t  t h e  war was due l a r g e l y  t o  t h e  cred  i t - c r e a t i n g  
a c t i v i t i e s  of p r i v a t e  banks ,  which enjoyed a c o n s i d e r a b l e  
i n f l u x  of d e p o s i t s  as  a r e s u l t  of i n c re a s e d  government 
e x p e n d i tu r e .  R. S tucken ,  Deutsche Geld-und K r e d i t p o l i t i k  
193.4 b i s  1 9 ^ . pp.  25-6 .
3* i b i d . ,  p p.16-7 .
4.  i b i d . ,  pp .  l 6 ,  32.
8im por tan t  were T reasu ry  Notes (R e ic h sk a ss e n s c h e in e )  which had 
o r i g i n a l l y  been bonds i s sued  on t h e  s e c u r i t y  o f  t h e  Im p er ia l  
War T r e a s u r e .  These n o t e s ,  which possessed  a f a c e  va lue  of 
240 m i l l i o n  marks, were made l e g a l  t e n d e r  on 4 August 1914 
and were  t r e a t e d  as o rd in a ry  cu r rency  th ro u g h o u t  t h e  war.^*
These increased  n o te  i s s u e s  e n t a i l e d  t h e  "d e th ronement" 
of gold from i t s  p o s i t i o n  as g u a ra n to r  of t h e  v a l u e  of t h e  
c u r r e n c y .  The f i r s t  s t e p  in t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  was t a k e n  when t h e  
Re ichsbank ,  alarmed at  t h e  r a p id  d e p l e t i o n  of i t s  gold r e s e r v e s
d u r in g  t h e  panic  of t h e  l a s t  week of J u l y  1914,  ceased  t o
2m
redeem i t s  n o t e s  in g o ld .  * The impor tance  of gold in t h e  
monetary system was f u r t h e r  d iminished  by t h e  a b o l i t i o n  of t h e  
t a x  which had p r e v io u s l y  been imposed on t h e  Re ichsbank when 
i t s  n o t e  i s s u e s  exceeded t h e  amount of s p e c i e  in i t s  r e s e r v e s  
by more tha n  550 m i l l i o n  m a rk s . ->• S ince  t h e  German cu r rency  
was no longe r  guaran teed  by g o ld ,  t h e  German monetary  
a u t h o r i t i e s  were a t  p a in s  t o  s t r e s s  t h a t  t h e  v a l u e  of money 
would c o n t in u e  t o  be sa feguarded  by t h e  m a in tenance  of a 
o n e - th i r d  r a t i o  between t h e  R e ich sb an k ’s gold r e s e r v e s  and t h e  
no te  c i r c u l a t i o n .  However, t h e  g r e a t  i n c r e a s e  in c i r c u l a t i o n  
which occurred  d u r ing  t h e  war would have made even t h i s  r a t i o  
im poss ib le  t o  m a in ta in  i f ,  in  accordance  w i th  p rev io u s  p r a c t i c e ,  
only s p e c i e ,  b u l l i o n  and commercial  b i l l s  had been counted as
1. Gesetz vom 4 August b e t r e f f e n d  d i e  R e i c h s k a s s e n s c h e in e  
und d i e  Banknoten,  R e i c h s t e s  et z b l a t t . 1914,  p .  347*
2.  idem. Vide:  W. L o tz ,  op.  c i t . ,  p. l 8 .
3.  Gesetz vom 4 August b e t r e f f e n d  d ie  R e i c h s k a s s e n s c h e in e  
und d i e  Banknoten,  R e i c h s g e s e t z b l a t t , 1914,  p .  347*
9part of th e  r e s e r v e .  With a view t o  avoiding t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  
i t  was provided, in th e  various monetary laws already referred  
t o  which were passed at th e  outbreak of war, th a t  Treasury 
B i l l s ,  War Credit Vouchers and Treasury Notes should be 
reckoned as cover for note i s s u e s .  As th e  war progressed  
th e  R eichsbank’s re ser v es  came t o  c o n s is t  predominantly of 
t h e s e  new forms of cover, which were them selves backed s o l e l y
by th e  c r e d it  of th e  s t a t e , O n  31 December 191B» th e
2 #
a s s e t s  of th e  Reichsbank co n s is ted  of -
m il l io n  marks
M e ta l l ic  Reserves 2,282
(o f  which gold 2 2^62 )
Treasury Notes and Credit
Vouchers 5 »267
Treasury B i l l s ,  B i l l s  of
Exchange and Cheques 2?>4l6
Notes of other banks 3
The cre d it  of th e  s t a t e  had in e f f e c t  replaced gold as 
guarantor of th e  currency. The vigorous e f f o r t s  of tbe  
Reichsbank t o  c o l l e c t  gold during th e  war years^ ’ seem to  
in d ic a te  th a t  the  German monetary a u th o r i t ie s  were re luctant  
t o  admit t h i s  f a c t ,  But, as th e  Reichsbank’s ho ld ings  of 
precious m etal dwindled during th e  course of th e  war in 
comparison w ith  other forms of cover , the  gold reserve  came 
t o  be regarded o f f i c i a l l y  l e s s  as a means of securing th e  note
1 . The Imperial War Treasure had been tran sferred  t o  the  
Reichsbank reserve at th e  outbreak of war. W. Lotz, op.
C i t  « , p • c  '^.' .
2. i b i d . ,  p . 94.
3 . H. Schacht, op. c i t . ,  p. 12.
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i s s u e  and more as  a war t r e a s u r e  which could be used by t h e
1 •government t o  f i n a n c e  e s s e n t i a l  im p o r t s .
Although t h e  expansion of c r e d i t ,  t h e  i n c r e a s e  in 
c i r c u l a t i o n  and t h e  "de th ronem ent” of  gold were a l l  
p o t e n t i a l l y  i n f l a t i o n a r y  developments ,  i t  was by no means 
i n e v i t a b l e ,  and i t  was c e r t a i n l y  not  in t e n d e d ,  t h a t  th e y  
should undermine t h e  s t a b i l i t y  of t h e  German monetary  system.
The t e c h n i c a l  f i n a n c i a l  measures  r e s o r t e d  t o  a t  t h e  outbreak 
of war were n e i t h e r  h a s t i l y  conceived nor  i l l - c o n s i d e r e d .  On 
t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h e y  fo l lowed c l o s e l y  t h e  l i n e s  l a i d  down in t h e  
numerous w a r - f i n a n c e  p lans  which had been formula ted  by t h e  
F r u s s i a n  F inance  M i n i s t r y  and by p r i v a t e  i n d i v i d u a l s  in t h e  
p re -w ar  p e r i o d ,  * A p lan  f o r  f i n a n c i n g  a f u t u r e  war which 
was submit ted  t o  W i l l i am  I I  in  1910 by Wermuth, a S e c r e t a r y  of  
S t a t e  t o  t h e  P r u s s i a n  F inance  M i n i s t r y ,  inc luded  recommendations 
f o r  t h e  su sp e n s io n  of c o n v e r t i b i l i t y ,  in c re a s e d  n o te  i s s u e s  on 
t h e  s e c u r i t y  of T re a s u ry  B i l l s  and t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of s p e c i a l  
c r e d i t  o f f i c e s , ' " *  In 1912 t h e  d i r e c t o r  of  t h e  Bavar ian  Bank ©f 
I s su e  ( S t r ö l l )  pub l i shed  in t h e  i n f l u e n t i a l  German banking
j o u r n a l  Bank-Archiv a p lan  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  m o b i l i s a t i o n  which was
4 ,
almost  i d e n t i c a l  w i th  t h e  s t e p s  a c t u a l l y  t a ken  in 1914, F i n a l l y ,
1,  J ,M,Keynes,  "The Economics of War in  Germany", Economic 
J o u r n a l « September 1915» V o l .  25> P« 444,
2. For t h e  more im por tan t  w r i t i n g s  on t h i s  s u b j e c t :  A,
M ende ls sohn-B ar tho ldy , The War and German S o c i e t y , p,63« Note ,
3 « i b i d , ,  p .  6 7 .
4 ,  C, R i s t ,  op. c i t . ,  p p . 3 1 -2 .
Dr* Jakob R i e s s e r ,  both in  h i s  b o o k s t a n d  in h i s  c a p a c i t y  as
head of a government depar tment  devoted t o  t h e  problem of war
f i n a n c e ,  had proposed a p la n  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  s i x  weeks of t h e  war
which s p e c i f i c a l l y  recommended inc reased  n o t e - i s s u e s  by t h e
2
Reichsbank and t h e  s e t t i n g  up of War C red i t  O f f i c e s .
I t  is  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  p la n n e r s  were mis led  by 
t h e  ex p e r i e n c e  of Germany in p rev ious  wars and by t h e  s t r a t e g i c a l  
views held a t  t h e  t im e  by t h e  German Genera l  S t a f f .  War 
C red i t  O f f i c e s  had been se t  up t o  meet t h e  abnormal demand 
f o r  c r e d i t  in t h e  p rev ious  com para t ive ly  s h o r t - l i v e d  n a t i o n a l  
emergencies of  1848, l 8 66 and 1870-1;^* but  t h e y  were c e r t a i n l y  
not  envisaged  in August 1914 as t h e  semi-permanent  c r e d i t  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  which t h e y  s u b se q u e n t ly  became. Memories of t h e  
s h o r t ,  v i c t o r i o u s  and r e m u n e ra t iv e  war of 1870-1 encouraged a 
g e n e r a l  approach t o  war f i n a n c e  which emphasised l i b e r a l  
c r e d i t  expansion and which was com para t ive ly  l i t t l e  concerned 
with  lo n g - t e rm  problems.  In t h e  opin ion of K ar l  H e l f f e r i c h ,  
who was Germany’ s M i n i s t e r  of F inance  between February  1915 and 
June 1916, t h e  now well-known p r e d i c t i o n s  of S c h l i e f fen  about  
t h e  course  of t h e  war were p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n f l u e n t i a l  in t h i s  
r e s p e c t .  * However, s t r a t e g i c  m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s  do not e x p la in
1. ( l )  Die deu tschen  Grossbanken und ih re n  Kon z e n t r a t i o n .
T ra n s ,  of 3rd e d n . ,  1911» N a t i o n a l  Monetary Commission, 
p p . 21-6 .  (2)  F i n a n z i e l l e  K r i e g s b e r e i t s c h a f t  und K r ie g s -
f t ih rung« 1909» Cf.  C. R i s t ,  op. c i t . ,  p.  30*
2. Mario A l b e r t i ,  "Le f i n a n z e  d e l l a  Germania e l a  G uerra" .
G i o r n a l i  d e g l i  Economis t i  (Rome). June 1915: summarised
in Economic J o u r n a l . September 1915» V o l .  25> p. 486.
3.  W. Lo tz ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 22.
4 .  K. H e l f f e r i c h ,  Money, Eng.  t r a n s .  of 6 th  e d n . ,  p .  227»
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t h e  s t e p s  t a k e n  to  expand c r e d i t ,  f o r  t h e s e  would have been 
n e c e s s a r y  no m a t t e r  how long t h e  war was expec ted  t o  l a s t .
In t h e  eyes of post-war c r i t i c s ,  t h e  main m is take  which t h i s  
s t r a t e g i c  e r r o r  of judgment had encouraged was not  t h e  
expansion of c r e d i t  but t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  p rov ide  a d e q u a te l y  f o r  
t h e  a b s o r p t i o n  of t h e  p u rch as in g  power which had been r e l e a s e d  
in t h e  community.
Even th e " d e th ro n e m e n t" of gold which occurred  d u r in g  
t h e  war should not  have caused undue t r e p i d a t i o n  about  t h e  
s t a b i l i t y  of t h e  mark in  German f i n a n c i a l  c i r c l e s .  There  had 
f o r  some y e a r s  been a t r e n d  away from t r a d i t i o n a l  • 'metal l ism '’ 
towards  what was vague ly  c a l l e d  " n o m i n a l i s t i c "  f i n a n c i a l  
p r a c t i c e .  The te rm  "nominalism" was in  i t s  na r row es t  s en s e  
t h e  name g iven  t o  t h e  t h e o r i e s  about  t h e  v a l u e  of  money put 
forward in 1905 by G.F,Knapp in h i s  St a a t l i c h e  T h eo r ie  des 
Geld e s . Knapp’s "nominalism" or C h a r t a l i s m ,  as i t  was 
u s u a l l y  c a l l e d ,  co n s i s te d  m a in ly  of  an a n t i - m e t a l l i s t  
a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  t h e  va lue  of money was dependent  not  upon gold 
but  upon t h e  g u a ran tee  of  t h e  s t a t e .  "Nominalism" was, however,  
a l s o  t h e  name given t o  subsequen t  developments of Knappian 
C har ta l i sm  which s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e  d e c id in g  f a c t o r  in  c r e d i t  
c r e a t i o n  should be not  t h e  l e v e l  of  a c o u n t r y ’s gold r e s e r v e s  
but  t h e  " l e g i t i m a t e "  c r e d i t  needs  of t h e  community. Th is  ty p e  
of "nominalism" was in  f a c t  a compound of C h a r t a l  t h e o r y  with  
t h e  "banking school"  t h e o r y  of c r e d i t ,  which emphasised t h e
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p a s s i v i t y  of t h e  p rocess  of c r e d i t  c r e a t i o n ,  * I t  was t o  t h i s
body of th o u g h t  t h a t  S c h i f f e r ,  a pos t -w ar  F inance  M i n i s t e r ,
r e f e r r e d  when he reminded t h e  C o n s t i t u e n t  N a t i o n a l  Assembly
of t h e  monetary developments which had occurred  in t h e  f i r s t
p
year  of t h e  war: *
"Heavens,  we were a l l  a t  t h a t  t im e  convinced t h a t  
what was needed f o r  f i g h t i n g  t h e  war was money, 
money, m o n e y , , , . .  The s o - c a l l e d  n o m in a l i s t  
t h e o r y  had tr iumphed over m e t a l l i s m ” .
D e s p i t e  t h e i r  o f f i c i a l  adherence  t o  t h e  gold s tandard
in t h e  p re -w ar  p e r io d ,  t h e  German monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  appea r
in p r a c t i c e  t o  have accepted  ’’n o m i n a l i s t i c M ideas  on c r e d i t .
This  was due l a r g e l y  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  German banking
system which,  u n l i k e  i t s  E n g l i s h  c o u n t e r p a r t ,  placed l e s s
emphasis upon prov id ing  s e c u r i t y  f o r  d e p o s i t o r s  than  i t  did
*>
upon s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  c r e d i t  needs  of i n d u s t r y  and t r a d e .
The p roceed ings  of t h e  German Bank I n q u i r y  of 1908-9» which 
was i n s t i t u t e d  in o rd e r  t o  d i s c u s s  ways of p re v e n t in g  a 
r e c u r r e n c e  of t h e  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s  of 1907» r e v e a l  a b ia s  
amongst German f i n a n c i e r s  in  favou r  of  cheap and l i b e r a l  
c r e d i t .  Among t h e  q u e s t i o n s  d i s c u s s e d  was the  f e a s i b i l i t y  
of cu sh ion ing  f u t u r e  c r i s e s  by b u i l d i n g  up t h e  R e ichsbank ’s 
r e s e r v e s  w i th  gold a t t r a c t e d  from abroad by h igh d i s c o u n t  
r a t e s .  Such a scheme was c o n s i s t e n t l y  opposed on t h e  grounds
1. H .3 . E l l i s ,  German Monetary Theory . 1905 -3 3 » p . l8 0 .
2 , N ationa lversam m lung . 15 F eb ru a ry  1919» V ol.  326, p . 95«
3* N a t io n a l  Monetary Commission. The German Bank In q u iry  of
190 6 -9 . V o l.  2 ,  pp. 803-5; Anon., ’’E n g lish  and German 
Banking in  r e l a t i o n  t o  T rad e  and I n d u s t r y ” , Q u a r te r lv  
Review, 1916, V o l .  126, pp, 538-9*
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t h a t  a h igh  r a t e  of d i s c o u n t  might  i n j u r e  German t r a d e  and 
i n d u s t r y .  * P ro p o sa l s  f o r  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  r e g u l a t i o n  of t h e  
c r e d i t - c r e a t i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  of d e p o s i t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  came to  
n o th i n g  f o r  t h e  same r e a s o n . “ * One of t h e  fo rem os t  opponents 
of any government i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i th  e x i s t i n g  German c r e d i t
3
machinery  was Dr.  Jakob R i e s s e r ,  whose i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  
shape  of  German war f i n a n c e  has  a l r e a d y  been n o t i c e d ,  R i e s s e r  
c o n s id e re d  t h a t  in  a f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s  or in  a t i m e  of monetary 
t e n s i o n  p reced ing  a war i t  was g e n e r a l l y  "a s e r i o u s  m i s t a k e ” 
t o  r e s o r t  t o  r e s t r i c t i v e  c r e d i t  p o l i c i e s  which might  ’’g i v e  
r i s e  t o  t h e  d i s a s t r o u s  n o t io n  t h a t  money and c r e d i t  (were)  
no t  mere ly  d e a r ,  but  (were)  not  t o  be had a t  a l l ” . * The 
Reichsbank ,  p reven ted  by t h e  p r e v a l e n c e  of v iews of  t h i s  t y p e  
from e i t h e r  i n c r e a s i n g  i t s  gold  r e s e r v e s  or r e s t r a i n i n g  c r e d i t  
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  had nc a l t e r n a t i v e  bu t  t o  d iv o r c e  t h e  German 
monetary system as  u n o b t r u s i v e l y  as  p o s s i b l e  from t h e  gold 
s t a n d a r d .  With t h i s  end in  v iew,  H a v e n s te in ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
of t h e  Reichsbank ,  proposed t h a t  Reichsbank n o te s  should 
become l e g a l  t e n d e r .  The aim of t h i s  s u g g e s t i o n ,  which was 
i n c o rp o ra te d  in t h e  Bank Act of  June 1909» was t o  i n c r e a s e  
t h e  R e i c h s b a n k 's  r e s e r v e s  by d i s c o u r a g i n g  t h e  u s e  of gold in  
i n d i v i d u a l  payments .  Although both  Havenste in  and t h e  wording
1. N a t i o n a l  Monetary Commission, op.  c i t , ,  V o l .  1 ,  pp.241 
( S t r ö l l ) ,  256(G onta rd) ,  226 (W achle r ) ,  303 ( R i e s s e r ) ,
335-6(Kaempf)•
2.  i b i d . ,  V o l .  2,  pass im.
3.  i b i d . ,  V o l .  2,  pp.  803-71.
4.  J .  R i e s s e r ,  The German Great  Banks and The i r  C o n c e n t r a t i o n , 
pp.  19-20 ,  23 -4 .
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of t h e  Act s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e  gold s tandard  was be ing  
m a in ta ined  -  s i n c e  no te s  could s t i l l  be conver ted  i n t o  gold - 
t h i s  a c t i o n  was an admission t h a t  i t  was i m p o s s ib l e  t o
r e c o n c i l e  an u n r e s t r i c t e d  c r e d i t  p o l i c y  w i th  t h e  gold
1.
s t a n d a r d .  Such an admiss ion  was a l s o  i m p l i c i t  in  a f u r t h e r  
p r o v i s i o n  of t h e  Bank Act a f f e c t i n g  t h e  untaxed  l i m i t  on n o t e -  
i s s u e s  which were uncovered by s p e c i e  r e s e r v e s .  Th is  l i m i t  was 
r a i s e d  from 470 m i l l i o n  t o  550 m i l l i o n  marks; and t h e  i s s u e  of 
a f u r t h e r  200 m i l l i o n  marks was a u t h o r i s e d  f o r  t h e  purpose of 
meeting  t h e  abnormal demand f o r  c r e d i t  a t  t h e  end of every 
q u a r t e r .  * These  reforms p repared  t h e  way f o r  t h e  measure of  
4 August 1914 which,  by d i s c o n t i n u i n g  t h e  c o n v e r t i b i l i t y  of 
Reichsbank n o te s  and by removing a l l  l i m i t a t i o n s  on n o t e -  
i s s u e s  uncovered by s p e c i e ,  swept away a l l  p r e t e n c e  t h a t  t h e  
gold s tan d a rd  was being m a in ta ined ."
The t e c h n i c a l  measures t o  which t h e  German government 
r e s o r t e d  in  o rder  t o  expand c r e d i t ,  t o  i n c r e a s e  c i r c u l a t i o n  
and t o  by-pass  t r a d i t i o n a l  monetary s a f e g u a r d s  w ere ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
c a r e f u l l y  planned and f i n a n c i a l l y  d e f e n s i b l e  a d a p t a t i o n s  of 
c u r r e n t  f i n a n c i a l  p r a c t i c e  t o  meet t h e  abnormal c o n d i t i o n s  of 
war .  Although t h e s e  measures n e c e s s a r i l y  in c r e a s e d  t h e  r i s k  
of i n f l a t i o n ,  t h e y  did not  make i t  u n a v o i d a b le .  The 
de te rm in ing  f a c t o r  in t h i s  r e s p e c t  was th e  s u c c e s s  of t h e
1. N a t i o n a l  Monetary Commission, op. c i t . ,  V o l .  1 ,  p.  696 ,
(H avens te i n ); W. L ex i s ,  "The German Bank Commission,  
1908- 9" ,  Economic J o u r n a l . June 1910, p .  2 l 6 .
2 . i b i d . ,  p .  213.
3. See above ,  pp.  8-9«
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government in ab s o rb in g ,  by means of e i t h e r  t a x e s  or  p u b l i c  
l o a n s ,  t h e  inc reased  p u rchas ing  power which had been r e l e a s e d  
in t h e  community by t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  war e x p e n d i t u r e .
There  was no i n t r i n s i c  f i n a n c i a l  reason  f o r  p r e f e r r i n g
t a x a t i o n  as a source  of revenue  t o  bo r row ing .  I t  was t h e r e f o r e
not  in  i t s e l f  impor tant  t h a t  a lower p r o p o r t i o n  (between 13 and
l6  per  c e n t )  *ef German war e x p e n d i tu r e  was covered by t a x a t i o n
t h a n  was t h e  case  in England ,  where 23 t o  27 p e r  cent  of t h e
2b u d g e ta ry  cos t  of  t h e  war was met out of c u r r e n t  revenue .
However,  i t  was im por tant  t h a t  t h e  heavy dependence of t h e
German government on borrowing i a 3  due in p a r t  t o  t h e
fundamenta l  weakness of t h e  German f e d e r a l  f i s c a l  system.
For t h i s  weakness,  ap a r t  from caus ing  unduly  r a p id  growth in
t h e  German p u b l i c  debt d u r ing  t h e  war ,  would be l i k e l y  t o
h in d e r  t h e  e f f o r t s  of p os t -w ar  governments t o  s e t  t h e  n a t i o n a l
f i n a n c i a l  system in o rd e r .
W i tnesses  t o  t h e  German Bank In q u i ry  of 1908-9 bad
expressed  concern a t  thegpowing in d e b ted n es s  of  t h e  f e d e r a l
government • In o rder  t o  curb  t h e  governm en t ' s  i n c r e a s i n g
demands on t h e  Reichsbank f o r  c r e d i t  th e y  had advoca ted
4
f i n a n c i a l  and ,  in some c a s e s ,  f i s c a l  r e fo rm s .  * The l a t t e r
1. W. Lotz, op. c i t . ,  p p . l ,  lOOff .
2.  S ir  Jo3iah Stamp, Taxation During t h e  War, p .  123*
3 . N a t i o n a l  Monetary Commission, op. c i t . ,  Vol.  1 ,  pp .85-6  
(Wagner) ,  246 (G on ta rd ) ,  639 (Roland Lücke).
4 .  i b i d . ,  V o l .  1, pp.  85-6 (Wagner) ,  1017(August Weber) ,
1021 ( S t r d l l ) ,  1067-8 ( R i e s s e r ) .
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were however d i f f i c u l t  t o  ach ieve  because  d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n  was 
t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  p r e s e r v e  of t h e  s t a t e s  and because  i n d i r e c t  
t a x a t i o n ,  upon which t h e  f e d e r a l  government depended f o r  i t s  
r e v e n u e ,  could no t  be in c r e a s e d  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  w i thou t  a rous ing  
t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  of t h e  L e f t .
In 1909 Bälow had a t tempted  u n s u c c e s s f u l l y  t o  so lve  t h e
f i s c a l  problem by i n t r o d u c i n g  a p ro p o sa l  fo r  a f e d e r a l
I n h e r i t a n c e  Tax.  He enjoyed t h e  support  of t h e  N a t io n a l  L i b e r a l s
and P r o g r e s s i v e s ,  who approved of f e d e r a l  d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n  which
■would f a l l  as  much upon t h e  a g r a r i a n  c l a s s  as upon i n d u s t r i a l
and commercial  g ro u p s ,  but  was v i o l e n t l y  opposed and de fe a te d
by t h e  C onse rva t ive  and C en t re  p a r t i e s . ^ *  The o p p o s i t io n  of
t h e s e  groups sprang  l a r g e l y  from t h e i r  d e s i r e  t o  p r e s e rv e  t h e
s t a t e s  as f i n a n c i a l l y  independent  u n i t s  w i th i n  t h e  German
f e d e r a l  s t r u c t u r e .  The C o n se rv a t iv es  in p a r t i c u l a r  were aware
t h a t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  hegemony of P r u s s i a ,  which t h e y  were anxious
2
t o  m a in t a i n ,  depended on i t s  con t inued  f i n a n c i a l  v i a b i l i t y .
The o p p o s i t i o n  of  t h e  C o n s e rv a t iv e s  t o  Bülow*s p ro p o s a l  was 
a l s o  caused by t h e i r  d e s i r e  t o  p r o t e c t  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r ty  from 
s p o l i a t i o n  a t  t h e  hands of t h e  f e d e r a l  l e g i s l a t u r e .  Because 
i t  was e l e c te d  by t h e  v o t e  of a l l  males over 25 y e a r s  of age ,  
t h e  R e ic h s ta g  was f a r  more r a d i c a l  in i t s  composi t ion  tha n  t h e  
P ru s s i a n  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  whose members were e l e c te d  under  a 
h i g h l y  c o n s e r v a t i v e  t h r e e - c l a s s  f r a n c h i s e .  The C onse rva t ives  
were t h e r e f o r e  u n d e r s t a n d a b ly  r e l u c t a n t  f o r  s o c i a l  reasons  t o
1. C ar l  E.  S c h c r s k e ,  German S o c i a l  Democracy 1909-17.  p p . 148-9*
2. H, Booms, Di e  Deuts c h k o n s e rv a t i v  P a r t e i , p .  71*
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t r a n s f e r  t h e  r i g h t  of d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n  t o  t h e  R e i c h s t a g , 1 ’ The 
C a t h o l i c  Cent re  p a r ty  a l s o  had s o c i a l  grounds  f o r  opposing t h e  
I n h e r i t a n c e  Tax,  which i t  r egarded  as  an a t t a c k  on t h e  f a m i l y . 2  34* 
The opp o s i t io n  of t h e  C onse rva t ive  and Centre  p a r t i e s  t o  
f e d e r a l  d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n  was so evenly matched by t h e  d e t e rm in ­
a t i o n  of t h e  o th e r  p a r t i e s  t o  r e s i s t  f u r t h e r  i n d i r e c t  t a x e s  
t h a t  Billow was prompted t o  r e s i g n  in J u l y  1909 a f t e r  t h e  d e f e a t  
of h i s  p r o p o s a l .  I t  was only a f t e r  t h e  S o c i a l  Democratic 
g a in s  a t  t h e  1912 e l e c t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  government was a b l e ,  in 
t h e  t e e t h  of f i e r c e  o p p o s i t i o n  from t h e  Conserva t ives , -^* to  c a r r y  
th ro u g h  a measure of d i r e c t  f e d e r a l  t a x a t i o n .  However, d e s p i t e  
t h e  j u b i l a t i o n  of t h e  SPD, t h e  s o - c a l l e d  Defence C o n t r i b u t io n  
( b e h r b e i t r a g ) of 1913» which was an e x t r a o r d i n a r y  p ro p e r ty  levy 
des igned  t o  r a i s e  t h e  l i m i t e d  sum of 900 m i l l i o n  marks ,  was of
such a s p e c i a l  n a t u r e  as t o  d im in i s h  i t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  as a
4.
p r e c e d e n t .  The g e n e r a l  r i g h t  of t h e  f e d e r a l  government t o  levy  
d i r e c t  t a x e s  was by no means e s t a b l i s h e d .
The e x i s t e n c e  of such s t r o n g  p a r t y  f e e l i n g  over t h e  
f i s c a l  q u e s t i o n  h e lp s  t o  e x p l a in  t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  German 
government t o  r e s o r t  t o  any means o th e r  th a n  borrowing t o  cover 
i t s  e x p e n d i tu r e s  in t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  of t h e  war .  As t h e  war 
p r o g r e s s e d ,  i t  i n e v i t a b l y  became more d i f f i c u l t  t o  m a in ta in  a 
p a r ty  t r u c e  in  f i s c a l  m a t t e r s .  Even in  March 1915? dur ing  t h e
1. i b i d . ,  pp.  71-2.
2.  Car l  E,  Schorske ,  op.  c i t . ,  p.  148.
3. H. Booms, op. c i t . ,  p .  71»
4.  For a d i s c u s s i o n  ^of t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h e  W eh rb e i t r a g :  V ,V. 
Badulesco ,  Le Pre'lkvement E x t r a o r d i n a i r e  su r  l e  C a p i t a l  dans 
l ’Empire Allemand, pp.  7-24 .
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d e b a t e  on th e  budget  f o r  1915-16,  t h e  S o c i a l  Democrats 
proposed a t a x  on war p r o f i t s .  The s u g g e s t io n  was smothered 
by a m a j o r i t y  which,  s t i l l  h o p e fu l  of a s h o r t  war and an 
inde m ni ty ,  and u n w i l l i n g  t o  broach t h e  t roub le som e  f i s c a l  
q u e s t i o n ,  suppor ted  F inance  M i n i s t e r  H e l f f e r i c h ' s  programme
-i
of "No new t a x e s " .  The f o r c e s  f a v o u r in g  f i s c a l  i n e r t i a
were a l s o  far  too  strong for  further  3PD d i r e c t  taxat ion
2
p r o p o s a l s  which were made in  t h e  course  of  1915*
From t h e  beg inn ing  of  1916 t h e  r e a l i s a t i o n  dawned 
t h a t  t h e  war would be lo n g ,  t h a t  i t s  c o s t  would be immense», 
and t h a t ,  i f  an indemnity were o b t a in e d ,  i t  would not be 
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  r e l i e v e  t h e  German people  of  t h e i r  e n t i r e  p o s t ­
war f i s c a l  bu rden .  One of t h e  d i s a d v a n ta g e s  of  f i n a n c i n g  t h e  
war by loans  was emphasised by t h e  budget  f o r  1916- 17» in 
which 2.3 b i l l i o n  of  a t o t a l  " o rd in a ry "  e x p e n d i tu r e  of fou r  
b i l l i o n  marks was earmarked f o r  s e r v i c i n g  t h e  p u b l i c  d e b t . “'* 
In a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  u n d e s i r a b i l i t y  of t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  almost 
e x c l u s i v e  dependence  upon v o l u n t a r y  war loans  became c l e a r  
when, a t  t h e  end of  1916,  t h e  y i e ld  from t h i s  source  became
4 #
i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  cover  t h e  r a p i d l y  i n c r e a s i n g  f l o a t i n g  d e b t .
These developments had a b e l a t e d  and muff led  impact on 
German b u d g e ta ry  p o l i c y .  Dur ing  1916 a r t i c l e s  advoca t ing
1.  R e i c h s t a g . 10 March 1915» V o l .  306 , pp.39 f f*> 47ff* V ,V • 
Badulesco ,  op, c i t . ,  p .  33*
2,  H, S c h a c h t ,  op.  c i t . ,  pp .17-8* W, Lo tz ,  op,  c i t . ,  p. 54.  
R e i c h s t a g , 20 December 1915» V o l .  306,  p.  462.
3, W, L o tz ,  op.  c i t . ,  p . 56 ; C. R i s t ,  op.  c i t . ,  p .121 .  The 
" o r d in a r y "  budget  covered only normal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
e x p e n d i tu r e .  War e x p e n d i tu r e  was en te red  in  a s e p a r a t e  
" e x t r a o r d i n a r y "  b u d g e t ,
4.  i b i d . ,  p p .  9 0 -1 .
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r a d i c a l  f i n a n c i a l  r e f o r m s  such  a s  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  a c a p i t a l
l e v y  began t o  appe ar  in  i n f l u e n t i a l  j o u r n a l s  and n e w s p a p e r s . 1 .  2345
B u t , a l t h o u g h  t h e  S o c i a l  Democrat K e i l  p r o p h e s i e d  t h a t  t h e  c o s t  of
t h e  war  would e v e n t u a l l y  have  t o  be cove re d  by an e x t r a o r d i n a r y
c a p i t a l  l e v y ,  * no such p r o p o s a l  was i n c o r p o r a t e d  in  t h e  budge t
f o r  1916 -17 .  The only  permanent  a d d i t i o n s  t o  r e v e n u e  in  1916
were d e r i v e d ,  in  s p i t e  of  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  of  t h e  SPD, from more
s e v e r e  i n d i r e c t  t a x e s  on t o b a c c o ,  c i g a r e t t e s ,  r e c e i p t s  and b i l l s
of l a d i n g  and from i n c r e a s e d  p o s t a l  c h a r g e s . T o  t h e  480
m i l l i o n  marks a n t i c i p a t e d  from t h i s  s o u r c e  shou ld  pe rhaps  be
added two b i l l i o n s  which  i t  was hoped t o  c o l l e c t  f rom t h e
War Tax ,  a c a p i t a l  g a i n s  l e v y  on companies  and p r i v a t e
i n d i v i d u a l s  d e s ig n e d  t o  c o v e r  t h e  d e f i c i t  i n  t h e  " o r d i n a r y "
budge t  f o r  1916-17 and s u c c e e d i n g  y e a r s .  But b e c a u s e  of
u n a v o i d a b l e  d e l a y s  in  a s s e s s m e n t  t h e r e  was no w o r t h w h i l e  y i e l d
4
from t h i s  s o u r c e  f o r  w e l l  ove r  a y e a r .
In 1917 growing p u b l i c  u n e a s i n e s s  a bou t  f e d e r a l  
f i n a n c e s  was r e f l e c t e d  in  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  number of  l e a r n e d  
a r t i c l e s  w r i t t e n  on t h e  p rob lem  of c o v e r i n g  t h e  c o s t s  of t h e  
nvar.y ' A l though  some w r i t e r s  p e r s i s t e d  i n  t h e  hope of an 
i n d e m n i ty  a s  a t  l e a s t  a p a r t i a l  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  p rob lem ,  t h e
1 . V .V. B a d u l e s c o ,  op .  c i t . ,  p .  33»
2.  Re i c h s t a g . 22 March 1916,  V o l .  3 0 6 , p p .  780-93»
3 .  W. Lot z , o p . c i t . ,  p . 59 f  f »
4.  K r i e g s s t e u e r g e s e t z  vom 21 J u n i  1916,  R e i c h s g e s e t z b l a t t .
1916,  p .  56I ;  W. L o t z ,  op .  c i t . ,  pp .  6 0 , 6 3 , 72.
5 .  V .V . B a d u l e s c o ,  op.  c i t . ,  p p . 35 -6 ;  C.W. G u i l l e b a u d ,  "The 
Cost  of  t h e  War t o  Germany",  Economic J o u r n a l . June  1917»
V o l .  27 ,  p .  270.
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idea  of  a l a r g e  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  c a p i t a l  l evy  became more and more 
p o p u la r . ^ *  Such a measure now began to  ap p e a l  t o  bus inessmen ,  
f i n a n c i e r s  and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  who, because  of t h e i r  e x t e n s i v e  
h o l d i n g s  of  government s e c u r i t i e s ,  were ready t o  suppor t  r a d i c a l  
re forms  in o rder  t o  p r e s e r v e  government c r e d i t .  For t h i s
r e a s o n ,  even N a t io n a l  L i b e r a l s  such as Stresemann and Gothein
2 .
spoke out in  favour  of  a d r a s t i c  c a p i t a l  l e v y .
D e s p i t e  t h e  r i s i n g  demand f o r  r a d i c a l  r e f o r m ,  t h e  
budget  f o r  1917-18 con ta ined  no s t r i k i n g  i n n o v a t io n s  and ,  l i k e  
i t s  p r e d e c e s s o r s ,  leaned h e a v i l y  on i n d i r e c t  t a x e s .  I n c r e a s e s  
in t h e  l a t t e r  -  n o t a b ly  a 20/£ Coal Tax -  a roused  l i v e l y  
o p p o s i t i o n  from both  t h e  S o c i a l i s t  p a r t i e s ,  who complained of 
" u n ju s t  and one-s ided  o p p re s s io n  of t h e  economically weak 
s e c t i o n s  of t h e  community".’'* Apart from a 20/£ s u r c h a rg e  on 
t h e  War Tax of 1918, t h e  only  s i g n i f i c a n t  move towards  d i r e c t  
t a x a t i o n  was a d i r e c t i v e  t o  b u s in e s s  f i rm s  t o  keep  in  r e s e r v e
4.
60 per  cent  of t h e i r  excess  p r o f i t s  during, t h e  coming y e a r .
The com para t ive ly  smal l  i n c r e a s e  in revenue ( 1 .2 5  b i l l i o n  m arks ) ,  
which resu lt ed  from t h e  governm en t’ s f i s c a l  measure in  1917» 
does not  seem t o  i n d i c a t e  any r a d i c a l  change in f i n a n c i a l
1 . e . g ,  E,  J a f f e ,  "Kriegskostendeckung und R e i c h s f i n a n z r e f o r m " ,  
Archiv f t i r  S o z i a lw i s s e n s c h a f t  und S o z i a l p o l i t i k . May 1917» 
V o l .  43,  p.  7 H  f f .
2.  V.V. Badulesco ,  op.  c i t , ,  p ,  3 8 .
3 . V/, Lo tz ,  op. c i t . ,  p .  63 .
4 .  i b i d . ,  p .  87 , Reich bk es e t z b l a t t « 1917» P« 351* For
d e f i n i t i o n  of excess p r o f i t s :  K r i e g s s t e u r e r g e s e t z  vom
21 J u n i  1918, A r t i c l e s  14,  16,  17, l 8 ,  20,  23,  24.
i b i d . ,  1916 , pp.  5 8 5 -9 .
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p o l i c y .  The German monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  remained in 1917 
l e s s  concerned t o  check t h e  r i s e  in  p u b l i c  in d e b te d n e s s  by 
i n c r e a s i n g  c u r r e n t  revenue t h a n  t h e y  were t o  r e a s s u r e  German 
i n v e s t o r s  t h a t  government war bonds would not  l o s e  t h e i r  v a l u e  
a f t e r  t h e  w a r • ^*
By 1918 pub l i c  i n t e r e s t  in r a d i c a l  f i n a n c i a l  re fo rm 
had become s u f f i c i e n t l y  i n t e n s e  t o  provoke g e n e r a l  d i s c u s s i o n  
of t h e  s u b je c t  in t h e  R e i c h s t a g .  E a r l y  in  1918 a deep 
im press ion  was made by a symposium on t h e  s u b j e c t  of a c a p i t a l  
l e v y  p u b l i sh e d  by t h e  Ve r e i n  f ü r  S o z i a l p o l i t i k . ' I t  was 
almost  c e r t a i n l y  t h i s  which prompted t h e  C o n s e rv a t iv e  Posadowsky- 
Wehner t o  ask t h e  government w he the r  i t  suppor ted  t h e  ideas  put 
forward in r e c e n t  p u b l i c a t i o n s  on t h e  q u e s t i o n  of f i s c a l  r e fo rm .  
The r e a s s u r i n g l y  ncn-com m it ta l  r e p l y  g iven  t o  t h i s  enqu i ry  by 
t h e  F inance  M i n i s t e r ,  Reedern ,  t y p i f i e d  t h e  a t t i t u d e  tow ards  
f i s c a l  re fo rm  which t h e  government main ta ined  th ro u g h o u t  
succeed ing  months.
The government’ s con t inued  i n a c t i v i t y  in  1918 sprang 
p a r t l y  from doubts  as  t o  t h e  shape  which re fo rm s  should  t a k e  
and as t o  t h e  moment a t  which th e y  should be c a r r i e d  t h r o u g h .  
Opinion in t h e  R e ich s tag  was d iv id e d  on t h e s e  i s s u e s  between 
t h o s e  who favoured  an immediate and r a d i c a l  r e fo rm  ( Independen t
1. C. R i s t ,  op. c i t . ,  p .  93 .
2.  V ere in  f t i r  S o z i a l p o l i t i k . V o l .  156; V .V. Badu lesco ,  op.  c i t . ,  
P. 39.
3. R e i c h s t a g . 1 March 1918, V o l .  311 ,pp .  4278f .
4.  i b i d . ,  p .  4283.
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S o c i a l  Democra ts ) ;  t h o s e  who wanted a r a d i c a l  reform a f t e r  
t h e  war ( S o c i a l  Democra ts ,  P r o g r e s s i v e s  and some N a t io n a l  
L i b e r a l s ) ;  and t h o s e  who d e s i r e d  e i t h e r  a l i m i t e d  pos t-war  
re fo rm  or no reform at  a l l  (C en t re  and C o n s e r v a t i v e s ) ,  The 
government appea rs  t o  have  a l ig n e d  i t s e l f  wi th t h e  second g ro u p ,  
A w eigh ty  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  which helped  t o  persuade  t h e  
government t o  postpone f i n a n c i a l  reform was t h e  f e a r  t h a t  
heavy t a x a t i o n  would m i l i t a t e  a g a i n s t  t h e  success  of t h e  War 
Loans,  On 23 A p r i l  Roedern,  a f t e r  a d m i t t i n g  t h e  inadequacy of 
German t a x a t i o n ,  expressed  doub ts  as t o  whether  an e f f e c t i v e
f i s c a l  p o l i c y  and a s u c c e s s f u l  programme of government borrowing
2.
could be c a r r i e d  on s i m u l t a n e o u s l y .  In view of t h e  f a i t h  
which t h e  F inance  M i n i s t e r  s t i l l  placed in t h e  War Loan 
campaigns,  such doubts  were p robab ly  a good r e a s o n  fo r  f i s c a l  
r e s t r a i n t ,
Another f a c t o r  which p robab ly  encouraged t h e  postponement 
of t a x  re fo rm  was u n c e r t a i n t y  about  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  indemnity 
which Germany hoped t o  e x t r a c t  from h e r  d e f e a te d  enemies. 
N a t i o n a l  L i b e r a l s  such as S t resem ann ," ’* and Conse rva t ives  such
4
as D i e t r i c h ,  Roes icke and Posadowsky-Wehne r , ’a l though  under  no 
i l l u s i o n  t h a t  an indemnity  would cover  t h e  whole cos t  of t h e  
war ,  emphasised t h a t  A l l i e d  r e p a r a t i o n s  would a s s i s t  Germany
1, Roedern,  i b i d , ,  26 F ebrua ry  1918» V o l .  3H> P* 4154;
23 A p r i l  1918,  V o l .  312, p .  4737.
2 . i b i d , ,  p ,  4735.
3 , i b i d . ,  27 February  1918,  V o l .  3H> P* 4192.
4 .  i b i d . ,  V o l .  312, 24 A p r i l  1918,  p.  4776; 25 A p r i l  1918,
p. 4809; 23 A p r i l  1918, p .  4757.
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m a t e r i a l l y  in b a l a n c in g  h e r  pos t -w ar  b u d g e t s .  The prospect  
of  such a s s i s t a n c e  was advanced -  i n s i n c e r e l y ,  in th e  opin ion 
of t h e  extreme Lef t  *- as  a good reason  f o r  d e l a y in g  f i s c a l  
r e fo rm .
By f a r  t h e  most im por tan t  reason  f o r  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  of 
t h e  government t o  ag ree  t o  any r a d i c a l  reforms was t h e  
o p p o s i t i o n  of  t h e  C onse rva t ive  and C en t re  p a r t i e s  t o  any 
d i s t u r b a n c e  of t h e  d e c e n t r a l i s e d  German f i s c a l  s t r u c t u r e .  The 
d e t e r m in a t io n  of t h e s e  groups  t o  p r e s e r v e  t h e  powerful  f i n a n c i a l  
p o s i t i o n  of t h e  s t a t e s  had no t  been d im in ished  by t h e  war; and 
t h e y  i n s i s t e d  t h a t ,  i f  t h e r e  was t o  be any r e fo rm ,  i t  should
not  i n c r e a s e  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  power of t h e  f e d e r a l  government a t
2 .
t h e  expense of t h e  s t a t e s ,  * As a r e s u l t  of p r e s s u r e  from
t h i s  d i r e c t i o n ,  Hoed e r a ' s  only  reform p ro p o s a l  was t h a t  t h e
s t a t e s  sh o u ld ,  on t h e i r  own i n i t i a t i v e ,  re form t h e i r  d i r e c t
t a x e s  in o rd e r  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  sha re  t h e  pos t -w ar
f i n a n c i a l  burden w i th  t h e  f e d e r a l  government , J *
The re fo rm ing  groups in  t h e  R e ic h s ta g  were c l e a r l y  of
t h e  op in ion  t h a t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  p a r t i c u l a r i s m  of t h e  s t a t e s  was
t h e  main o b s t a c l e  in t h e  way of f i s c a l  re form; and th e y
s p e c i f i c a l l y  a t t r i b u t e d  R o e d e rn ' s  t i m i d i t y  t o  p r e s s u r e  exer ted
4
by t h e  s t a t e  f in a n c e  m i n i s t e r s ,  * Although t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
1. i b i d . ,  V o g th e r r  (USPD), 1 March 1918, V o l.  3H> p . 4289.
2.  i b i d . ,  Mayer (Zent rum),  23 A p r i l  1918, V ol .  312,  p,  4742; 
D i e t r i c h  (K), 24 A p r i l  1918, V o l .  312,  p,  4778.
3.  i b i d . ,  23 A p r i l  1918, V o l .  312, p .  4736.
4 . i b i d . ,  Wiemer (FVp), 27 F eb rua ry  1918, V o l.  311, p .  4185;
K e i l  (SPD), 23 A p r i l  1918, V o l .  312, p.  4747; W alds te in  (FVp), 
24 A p r i l  1918, V o l .  312,  p .  4764.
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was j u s t i f i e d ,  i t  shou ld  no t  be  f o r g o t t e n  t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  of  
t h o s e  who a d v o c a t e d  r e f o r m  or  c r i t i c i s e d  t h e  i n a c t i v i t y  of  t h e  
government  were  t h e m s e l v e s  n o t  p r e p a r e d  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  
im m edia te  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  schemes f o r  r a d i c a l  r e f o r m .  The 
d e t a i l e d  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  a c a p i t a l  l evy  which w e re  put  fo rw ard
by t h e  Independen t  S o c i a l i s t  B e r n s t e i n  w e re  n o t  even s u p p o r t e d
1.
by t h e  M a j o r i t y  S o c i a l i s t s .  The S o c i a l  Dem ocra ts  d id  s u p p o r t  
t h e  p r o p o s a l s  of  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t s  f o r  an I n h e r i t a n c e  Tax and 
f o r  a g e n e r a l  l evy  on p r o p e r t y  which were  l a i d  b e f o r e  t h e  
R e i c h s t a g  in  J u l y  1918.  But t h i s  s u p p o r t  was c o n d i t i o n a l  on
pos tponem en t  of  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of t h e  l a t t e r  m ea su re  u n t i l
2 .
a f t e r  t h e  w a r .
The ach ie vem en t  of  any s u b s t a n t i a l  f i s c a l  r e f o r m  had
been p r e v e n t e d  d u r i n g  t h e  war p e r i o d  l a r g e l y  by t h e
i n t r a n s i g e n c e  of t h e  s t a t e s  and of t h e  p r o p e r t i e d  c l a s s e s  in
d e f e n d i n g  t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r e s t s .  I t  had a l s o  been  made
more d i f f i c u l t  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  of  German
p o l i t i c i a n s ,  who in  t h e o r y  s u p p o r t e d  f i s c a l  r e f o r m ,  were  in
p r a c t i c e  w i l l i n g  t o  t o l e r a t e  a f i n a n c i a l  sy s te m  based  on
bo r row ing  f o r  t h e  d u r a t i o n  of  t h e  w a r .  T h i s  a c q u i e s c e n c e  was
due p a r t l y  t o  t h e  f a i t h  which  had come t o  be p l a c e d  i n  t h e
sys tem  of  war l o a n s ,  p a r t l y  t o  hopes of an i n d e m n i t y  and
7^ i b i d . ,  22 March 1918 , V o l .  311,  p .  4 5 2 7 f f j  B e r n s t e i n  (USPD), 
24 A p r i l  1918,  V o l .  312 ,  p .  4781$ M ö l l e r  (SPD),  25 A p r i l  
1918 ,  V o l .  312,  p .  4797 f f .
2 .  i b i d . ,  K e i l  (SPD),  12 J u l y  1918,  V o l .  3 1 3 , p .  6123 .
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p a r t l y  a l s o ,  no doub t ,  t o  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of exec u t in g  major 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  reforms in w a r - t im e .
Although t h e  low l e v e l  of German war t a x a t i o n  had not  
caused any i r r e p a r a b l e  f i n a n c i a l  damage by November 1918, i t  
i n c re a s e d  t h e  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  of t h e  German f i n a n c i a l  system t o  
i n f l a t i o n .  Throughout t h e  war t h e  lowness of t h e  ta x  y ie ld  
meant t h a t  th e  con tinued  s t a b i l i t y  of German c u r re n c y  depended 
almost  e n t i r e l y  on t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  of t h e  p u b l i c  t o  s u b s c r ib e  
t o  government l o a n s ,  Y/hen, s h o r t l y  a f t e r  t h e  war ,  t h e  German 
p u b l i c  in f a c t  ceased t o  lend  t o  t h e  government t h e  f e d e r a l  
f i s c a l  machinery proved,  in i t s  unreformed s t a t e ,  a p a t h e t i c ­
a l l y  in a d e q u a te  in s t rum en t  f o r  a b so rb ing  t h e  excess  purchas ing  
power of  t h e  community, F os t -w a r  German governments were 
un ab le  t o  command any s i z e a b l e  revenue u n t i l ,  in c o n d i t i o n s  
which were p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  f a r  l e s s  f a v o u ra b l e  t h a n  dur ing  t h e  
war,  t h e y  had c o n s t ru c t e d  a system of d i r e c t  f e d e r a l  t a x a t i o n .
In t h e  y ea rs  which in t e rv e n e d  b e f o r e  t h i s  t a s k  was accompli shed ,  
t h e  impoverishment of  t h e  f e d e r a l  government was an important  
f a c t o r  in t h e  g e n e r a l  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of German f i n a n c e s .
Other  f a c t o r s  b e s id e s  t h e  weakness of t h e  German f e d e r a l  
f i s c a l  system h e lp  t o  e x p l a in  t h e  dependence  of German w ar - t im e  
governments on bor row ing ,  above a l l  in  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  of t h e  
war .  One im por tan t  i n f l u e n c e  was t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  of  a s h o r t  and 
v i c t o r i o u s  war in which t h e r e  would be n e i t h e r  t h e  t im e  n o r ,  i t
•j
was hoped,  t h e  need f o r  in c re a s e d  t a x a t i o n .  * Another f a c t o r
1, See above,  p p . 11-12
27
wa3 t h e  op in ion  of c e r t a i n  German economis ts  t h a t  loans  would 
cause  l e s s  d i s t u r b a n c e  t o  economic a c t i v i t y  th a n  inc reased  
t a x e s .  * C o n s id e ra t io n s  such as t h e s e  encouraged t h e  emphasis
2.
on p u b l i c  borrowing in p re -w ar  p lans  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  m o b i l i s a t i o n .  
They would a l s o  have been i n f l u e n t i a l  a t  t h e  ou tb reak  of war ,  when 
t h e  im p o s i t io n  of new t a x e s  appeared unduly  t ime-consuming,  and
3.
when i t  was fea red  t h a t  t h e r e  might be an economic r e c e s s i o n .
Apart from being  e x p l i c a b l e  and,  on c e r t a i n  a ssum pt ions ,  
f i n a n c i a l l y  d e f e n s i b l e ,  t h e  German g o v e r n m e n t s  programme of 
p u b l i c  borrowing was, in t h e  f i r s t  two y e a r s  of t h e  war,  
remarkab ly  s u c c e s s f u l .  Th i s  was due l a r g e l y  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
loan campaigns took  on t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of p a t r i o t i c  s u b s c r i p t i o n s ,  
and were u n l i k e  orthodox f i n a n c i a l  v e n t u r e s .  The aid of 
f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  such as banks ,  sav ings  banks and c r e d i t
c o - o p e r a t i v e s  was e n l i s t e d .  Encouraged by a war-induced i n f l u x
4.
of d e p o s i t s ,  and by t h e  ease  w i th  which th e y  could ob ta in
c r e d i t s  a t  t h e  War C red i t  O f f i c e s ,  t h e s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a s s i s t e d
p o t e n t i a l  loan  s u b s c r i b e r s  in v a r io u s  ways. * S o c i a l l y
i n f l u e n t i a l  groups such as employers,  t h e  armed s e r v i c e s ,  and
£
t h e  p r o f e s s i o n s  were a l s o  c a l l e d  upon t o  a s s i s t . " ’ F i n a n c i a l  
p a t r i o t i s m ,  a p a r t  from be ing  made t e c h n i c a l l y  easy and s o c i a l l y
1. e . g . K. D i e t z e l , K r i e g s s t e u e r n  oder K r i e g s a n l e i h e n ? (1911) ; 
c i t e d  in  F .Y .Edgeworth,  "Some German Economic W ri t ings  about 
t h e  War",  Economic J o u r n a l . June 1917» Vol.  27,  p.  241.
2 .  A. Mend e l s e o h n - 3 a r t h o l d y , op.  c i t . ,  pp .65 ,  6? f f .
3* R. S tucke n ,  op. c i t . ,  pp.22-3»
4.  C, R i s t ,  op. c i t . ,  pp ,  76-9*
5.  i b i d . ,  pp .  99*103.
6.  W. L o tz ,  op. c i t . ,  p.  32.
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o b l i g a t o r y ,  a l s o  became a m a t t e r  of s e l f - i n t e r e s t  both  fo r
bus inessmen who did not  want t h e  source  of t h e i r  war c o n t r a c t s
t o  d ry  up and f o r  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  whose r e s e r v e s  and
p o r t f o l i o s  were coming t o  be composed l a r g e l y  of war bonds .
The combined i n f l u e n c e  of t h e s e  f a c t o r s  was so g r e a t  t h a t  in
t h e  s p r in g  of 1916 t h e  y i e l d  of War Loans exceeded t h e
governm e n t ' s  s ho r t  te rm  debt  t o  t h e  Reichsbank by 6 .6  b i l l i o n
marks.  T h e r e a f t e r ,  however,  a l though  the  y i e l d  of  t h e  Loans
kept  i n c r e a s i n g ,  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  r i s i n g  e x p e n d i tu r e  caused
i t s  f l o a t i n g  debt  t o  reach  48 b i l l i o n  marks by t h e  end of 
n 1 .
October 191c.  Although t h e  growth of t h e  f l o a t i n g  deb t  can 
be a t t r i b u t e d  p a r t l y  t o  t h e  immense o u t l a y s  occas ioned  by t h e  
Hindenburg programme from 1917 onwards,  * i t  was a l s o  due t o  
t h e  d im in i s h in g  en thus iasm of t h e  German l e n d in g  p u b l i c  f o r  
government bonds .  This  was r e f l e c t e d  in a s s u r a n c e s  of 
Havens te in  in  t h e  autumn of 1917 t h a t  w i th  t h e  coming of 
peace war bonds would be absorbed by l a r g e  combinations  of 
banks and f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s . ^ *
These  developments r e v e a le d  t h e  fundam en ta l  weakness 
of a system of war f in a n c e  based on v o lu n t a ry  p u b l i c  l e n d i n g .  
The so lvency  of t h e  German government and t h e  s t a b i l i t y  of 
t h e  monetary system depended to o  h e a v i l y  on t h e  good or  i l l  
w i l l  of t h e  le nd ing  p u b l i c .  Whi le t h i s  would no t  have been
1 . C, B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i , The Economics of I n f l a t i o n , p.  439; 
H. S c h a c h t ,  op. c i t . ,  pp.  14-15.
2.  See above,  p. 6 .
3 . C. R i s t ,  op. c i t , ,  p.  93 .
29
dangerous  in a s ho r t  and v i c t o r i o u s  c o n f l i c t ,  i t  t h r e a t e n e d  
t o  be d i s a s t r o u s  in t h e  pro longed and f l u c t u a t i n g  s t r u g g le  
i n t o  which t h e  war had deve loped  by 1917* The growing 
inadequacy  of  War Loans as a b s o rb e n t s  of p u rc h a s in g  power 
made i t  l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e r e  would be s u b s t a n t i a l  i n f l a t i o n  in 
Germany in t h e  l a s t  two y e a r s  of  t h e  war.
The t h r e a t  of i n f l a t i o n  was i n c re a s e d  by f a c t o r s  on 
t h e  s i d e  of ’’goods” (as  opposed t o  monetary  f a c t o r s )  such as 
f a l l i n g  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  t r a n s p o r t  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  and the
i n c r e a s i n g  demand f o r  war equipment which ,  from 1917»
•1
encouraged r i s i n g  p r i c e s .  * To make m a t t e r s  worse ,  t h e  
governm en t ' s  a t t e m p t s  t o  impose p r i c e  c o n t r o l  had been l a r g e l y  
u n s u c c e s s f u l .  Laws had been passed on 4 August and 17 December 
1914 empowering t h e  Bundesrat  t o  f i x  maximum p r i c e s  f o r  
s t r a t e g i c  commodit ies  such as  f o o d ,  f o d d e r ,  f u e l  and raw
p
m a t e r i a l s .  * However, t h e  Bundesra t  was both t a r d y  and inep t  
in i t s  im p o s i t io n  of  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  and ves ted  i n t e r e s t s  had 
l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t y  in  s ab o tag in g  a t t e m p t s  t o  f i x  maximum p r i c e s
in t h e  e a r l y  yea rs  of t h e  war .^* There  was a f lood  of  maximum
4 1
p r i c e  l e g i s l a t i o n  in t h e  autumn of 1915» * but  i t s  e f f e c t  was
1 . K. P r ib ram ,  ’’Zur Entwicklung d e r  L e b e n s m i t t e l p r e i s e  in de r  
K r i e g s 2e i t ” , Archiv f ü r  S o z i a lw i s s e n s c h a f t  und S o z i a l ­
p o l i t i k . May 1917, V o l .  4 3 , pp.  773-4.
2. H. S ch ach t ,  op. c i t . ,  p.  20.
3 . Mary S to c k s ,  ”The Attempt t o  Fix  Maximum Corn P r i c e s  in 
Germany", November 1914,  Economic J o u r n a l . June  1915*
V o l .  25» p* 274; eadem, "German P o ta to  F o l i c y ” , i b i d . ,  
March 1916, V o l .  26,  p.  57;  eadem, "The Meat Problem in  
Germany", i b i d . ,  June 1916, V o l .  26,  p.  l 68 .
4.  i b i d . ,  p ,  169•
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diminished by th e  so p h is t ic a te d  evasion tech n iq u es  p ractised  by 
th e  German business  community. An observer w r it in g  in May 1917 
noted th a t  th e  German governm ents  counter-measures had not met 
with d e c i s i v e  s u c c e s s .^ ’
In th e se  circumstances i t  was not s u r p r is in g  th a t  th e
index of German w holesa le  p r ic e s  rose during th e  war from 100
2
(1913) t o  234 in November 1918. This r i s e  was no g rea ter  
than that which had occurred in B r ita in  and America.'" But 
th e  weakness of th e  German monetary system at th e  end of th e  
war was revealed  by an observation  made by Karl H e l f f e r ic h ,  
th e  monetary th e o r is t  and war-time f in an ce  m in is t e r .  H e lf fe r ic h  
argued p la u s ib ly  t h a t ,  d e s p i t e  th e  increased qu antity  of money 
and cre d it  a v a i la b le ,  th e r e  was no m onetarily-induced  i n f la t i o n  
in Germany during th e  war p er iod . This was, however, because of 
"the amounts t ie d  up in the cash reserves  of th e  army and of 
in d u stry ,  . . . .  the  amounts required in th e  war areas and . . .  th e  
increased demand, due to  r i s e s  in p r ices  and wages, conditioned
4 . _ _
by th e  war and independently of currency p o l ic y " .  I f
H e l f f e r ic h 's  observation was c o r r e c t ,  i t  seems th a t  v io le n t  
p r ic e  i n f la t i o n  was only prevented during th e  war by the  
temporary and a r t i f i c i a l  suppression of la r g e  amounts of excess  
purchasing power. S ince t h i s  suppression was l i k e l y  t o  cease  
abruptly with th e  coming of peace and with th e  attempt to
1 . K. Fribram, op. c i t , ,  p p .775-6 .
2. C. B resc ian i-T u rron i,  op. c i t . ,  p . 25 and Appendix,Table V,
3 . W. Lotz, op. c i t , ,  p. 96 .
4.  K. H e l f f e r ic h ,  Honey, Eng. Tr. of 6th German Edn. ,  pp .593-5
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resume normal p a t t e r n s  of  p ro d u c t io n  and consumption,  t h e  
p ro s p e c t s  f o r  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  of  t h e  cur rency  in t h e  pos t -w ar  
per iod  were not  good.
In o rd e r  t o  complete  t h i s  survey  of t h e  impact of 
t h e  war on German f i n a n c e s  i t  remains only t o  summarise th e  
somewhat c i r c u m s t a n t i a l  ev idence  which e x i s t s  about t h e  s t a t e  
of Germany’ s e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  between 1914- and 
1918. I t  has  been seen t h a t  t h e  war com ple te ly  depr ived  
Germany of h a l f  her  expor t  m a rk e t s ,  s e v e r e l y  r e s t r i c t e d  her  
e n t r y  i n t o  o t h e r s ,  and p a ra ly se d  h e r  merchant shipping. '*'*
The r e s u l t i n g  d e c l i n e  of German f o r e i g n  ea rn in g s  was no doubt 
matched t o  some ex ten t  by t h e  f a l l  in German spending abroad 
induced by t h e  b loc kade .  However, t h e  emphasis of t h e  t r a d e
which Germany managed t o  m a in ta in  du r ing  t h e  war w i th  n e u t r a l
2 #
ne ighbours  was i n e v i t a b l y  on impor ts  r a t h e r  t h a n  e x p o r t s .
Thus,  even i f  no f i g u r e s  were a v a i l a b l e ,  i t  could s a f e l y  be 
assumed t h a t  Germany’s b a l a n c e  of t r a d e  was d e c i d e d ly  
u n fa v o u r a b l e .  The f i n a n c i a l  r e p e r c u s s io n s  of t h i s  were 
s e r io u s  f o r  a count ry  which possessed  r e l a t i v e l y  sm a l l  r e s e r v e s  
of gold and f o r e i g n  s e c u r i t i e s ,  and which exper ienced  d i f f i c u l t y  
in o b ta in in g  f o r e i g n  c r e d i t s . " '  I t  has been es t im a ted  by 
competent a u t h o r i t i e s  t h a t  Germany's t o t a l  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  dur ing
1.  See above ,  pp.  4-5 .
2. M.C. S in e y ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 125.
3. C, R i s t ,  op.  c i t . ,  p. l 8l .
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t h e  war was in f a c t  15 b i l l i o n  gold marks; and t h a t  of t h i s  
d e f i c i t  only  5 b i l l i o n s  were covered by e x p o r t s  of gold and 
by t h e  s a l e  of  s e c u r i t i e s .  S ince  only o n e - t h i r d  of th e  
remain ing  10 b i l l i o n  marks appea rs  t o  have been covered by 
c r e d i t s ,  t h e  r e s t  must e i t h e r  have been owed or have been 
paid f o r  by s e l l i n g  mark n o t e s . T h i s  meant t h a t  by t h e  
end of t h e  war Germany had a s i z e a b l e  e x t e r n a l  f l o a t i n g  debt  
which was l i k e l y  t o  e x e r t  downward p r e s s u r e  on t h e  v a l u e  of 
t h e  mark.
Germany’ s p r e c a r i o u s  e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  could
net  be eased by t h e  b e l a t e d  and i n e f f e c t i v e  a t tem p ts  of t h e
German government t o  impose t r a d e  c o n t r o l s  and exchange
r e s t r i c t i o n s .  A l i s t  of  f o rb id d e n  impor ts  was pub l i shed  in
February  1916; and in t h e  fo l low ing  J a n u a ry  a system of
2
import l i c e n s i n g  was fo r m a l ly  in t r o d u c e d .  * Over t h e  same 
per iod  a system of exchange c o n t r o l  was s e t  up which,  a l though  
o r i g i n a l l y  des igned  simply t o  r e g u l a t e  t h e  use  of  f o r e i g n  
exchange f o r  im p o r t s ,  was extended in February  1917 w i th  a 
view t o  c o u n te r in g  t h e  f l i g h t  of  c a p i t a l  from Germany.^* But 
t h e s e  measures had l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on t h e  b a s i c  imbalance  of 
German t r a d e  or on t h e  p s y c h o lo g i c a l l y - in d u c e d  a c t i v i t i e s  of
1.  Dr. von Glasenapp (V ic e - P r e s id e n t  of  t h e  Re ichsbank ) ,
"Germany’ s Balance  of Payments w i th  o th e r  C o u n t r i e s ” , 1'GCRS.
20 A p r i l  1922, p.  22.  Schacht  c i t e s  f i g u r e s  which a r e  t h e  
same as G lasenapp’s from a p u b l i c a t i o n  of t h e  German S t a t i s t ­
i c a l  O f f i c e  e n t i t l e d  D eutsch lands  W i r t s c h a f t s l a g e  u n t e r  den 
Fachwirkungen des W e l t k r i e g e s : v i d e  H. Schach t ,  op. c i t . ,  p .2 ß .
2. C. R i s t ,  op. c i t . ,  p .  190.
3.  i b i d . ,  p .  192.
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s p e c u l a t  o r s • *
In t h e s e  c i rc u m s tan c es  i t  was remarkab le  t h a t  t h e  
exchange r a t e  of t h e  gold mark expressed in  paper  marks
d e c l i n e d  only  from p a r i t y  in  August 1914 t o  1.77 in  November
2 .
1 9 l 8 . ' *  The r e l a t i v e l y  s l i g h t  f a l l  of t h e  mark dur ing  t h e  
war was however due t o  a number of a r t i f i c i a l  and temporary  
f a c t o r s  which could not  be expec ted t o  remain i n f l u e n t i a l  in 
p e a c e - t im e .  One of t h e s e  was t h e  hope of v i c t o r y  which ,  by 
p e r s i s t i n g  w e l l  i n t o  1918, d is suaded  both  German c i t i z e n s  and 
f o r e i g n  m ark-ho lders  from s p e c u l a t i n g  a g a i n s t  t h e  mark.
Another was t h e  A l l i ed  b lockade  of Germany which ,  by p rev en t in g  
l a r g e - s c a l e  imports  a t  a t ime when t h e r e  was an overwhelming 
demand f o r  goods w i t h i n  Germany, postponed a v i o l e n t  
d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of Germany's t r a d e  b a l a n c e .  When t h e  war ended 
in  d e f e a t  and t h e  A l l i e d  b loc kade  was l i f t e d ,  t h e  s t a g e  was 
s e t  f o r  a c o n s id e r a b l e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  mark.
The war of  1914-18 had brought Germany t o  t h e  b r in k  of 
complete economic e xhaus t ion  and s e r io u s  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t a b i l i t y .  
The e x h a u s t io n  of t h e  economy was t h e  r e s u l t  of t h e  r u t h l e s s  
m o b i l i s a t i o n  of domestic  r e s o u r c e s  which cu lminated  in t h e  
Hindenburg Programme, and of t h e  s e v e r in g  of Germany's economic 
t i e s  w i th  t h e  g r e a t e r  p a r t  of  t h e  w or ld .  F i n a n c i a l  c o l l a p s e  
loomed, n o t  because  of t h e  t e c h n i c a l  measures which were 
dev ised  t o  expand c r e d i t ,  bu t  because  of t h e  i n a b i l i t y  of t h e
1. i b i d . ,  p .  195.
2.  C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op.  c i t . ,  p .  441.
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German government t o  absorb  or  t o  have absorbed  t h e  in c re as ed  
m ark -ho ld ings  and c r e d i t  ba lan ces  c re a te d  both  i n s i d e  and 
o u t s i d e  Germany by war - induced overspending both a t  home and 
a b ro a d ,
F i n a n c i a l  c o l l a p s e  was made more l i k e l y  in t h e  pos t -w ar  
y e a r s  by t h e  heavy w ar - t im e  dependence of  t h e  German government 
on t h e  good w i l l  of both t h e  domestic  and t h e  f o r e i g n  lend ing  
p u b l i c .  Th is  dependence was perhaps  i n e v i t a b l e  in  view of 
t h e  weakness of t h e  German f i s c a l  system and in view o f  t h e  
d i s r u p t i o n  of German t r a d e  caused by t h e  w ar .  But i t  was t o  
have  d i s a s t r o u s  e f f e c t s  a f t e r  t h e  war when domest ic  l e nde r s  
ceased t o  s u b s c r ib e  t o  government loans  and when t h e  only form 
of f o r e i g n  le nd ing  t o  Germany was t h e  s p e c u l a t i v e  buying of 
mark n o t e s .  The f i n a n c i a l  l e a d e r s  of pos t -w ar  Germany were 
fo rced  back on th o s e  s o u rces  of i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  revenue  -  
t a x a t i o n  and t r a d e  -  which had been n e g lec te d  dur ing  t h e  war .
In a t t e m p t in g  t o  e x p l o i t  t h e s e  t h e y  were s e r i o u s l y  handicapped 
not  only by t h e  g e n e r a l  economic e x h au s t io n  and d i s l o c a t i o n  
caused by t h e  war but  a l s o  by t h e  in a d eq u a te  f e d e r a l  f i s c a l  
machinery and t h e  i n e f f e c t i v e  system of t r a d e  and exchange 
c o n t r o l s  bequea thed t o  them by w ar- t ime governments .
PART I I
THE F IR S T  THIRTY MONTHS OF PEACE
SECTION I
35.
THE GERMAN ECONCHY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM BEFORE MAY 1 9 2 1
Germany's r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s  in t h e  f i r s t  t h i r t y  
months of  peace were r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  from th o s e  which she 
assumed a f t e r  May 1921* Befo re  May 1921 r e p a r a t i o n  payments 
took  t h e  form e i t h e r  of  d e l i v e r i e s  of goods or  of  p ro p e r ty  
s u r ren d e red  in ceded t e r r i t o r i e s .  A f t e r  May 1921 t h e  London 
Schedule of  Payments t r an s fo rm e d  t h e  n a t u r e  of  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  
problem by p r e s c r i b i n g  a n n u i t i e s  which were not  only t o  be 
d i s ch a rg e d  in r e g u l a r  i n s t a l m e n t s  but  were a l s o  t o  be pa id  
l a r g e l y  in cash .  Th is  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  makes i t  d e s i r a b l e  t o  
break  a t  May 1921 any assessm en t  of t h e  economic and f i n a n c i a l  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  r e p a r a t i o n  in t h e  pre-Dawes F lan  p e r io d .
Between t h e  end of  t h e  war and May 1921, t h e  economic 
d i s r u p t i o n  and e x haus t ion  of  Germany con t inued  j u s t  as  i t  had 
d u r ing  t h e  w ar .  Almost a l l  impor tan t  i n d i c e s  of p roduc t ion  
in f a c t  slumped below t h e i r  1918 l e v e l  in th e  f i r s t  y e a r  of  
peace .  Although t h e r e  was a g r a d u a l  r ecove ry  in 1920 and 
1921, t h e  l e v e l  of  p ro d u c t io n  s t i l l  remained in most c a s e s  
w el l  below t h a t  a t t a i n e d  in 1913 w i th i n  Germany's p03t-war
'j #
f r o n t i e r s ,  v i z ,










1913 (post-war 173 87 10.9 11.9
f ro n t ie r s )
1918 160 101 9.2 12.9
1919 108 94 6.3 8.5
1920 131 112 6.4 8.5
1921 136 123 7.9 10.1
1. F ig u re s  c o l l e c t e d  from: Supreme Economic Counc i l ,  Monthly
B u l l e t i n  of  S t a t i s t i c s . See a l s o ,  J . L . F .  T h e l w a l l ,  op,  c i t . ,  
pp .  58-9» 79; C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op.  c i t . ,  p.  193 L o te .
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Perhaps  t h e  bes t  g e n e r a l  i n d i c a t i o n  of t h e  reduced economic 
a c t i v i t y  in  t h e  immediate pos t -w ar  y ea rs  was t h a t  railw'ay 
t r a f f i c  f e l l  t o  6 o /  of i t s  1913 l e v e l  in 1919» and recovered 
only  t o  75?o of  i t s  pre-war i n t e n s i t y  in t h e  fo l low ing  y e a r . ^ *
There  were o the r  s igns  of co n t in u in g  economic p r o s t r a t i o n  
in t h e  p o s t -w a r  p e r io d .  Numbers of most forms of l i v e s t o c k ,  w i th  
t h e  e x ce p t io n  of sheep and g o a t s ,  recovered  only slowly from t h e
p
l e v e l  t o  which th e y  had plunged dur ing  t h e  war .  *
(Thousand head)
Date Hors es C a t t l e Sheep Pigs Goats
1/ 12/13 4,523 20,994 5 ,521 25,659 3,548
4 /12 /18  
P os t -w ar  
f r o n t i e r s
3,493 18,095 5,382 10,545 4,426
4/ 12/18 2,978 16,448 4,905 9,227 4,021
1/ 12/19 3,468 16,298 5,356 11,469 4,052
1/12/20 3,588 16,807 6,150 14,179 4,459
The w ar - t im e  f a l l  in crop y i e l d s  grew n o t i c e a b l y  worse in  1919»
There was a s l i g h t  g e n e r a l  improvement in  1920, but th e  rye  
h a r v e s t ,  which provided an important part of t h e  German food  
su p p ly ,  slumped t o  an u n p reced en ted ly  low l e v e l  in  t h i s  year.-**
(Thousand m etr ic  t o n s )
Year Rye Wheat Bar iev Pot a t  oes Oats
1913 12,222 4,656 3,673 54,121 9,714
1918 8 ,035 2,527 2,038 29,941 4,769
Po s t -w a r  
f r o n t i e r s  
1918 6,676 2,337 1,850 24,744 4,381
1919 6,100 2,169 1,670 21,449 4,494
1920 4,970 2,250 1,800 28,250 4,870
1. G roener ,  17 March 1921,  R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  348, p .  3120.
2.  For f i g u r e s  up t o  1 /12 /19 :  Month ly  B u l l e t i n  of S t a t i s t i c s .
V o l .  I ,  No. 12, p.  30; V o l .  I I ,  No. 4, p. 34.  Summarised in :  
J . S ,  D av is ,  ’’Recent  F i n a n c i a l  and Economic P ro g re s s  in Germany", 
Review of Economic S t a t i s t i c s . 1921, V ol .  I l l ,  p.  154. For 
1920 f i g u r e s :  J .W.F.  T h e l w a l l ,  Report  on. . .Germany t o  March.
1922, (Great  B r i t a i n .  Department of Overseas T r a d e ) ,  p p . l 8 4 - 5 .
3 .  J . S .  D av is ,  op. c i t . ,  p.  155»
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The c o n t in u a t io n of w ar- tim e d i s l o c a t i o n was
p a r t i c u l a r l y ev id ent in t h e  f ig u r e s f o r  t h e  v a lu e  and volume
of German fo r e ig n  t r a d e b e f o r e  May 1921, v i z , 1.
V A L U E VOLUME
( m i l l i o n  gold marks) (thousand to n s )
Month Import s E x p o r ts Balanc e Import s E x p o r ts
1913 Average W 842 -  55 6,066 6,143
1919 Jan 204 £3 -  121 200 323
Feb 188 90 -  98 159 377
Mar 178 118 -  60 249 583
Apr 209 90 -  119 373 641
May 480 82 -  398 613 538
June 805 122 -  683 884 1,055
J u ly l , 06l 171 -  890 1,298 1,085
Aug 824 158 -  666 1,531 1,202
Sep 702 132 -  570 1,277 944
Oct 832 175 -  657 1,240 1,231
Nov 500 144 -  356 1,018 1,324
Dec 489 392 97 l , 08l 2.762
6,472 1.757 -4 .7 1 5 9.923 12.065
1920 Jan 459 224 -  235 1,129 1,523
Feb 269 193 " 76 1,475 1,923
Mar 310 230 -  80 1,357 1,826
Apr 328 379 + 51 1,224 2,170
May 514 616 + 102 1 ,485 2,895
June 562 1,737 2,680
J u ly 544 1,739 2,004
Aug 529 1,512 1,910
Sep 468 1,680 1,837
Oct 401 1,758 1,494
Nov 430 1,757 1,768
Dec 449 2,007 1.758
7.000 5,025 -2 .0 0 0 18.860 23.786
1921 Jan .
Feb - _ - - -
Mar - - - - -
Apr - M —
1.500 1.000 -  5oo - -
1. N o tes : (a )  F ig u re s  f o r  th e  volume of t r a d e  in  1919-20 a re
ta b u la t e d  in :  C. B r e s c ia n i - T u r r o n i ,  op. c i t . ,  p ,448 .  
(b) F ig u re s  f o r  t h e  v a lu e  of t r a d e  between January  
1919 and May 1920: League o f  N a t io n s ,  I n t e r n a t io n a l
F in a n c ia l  C o n fe ren c e . B ru s s e ls  1920, V o l.  I l l ,  p .3 4 .  
S t a t i s t i c s  of e x p o r ts  June-December 1920: Supreme
Economic C o u n c i l ,  Monthly B u l l e t i n  of S t a t i s t i c s . 
F ig u re s  f o r  the v a lu e  o f  im ports  in  t h i s  pe r iod  a re  
u n a v a i l a b l e .  (C ontinued foo t  of page 38. )
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These f i g u r e s  a r e  i n a c c u r a t e  f o r  a number of  r e a s o n s .  F i r s t l y ,  
t h e r e  was a c o n s id e r a b l e  amount of smuggling ,  mos t ly  th ro u g h  t h e  
s o - c a l l e d  ’’Hole in t h e  West" c r ea ted  by t h e  t e r r i t o r i e s  occupied 
by t h e  A l l i e s .  Secondly ,  t h e  va lu e  of impor ts  was unde re s t im a ted  
because  of  t h e  i n f l e x i b i l i t y  of o f f i c i a l  methods of v a l u a t i o n  in 
a t ime of f l u c t u a t i n g  e x c h a n g e s .* 1  I,* F i n a l l y ,  expor t  f i g u r e s  were
2 .
i n f l a t e d  by t h e  i n c l u s i o n  of t h e  va lue  of r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s .  
However, t h e s e  i n a c c u r a c i e s  cannot i n v a l i d a t e  a g e n e r a l  conc lu s ion  
t h a t  both  t h e  volume and v a lu e  of German t r a d e  were exceed ing ly  
low and t h a t  t h e  t r a d i n g  d e f i c i t  was d i s a s t r o u s l y  l a r g e  in t h e  
e a r l y  p o s t -w ar  y e a r s .  The v a l u e ,  i f  not t h e  volume, of imports  
showed some s igns  of r e c o v e ry  a f t e r  t h e  l i f t i n g  of t h e  A l l i e d  
b lockade  in J u l y  1919* On t h e  o th e r  hand ,  ex p o r t s  remained 
n e g l i g i b l e  u n t i l  t h e  v i o l e n t  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of  t h e  mark a t  t h e  end 
of 1919 made t h e  p r i c e  of imported raw m a t e r i a l s  so p r o h i b i t i v e  
and German domest ic  p r i c e s  so a t t r a c t i v e  t o  f o r e i g n e r s  t h a t  i t
3
encouraged a grand " c l e a r i n g  s a l e "  of German p r o d u c t i v e  equipment.
During 1920 t h e r e  was a more h e a l t h y  r e v i v a l  of  e x p o r t s  t o  Great
B r i t a i n
N otes :  ( con t inued  from f o o t  of  page 37)
(c )  The v a l u e  of expo r ts  and impor ts  has been conver ted  
from paper  marks t o  gold marks in accordance  w i th  t h e  
monthly ave ra ge  r a t e s  in :  C . B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op. c i t . ,  
p .  441.
(d)  F ig u re s  of both t h e  v a lu e  and volume of t r a d e  
between January  and A p r i l  1921 have neve r  been p u b l i s h e d .  
Approximate f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  va lue  of t r a d e  in  t h i s  pe r iod  
and a l s o  f o r  t h e  v a l u e  of im por ts  between June and 
December 1920 have been der ived  from t h e  g l o b a l  e s t im a te s  
of t r a d e  in  1920 and 1921 made by Dr. von Glasenapp,
op.  c i t . ,  MGCRE. 20 A p r i l  1922,  p .  22.
1. Supreme Economic Counc i l ,  Month ly  B u l l e t i n  of S t a t i s t i c s , V o l .
I I ,  No. 2,  p . v .
2. i b i d . ,  V o l .  I I ,  No. 3 , p . v i i .
3« The Econom is t , 29 November 1919» PP* 9 8 3 -4 .
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France  and t h e  United S t a t e s ,  and a l s o  t o  t h e  European n e u t r a l s  
w i th  whom Germany had t r a d e d  in th e  war y e a r s ,  * However, t h e  
v a l u e  of  bo th  impor ts  and e x p o r t s  s t i l l  remained w e l l  below i t s  
p re -w ar  l e v e l*  The f i g u r e s  which have been de r ived  f o r  t h e  
f i r s t  fou r  months of 1921 seem, i f  a n y t h in g ,  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
t h e  r e l a t i v e  r e v i v a l  of German fo r e ig n  t r a d e  which occurred  in 
1920 had been s h o r t - l i v e d .
The p e r s i s t e n c e  of  domest ic  and e x t e r n a l  economic d i s l o c ­
a t i o n  in t h e  e a r l y  pos t-war  y ea r s  was p a r a l l e l e d  by t h e  con t inued  
imbalance of  Germany’ s domest ic  f i n a n c e s  and of  her  f o r e ig n  
f i n a n c i a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  HVith t h e  coming of peace ,  government 
e x p e n d i tu r e  did  no t  r e t u r n  t o  i t s  1913 l e v e l  of  3*6 b i l l i o n  gold 
marks but  remained a t  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  h igh f i g u r e  of 8 .6  b i l l i o n s  
(go ld )  in t h e  budge ta ry  y e a r  1919/20 and 9*3 b i l l i o n  gold marks 
in 1920/21 . * S ince  revenues  amounted t o  only 2.6  b i l l i o n s  in 
1919/20 and 3 .2  b i l l i o n s  in 1920/21 and s in c e  t h e  d e f i c i t s  were 
not  covered by p u b l i c  l o a n s ,  t h e  government’ s f l o a t i n g  debt  
in c re a s e d  from 49 b i l l i o n  paper  marks a t  t h e  end of t h e  war t o  
173 b i l l i o n  paper marks in A p r i l  1921.^* Th i s  enormous 
expansion of c r e d i t  in t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  made p o s s i b l e ,  as  i t  had 
d u r in g  t h e  war ,  an in c re as ed  amount of  l end ing  by p r i v a t e  c r e d i t  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  whose d e p o s i t s  had been swollen  by t h e  abnormal 
spending of  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t T h e  supply  of c r e d i t  in  t h e  
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  was s t i l l  supplemen ted ,  moreover,  by t h e  advances
1. Mon th ly  B u l l e t i n  0^ S t a t i s t i c s . V o l .  I I ,  No. 3» PP* v i - v i i .
2. C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op.  c i t . ,  p.  437,
3.  Die Entwicklung  d e r  Reoara t  i o n s f r a g e . p.  l 8 .
4.  J , S .  D a v i s ,  op.  c i t . ,  p ,  148.
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of th e  War Credit O ff ices*  The va lue  of t h e s e  rose  from 
14 b i l l i o n  marks at th e  end of the  war t o  a peak of 33 b i l l i o n  
marks in November 1920, and was s t i l l  23 b i l l i o n  marks in May 
1921. * A by-product of a l l  of th e s e  forms of cred it  creation  
was the expansion of th e  c ir c u la t io n  of Reichsbank notes  and 
War Credit Vouchers from 28 t o  8 l  b i l l i o n  marks in th e  period  
under rev iew ,' * A fu rth er  consequence was th a t  th e  excess  
purchasing power re leased  in the  community, to g e th e r  with th e  
e x ter n a l  d ep rec ia t io n  of th e  mark, caused th e  index of w ho lesa le  
p r ic e s  (1913=100) t o  r i s e  from 234 in  November 1918 t o  1570 in 
A pril 1921.
The imbalance of Germany's ex tern a l f in a n ces  was worse  
than th e  f ig u r e s  for th e  trad e  d e f i c i t  s u g g e s t .  This was not
only because of th e  o f f i c i a l  underestim ation  of imports and
4.
overestim ation  of exports which has a lready  been n o t ic e d .
It was a ls o  because Germany's n e g l ig ib le  i n v i s i b l e  earnings in 
the  ear ly  post-v/ar years were far  outweighed by th e  0 .7 5  b i l l i o n
gold marks she spent annually  on the in t e r e s t  and am ortisation
5.
of post-war c r e d i t s . '  * S ince  the  o f f i c i a l  v i s i b l e  trading  
d e f i c i t  between January 1919 and A pril 1921 was about 7*2 b i l l i o n  
gold marks, Germany*3 r e a l  d e f i c i t  on both i n v i s i b l e  and v i s i b l e  
account was probably c lo s e  to  10 b i l l i o n  gold marks. In the  
absence of any long-term fo re ig n  loan th e r e  was an in e v i ta b le
1.  R. S tucken ,  Deutsche Geld-und K r e d i t p o l i t i k  \ 9 1 4 - 1 9 5 l . p*35*
2. ib id .
3. C. B resc ian i-T u rron i,  op. c i t . ,  p. 442.
4 . See above, p. 38.
5 .  Dr.  von Glasenapp,  l o c .  c i t .
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i n c r e a s e  in t h e  amount of  Germany’s f o r e ig n  o b l i g a t i o n s  which 
were in t h e  form of e i t h e r  bank or  book c r e d i t s  or mark n o t e s  
h e ld  by f o r e i g n e r s .  By August 1920 Germany’ s e x t e r n a l  f l o a t i n g  
debt  had in c re a s e d  from 6 b i l l i o n  paper marks a t  t h e  end of  th e
•t
war t o  about  50 b i l l i o n  marks.  * Such a development provided  
t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  s u b s t a n t i a l  e x t e r n a l  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  
German c u r r e n c y .  Between November 1918 and A p r i l  1921 t h e
exchange r a t e  of th e  gold mark expressed  in  paper  marks had
2 #
risen from 1.77 t o  15*1.
1. League of  N a t i o n s ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  C o n fe ren c e , 
Paper No. I I l ( r e v i s e d  e d i t i o n ) ,  pp.  53-7*
2.  C. B r a s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op.  c i t , ,  p .  441.
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SECT ION__I I
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF RE PARATIONS BEFORE MAY 1921
The lo s s  of  many of t h e  i tems c r e d i t e d  t o  Germany's 
r e p a r a t i o n  account  b e f o r e  May 1921, such as s t a t e  p ro p e r ty  
in ceded t e r r i t o r i e s  and war m a t e r i a l  abandoned in b a t t l e  
a r e a s ,  could have ex e r t ed  no economic e f f e c t  a t  a l l  on pos t -w ar  
Germany, However, i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  economic d i s l o c a t i o n  
may have  been aggrava ted  by t h e  temporary  c e s s io n  of t h e  Saar  
c o a l  f i e l d s  t o  F ra n c e ,  t h e  d e l i v e r y  of  c a p i t a l  equipment such 
as  r a i l w a y  r o l l i n g  s t o c k ,  merchant s h ip p in g  and r i v e r c r a f t ,  
and t h e  d e l i v e r y  of o th e r  economica lly  im por tan t  goods such as 
c o a l  and i t s  d e r i v a t i v e s ,  l i v e s t o c k ,  a g r i c u l t u r a l  equipment,  
d y e s t u f f s  and pha rm a c e u t i c a l  p r o d u c t s .
The Saar  Coal Mines
A r t i c l e s  45-50 of t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a ty  d i r e c t e d  t h a t ,  
in  o rd e r  t o  compensate f o r  t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  of t h e  c o a l  mines of 
N or thern  F ran ce ,  t h e  ownership of t h e  Saar  co a l  mines should be 
t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  France ;  and t h a t  t h e  government of t h e  Saar 
d i s t r i c t  should be p laced  in t h e  hands of  a Commission appoin ted  
by t h e  League of N at ions  f o r  15 y e a r s .  Such a change,  both  in 
t h e  ownership of t h e  S a a r ' s  main i n d u s t r y  and in  t h e  government 
of  t h e  a r e a ,  m ight ,  in  c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  have  had q u i t e  a 
s e r i o u s  economic e f f e c t  on t h e  r e s t  of  Germany, In 1913 37/£ of 
t h e  S a a r ' s  t o t a l  c o a l  output  of  12.2 m i l l i o n  t o n s  was consumed 
w i th i n  Germany (exc lud ing  A l s a c e - L o r r a i n e  and t h e  Saar  i t s e l f ) ;
and t h e r e  were  c o n s id e r a b l e  economic t i e s  between t h e  Saar and
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n e ig h b o u r in g  reg io n s  of  Germany.^* In p r a c t i c e ,  s i n c e  t h e
t r e a t y  prov ided  t h a t  t h e r e  should be f r e e  t r a d e  between t h e
2 #
S aa r  and Germany f o r  f i v e  y e a r s ,  economic d i s l o c a t i o n  could 
be caused s o l e l y  by t h e  d i v e r s i o n  of t h e  Saar*s  co a l  output  
t o  F ra n c e ,  But ,  because  much of t h e  a rea  of Germany which had 
been dependent  on Saar c o a l  was occupied by A l l i e d  t r o o p s  in 
t h e  p os t -w ar  y e a r s ,  even t h i s  d i v e r s i o n  was accomplished 
g r a d u a l l y  and w i thou t  overmuch economic d i s l o c a t i o n .^ * T h e  
Luxemburg P r o t o c o l  of 28 F ebruary  1919 d i r e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  Saar 
c o a l f i e l d s  should c on t inue  t o  d e l i v e r  c o a l  t o  t h o s e  p o r t i o n s  
of  occupied Germany which t h e y  had supp l ied  b e f o r e  t h e  
A r m i s t i c e ,  I t  was only a f t e r  t h i s  arrangement had been s u p e r ­
seded by t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  F r o t o c o l  of 29 August 1919 t h a t  a coa l  
s h o r t a g e  began t o  be f e l t  in t h e  occupied t e r r i t o r i e s .  The 
V e r s a i l l e s  F r o to c o l  had s t i p u l a t e d ,  as  one of t h e  c o n d i t io n s  
of  t h e  commencement of r e p a r a t i o n  coa l  d e l i v e r i e s  from th e  Ruhr 
t o  F ran ce ,  t h a t  100,000 t o n s  of  coa l  should be d e l iv e r e d  monthly 
from t h e  Saa r  t o  K o s e l l e  and P a l a t i n a t e  reg ions  which were under  
A l l i e d  o cc u p a t io n .  However, because of t h e  low l e v e l  of 
r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  from t h e  Ruhr between September and 
December 1919> t h e  French a u t h o r i t i e s  l im i t e d  d e l i v e r i e s  from
1. L.G. Cowan, France  and t h e  S a a r .  l6SO-194S. pp .145,  148-51*
2.  Clause  31 of  t h e  Annex t o  P a ra ,  50,
3.  The fo l l o w i n g  account  i s  drawn from: ’’Report of t h e  Coal 
S i t u a t i o n  in Occupied German T e r r i t o r i e s  by t h e  B r i t i s h  
Department of t h e  I n t e r - A l l i e d  Rhineland High Commission, 
F ebruary  1920", in S t u a r t  t o  Curzon, February  14, 1920, 
Documents on B r i t i s h  F o re ig n  P o l i c y  1919-1939. S e r i e s  I ,
V o l .  X, pp.  184-95.  ( H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d :  DBFP),
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t h e  S aa r  t o  2 ,000-2 ,500  t o n s  a day; and on 6 J a n u a ry  1920 
t h e y  announced t h a t  a l l  Saar coa l  d e l i v e r i e s  t o  Germany would 
cease  from 1 F eb rua ry .  These measures c e r t a i n l y  c o n t r i b u t e d  
t o  t h e  s e r i o u s  c o a l  s h o r t a g e  which was f e l t  in  t h e  occupied
•j
t e r r i t o r i e s  a t  t h i s  t i m e .  * But t h e  main cau s e  of both  t h e  
s h o r t a g e  in t h e  occupied t e r r i t o r i e s  and t h e  low l e v e l  of 
d e l i v e r i e s  t o  F rance  which had prompted French  r e p r i s a l s ,  was 
t h e  s e v e r e  f l o o d i n g  of t h e  Rhine in December 1919 and a r a i l ­
way s t r i k e  in t h e  fo l lo w in g  month.  These e v e n t s  had caused a
t r a n s p o r t  b o t t l e n e c k  which t e m p o r a r i l y  reduced Ruhr co a l
2 .
shipments bo th  t o  France  and t o  t h e  south  of  Germany. A f t e r  
t h i s  b o t t l e n e c k  had been r e l i e v e d  in A p r i l ,  t h e  s h o r t a g e  of 
c o a l  in t h e  a r e a s  b o rd e r in g  t h e  Saar  was no worse  t h a n  in t h e
•3
r e s t  of Germany. Moreover,  as  t h e  French c o a l  s i t u a t i o n  
improved,  more S aa r  coa l  g r a d u a l l y  became a v a i l a b l e  f o r  shipment
4
t o  Germany. * The t r a n s f e r  of t h e  Saar  c o a l  mines t o  French 
hands was t h e r e f o r e  only of economic im por tance  a t  a t ime when 
t h e  co a l  s h o r t a g e  in  Germany was a l r e a d y  agg rava ted  by abnormal 
seescnal f a c t o r s  and by i n d u s t r i a l  u n r e s t .
1. For a com pla in t  t o  t h i s  e f f e c t :  F&it ion  of Herr  P i c k ,  19
December 1919» N a t i o n a lv erSammlung. V o l .  340,  Anl.  1855: 
answered ,  13 F ebruary  1920,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  341,  Anl.  2133*
2.  P e t i t i o n  of Herr  Haussman and o t h e r s ,  15 J a n u a ry  1920,
i b i d . ,  V o l .  341,  Anl.  1950: answered ,  13 F eb rua ry  1920,
i b i d . ,  V ol .  341,  Anl.  2135; P e t i t i o n  of  Herr  P i c k ,  3 March 
1920, i b i d . ,  V o l .  341 ,  Anl.  2284: answered ,  19 A p r i l  1920,
i b i d . ,  V o l .  343, Anl.  2775.
3 . For an examinat ion of t h e  g e n e r a l  German c o a l  s h o r t a g e ,  see 
be low ,pp ,  53-68 .
4 .  By 1922 20# of t h e  Saar  output  was sh ipped  t o  Germany:
F .  D e l a i s i ,  "French Coal P o l ic y  and t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y " ,  
MGCRE, 7 September 1922,  p .  421.
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De l i v e r i e s  of Railway R o l l i n g  Stock
A r t i c l e  V II  of t h e  A rm is t i c e  of 11 November 1918 
d i r e c t e d  t h a t  Germany should d e l i v e r  t o  t h e  A l l i e s  5»000 
locom ot ives  and 150,000 goods waggons wi th  spare  p a r t s  and 
in working order."*'* The f u l f i l m e n t  of t h i s  p r o v i s io n  was 
l i k e l y  t o  have s e r i o u s  economic e f f e c t s .  German hold ings  of 
r o l l i n g  s tock  had inc re ased  from 27,214 locomotives  and 617,748 
goods waggons in 1913 t o  34,208 locomotives  and 778,912 goods 
waggons in 1918. * But t h i s  i n c r e a s e  did not  make t h e  German 
r a i l w a y  system any b e t t e r  f i t t e d  t o  w i th s ta nd  t h e  r e d u c t io n  of 
equipment which occurred  in 1919 as a r e s u l t  of t h e  A rm is t i ce  
d e l i v e r i e s .  For a l though  in  1919 Germany r e t a i n e d  29,945 
locomot ives  and 597,978 goods waggons,  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  of t h e  
German ra i lw a y s  was de termined  not by t h e  amount of r o l l i n g  
s tock  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  a v a i l a b l e  but  by t h e  p ro p o r t i o n  of i t  which 
was in  working o r d e r .  Th is  p ro p o r t i o n  had ,  by t h e  end of t h e  
war ,  become abnormally  sm al l  because  of t h e  s e r i o u s  d i s r e p a i r  
i n t o  which German r a i lw a y  equipment had been al lowed t o  f a l l  
du r ing  t h e  war y e a r s ,  and i t  became s m a l l e r  s t i l l  in t h e  
economic d i s l o c a t i o n  and i n d u s t r i a l  u n r e s t  of t h e  a f te rm a th .^ *
In 1913, 19^ of  a l l  locomotives  were undergoing  r e p a i r s .  By 
1918 t h e  number had grown t o  34/£ of t h e  machines at  th e  d i s p o s a l
1. Royal  I n s t i t u t e  of I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s ,  The German T r e a t y .
P. 273.
2. These and o th e r  f i g u r e s  drawn from: A. S a r t e r ,  Die Deutschen 
Eisenbahnen im K r i e g e , pp.  163-5» 287•
3 . J . S ,  D a v i s ,  op. c i t . ,  p p . l 5 9 - 6 0 ;  G* Francke ,  "The German 
Railway System a f t e r  t h e  War” , MGCRE, 7 September 1922, p .405;  
M i n i s t e r i a l r a t  van V d i c k e r ,  "German T ran sp o r t  and Communic­
a t i o n " ,  Annals of t h e  American Academy of P o l i t i c a l  and 
So c i a l  S c i e n c e s . November 1920,  V o l .  92, p p . 8 l - 2 .
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of the  German c i v i l  a u th o r it ie s .  * In August 1919 i t  was
asserted in the National Assembly that between 40% and 50%
2
of Germany’ s locomotives were not in running order. * It was 
also  claimed that l 600 disabled locomotives were receiving no 
atten tion  at a l l . - *
Although the d eter ioration  of German railway equipment 
in the war and during 1919 made the Armistice d e l iv e r ie s  a l l  
th e  more undesirable, i t  reduced th eir  r e la t iv e  s ig n if ica n ce  as
a cause of th e  econom ically  d isa s tro u s  reduction of railway
4.
t r a f f i c  which occurred in th e  post-war y ea rs .  Speakers in  
th e  N ation a l Assembly e i th e r  ascribed th e  shortage of railway  
equipment d i r e c t ly  t o  "the human and m ateria l wear and tea r  
caused by th e  war" * or d iv ided  th e  blame fo r  th e  railway  
c r i s i s  between th e  A rm istice  d e l iv e r ie s  and th e  decreased
6
e f f i c i e n c y  of equipment and personnel in th e  post-war period.  
Factors commonly blamed for the  l a t t e r  phenomenon, apart from
poor maintenance, were in d u s tr ia l  u n res t ,  the  eight-hour day,
y #
seasonal b o tt len eck s  and th e  lack of c o a l .
1 . Percentages derived from: A. Sarter, op. c i t . ,  p. 165*
2. Mumm(DNVP), 15 August 1919j NationaIyerSammlung. Vol. 329» 
p. 2500. Cf. Dr. Feirauch, "Railway Trans portat ion in 
Germany", Annals  of the American Academy of P o l i t i c a l  and 
Socia l S c ien ces . November 1920, Vol. 92, p. 88 .
3* Hugenberg (DNVP), 15 August 1919» Nationalversammlung. Vol. 
329, p. 2467. Of. "Report on Industrial and Commercial 
Conditions in Germany at the  c lo se  of the year 1919"» House 
of Commons Fapers. 1920, V ol .  43, Cd. 752, p. 257» at. P»l6.
4. Deglerk, 17 March 1921, R eichstag. Vol. 3^8 , P» 3^20.
5 . Hüe (SFD), 15 August 1919» Nationalversammlung. Vol. 329»
P. 2479.
6 . Schirmer (Zentrum), 25 October 1919» ib id . ,  Vol. 330,P*3^30.
7. J .3 .  Davis, l o c , c i t .
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The A rm is t i ce  d e l i v e r i e s  of  r a i l w a y  equipment cannot  
be blamed a t  a l l  f o r  r a i l w a y  b o t t l e n e c k s  a f t e r  1919« By 
August 1920 Germany p o s s e s s e d ,  w i th in  h e r  reduced b o u n d a r i e s ,
■j
some 30,000 locomotives  and 546,800 goods waggons,  ‘and t h e
2
e f f i c i e n c y  of  t h e  r a i lw a y  system had in c r e a s e d  n o t i c e a b l y .
I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  a German r a i lw a y  exper t  a t t r i b u t e d  t h e  
adequacy of t h e  r a i lw a y s  in t h e  summer of 1920 e n t i r e l y  t o  
t h e  dep res sed  s t a t e  of German i n d u s t r y . “1 234* I t  i s  t r u e  a l s o  
t h a t  t h e r e  was a s e v e r e  s h o r t a g e  of t r u c k s  tow ards  t h e  end of  
1920. However, t h i s  s h o r t a g e  was, s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  r e f e r r e d  t o  
a t  t h e  t im e  as a r e c u r r i n g  s e a s o n a l  phenomenon caused by 
f r o s t s  and by low water ,  which ,  by p r e v e n t in g  waterways from
4
being  f u l l y  u t i l i s e d ,  s u b je c t e d  t h e  r a i lw a y s  t o  abnormal s t r a i n .
D e l i v e r i e s  of r a i lw a y  r o l l i n g  s to ck  t o  t h e  A l l i e s  
appea r  t h e r e f o r e  t o  have  ex e r t ed  no a p p r e c i a b l e  economic e f f e c t  
a f t e r  th e  w i n t e r  of 1919-20.  Moreover,  even in  1919» when th e y  
did i n f l u e n c e  t h e  l e v e l  of i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t y ,  t h e y  were only 
one of s e v e r a l  f a c t o r s  such as  t h e  lag  in m a in te n a n c e ,  s o c i a l  
u n r e s t  and s e a s o n a l  b o t t l e n e c k s  which caused t h e  s h o r t a g e  of 
r a i lw a y  t r a n s p o r t  t o  be so a c u t e .
1 . C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op.  c i t . ,  p.  196 . Th is  f i g u r e  
compares fav o u ra b ly  w i th  an e s t im a te d  26,369 locom ot ives  
and 579>56l  goods waggons in a comparable a r e a  in 1913?
A. S a r t e r ,  op.  c i t . ,  p. 293*
2.  J . S .  D av is ,  l o c . c i t ;  J .W, F.  T h e l w a l l ,  op.  c i t . ,  p .  19 ,
3 . Dr Weirauch ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 90 .
4 .  e . g .  Klöckner  (Zent rum),  17 March 1921,  R e i c h s t a g «
V o l .  348,  p.  3129.  Klöckner  urged t h e  M i n i s t e r  f o r  
T ra n s p o r t  " to  come t o  g r i p s "  w i th  a waggon s h o r t a g e  which 
had " r e c u r r e d  f o r  15 y e a r s " .
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De l i v e r i e s  of Merchant Shipping and R i v e r c r a f t
The Treves  Convention of 16 Janua ry  1919 and Annex 
I I I  of t h e  R ep a ra t io n  Chapter  of t h e  T rea ty  of V e r s a i l l e s  
s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  Germany should d e l i v e r  ( l )  a l l  her  merchant  
s h ip s  of over l 600 t o n s ,  ( 2 ) h a l f  of t h o s e  weighing between 
1000 and l 600 t o n s  and ( 3 ) a q u a r t e r  of h e r  s team t r a w l e r s  
and o t h e r  f i s h i n g  b o a t s .  In f u l f i l m e n t  of t h e s e  p r o v i s i o n s ,  
Germany s u r re n d e re d  a t o t a l  of  2,6 m i l l i o n  to n s  of merchant 
s h i p p i n g .  A l a r g e  p a r t  of t h i s  (1 ,8  m i l l i o n  t o n s )  was 
d e l i v e r e d  in t h e  A rm is t i c e  pe r iod  which ended on 10 January
1920* and most of t h e  remainder  (up t o  2 ,2  m i l l i o n  t o n s )
2 .
was handed over in t h e  per iod  be fo re  May 1921, These 
d e l i v e r i e s  were r e s p o n s i b l e ,  t o g e t h e r  with  t h e  l o s s  of 
about  2 .7  m i l l i o n  to n s  d u r in g  t h e  war ,  f o r  t h e  r e d u c t io n  of 
t h e  German merchant f l e e t  from i t s  p re-war  s i z e  of over 5
ß #
m i l l i o n  t o n s  t o  about  500,000 to n s  a t  t h e  end of 1919»
D e s p i t e  t h e  a l l e g a t i o n s  of t h e  German government t o  t h e  
c o n t r a r y ,  t h e  economic,  as  opposed t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l ,  damage 
done t o  Germany by s h ip  d e l i v e r i e s  was by no means overwhelming
e x c e p t ,  p e rh a p s ,  immedia te ly  a f t e r  t h e  bulk of t h e  sh ips  were
4 #
handed over in  1919.  * The d i s l o c a t i o n  of German fo r e ig n  
t r a d e  in  1919/20 was due much l e s s  t o  l ack  of German-owned
1. R , I , I , A , , The German T r e a t y , pp.  288-91.
2. For p ro g re s s  of  d e l i v e r i e s :  R,C, , V, Appendix XVIII ,
pp.  225- 6 .
3 . "Report o n . . .C ond i t ions  in  Germany. . , 1 9 1 9 ” » P* 22; W, Cuno, 
"The P re s e n t  P o s i t i o n  and P ro sp e c t s  of t h e  German M erc a n t i l e  
M ar ine" ,  MGCRE. l 8 May 1922,  p p .8 7 -8 .
4 .  R . C . . v ,  pp.  75-6) Cf.  J . W . F .  T h e l w a l l ,  Report  on. . .Germany 
t o  March,  1922, pp . 103-4 •
1 .
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sh ip p in g  t h a n  t o  t h e  i s o l a t i o n  and exhaus t ion  of Germany 
caused by t h e  A l l i e d  b lo c k a d e .  D es p i te  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of  
ownership of t h e  German merchant  f l e e t ,  t r a d e  was i n e v i t a b l y  
resumed,  w i th i n  t h e  l i m i t s  imposed by t h i s  i s o l a t i o n  and d i s -
1 .
l o c a t i o n ,  in  i t s  old pa ths  and w i th  t h e  old means of t r a n s p o r t .  
The f i r s t  i n d i c a t i o n  of t h i s  was t h e  s t i p u l a t i o n  of t h e  Treves  
Convention t h a t  t h e  s u r r e n d e re d  v e s s e l s  should be used d u r ing  
t h e  A rm is t i c e  per iod  f o r  t h e  purpose of t r a n s p o r t i n g  food and 
raw m a t e r i a l s  t o  Germany, The second i n d i c a t i o n  was t h a t  by 
t h e  end of 1919 t h e  l a r g e r  German sh ipp ing  companies such as 
HAPAG and Norddeu tscher  Lloyd had begun t o  u n d e r ta k e  agenc ies  
f o r  l i n e s  running  t h e i r  fo rmer  f l e e t s ,  * By t h e  end of 1920 
t h e  major  German l i n e s  had ,  w i th  t h e  aid of a r rangem ents  such 
as t h e s e  and by means of c h a r t e r i n g ,  resumed most of t h e i r  p re ­
war s e r v i c e s , “"* I t  does  not  s eem t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  t h e  
s u r r e n d e r  of  t h e  German merchant  f l e e t  added s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t o  
Germany's pos t -w ar  economic d i f f i c u l t i e s .  The f i n a n c i a l  
e f f e c t s  of  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of ownership  were in a d i f f e r e n t  
c a t e g o r y ,  and w i l l  be t r e a t e d  s e p a r a t e l y .
The s u r r e n d e r  of r i v e r c r a f t  in  accordance  wi th  paragraph  
6 of Annex I I I  of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Chapter  and A r t i c l e s  339 and 
357 of t h e  T r e a t y  p roper  was of  even l e s s  economic s i g n i f i c a n c e  
th a n  t h e  d e l i v e r y  of t h e  merchant  f l e e t  in t h e  per iod  b e fo re
1,  W, Cuno, l o c .  c i t .
2,  ’’Report  o n , , .C o nd i t ions  in Germany,. ,1919" > P* 22.
3. The Econom is t . 18 December 1920,  p.  108 l .
4 .  See Appendix I .
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May 1921.  There  were no d e l i v e r i e s  under  t h i s  heading u n t i l
a s e r i e s  of  awards was made by an American a r b i t r a t o r  in t h e
cou rse  of 1921.  The f i r s t  of t h e s e ,  which was announced on
8 Janua ry  1921,  d i r e c t e d  t h a t  Germany should  " d e l i v e r  t o
France  254,150 to n s  in ba rges  and 23,760 r e g i s t e r e d  K.P.  in 
•1
t u g s " .  * The r e s u l t i n g  d e l i v e r i e s ,  which were completed by 
t h e  middle of  May 1921,  were t h e  only ones executed in t h e  
per iod  under  rev iew.  The d i s t u r b a n c e  which th e y  caused t o  
German in land  w a te r  n a v i g a t i o n  was s u f f i c i e n t ,  t o g e t h e r  w i th  
t h e  d e s i r e  of t h e  r e c i p i e n t s  t o  o b ta in  c r a f t  s u i t e d  t o  t h e i r  
p a r t i c u l a r  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  t o  prompt, an agreement t h a t  t h e  bulk
of boa ts  t o  be d e l iv e r e d  in t h e  f u t u r e  should be s p e c i a l l y
2 #
b u i l t  by Germany. But t h e  economic d i s l o c a t i o n  caused by 
t h e s e  d e l i v e r i e s  had been c o m p ara t iv e ly  s l i g h t  and s h o r t - l i v e d .
D e l i v e r i e s  of  A g r i c u l t u r a l  Equipment and L ives tock
D e l i v e r i e s  of a g r i c u l t u r a l  equipment and of l i v e s t o c k  
do not  appea r  t o  have c o n t r i b u t e d  much t o  t h e  d i s l o c a t i o n  of 
German a g r i c u l t u r e  a f t e r  t h e  war .  The p e r s i s t e n t  lowness of 
crop  y i e l d s  in t h e  e a r l y  post~v/ar y ea rs  was f o r  t h e  most p a r t  
due t o  t h e  con t inuance  of such war- t im e  phenomena as t h e  
s h o r t a g e  of  p h o s p h a te s .  According t o  a con temporary  German 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  e x p e r t ,  only  139»000 t o n s  of  an es t imated  need
3.
of 500,000 to n s  of  phospha te  was s a t i s f i e d  in t h e  year  1919- 20.
1. R«C«. V, Appendix XXXVII, p.  266.
2.  i b i d . ,  p .  146.
3 .  Dr.  Huber,  "Food C o n d i t io n s  and A g r i c u l t u r a l  P ro d u c t io n " ,  
Annals of t h e  American Academy of P o l i t i c a l  and S o c i a l
Sc jene e s . November 1920,  Vol.  92,  p.  135»
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The low p r i c e  of  a g r i c u l t u r a l  produce was a l s o  an impor tan t  
i n f l u e n c e ,  s i n c e  i t  d i s c o u ra g e d  farmers  from pu rchas ing  
c o m p a ra t iv e ly  expens ive  f e r t i l i s e r s  and a g r i c u l t u r a l
•j #
machinery  f o r  t h e  purpose  of improving t h e i r  l a n d ,  * Other
2 #
i n h i b i t i n g  f a c t o r s  were t h e  s h o r tag e  of l a b o u r  *and t h e  
d e a r t h  of c o a l ,  which was v i t a l  t o  numerous phases  of 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  a c t i v i t y . ' J * Compared with  f a c t o r s  such as t h e s e ,  
t h e  d e l i v e r i e s  of  a g r i c u l t u r a l  equipment which were made under  
A r t i c l e  3 of  t h e  Treves  Convention of  l6  J anuary  1919 and
4
under  A r t i c l e  238 of  t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a ty  were i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  
The l o s s  of  t h e  2500 machines ,  2000 waggons and 200 ,000  t o o l s  
which were d s l iv e r e d '* r c a y  have had a t e m p o r a r i l y  d i s l o c a t i n g  
e f f e c t  on a g r i c u l t u r a l  a c t i v i t y  when, e a r l y  in  1919> d e l i v e r i e s  
c o n s i s t e d  of t h e  a c t u a l  a r t i c l e s  w-hich had been removed from 
occupied t e r r i t o r i e s  du r ing  t h e  war .  But t h i s  d i s l o c a t i o n  was 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  reduced by t h e  a c t i o n  of t h e  French government 
in " s p e e d i l y  compounding f o r  t h e  r e s t i t u t i o n  of i d e n t i f i e d  
m a t e r i a l  by t h e  d e l i v e r y  of new m a t e r i a l " . ^ 1*
Paragraph  6 of Annex IV of t h e  R epa ra t ion  Chapter
demanded t h e  d e l i v e r y ,  w i th in  t h r e e  months of t h e  coming i n t o
7 #
f o r c e  of t h e  T r e a t y ,  of t h e  fo l low ing  an im a ls :
1. i b i d .  C f. J . S , Davis , op. c i t . ,  p. 155.
2. i b i d .
3. "Report o n . . .C ond i t ions in  Germany. . .1919"
4. See Appendix I .
5 . R . C , , V,  Appendix X, p. 204 .
6. i b i d . ,  p. 68.
7. See Appendix I .
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700 s t a l l i o n s
40.000 mares and f i l l i e s
4,000 b u l l s
180.000 cows
120.000 sheep
10.000 g o a t s  
15>000 sows.
Because of  t h e  de lay  in t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  T r e a ty  and 
because  of subsequent  h e s i t a t i o n s  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  
R e p a ra t io n  Commission, t h e s e  d e l i v e r i e s  d id  not  beg in  u n t i l  
March 1920. Nor even th e n  did  t h e y  proceed a t  t h e  speed
1 .
p r e s c r i b e d  by t h e  T r e a t y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in t h e  c a s e  of c a t t l e .
By May 1921 d e l i v e r i e s  of a l l  k in d s  under  t h i s  pa rag raph  and
2.
under  paragraph 2 of  Annex IV amounted t o  some 340,000 head .  
S ince  t h e  number of  an imals  d e l i v e r e d  amounted t o  as much as  
tv/o per  cent  of t o t a l  German h o ld i n g s  only  in t h e  case of 
c a t t l e ,  t h e  economic impact of d e l i v e r i e s  cannot  have been 
v e ry  g r e a t  b e f o r e  May 1921.  The numbers of German l i v e s t o c k  
were f a r  more h e a v i ly  in f l u e n c e d  by 3uch f a c t o r s  as  t h o
a v a i l a b i l i t y  of fodder  and,  in t h e  case  of c a t t l e ,  t h e  l e n g t h
3.
of t h e  b re e d in g  p r o c e s s . '
D e l i v e r i e s  of l i m b e r .  D y e s t u f f s .  P h a rm a c e u t i c a l  P ro d u c ts  and 
D e r i v a t i v e s  of Coal
L i t t l e  or  no economic d i s l o c a t i o n  was caused b e f o r e  May 
1921 by d e l i v e r i e s  of t i m b e r ,  d y e s t u f f s ,  p h a rm a c e u t i c a l  p ro d u c t s  
and c o a l  d e r i v a t i v e s .  Because of t h e  d e l a y in g  t a c t i c s  employed 
by t h e  German government,  d e l i v e r i e s  of t i m b e r  under  Annex IV of
1 .  R * C » ,  V , p .  133.
C  .  - u  • '  - »  ,  I ,  p .  £
3 . J . 3 .  D av is ,  op. c i t . ,  p.  154,
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th e  Reparation Chapter did not begin u n t i l  15 May 1921.'*
Although there  were shipments of d y e s tu f f s  from November 1919
2 .
and of pharmaceutical products from August 1920, t h e s e
aroused no adverse comment w ith in  Germany. Bergmann, a German
reparation  expert who was c r i t i c a l  of th e  manner in which other
d e l i v e r i e s  were extracted  from Germany, considered that they
were mad© " q u ie t ly  in a mutually s a t i s f a c t o r y  manner". This
was due p a r t ly  to  th e  r e l a t i v e l y  small q u a n t i t ie s  in v o lv ed , but
more to  th e  a b i l i t y  of th e  h ig h ly  organised German chemical
industry  t o  n e g o t ia te  e f f e c t i v e l y  and to  adjust  i t s  production
o
t o  th e  demands made upon i t * “'* The same was tru e  of d e l i v e r i e s
of co a l d e r iv a t iv e s  -  sulphate of ammonia, benzol and co a l ta r  -
n 4.under paragraph o of Annex V of th e  Reparation Chapter. These,
in the  words of a Reparation Commission r e p o r t ,  gave r i s e  t o
5 .
"no s p e c ia l  comment"." *
D e l iv e r ie s  of Coal
Coal d e l i v e r i e s  v'ere, a f t e r  th ose  of merchant shipping
and railway r o l l in g  s to c k ,  by fa r  th e  most va lu ab le  form of
6 .
reparation payment in th e  period before May 1921. They were, 
moreover, made continuously  and at an in creas in g  tempo from
1. R.C. . V, p. 138. For t e x t  of Annex IV: see Appendix I .
2. Under Annex VI of th e  Reparation Chapter ( s e e  Appendix I ) . 
R*C., V, pp. 109, I l 6 ,
3. C. Bergmann, The H istory  of R ep aration s , p. 86.
4. See Appendix I .
5 .  R» C , , V, p. 106. C. Bergmann, l o c .  c i t .
6 . Under Annex V of th e  Reparation Chapter (see  Appendix I ) .
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September 1919» Since th e  supply of co a l  a f fe c te d  the  
e f f i c i e n c y  of German in d u str y ,  communications and a g r ic u ltu r e ,  
reparation  coal d e l i v e r i e s ,  which reduced the amount of co a l  
a v a i la b le  in Germany, were l i k e l y  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  l e v e l  of German 
economic a c t i v i t y .
In o rd e r  t o  th row i n t o  r e l i e f  t h e  impact  of r e p a r a t i o n  
c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  on German domest ic  c o a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  i t  i s  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between t h r e e  p e r io d s  in which t h e  
l e v e l  of t h e s e  d e l i v e r i e s  was n o t i c e a b l y  d i f f e r e n t .  Between 
September 1919» when s u b s t a n t i a l  sh ipments  began ,  and December 
1919 "the average  r a t e  was 600,000 t o n s  a month.  This  average 
r o s e  t o  850,000 to n s  between Jan u a ry  and J u l y  1920; and,  in 
t h e  ensuing  n in e  months (August 1920 t o  A p r i l  1921),  i t  
reached 1,750 ,000 t o n s  ,  ^* A f t e r  ex p o r t s  had been deduc ted ,  t h e  
amount of c o a l  a v a i l a b l e  in t h e s e  p e r io d s  f o r  a l l  purposes 
( in c l u d in g  r e p a r a t i o n )  was:
( m i l l i o n  t o n s )
1211
Net 1 2 * 
Black Coal 
P roduc t ion
Brown Coal-** 
P roduc t ion  
( in  te rms 
of  b la c k  
c o a l )
T o t a l
4
E x p o r t s  ’Remainder
3 ep-Dec 
Ü 2 0
3 5 .7 7 .5 43.2 1 .8  41.4
J a n - J u l
1920-21
6 3 .9 13.7 7 7 .6 4 .5  7 3 .1
Aug-Apr 8 9 . I 20 .1 1 0 9 .2 4 .5  104.7
1, For f i g u r e s  of monthly d e l i v e r i e s  from Ja n u a ry  1920: R.C. ,V, 
Appendix XXI, p ,  229« For d e l i v e r i e s  between September 1919 
and 10 Janua ry  1920: ibid. ,  p,  95,
2, For f i g u r e s  of  monthly g ro s s  p ro d u c t io n  of b lack  co a l  and 
monthly p roduc t ion  of brown c o a l  ( l i g n i t e ) :  Supreme Economic 
Counc i l ,  Monthly B u l l e t i n  of S t a t i s t i c s , In t h e  case  of 
b lack  c o a l  "net  p ro d u c t io n * ^  g ro s s  p ro d u c t io n  l e s s  p i thead  
consumption.  In the  p re -w ar  p e r i o d ,  p i t h e a d  consumption was
(con t inued  fo o t  of  page 55)
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The e f f e c t  of r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  on c o a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n
in each of t h e s e  p e r io d s  was as  fo l lo w s :
( m i l l i o n  t 0  n s)
Amount a v a i l a b l e Reparation Amount a v a i l a b l e
b e fo r e  R eparation D e l i v e r i e s a f t e r  R eparation
m i
Sep-Dec 4 1 .4 2 .5 3 8 .9
1220 
J a n -J u l 7 3 .1 6 .0 6 7 .1
1920-21
Aug-Apr 104 .7 15.8 8 8 . 9
In o rde r  t o  ju dge  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  as
a cause  of t h e  coa l  s h o r t a g e  in  post-war  Germany, t h e s e  f i g u r e s  
must be compared w i th  t h o s e  f o r  c o a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  in Germany
(Continued from foo t  of page 54)
about 10$ of g r o s s  p ro d u c t io n :  J .M. Keynes, The
Economic Consequences of t h e  P e a c e , p.  8 l .  Because 
of t h e  l a r g e r  number of miners employed a f t e r  t h e  
war t h i s  f i g u r e  r o s e  t o  about 13$. See f i g u r e s  f o r  
p i th ead  consumption in  August-Sept  ember 1920 in J.W.F# 
T h e l w a l l ,  ’’G enera l  Report  o n . ,  .Germany in December, 
1920” , H, of C. P a p e r s . 1921, Cd. 1114, pp.  73-6 .
Cf.  G. Ltfbsen, "The German Coal S i t u a t i o n  and t h e  
R e p a ra t io n  D e l i v e r i e s ” , MGCRE, 7 September 1922,
pp. 4 2 7 -9 .
3 .  9 t o n s  o f  brown c o a l  was t h e  c a l o r i f i c  e q u iv a le n t  of
2 t o n s  of  b lack  c o a l :  C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op.  c i t . ,
pp.  192-3 Note .  There  was l i t t l e  or no p i t h e a d  
consumption of brown c o a l .
4.  No complete monthly f i g u r e s  f o r  German coa l  e x p o r t s  in 
1919-21 a r e  a v a i l a b l e .  The f i g u r e s  h e re  g iv e n  have 
been deduced from ( l )  monthly expor t  f i g u r e s  f o r  J u l y  
1919 t o  May 1920 in "Die Konferenz in Spa vom 5 b i s  16 
J u l i  1920",  R e i c h s t a g , V o l .  3&3> Anl.  187 , p .65;
(2) f i g u r e s  f o r  ave ra ge  monthly expor ts  in  1920 and 
1921 in  J .W.F .  T h e l w a l l ,  Report on . . .  Germany t o  March. 
1923, (Great  B r i t a i n .  Department of Overseas  T r a d e ) ,  
p .44;  and (3) f i g u r e s  f o r  August and September 1920 in 
J .W .F .  T h e l w a l l ,  ’’Genera l  Report on. . .Germany in  
December, 1920” , pp.  7 3 - 6 .
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in  1913 f  v i z ,
N e t 1 *
(m i  1 1 i o n  t 0 n s )
Brown Coal^* . T o t a l Net Remainder
Black Coal Product  ion Expor ts
Product  ion ( in  te rms of 
b lack  c o a l )
171 23.6 194.6 34 I 60 .6
For t h e  purposes  of comparison w i th  t h e consumption of p o s t -
war Germany t h i s  f i g u r e  must be reduced by 25*5 m i l l i o n  t o n s ,  
t h e  amount of  b lack  coa l  consumed in 1913 in  t e r r i t o r i e s  ceded
a f t e r  th e  war ,  v i z ,
( m i l l i o n  t o n s )
A l s a c e -L o r r a in e 11.1
Saar  Basin 5.8
S ch le sw ig -H ols t  ein
and Eupen Malmedy 0 .6
Foznania 2.6
Eas t  P r u s s i a  ( P o l i s h )
and Danzig 1 .5
Luxemburg 3.9
25 .5
F u r t h e r  d e d u c t io n s  must be made in r e s p e c t  of t h e  3 m i l l i o n
to n s  of b lack  coa l  consumed in 1913 by t h e  navy,  t h e  merchant
£
marine and t h e  war i n d u s t r i e s ;  and in r e s p e c t  of  t h e  0*3
m i l l i o n  t o n s  of brown c o a l  ( i n  terms of b lack  c o a l )  consumed
£
in  t e r r i t o r i e s  su b se q u en t ly  ceded.  * Thus t h e  1913 consumption
1. That  i s ,  g ro s s  p ro d u c t io n  of 190 m i l l i o n  t o n s ,  l e s s  19 
m i l l i o n  t o n s  p i thead  consumption .  Gross p ro d u c t io n  f i g u r e  
from: Supreme Economic C o u n c i l ,  Monthly B u l l e t i n  of S t a t i s t i c s .
2. Th is  f i g u r e  inc ludes  im por ts  of Bohemian brown c o a l :  s ee ,
J .W.F .  T h e l w a l l ,  ’’G enera l  Report on. . .Germany in December,
1920” , pp.  73-6.
3 . F ig u re  f o r  ne t  e x p o r t s  in 19131 G.Ltfbsen, op. c i t . ,  p .  4-27*
4.  For f i g u r e s  of consumption in ceded t e r r i t o r i e s :  Economic 
Review, 1 A p r i l  1921, p.  373* These d e d u c t io n s  a r e  almost  
c e r t a i n l y  too  l a r g e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in r e s p e c t  of t h e  l a t t e r  p a r t  
of 1919> when t h e  c e s s i o n s  of t e r r i t o r y  had not  been fo rm a l i s ed  
by t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  t r e a t y .  See below, p.58 Note 1.
5 .  Economic Rev iew , loc . c i t .
6.  T7F7F. T h e l w a l l ,  "Genera l  Report  on. . .Germany in December 1920",
PP .73-6 .
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of a l l  t y p e s  of c o a l  in pos t -w ar  Germany would have been:
l 60.6  -  28 ,8  = 131 .8  m i l l i o n  t o n s  a year
or
11 m i l l i o n  t o n s  a month.
The fo l l o w in g  t a b l e  compares t h e  amount of coa l  
a v a i l a b l e  in 1913 w i th  t h a t  a v a i l a b l e  in e a r l y  pos t -w ar  
Germany, and shows t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  d i s c r e p a n c y  was 
due t o  r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s .  The columns show:
(1) t h e  amount of r e p a r a t i o n  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s ;
(2) t h e  amount of c o a l  which was a v a i l a b l e  in 
Germany a f t e r  r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  had 
been made;
(3)  t h e  amount of c o a l  which would p robab ly  
have been a v a i l a b l e  i f  no r e p a r a t i o n  
d e l i v e r i e s  had been made;
(4)  t h e  amount of c o a l  which was a v a i l a b l e  in 
t h e  same a rea  and over t h e  same p e r io d  in
1913;
(5)  t h e  p e r c e n ta g e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between (2) and
(4 ) ;
(6)  t h e  p e r c e n ta g e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between ( 3 ) and 
( 4 ) .
In c a l c u l a t i n g  ( 3 ) i t  has  been assumed (a )  t h a t  o n e - th i r d
of t h e  c o a l  d e l i v e r e d  as r e p a r a t i o n  would o th e rw is e  have
been e x p o r te d ,  and (b) t h a t  German coa l  p r o d u c t i o n  would have
-|
been t h e  same i f  t h e r e  had been no r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s ,
1. Both of t h e s e  assumptions  a r e  hard t o  j u s t i f y .  Because of 
t h e  c o a l  s h o r t a g e  in Germany t h e r e  was s t r o n g  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  
i n c re a s e d  c o a l  e x p o r t s ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  th e y  were one 
of t h e  few means by which Germany could ea rn  f o r e ig n  
exchange; see  below, p.77  f o r  f u l l e r  d i s c u s s i o n .  The assump< 
t i o n  t h a t  t h e  l e v e l  of German c o a l  p r o d u c t io n  would have  
remained t h e  same is  a l s o  u n r e a l  in view of t h e  f i l l i p  g iven  
t o  output  by t h e  Spa Coal Agreement of J u l y  1920: see below,  
p . l 6 8 .  However, s i n c e  t h e  f i r s t  assumption  encourages an 
u n d e r - e s t  imat e,  and t h e  second assumpt ion an o v e r - e s t i m a t e ,  
of t h e  amount of  c o a l  which would have been a v a i l a b l e ,  i t  
can r e a s o n a b ly  be hoped t h a t  any e r r o r  w i l l  be c an c e l l ed  out
58
M i l l i o n t o n s Perc en tace
m i
(1) ( 2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sep-Dec
Ü 2 0







J a n - J u l
1920-21
6.0 67.1 7 1 a 77 87$ 32%
Aug-Apr 15.8 88.9 99 .5 99 30 100$
I t  can be seen t h a t  in t h e  f i r s t  two p e r i o d s ,  t h a t  i s ,  between 
September 1919 and J u ly  1920, t h e  s e v e r i t y  of t h e  coal  s h o r ta g e  
in Germany was due f a r  more t o  t h e  low l e v e l  of  p roduc t ion  th a n  
t o  t h e  s i z e  of r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s .  The l a t t e r  were 
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  only 4-5  p a r t s  of a t o t a l  la g  of 12-13$ behind 
t h e  1913 l e v e l  of  co a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  R e p a ra t io n  d e l i v e r i e s  
only became a major f a c t o r  in t h e  coa l  s h o r t a g e  between August 
1920 and A p r i l  1921 when, a l though  not i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  o v e r a l l  
d e f i c i e n c y ,  they  were r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a l l  of a 10$ lag behind 
t h e  1913 d i s t r i b u t i o n  l e v e l .
Although a h igh  deg ree  of accuracy  cannot  be claimed f o r  
t h e s e  f i g u r e s ’^ * and a l though  t h e y  concea l  month-to-month 
v a r i a t i o n s ,  t h e y  i l l u s t r a t e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  w e l l  t h a t  i t  was not 
u n t i l  t h e  l a t t e r  h a l f  of 1920 t h a t  r e p a r a t i o n  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s
1. I t  i s , in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e s t i m a t e  a c c u r a t e l y  t h e  
c o a l  needs  of pos t -w ar  Germany by 1913 s t a n d a r d s .  The 
f i g u r e  c i t e d  (132 m i l l i o n  t o n s )  i s  in danger  of being an 
und e r - e s t i m a t e  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  r e v e r s e .  See above,  p.  58,  
Note 4.  Such an u n d e r - e s t i m a t e  would make t h e  pos t-war  
c o a l  s h o r ta g e  appear  l e s s  s e r i o u s  t h a n  i t  r e a l l y  was; and 
would t h e r e f o r e  exagge ra te  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of 
r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  as a cause of t h i s  s h o r t a g e .  I f ,  
f o r  example,  in  t h e  per iod  September-December 1919» t h e  
c o a l  needs of Germany w ere ,  by 1913 s t a n d a r d s ,  12 m i l l i o n  
t o n s  a month r a t h e r  than  11 m i l l i o n  to n s  a month (132 
m i l l i o n  t o n s  p . a . )  t h e n  r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  ( 2 .5  m i l l i o n  
t o n s )  would have been r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  only 4 p a r t s  of a 
t o t a l  lag  of 19$ behind t h e  1913 d i s t r i b u t i o n  l e v e l .
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could have  had a n o t i c e a b l e  e f f e c t  on t h e  l e v e l  of  German 
economic a c t i v i t y .  The impress ion  conveyed by t h e  f i g u r e s  
i s  s t r e n g th e n e d  by t h e  n a t u r e  of contemporary com pla in t s  about 
t h e  c o a l  s h o r t a g e .  In t h e  wint  er  of 1919-20 many p e t i t i o n s  
were d i r e c t e d  t o  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of
i
i n d u s t r i e s  or reg io n s  s u f f e r i n g  from t h e  d e a r t h  of c o a l .  *
Although r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  were sometimes mentioned in
t h e s e  p e t i t i o n s  and in t h e  government ' s  r e p l i e s ,  t h e  main
emphasis was i n v a r i a b l y  on t h e  low l e v e l  of  p r o d u c t i o n ,
t r a n s p o r t  b o t t l e n e c k s  and th e  d i f f i c u l t y  of  a c h i e v in g  an
e e d i t a b l e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of c o a l .  An answer g iven  in December
1919 by a government spokesman t o  a p e t i t i o n  which dep lo red
t h e  t h r e a t  t o  employment caused by t h e  inadequacy  of t h e
supply  of c o a l  t o  i n d u s t r y  revea led  t h e  g e n e r a l  a t t i t u d e  t o
coa l  d e l i v e r i e s  a t  t h i s  t i m e .  Repara t ion  sh ipments  were
r e f e r r e d  t o  as  merely one of  a number of h igh  p r i o r i t y  demands
on German coa l  p r o d u c t io n ,  such as s u p p l i e s  t o  r a i l w a y s ,
gasworks ,  waterworks and power s t a t i o n s ,  which had t o  t a k e
precedence  ever t h e  needs  of  German i n d u s t r y .  * The f r e q u e n t
1. E . g .  ( l )  D ü ss e ld o r f  a r e a :  P e t i t i o n  of  E rk e len z  and
J ä c k e r ,  11 December 1919» N at  i  on a lv er  s ammlung , V o l .  340, 
Anl,  1746.
(2)  Aachen a r e a :  P e t i t i o n  of C e r t e l ,  l 8  December
1919,  i b i d . ,  V ol .  340,  Anl.  1844.
( 3 ) Rhenish-Westphali an  smel t ing  i n d u s t r y :  R e ich s ­
w i r t s c h a f t  sausschuss ,  6 December 1919» i b i d . ,  V o l .
341, Anl.  1946.
(4)  Lime and cement i n d u s t r y :  P e t i t i o n  of Dusche,
29 December 1919» i b i d . ,  V o l .  341? Anl.  I 876;
P e t i t i o n  of A s to r ,  14 A p r i l  1920, i b i d . ,  V o l .  342,
Anl.  2580.
2.  P e t i t i o n  of D i e t r i c h  and Löbe, 22 November 1919> i b i d . ,  
V o l .  339> Anl.  1522. Answered on 5 December 1919> i b i d . ,  
V o l .  331,  p ,  3850.
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co m p la in t s  in January  and February  1920 from t h e  P a l a t i n a t e  
and South Germany, which had p rev io u s ly  been h e a v i l y  dependent  
on t h e  Saar  f o r  t h e i r  c o a l  s u p p l i e s ,  provoked a s i m i l a r  
government r e a c t i o n .  The s h o r t a g e  of c o a l  in South Germany, 
a l though  aggrava ted  by d e l i v e r i e s  to  t h e  E n t e n t e ,  was 
a t t r i b u t e d  l a r g e l y  t o  t h e  f lo o d i n g  of t h e  Rhine;  and a r a i lw a y  
s t r i k e  in February  was advanced as t h e  majo r  reason  f o r  t h e  
s c a r c i t y  of f u e l  in t h e  F a l a t i n a t e ,  * Schmid t ,  t h e  M in i s t e r  
f o r  Economic A f f a i r s ,  a l s o  s t r e s s e d  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
problems involved  in gauging and s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  f u e l  needs of  
p r i v a t e  i n d u s t r y  d u r ing  t h e  pe r iod  of t r a n s i t i o n  from a war­
t im e  t o  a peace economy.
The im press ion  t h a t  i s  gained from p r o t e s t s  about t h e  
c o a l  s h o r t a g e  in th e  second h a l f  of  1920 i s  e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t .
I t  was g e n e r a l l y  complained t h a t  t h e  in c re a s e d  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  
which were made under  t h e  Spa Agreement between August 1920 
and Janua ry  1921 n o t i c e a b l y  reduced th e  amount of  co a l  a v a i l a b l e  
w i th i n  Germany, In August ,  a l though  s u p p l i e s  t o  e s s e n t i a l  
s e r v i c e s  were m a in ta in e d ,  t h e  amount of c o a l  d i s t r i b u t e d  f o r  
g e n e r a l  i n d u s t r i a l  purposes  f e l l  by 400,000 to n s  from i t s  J u l y  
l e v e l  of 4 ,768 ,000  t o n s .  Only p a r t  of  t h i s  d e f i c i e n c y  could 
be made up w i th  s u p p l i e s  of brown c o a l .^ *
1. Quest ion  of Kaussmann and o t h e r s ,  15 J a n u a ry  1920, i b i d , ,
V o l .  341, Anl.  1950: answered ,  13 F eb rua ry  1920,  i b i d . ,
V o l .  341> Anl.  2135« Q ues t ion  of  P i c k ,  3 March 1920, i b i d , ,  
V o l .  34 1 > Anl.  2284: answered ,  19 A p r i l  1920,  i b i d , ,  V o l ,
343, Anl.  2775.
2.  13 F ebruary  1920,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  341,  Anl.  2135.
3. "Report on t h e  Coal S i t u a t i o n  in Occupied Germany", 15 August 
1920, DBFF, X, p.  505.  S cho lz ,  29 November 1920,  R e i c h s t a g , 
V o l .  346, p .  1333.
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In October th e r e  were p r o te s t s  from the iron and s t e e l  
industry  t h a t ,  as a r e s u l t  of coa l d e l i v e r i e s ,  cer ta in  p lants  
were being forced to  slow down or even to  cease  production 
a l t o g e t h e r , 1  234* In mid-October an American observer reported  
th a t  th e  Spa coa l d e l i v e r i e s  were having "an exceedingly  
u p se tt in g  e f f e c t  on th e  iron trade" in Germany, Several b la st  
furnaces had been blown out and important iron working concerns 
in Bremen, Hamburg, C assel and Hanover which had in May been 
r e c e iv in g  82/£ of t h e ir  requirements were now r e c e iv in g  l e s s  
than 48/b.^* In October and November th e r e  were reports th a t  
some of th e  larger  firms were paying s ix  tim es th e  ru ling  
domestic p r ic e  fo r  imported American coal,""* F in a l ly ,  when 
th e  Reichstag, had reassembled a f t e r  i t s  summer r e c e s s ,  the
re p r e se n ta t iv e s  of th e  government jo ined  in th e  chorus of
4.
p r o t e s t ,
A ll  t h i s  evidence seems t o  in d ic a te  that in the period 
between August 1920 and A pril 1921 reparation d e l i v e r i e s  had 
an in h ib i t in g  e f f e c t  on German in d u s tr ia l  a c t i v i t y .  It has 
however been seen t h a t ,  although reparation d e l i v e r i e s  were a 
r e l a t i v e l y  more important cause of th e  coal shortage in th e s e  
months, th e  t o t a l  amount of co a l  which was a v a i la b le  was 
ex a c t ly  th e  same as in th e  preceding period . The only month
1 , The most a u th o r i ta t iv e  of th e s e  complaints are summarised
in J , ¥ ,F ,  T h elw all ,  "General Report, o n . . «Germany in December, 
1920", pp, 1 4 - l 6 .  For te x t  of telegram  addressed to  th e  
German government on 15 October by S t in n e s ,  V ögler , and 
Kirdorf: D ie Entwicklung der Reoaratio n s fr a g e , p .l5*
2, Iron A ge« 4 November 1920, p. 1234.
3 . i b i d . ,  2 December 1920, p, 1483»
4. E .g .  Fehrenbach, 22 October 1920, R e ich sta g , V o l.3 4 5 ,  p . 7^7 s 
S ch o lz ,  29 November 1920, i b i d . ,  V o l .  346, p. 1334.
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f o r  which t h i s  v'as not  t r u e  was August 1920,  when coa l
A
d i s t r i b u t i o n  was 82^. of i t s  p re -w ar  l e v e l .  * T h i s  was due
l a r g e l y  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  c o a l  p roduc t ion  had not  then  r i s e n
2 .
t o  t h e  h igh  l e v e l  i t  was t o  a t t a i n  in  su c c e e d in g  months.
For t h e  r e s t  of t h e  per iod  t h e  p r o t e s t s  of  German in d u s t r y  
must be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  l a r g e r  s i z e  of  r e p a r a t i o n  shipments 
r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  a d im inu t ion  of t h e  t o t a l  amount of  coa l  
a v a i l a b l e .
I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  m a in tenance  of th e
1 . D e t a i l e d  f i g u r e s  of  c o a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  in  August and S ep t ­
ember 1920 a r e  supp l ied  in  J .W .F .  T h e l w a l l ,  op.  c i t s u p r a , p p .  
73-6 .  T h e lw a l l  c a l c u l a t e d  t h a t  i n t e r n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  was 
73a August and 78$ in September of  i t s  1913 l e v e l .  
However, h i s  f i g u r e  of 12.4  m i l l i o n  t o n s  f o r  t h e  average 
monthly 1913 co a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  seems much t o o  h ig h .  (See 
above ,pp .76f . ) T h e l w a l l ' s  p e r c e n ta g e s  a r e  l e s s  m is lead ing  
th a n  t h o s e  of t h e  German c o a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  who main ta ined  
t h a t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  in August was 64/£ and in  September was
70/ of t h e  l e v e l  in 1913« These f i g u r e s  no t  only n e g le c te d  
t h e  r e d u c t i o n  of German consumption occas ioned  by c e s s io n s  
of t e r r i t o r y ,  t h e y  a l s o  r e f e r r e d  only t o  c o a l  d i s t r i b u t e d  
t o  p r i v a t e  i n d u s t r y ,  domest ic  consumers and a g r i c u l t u r a l ­
i s t s ;  and did not t a k e  i n t o  account  t h e  consumption of 
r a i l w a y s ,  gasworks and power s t a t i o n s  which was at  t h i s  
t im e  h ig h e r  than  t h e  1913 monthly a v e r a g e .  S ince  t h e s e  
p u b l i c  u t i l i t i e s  were an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  of t h e  German 
economy t h e r e  i s  no r ea son  f o r  showing t h e  l e v e l  of German 
c o a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  in t h i s  manner.
2 . Monthly p roduc t ion  of b la c k  c o a l  and l i g n i t e ,  accord ing  t o  
t h e  Month 1y Bu11e t i n  of St a t  i s t i c  s . was:
( m i l l i o n  t o n s )
Black Coal L i e n i t  e
J a n - J u ly  Av. 10 .5 8 .8
August 10 .8 9.7
September 11.6 10.1
Oct ober 11 .9 1 0 .5
November 1 1 .8 9 .8
Dec ember 11.9 10.1
Jan u ary 12 .0 10.1
F ebruary 12.0 10.0
March 11 .5 9 .9
A p r i l 9 . 0 10.4
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g e n e r a l  l e v e l  of  co a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  in t h i s  p e r i o d ,  e i t h e r  t h e
q u a l i t y  or  t h e  r e g u l a r i t y  of t h e  coa l  supp ly  v:as u n s a t i s f a c t o r y .
In November 1920 t h e r e  were com pla in t s  t h a t  t h e r e  was a s c a r c i t y
of h igh  g r a d e  c o a l  because  of t h e  q u a n t i t i e s  which were absorbed
1
by r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s .  However, i t  seems t h a t  t h e
p r o p o r t i o n  of high g rade  c o a l  demanded by th e  A l l i e s  under  t h e
3pa Agreement was w e l l  below t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  of  such c o a l  t o  t h e
2
t o t a l  German coa l  p r o d u c t i o n .  * Th i s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  any 
s h o r t a g e  of  h igh  g rade  c o a l  w i t h i n  Germany was p robab ly  due t o  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  These c e r t a i n l y  e x i s t e d ,  above a l l  
in October and November 1920,  when t h e  lowness of  t h e  Rhine 
reduced r i v e r  t r a n s p o r t  and so p laced  an i n o r d i n a t e  s t r a i n  upon 
t h e  German r a i lw a y  s y s t e m . “'* Any i n d u s t r i a l  d i s l o c a t i o n  
occas ioned  by t h i s  f a c t o r  ob v io u s ly  cannot  be blamed upon 
r e p a r a t i o n  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s .
■Whatever t h e  exac t  s t a t e  of  German c o a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
in t h e s e  months,  i t  seems t h a t  in c r e a s e d  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  were 
no t  t h e  major  f a c t o r  de t e rm in in g  t h e  l e v e l  of German p ro d u c t i o n .  
One i n d i c a t i o n  of t h i s  was t h a t  t h e  ave ra ge  monthly p roduc t ion  
of s t e e l ,  which v/as h ig h l y  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  supply  of c o a l ,  
i n c re a s e d  c o n s id e r a b ly  du r ing  t h e  pe r iod  of t h e  Spa Agreement,
1. R e s o lu t io n  l i e  of t h e  Committee f o r  t h e  Budget of t h e  
M i n i s t r y  of Economic A f f a i r s ,  19 November 1920,  Reichstage, 
V o l .  364,  Anl.  939.
2.  J .W.F.  T h e l w a l l ,  op.  c i t . ,  p .  18.
3.  i b i d . ,  p .  19; Iron Age. 2 December 1920,  p .  1483;
16 December 1920, p.  1623* Of.  a l s o  t h e  Amendment of 29 
November 1920 t o  t h e  R e s o lu t io n  of 19 November 1920 ( c i t e d  
above) :  Re i c h s t a g . V o l .  364,  Anl.  1002.
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. 1 .v 1Z  ,
( thousand t o n s )
1920 1121
Jan-Mar 660 813
A pr-June 727 758
J u ly -S e p 812 839
Oct-Dec 873 922
A second p o i n t e r  i s  provided  by t h e  f i g u r e s  f o r  unemployment.
The number of persons r e c e iv in g  unemployment r e l i e f  was 271>698 
on 1 June 1920 ( i t s  low est p o in t  f o r  t h e  y e a r ) .  This  f i g u r e  
ro s e  by 20^ t o  322,452 d u r in g  June ; by a f u r t h e r  25% t o  
403,815 d u r in g  J u ly  and by 2 ,5^  t o  414,672 in  August, But 
between 1 September and th e  end of November i t  d e c l in e d  s t e a d i l y  
by about l5/£ t o  350 ,087. T h is  t r e n d  was re v e rse d  from December
1920 onwards u n t i l ,  on 1 March 1921,  a month a f t e r  t h e  end of 
t h e  Spa Agreement,  a new peak was reached  wi th  a f i g u r e  of 
426 ,600 ,  * These f i g u r e s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  most dramatic  
i n c r e a s e  in  unemployment in 1920 occurred  b e f o r e  t h e  Spa 
Agreement, and t h a t  f o r  most of t h e  p e r io d  August 1920-Janua ry
1921 t h e  employment s i t u a t i o n  was improving .  Because of t h e  
. i n f l u e n c e  of  ex t raneous  f a c t o r s  on t h e  l e v e l  of employment, 
t h e s e  f i g u r e s  a r e  dangerous  t o  u se  as  a gu ide  t o  t h e  impact of  
coa l  d e l i v e r i e s .  But i t  seems t h a t  t h e r e  was,  a t  any r a t e ,  
no d e c l i n e  in economic a c t i v i t y  in  t h e  per iod  of t h e  Spa 
Agreement •
1 . C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op, c i t . ,  p . 198.
2. F ig u re s  from: J ,W,F ,  T h e l w a l l ,  ‘'Genera l  Repor t  on . . .Germany 
in December,  1920",  Appendix V I I I ,  p,  62; idem, "Report 
on . . .Germany t o  March, 1922",  p.  92; S c h o lz ,  29 November 
1920,  R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  346 , p,  1334.  For p e r c e n ta g e s  of 
unemployment among t r a d e  un ion  members in t h e s e  months; 
League of N a t io n s ,  Monthly B u l l e t i n  of S t a t i s t i c s .
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The l e v e l  of German in d u s tr ia l  a c t i v i t y  in fact  
depended la r g e ly  on the "behaviour of the  mark exchange. Any 
v io le n t  exchange d ep rec ia t io n  was l i k e l y  t o  in crease  
production both by s t im u la t in g  foreign demand for German 
exports and by inducing an unhealthy domestic ’’catastrophe  
boom” , which resu lted  from panic purchases of goods by persons  
who expected the buying-pow'er of th e  mark t o  d e c l in e  s t i l l  
fu r th e r .  On the other hand any rapid improvement of th e  mark 
could bring about in d u s tr ia l  stagnation  by discouraging fore ign  
buyers and by dampening th e  domestic demand fo r  goods amongst 
consumers who a n t ic ip a te d  th a t  the value of th e  mark would r i s e  
s t i l l  fu r th e r .
There is  evidence that exchange f lu c tu a t io n s  in fluenced
th e  l e v e l  of economic a c t i v i t y  during th e  period of th e  Spa
Agreement, when coa l d e l i v e r i e s  were at t h e ir  h e a v ie s t .  Between
A pril and June 1920 th e r e  had been something of an export boom'* *
and a quickening of in d u s tr ia l  a c t i v i t y  ( r e f le c t e d  in the f ig u r e s
for employment) in response to  the low, but gradually  r i s i n g ,
2
va lu e  of th e  mark. The v io le n t  improvement of th e  exchange 
in May had been la r g e ly  re sp o n s ib le  for  a tim e-lagged  rev ersa l  
of t h i s  trend and for  th e  in cr ea se  in unemployment between June 
and A u g u s t . T h e  gradual d e c l in e  of th e  mark which began la t e
1 • See above, p, 37.
2, J•H .W illiam s, ’’German Foreign Trade and th e  Reparation 
Payments” , Quarterly Journal of Economics. May 1922, V o l . 36 , 
P. 493.
3 , J ,S ,  D av is ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 165» The d o lla r  was worth 73 marks 
at the end of A p r i l ,  50 marks in mid-May and 37.25 marks on 
May 31, 1920: Die Pntwicklung. der Reparatio n s fr a g e , p, 13*
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1
in  August s t im u la t e d  e x p o r t s ;  * and t h e  more v i o l e n t
d e p r e c i a t i o n  which occur red  in  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of September
2.
awakened f e a r s  of a " c a t a s t r o p h e  boom", * In t h e  opinion 
of t h e  B e r l i n  co r responden t  of The E c o n o m is t , t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  
r e v i v a l  in ensuing months had "no b e t t e r  f o u n d a t io n  than  t h e  
i n c r e a s i n g  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  cu r rency  bo th  a t  home and 
a b r o a d " . 3* S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s t a g n a t i o n  which se t  in 
aga in  a f t e r  December 1920 was connected  w i th  t h e  d i sap p ea ran ce  
of t h e  s t im u lu s  of a f a l l i n g  exchange a t  a t im e  when t h e  wor ld ­
wide i n d u s t r i a l  r e a c t i o n  was beg inn ing  t o  make i t s e l f  f e l t  in
„ 4 .
Germany.
The f l u c t u a t i o n  of t h e  mark was p a r t i c u l a r l y  
i n f l u e n t i a l  on t h e  l e v e l  of i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t y  in August 1920 
when, because  of t h e  abnormally  low l e v e l  of c o a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  
r e p a r a t i o n  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  might have exe r t ed  t h e i r  most s e r io u s  
economic e f f e c t .  At t h e  end of August i t  was observed t h a t ,  
because  of t h e  c u r r e n t  i n d u s t r i a l  s t a g n a t i o n ,  t h e  c o a l  s h o r tag e  
caused by d e l i v e r i e s  under  t h e  Spa Agreement was a f f e c t i n g  t h e  
h ig h ly  s e n s i t i v e  i ron  and s t e e l  i n d u s t r i e s  l e s s  t h a n  had been 
f e a r e d .  The only a r e a  in  which i ro n  and s t e e l  p roduc t ion  was 
hampered by lack  of  coa l  was Upper S i l e s i a ,  where t h e  sh o r ta g e  
was caused not  by r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  but  by t h e  German-Polish
1. The E conom is t , l8  September 1920,  p.  437; I ron Age,
7 October 1920,  p.  9 1 6 .
2. The E conom is t . 25 September 1920,  p .  475; Iron  Age,
21 October  1920,  p.  1062.
3 . The Econom is t . 13 November 1920,  p .  866; i b i d . ,  1 January
1921, p. 15.
4. i b i d . ,  23 A p r i l  1921,  p. 825; J . S .  D a v is ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 144.
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r i o t i n g ; .  * I t  was not  u n t i l  a month l a t e r ,  when t h e  f a l l  of  
t h e  mark had s t im u la t e d  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t y ,  t h a t  t h e  same 
o b s e rv e r  d e s c r ib e d  t h e  lack  of c o a l  as  "a d i s t i n c t l y  l i m i t i n g  
f a c to r* ' .  Although t h e  c o a l  s h o r t a g e  con t inued  t o  be 
complained of in t h e  nex t  few months,  t h i s  was due as much 
t o  s e a s o n a l  t r a n s p o r t  b o t t l e n e c k s  as t o  any d e a r t h  induced by 
r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s . J * Moreover,  when t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
economic r e c e s s i o n  s t r u c k  Germany in t h e  e a r l y  months of 1921 
t h e  i n h i b i t i n g  i n f l u e n c e  exer ted  by c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  became 
r e l a t i v e l y  un im por tan t  as  a cause  of i n d u s t r i a l  s t a g n a t i o n .
The c o n t r i b u t i o n  of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  p ro v i s io n s  of t h e  
A rm is t i c e  agreements  and of t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y  t o  t h e  
economic d i s l o c a t i o n  of Germany b e f o r e  May 1921 was r e l a t i v e l y  
i n s i g n i f i c a n t  in  t h e  case  of  many d e l i v e r i e s  and ,  in the  
case  of d e l i v e r i e s  of r a i l w a y  r o l l i n g  s t o c k ,  merchant  sh ipp ing  
and c o a l ,  ex t remely  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i s o l a t e .  When d e l i v e r i e s  of 
r a i lw a y  m a t e r i a l  exe r t ed  t h e i r  s t r o n g e s t  e f f e c t  in 1919 t h e r e  
were many o th e r  powerfu l  f a c t o r s ,  such as t h e  poor c o n d i t i o n  of  
t h e  equipment which remained in  Germany, t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  u n r e s t  
of t h e  a f t e r m a t h  and s e a s o n a l l y - i n d u c e d  b o t t l e n e c k s  which he lped  
t o  make t h e  German r a i lw a y s  i n e f f i c i e n t • The s u r r e n d e r  of  t h e  
German merchant  f l e e t  was by no means t h e  major reason  f o r  t h e  
pos t -w ar  d i s l o c a t i o n  of German f o r e i g n  t r a d e ;  and i t s  economic
1. Iron Age. 23 September 1920,  p .  809 . ( B e r l i n  Corr .  29 August).
2.  i b i d . ,  21 October 1920,  p .  1062.  ( B e r l i n  C or r .  1 O c to b e r ) .
3.  i b i d . ,  l6  December 1920,  p .  1624; 27 J anuary  1921, p .265;
see above ,  p ,  63 .
4. The Econom is t . 23 A p r i l  1921,  p .  825.
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impact was so f tened  f i r s t l y  by t h e  u s e  of t h e  s u r re n d e re d  
v e s s e l s  in  1919 1°  t r a n s p o r t  merchandise  t o  Germany, and 
second ly  by t h e  speedy o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  r eco v e ry  of t h e  German 
s h ip p in g  l i n e s .  F i n a l l y ,  r e p a r a t i o n  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  were not 
t h e  main cause  of t h e  German c o a l  s h o r t a g e  except  du r ing  t h e  
per iod  of t h e  Spa Agreement; and,  even t h e n ,  th e y  were neve r  
t h e  most im por tan t  de te rm ina n t  of t h e  l e v e l  of economic 
a c t i v i t y .
6 9 .
SECTION I I I
THE DIRECT FINANCIAL IMPACT OF REPARATION FAYMENTS BEFORE MY 1921
( a ) R e p a ra t io n  Payments and Government Expend i tu re
R e p a ra t io n  payments inc reased  t h e  o u t l a y  of t h e  German 
government in  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  ways.  The owners of p r o p e r ty  
and goods d e l i v e r e d  t o  t h e  A l l i e s  had t o  be compensated out of  
p u b l i c  f u n d s .  The f i n a n c i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of t h e  r a i l w a y s ,  
which came under  f e d e r a l  c o n t r o l  in March 1920, were in c re as ed  
as a r e s u l t  of t h e  A rm is t i ce  d e l i v e r i e s  of r o l l i n g  s to c k .  And 
t h e  e x p e n d i tu r e  of t h e  government on such i tems as  unemployment 
r e l i e f  and food s u b s i d i e s  was inc reased  by economic d i s l o c a t i o n  
t o  which r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  may have c o n t r i b u t e d .
The o f f i c i a l  e s t i m a t e s  of t h e  va lue  of r e p a r a t i o n  
d e l i v e r i e s  which were made by both t h e  R epa ra t ion  Commission 
and t h e  German government a r e  of l i t t l e  us© in e s t i m a t in g  t h e  
ex ten t  t o  which r e p a r a t i o n s  inc reased  t h e  German budge ta ry  
burden .  The lo s s  of s t a t e  p r o p e r ty  in ceded t e r r i t o r i e s ,  t h e  
v a l u e  of which was c r e d i t e d  t o  Germany’s r e p a r a t i o n  a c c o u n t ,  
had no e f f e c t  on government e x p e n d i tu r e .  Moreover,  th e  
o f f i c i a l  f i g u r e s  fo r  t h e  v a l u e  of t h o s e  d e l i v e r i e s  which d id  
g ive  r i s e  t o  in c re a s e d  government expend i tu re  bo re  l i t t l e  
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  s i z e  of a c t u a l  d isbursem en ts  and did not  
i n d i c a t e  when t h e s e  d i sbu r sem en ts  were made.
The u s e l e s s n e s s  of A l l i e d  and German v a l u a t i o n s  
becomes c l e a r  when t h e  i n t e r n a l  burden of r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  
made b e f o r e  May 1921 i s  examined.  The Germans claimed in
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January  1921 t h a t  the y  had a l r e a d y  paid r e p a r a t i o n  t o  t h e  
v a l u e  of 21 b i l l i o n  gold marks in f u l f i l m e n t  of  t h e i r  
o b l i g a t i o n  under  A r t i c l e  235 of  ' the T r e a t y .  The R e p a ra t io n  
Commission l a t e r  es t im a ted  t h a t  payments and d e l i v e r i e s  made 
in acco rdance  with  A r t i c l e  235 were worth only 5»1 b i l l i o n  
gold m a r k s , ' *  However, t h e  f i g u r e s  f o r  T rea su ry  d i s b u r s e m e n t s ,  
which a r e  t h e  main ev idence  f o r  t h e  i n t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  impact 
of r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s ,  r e v e a l  t h a t  t h e  e x p e n d i tu r e  of  t h e  
German government a r i s i n g  out of t h e  e n t i r e  T r e a ty  was only  
232 m i l l i o n  gold marks in 1919-20 and 1 ,8  b i l l i o n  gold marks 
in 1920-21,  I f  d ed u c t io n s  a r e  made f o r  t h e  sums d i s b u r s e d  
in compliance with  t h e  T r e a t y  f o r  "purposes  o th e r  than  
r e p a r a t i o n "  and f o r  payments on account  of  c l e a r i n g  agreements 
under  A r t i c l e  296 of t h e  T r e a t y ,  t h e s e  f i g u r e s  a r e  reduced t o  
143 m i l l i o n  gold marks in 1919-20 and 888 m i l l i o n  gold marks 
in 1920-21.- '* These amounts,  a l though  by no means n e g l i g i b l e ,  
a r e  not  a dominat ing i t em in  annua l  ex p e n d i tu r e s  of 8 ,6  b i l l i o n s  
and 9,3 b i l l i o n s  or in t h e  d e f i c i t s  of 6 ,0  and 6 .1  b i l l i o n s  
which occur red  in t h e s e  y e a r s . 1 234 *
In t h e  budge ta ry  year  1920-21,  du r ing  which t h e  German 
rai lways f i r s t  became t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of t h e  f e d e r a l  govern­
ment,  t h e  r a i l w a y  d e f i c i t  amounted t o  t h e  enormous sum of 16 .38  
b i l l i o n  paper  marks." Although t h e  A rm is t i ce  d e l i v e r i e s  of
1 . R«C* * V, p.  l 6 . See Appendix I .
2. R»C• « I ,  p.  9.
3 . H.J .Moulton  and C.E,  McGuire, op. c i t . ,  pp .170-1 .
4.  C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op. c i t . ,  p ,  437 .
5* R e ich sh au sh a l t s r ech n u n g  1920,  R e i c h s t a g , V o l .  375»
Anl.  4883,  p. 57.
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r o l l i n g  s tock  must have  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h i s ,  t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  
impact was by no means a dominating one.  The es t imated  c a p i t a l  
v a l u e  of  t h e  d e l i v e r i e s  -  1 ,151  m i l l i o n  gold marks -  was, f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  only a q u a r t e r  of t h e  s i z e  of t h e  c a p i t a l  l o s s
i n f l i c t e d  on t h e  German r a i lw a y  system by pos t -w ar  t e r r i t o r i a l
1 #
r e a d j u s t m e n t s .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  in t h e  b u d g e ta ry  yea r  1920-21 
some 9 b i l l i o n  paper marks of  a t o t a l  e x p e n d i tu r e  of  34 ,4  b i l l i o n  
paper  marks was spen t  on t h e  r e p a i r  and replacement of r o l l i n g  
s t o c k .  * But much of t h i s  ex p e n d i tu re  was a t t r i b u t e d  by 
co n te m p o ra r i e s  t o  t h e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of equipment which had been 
a l lowed t o  occur du r ing  t h e  war and t h e  a f te rm a th , - '*  In any 
c a s e ,  e x p e n d i tu r e  on working c a p i t a l  was by no means t h e  only 
cause  of t h e  s i z e  of t h e  d e f i c i t .  Other i n f l u e n t i a l  f a c t o r s  
f r e q u e n t l y  c i t e d  were l a b o u r  s toppages ;  t h e  s h o r te n in g  of 
working hours  r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  t h e  e i g h t - h o u r  
day; t h e  u s e  of t h e  r a i lw a y s  as  a means of abso rb ing  unemployed 
w orke rs ;  and ,  above a l l ,  t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  r a i s e  f a r e s  and
4
f r e i g h t  r a t e s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  t o  cover  r a p i d l y  r i s i n g  c o s t s .
1 . A, B a r t e r ,  Die Deutschen Eisenbahnen im K r i e g e , p .  227.
2 . R e i ch s h au sh a l t s r ech n u n g  1920, l o c , c i t . ,  and p p . 410-11.
3.  ' i r t h ,  26 A p r i l  1920,  Nationalversammlung;« V ol .  333»
p .  5^45; idem, 27 October 1920,  R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  345, p . 796; 
R e i c h e r t  (DNVP), 17 March 1921, i b i d . ,  V ol ,  348, pp .3130-1;  
Wieland(DDF), i b i d ,  p,  3143*
4.  Debate on t h e  2nd Reading of t h e  Budgets of t h e  Railways fo r  
I 920/ I  and 1921/2,  i b i d . ,  17 March 1921,  V o l .  348,  p p . 3 1 l 6 f .  
Of, f i r t h  on 27 October 1920 concern ing  t h e  e f f e c t  of  t h e  
lowness of  f a r e s  and f r e i g h t  r a t e s :  "Wenn Post  und Eisenbahn 
i h r e  P r e i s e  genau so erhöht  h ä t t e n  oder h ä t t e n  erhöhen können 
wie d i e  I n d u s t r i e . . . .dann wäre n i c h t  nur  ke in  D e f i z i t  
vorhanden ,  sondern d i e  B e t r iebsve rw a l tungen  würden im Golde 
schwimmen können ( s e h r  r i c h t i g !  und H e i t e r k e i t ) :  i b i d . ,  V o l .  
345,  p.  796.
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Thus i t  36ems s a f e  t o  assume t h a t  a l th o u g h  t h e  A rm is t i ce  
d e l i v e r i e s  of  r o l l i n g  stock  in c re a s e d  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
embarrassment of  t h e  r a i l w a y s ,  t h e y  were not  a major cause 
of t h e  enormi ty  of t h e  d e f i c i t ,
The burden of unemployment r e l i e f  upon t h e  Reich was 
about  700 m i l l i o n  paper  marks between November 1918 and 31
March 1920,^* and 1,039 b i l l i o n  paper  marks in t h e  budge ta ry
2,
y e a r  1 9 2 0 / l .  * In a d d i t i o n  t o  d i r e c t  aid  t h e  government 
provided  i n d i r e c t  r e l i e f  by i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  p a y - r o l l  of t h e
p u b l i c  u t i l i t i e s .  In 1919/20 t h e  r a i l w a y s  employed over
3.
one m i l l i o n  persons  compared w i th  740,000 in 1913> and t h e
number of p o s t a l  employees was 120,000 h ig h e r  t h a n  b e f o r e  t h e  
4
war ,  * A commission of  enqu i ry  es t im a ted  in 1920 t h a t  t h e  
annual  cos t  of  t h i s  p r a c t i c e  t o  t h e  r a i l w a y s  was 1 ,5  b i l l i o n  
marks,-7 * Thus t h e  t o t a l  cos t  of bo th  d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  
unemployment r e l i e f  would have been between two and t h r e e  
b i l l i o n  paper  marks a y e a r .  The e x t e n t  t o  which d e l i v e r i e s  
of r a i lw a y  equipment and c o a l  were r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h i s  and 
o th e r  e x p e n d i tu r e s  occasioned  by economic d i s l o c a t i o n  cannot  
be e x a c t l y  c a l c u l a t e d .  But when t h e  d e l i v e r i e s  of  r o l l i n g  
s tock  were made in 1919 t h e r e  w ere ,  as  we have s e e n ,  o th e r  
f a c t o r s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  of t h e  r a i lw a y s  and o th e r  
f a c t o r s  b e s i d e s  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  of t h e  r a i l w a y s ,  such as
1, Brauns ,  4 August 1920,  i b i d , ,  V o l .  345 , P* 683 .
2, R e ich s h au sh a l t s r ech n u n g  1920,  i b i d , ,  l o c .  c i t . ,  p,  340.
3 , D eg le rk ,  17 March 1921, i b i d , ,  V o l ,  348,  pp.  3 H 7 -8 ;
A. S a r t e r ,  op.  c i t . ,  pp,  229-30*
4, C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i , op.  c i t . ,  p . l 8 8 .
5* The E conom is t . 4 December 1920,  p,  987*
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d e m o b i l i s a t i o n ,  p o l i t i c a l  upheava l  and g e n e r a l  pos t-war  
r e a d ju s tm e n t  which in f lu en ced  t h e  l e v e l  of  employment. The 
same s o r t  of  o b s e rv a t io n  may be  made about  t h e  e f f e c t s  of 
co a l  d e l i v e r i e s  when t h e y  began tow ards  t h e  end of 1 9 1 9 *
In t h e  w i n t e r  of 1919/20 t h e  s h o r ta g e  of r o l l i n g  stock 
and t h e  d e a r t h  of coa l  were d i r e c t l y  blamed f o r  in c re a s in g  
unemployment in s p e c i f i c  a r e a s  such as D ü s s e l d o r f , 1 ’ But i t  
seems c l e a r  t h a t  a t  t h i s  t im e  r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  were not  
t h e  main cause  of t h e  t r a n s p o r t  or  c o a l  s h o r ta g e s  which were 
complained o f ,  * Moreover,  when l a t e  in 1920 r e p a r a t i o n  
d e l i v e r i e s  became r e l a t i v e l y  more im por tan t  as  a cause of 
t h e  d e a r t h  o f  c o a l ,  t h e  l e v e l  of  employment seems t o  have 
been de termined  as much by t h e  behav iour  of  t h e  mark exchange 
as by t h e  s t a t e  of t h e  German coa l  supply ,^*  These g e n e r a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  seem t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t ,  j u s t  as  t h e y  were not  
t h e  main cause  of t h e  d e f i c i t  of t h e  r a i l w a y s ,  so r e p a r a t i o n  
d e l i v e r i e s  cannot  be blamed t o  any l a r g e  e x t e n t  f o r  t h e  
inc reased  e x p e n d i tu r e  of t h e  German government on unemployment 
r e l i e f .
The h igh  l e v e l  of government e x p en d i tu re  in t h e  e a r l y  
pos t -w ar  y e a r s  was in f a c t  a product  of t h e  g e n e r a l  domestic  
f i n a n c i a l  s t r a i n ,  economic d i s l o c a t i o n  and p o l i t i c a l  
r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  of t h e  war and t h e  a f t e r m a t h .  In t h e  budge ta ry
1. F e t i t i o n  of E rk e l e n z ,  J ä c k e r ,  11 December 1919»
?Ta t  io n a lv  er  Sammlung . V o l ,  340,  Anl,  1746; Quest ion of
Frau Agnes, 17 January  1920, i b i d . ,  Vol.  341, Anl,  2015:
answered ,  27 February  1920,  i b i d , ,  V o l ,  332,  p.  4537«
2.  See above ,  pp.  59-60 .
3. See above,  p p ,  65-7*
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year  1919- 2 0 , when a l l  e x p e n d i tu r e s  occasioned by t h e  
V e r s a i l l e s  T re a ty  amounted t o  2 b i l l i o n  paper marks , i n t e r e s t  
payments on t h e  p u b l i c  debt  amounted t o  some 9 b i l l i o n  paper 
marks; and e x p e n d i tu r e  on d e m o b i l i s a t i o n ,  t h e  winding-up of 
t h e  old army, p e n s io n s ,  food s u b s i d i e s ,  unemployment r e l i e f  
and on t h e  swol len  corps  of p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s  accounted f o r  most 
of t h e  r e s t  of t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  o u t l a y  of 90 b i l l i o n  paper 
m a r k s . I n  1920-21 t h e  f a l l i n g v a l u e  of money made i n t e r e s t  
payments of  some 13 b i l l i o n s  paper  l e s s  s i g n i f i c a n t  in a t o t a l  
e x p e n d i tu r e  of l60  b i l l i o n  paper  marks.  However, expend i tu re  
on s u b s i d i e s  t o  reduce  t h e  cos t  of  l i v i n g  remained high at  
11 b i l l i o n s ;  and t h e  burden of a l l  e x p e n d i tu r e  occasioned by 
t h e  T r e a ty  -  some 26 b i l l i o n s ,  out of which only 12 b i l l i o n s  
a ro s e  out of r e p a r a t i o n  payments p roper  - was no more th a n  th e  
in c re as ed  o u t l a y  caused by t h e  d e f i c i t  of t h e  newly n a t i o n a l i s e d  
r a i lw a y s  and by t h e  s u b s i d i e s  paid t o  s t a t e s  and communes in
compensation f o r  t h e  f i s c a l  revenues  which had in t h e o ry  been
2 .
t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  f e d e r a l  government by reforms in  1919- 20 ,
The in c re a s e d  e x p en d i tu re  of  t h e  f e d e r a l  government in t h e  two 
y ea rs  under  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  was t h e r e f o r e  due l a r g e l y  t o  th e  
w ar- induced  growth of t h e  n a t i o n a l  d e b t ,  t o  t h e  assumption by 
t h e  f e d e r a l  government of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  s o c i a l  and 
economic w e l f a r e  d u r ing  t h e  a f t e r m a t h ,  and t o  t h e  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n
1. Budget F i g u r e s :  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  C onference ,
B r u s s e l s ,  1920. Paper No, IV ( r e v i s e d  e d i t i o n ) ,  p,  l 6 7; 
H.J.Moulton  and C,E,  McGuire, op,  c i t . ,  p p , 1 7 0 - l ;  J . 3 ,
Dav is ,  op,  c i t . ,  pp.  144-5 .
2. 3ee be low,pp ,277-8 .Budge t  f i g u r e s :  R e ichshausha l t s rechnung  
1920 , l o c .  c i t , ,  pass im.
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of nominal  f i n a n c i a l  power which occurred  in t h e  pos t -w ar  
p e r i o d ,
(b ) R e p a ra t io n s  and t h e  Balance  of Payments
R e p a ra t io n  payments could have added d i r e c t l y  t o  
Germany's  e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  burden in t h e  pe r iod  b e fo re  
May 1921 i n s o f a r  as  t h e y  c o n s i s t e d  of cash or d e l i v e r i e s  of 
goods or c a p i t a l  equipment which would have  been e a rn e r s  or 
s a v e r s  of  f o r e i g n  exchange.  They could a l s o  have  added t o  
Germany’s e x t e r n a l  burdens i n d i r e c t l y  i f  t h e y  caused economic 
d i s l o c a t i o n  which occasioned  reduced ex p o r t s  and in c re a s e d  
im p o r t s .  In c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of 
payments made in  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  i t  w i l l  aga in  be n e c e s s a r y  
e i t h e r  t o  ig n o re  or t o  u se  w i th  cau t ion  t h e  v a l u a t i o n s  of t h e  
R e p a ra t io n  Commission and t h e  German government,  Whatever 
t h e i r  i n t r i n s i c  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  t h e s e  f i g u r e s  p ro v id e  no - 
t r u s t w o r t h y  i n d i c a t i o n  of t h e  f i n a n c i a l  impact of  t h e  
d e l i v e r i e s  in q u e s t i o n .
Cash payments b e f o r e  1 May 1921 were r e l a t i v e l y  
u n im p o r t a n t .  According t o  t h e  R epara t ion  Commission t h e y  
amounted t o  l e s s  than  90 m i l l i o n  gold marks,  of  which p a r t  
accrued  from t h e  s a l e  of v>ar m a t e r i a l  and th e  r e s t  r e p re s e n t e d  
c r e d i t s  extended by France  and Denmark f o r  t h e  v a l u e  of
1
p r o p e r ty  ceded under  t h e  T r e a t y ,
1* R«Ci, I ,  p ,  9
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D e l i v e r i e s  from c u r r e n t  output  were ,  in order  of
im p o r tan ce ,  c o a l  and coke ,  a n im a l s ,  dyes and chem ica ls ,  and
m i s c e l l a n e o u s  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  m a t e r i a l s .  A l l  of t h e s e  goods,
except  c o a l  and coke,  can s a f e l y  be c l a s s i f i e d  as p o t e n t i a l
e x p o r t s  or  import s u b s t i t u t e s .  D e l i v e r i e s  of t h i s  ty p e
( t h a t  i s ,  exc lud ing  c o a l  and coke) were valued  by one of t h e
S e c r e t a r i e s  of S t a t e  in  t h e  German Finance  M in i s t r y  a t  l 8 l
m i l l i o n  gold  marks^and by t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission a t  about
2
140 m i l l i o n  gold marks .  S ince  Germany was u s u a l l y  c r e d i t e d  
w i th  t h e s e  d e l i v e r i e s  a t  h e r  own domest ic  p r i c e s ,  which were 
o f t e n  lower than  world market  p r i c e s ,  t h e  adve r se  e f f e c t  upon 
t h e  German ba lance  of payments could re a s o n a b ly  bees t im a ted  
a t  t h e  h i g h e r  German f i g u r e  or  even a t  a round sum of 200 
m i l l i o n  marks*
The d e l i v e r i e s  of  24*3 m i l l i o n  t o n s  of c o a l  and coke 
which made up t h e  bulk of  r e p a r a t i o n  payments out of c u r r e n t  
ou tpu t  b e f o r e  May 1921 had s u r p r i s i n g l y  l i t t l e  d i r e c t  e f f e c t  
upon t h e  German ba lance  of  payments.  S ince  Germany was u nab le  
t o  import a s i g n i f i c a n t  amount of c o a l  in t h i s  p e r i o d ,  t h e  c o a l  
d e l i v e r e d  could not  be reckoned as  a p o t e n t i a l  import s u b s t i t ­
u t e .  Nor would t h e  major p a r t  of i t  have been used d i r e c t l y  
f o r  e x p o r t .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  amount of  co a l  exported  by 
Germany in  1913 -  34 m i l l i o n  t o n s  -  was f a r  h ig h e r  tha n  t h e  
6 m i l l i o n  t o n s  expor ted  in  1919 and t h e  6 or  7 m i l l i o n  to n s
1.  F .  S ch ro ed e r ,  op. e i t . ,  MGCHS. 28 September 1922,  p p , 474-6,  
c . R. C #, 3V , p . 6 •
3.  G. Lübsen,  ’’The German Coal S i t u a t i o n  and t h e  R epara t ion  
D e l i v e r i e s " ,  MGCRE, 7 September 1922,  p.  427.
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sold abroad in 1920 and 1921. * It i s  t r u e  a ls o  that coal  
was one of th e  few a r t i c l e s  with which Germany could earn 
th e  fo re ig n  exchange she needed t o  f in an ce  her e s s e n t ia l  
imports. But i t  i s  s t i l l  u n l ik e ly  th a t  th ere  would have been 
a s u b s ta n t ia l  increase  in German coal exports i f  there had 
been no reparation  d e l i v e r i e s .  Post-war Germany's supply of  
coa l for  a l l  purposes ( in c lu d in g  reparation) remained, a f t e r  
a c tu a l  exports  had been deducted, below th e  amount which had 
been consumed d o m est ica lly  in th e  same area in 1913* There was 
for  t h i s  reason strong domestic opposit ion  to  increased coa l  
exports.*"* As co a l production improved in 1920 and 1921, the  
pressure aga inst  exports might have eased . But th e  con sid erab le  
in crease  in coa l output which occurred in the  second h a lf  of 
1920 would not have been as great i f  th ere  had been no 
reparation  scheme. The th r e a t s  and th e  f in a n c ia l  inducements 
embodied in th e  Spa P rotoco l of July  1920 prompted th e  German 
miners to  prolong an overtime agreement which they had made 
early  in 1 9 2 0 .“"* I f  t h i s  spur t o  German production had been 
absent, th e  amount of coa l a v a i la b le  for  e i th e r  in tern a l  
d is t r ib u t io n  or fo r  export would have been lower than i t  was 
in f a c t .  For th e s e  reasons i t  seems s a fe  to  assume that no more 
than one-th ird  of th e  amount of coa l d e liv ered  as reparation
1. See above, p .55  Note 4.
2 . P e t i t io n  of S ch ilg e r  and Hagemann, 15 December 1919»
Nat ion a lv  er Sammlung.. V o l.  340, Anl. 17^3.
3. See below , p. 168.
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would o th e rw is e  have been e x p o r te d .  The maximum d i r e c t  
l o s s  t o  t h e  German b a l a n c e  of t r a d e  occas ioned  by co a l  
d e l i v e r i e s  b e f o r e  May 1921 was t h e r e f o r e  nc more tha n  one' 
t h i r d  of t h e  t o t a l  expor t  v a l u e  of t h e  coa l  in  q u e s t i o n ,
or  570 m i l l i o n  gold marks,  v i z ,
Amount  ^* Av. B r i t i s h V a l u e 1 23,
D el ivered  
( m i l l i o n  t o n s )
Export P r i c e  
per  to n
( m i l l i o n  gold marks)
m i
Jan-Dec 2.5 60/ - 150
1Q20
Jan-Dec 15.4 80/ - 1,232
1921 
Jan-Apr 6 .4 50/ - 320
T o t a l 24.3 1,702
However, s in c e  under t h e  Spa P ro to c o l  r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  of
c o a l  between August 1920 and January  1921 earned Germany some
4.
390 m i l l i o n  gold marks,  t h e  n e t  d i r e c t l y  u n fa v o u ra b l e  e f f e c t  
of t h e s e  d e l i v e r i e s  upon t h e  German b a lance  of  t r a d e  b e f o r e  May 
1921 was I 80 m i l l i o n  gold marks.  Thus t h e  t o t a l  l o s s  occasioned  
b e f o r e  May 1921 by d e l i v e r i e s  of  a l l  goods which were e i t h e r  
p o t e n t i a l  e x p o r t s  or import s u b s t i t u t e s  was, a t  t h e  m os t ,  380
m i l l i o n  marks v i z ,
M isce l laneous
Coal
( m i l l i o n  gold marks)
d e l i v e r i e s  200
ISO
T o t a l  3^0
1, F ig u re s  f o r  monthly d e l i v e r i e s :  R . C , , V, p,  229.
2,  Export  p r i c e s  f o r  German coa l  in t h i s  pe r iod  a r e  u n a v a i l a b l e .  
B r i t i s h  expor t  p r i c e s  a r e  a c l o s e  enough g u id e  in  t h i s  rough 
c a l c u l a t i o n .  They a r e  drawn from: The S t a t i s t , 24 Jan u a ry  1920, 
p. l59$  29 January  1921,  p , l 5 9 j  18 February  1922,  Supplement 
p .4 4 ,
3 ,  These f i g u r e s  a r e  h ig h e r  th a n  th o s e  of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commiss­
ion (R . C , , IV, p . 6 ) and th o s e  of F .S ch roede r  ( l o c , c i t . ) , s i n c e  
under  t h e  T r e a t y  Germany was c r e d i t e d  with  t h e  bulk  of h e r  
c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  a t  a r t i f i c i a l l y  low i n t e r n a l  p r i c e s .  See 
be low,  p .  144.
• n-«C , , IV , p , 2 0 ,4
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C a l c u l a t i o n  of t h e  impact on Germany's e x t e r n a l  
f i n a n c e s  of d e l i v e r i e s  of  c a p i t a l  equipment depends t o  an 
even g r e a t e r  ex ten t  upon su rm ise .  The annual  f o r e ig n  earn­
ings  of t h e  German merchant  f l e e t  b e fo re  t h e  war were 
e s t im a ted  a t  400 m i l l i o n  marks by a committee of exper ts  
appoin ted  by t h e  German government e a r l y  in 1921. * In 
c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  u n favou rab le  e f f e c t  on t h e  pos t -w ar  ba lance  
of payments of t h e  s u r r e n d e r  of  t h e  German merchant f l e e t  
i t  should be remembered t h a t  a c o n s id e r a b l e  amount of German 
merchant sh ipp ing  was e i t h e r  des t royed  or cap tu red  dur ing  t h e  
war*“' * F r o f i t s  would,  moreover,  have been reduced c o n s id e ra b ly  
by t h e  p o s t -w ar  d i s l o c a t i o n  of  t r a d e  and low f r e i g h t  rates.-}*  
F i n a l l y ,  from 1920 onwards t h e r e  must have been a g r a d u a l
i n c r e a s e  in t h e  e a rn in g s  of sh ips  which were e i t h e r  r e t a i n e d ,
4.
c h a r t e r e d  or co n s t ru c t e d  by t h e  German sh ipp ing  l i n e s .  For 
t h e s e  r ea s o n s  t h e  net  ba lance -o f -paym en ts  e f f e c t  of r e p a r a t i o n  
d e l i v e r i e s  of merchant sh ipp ing  could n o t ,  on t h e  most generous  
e s t i m a t e ,  have amounted t o  more t h a n  300 m i l l i o n  gold marks a 
y e a r .
D e l i v e r i e s  of r a i l w a y  r o l l i n g  stock  and of r i v e r  
s h ip p in g  may have a f f e c t e d  t h e  German ba lance  of payments by 
reduc ing  t h e  income from t r a n s i t  t r a f f i c  on German r a i lw a y s  and
1. The T im es . 11 Feb ruary  1921,  p.  9a» American commentators 
b as ing  t h e i r  c a l c u l a t i o n s  on a comparison w i th  t h e  p re-war  
ea rn in g s  of t h e  B r i t i s h  merchant f l e e t ,  a r r i v e d  a t  a f i g u r e  
of 500 m i l l i o n  gold marks: H,J .Moult  on and C.E.McGuire,
op.  c i t . ,  p.  290.
2. See above p.  48.
3.  J . 3 . D a v i s ,  op. c i t . ,  p p ,1 4 4 , l 6 0 .
4 .  See above p.  49 . For tonnage  launched in Germany in 1920
and 1921: see  below, p.  296 .
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and wate rw ays .  Earn ings  from t h i s  so u rc e  in  1913 have  been
■j
e s t im a ted  a t  100 m i l l i o n  gold marks. * The f i g u r e s  f o r  
1919-21 a r e  unknown, but  any r e d u c t i o n  of r a i l w a y  t r a n s i t  
t r a f f i c  should be a t t r i b u t e d  l e s s  t o  t h e  l o s s  of c a p i t a l  
equipment t h a n  to  g e n e r a l  t r a d e  d i s l o c a t i o n  and t o  t h e  
a l t e r a t i o n  of t r a d e  r o u t e s  caused by t h e  r e -d r a w in g  of t h e  
F c l i s h  f r o n t i e r s ,  Moreover,  in land  w a te r  t r a n s p o r t  was not 
a f f e c t e d  by c e s s io n s  of r i v e r  c r a f t  u n t i l  t h e  b eg in n in g  of 
1921; and even th e n  any f a l l i n g  o f f  in r e t u r n s  from t h i s  
source  was a l s o  due t o  t h e  "com pe t i t ion  of  abnormally  low 
r a i l w a y  r a t e s ,  and ex t remely  low w a te r  on t h e  r i v e r s " , - ' *
The l o s s  of f o r e i g n  exchange which occurred  in  t h i s  s e c t o r  
of t h e  German economy as  a r e s u l t  of r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  
could h a r d l y  have been as much as 50 m i l l i o n  marks a y e a r .
I f  t h e  annual  income from f o r e i g n  s e c u r i t i e s
4.
su r ren d e red  t o  t h e  A l l i e s  - say 40 m i l l i o n  gold marks -  i s  
inc luded  in th e  rec k o n in g ,  t h e  t o t a l  l o s s  of i n v i s i b l e  
income occasioned by r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  and payments would 
have been ,  a t  t h e  mos t ,  between 350 and 400 m i l l i o n  gold marks 
a y e a r ,  o r ,  du r ing  t h e  t h i r t y  months b e f o r e  May 1921,  a t o t a l  
of  between 875 and 1,000 m i l l i o n  gold marks.  I f  t h e  ne t  
l o s s e s  caused by cash payments (90 m i l l i o n  gold  marks)  and by
1. K .J .Moulton  and C.E,  McGuire, op.  c i t . ,  p .  266.
2. See above ,pp .  49-50.
3 , J . S ,  D av is ,  op. c i t , ,  p .  144,
4, I . e .  5f  y i e ld  on a f a c e  va lue  of 800 m i l l i o n  marks:
H.J.Moulton  and C.E.McGuire,  op. c i t . ,  p ,  288.
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d e l i v e r i e s  of goods from c u r r e n t  output  (380 m i l l i o n  gold 
marks)  a r e  added,  t h e  e n t i r e  burden placed upon t h e  German 
ba lance  of  payments by t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  scheme in t h i s  per iod 
was between 1,345 and 1,470 m i l l i o n  gold marks.  This  means 
t h a t  r e p a r a t i o n s  could p o s s i b l y  have worsened Germany'3 
e x t e r n a l  payments p o s i t i o n  by as much as 540 t o  590 m i l l i o n  
gold marks a y e a r .  T h i 3 i s  a c o n s id e r a b le  sum, but  i t s  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  i s  d im in ished  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  Germany's v i s i b l e  
t r a d e  d e f i c i t s  amounted t o  about  4.7 b i l l i o n  gold marks in 
1919> 2 .0  b i l l i o n  gold marks in 1920 and app rox im ate ly  0 .5  
b i l l i o n  in t h e  f i r s t  fo u r  months of 1921.
There  can be no doubt t h a t  t h e  German e x t e r n a l  t r a d e  
d e f i c i t  was,  l i k e  t h e  domest ic  budge ta ry  d e f i c i t ,  aggrava ted  
by any economic d i s l o c a t i o n  which was caused by t h e  v a r io u s  
t y p e s  of r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s .  But s u f f i c i e n t  evidence has  
a l r e a d y  been adduced *to prove t h a t  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  of 
r e p a r a t i o n s  t o  Germany'3 g e n e r a l  pos t -w ar  economic m a la i se  
was,  a p a r t  from being almost  im poss ib le  t o  i s o l a t e ,  r e l a t i v e l y  
un im por tan t  compared w i th  t h e  exhaus t ion  and d i s l o c a t i o n  which 
was produced both by t h e  war and by t h e  g e n e r a l  u n r e s t  of t h e  
a f t e r m a t h .  I t  must t h e r e f o r e  be concluded t h a t  t h e  i n d i r e c t  
e f f e c t  of r e p a r a t i o n  payments on Germany's e x t e r n a l  f in a n c e s  
v i a  t h e  l e v e l  of economic a c t i v i t y  was by no means of 
d e c i s i v e  impor tance  in t h e  per iod  b e fo re  May 1921.
1. See above,  pp .  37-8.
S ince  German export  f i g u r e s  in c lu d e  t h e  v a l u e  of goods 
d e l i v e r e d  as r e p a r a t i o n ,  t h e  r e a l  s i z e  of t h e  t r a d e  gap was 
g r e a t e r ,  and t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of r e p a r a t i o n s  
p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  s m a l l e r .
2.  See above ,pp .  72-3.
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SECTION. IV
THE INDIRECT FINANCIAL II. FACT OF REPAKaT ION PAYMENTS 
BEFORE Ma Y 1 9 2 1 : PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PO LITIC A L REPERCUooIONS
It has been seen th a t  the  in tern a l  and ex te r n a l  economic 
d is lo c a t io n  of Germany b efore  May 1921 would have been ser io u s  
i f  no reparation  payments had been made. It has a l s o  been seen 
that th e  high l e v e l  of government expenditure and th e  large  
s i z e  of th e  fore ign  trad e  d e f i c i t  in t h i s  period cannot be 
a ttr ib u ted  t o  any large  extent t o  reparation d e l i v e r i e s .
However, th e  f in a n c ia l  i n s t a b i l i t y  of the  post-war period was 
due t o  other fa c to r s  b es id es  th e  extent of government spending 
and th e  width of th e  tra d e  gap. Domestic in f la t i o n  could have 
been checked i f  th e  excess  purchasing power of th e  German 
community had been absorbed e i th e r  by ta x a t io n  or by public  
borrowing; and th e  ser ious external d ep rec ia t ion  which occurred 
would have been im possib le  i f  Germany*s f lo a t in g  debt abroad 
could have been absorbed by means of a la r g e - s c a le  fo r e ig n  loan .  
In fa c t  i t  w/as la r g e ly  th e  i n a b i l i t y  of th e  German government t o  
ach ieve  such in tern a l  absorption and external co n so l id a t io n  which 
caused th e  d e te r io r a t io n  of Germany's f in a n c ia l  p o s i t io n  in the  
period b e fo re  May 1921.
The reparation question  almost c e r ta in ly  made i t  
p s y c h o lo g ic a l ly  and p o l i t i c a l l y  more d i f f i c u l t  fo r  th e  German 
government to  increase  i t 3 f i s c a l  revenues and t o  f l o a t  domestic  
or fore ign  lo a n s .  D e l iv e r ie s  made under th e  A rm istice  and under 
A r t ic le  235 of the  V e r s a i l l e s  Treaty aroused domestic i l l - f e e l i n g  
because th ey  occurred at a time when Germany's economic problems
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were a c u t e  and because  t h e y  ran  c o u n te r  t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of  
v o c a l  and powerful  groups w i t h i n  German s o c i e t y .  Any r e s e n t ­
ment t h u s  gene ra ted  would have inc reased  t h e  r e l u c t a n c e  of t h e  
Germans e i t h e r  t o  v o t e  or  t o  pay t a x e s  or  t o  lend t o  t h e  
government,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  government revenues  appeared  l i k e l y  
t o  be devoted t o  r e p a r a t i o n  payments,  A s i m i l a r l y  u n d e s i r a b l e  
p s y c h o lo g i c a l  impact would have been ex e r t ed  both  i n s i d e  and 
o u t s i d e  Germany by t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  over Germany’ s t o t a l  
r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n  which began a t  t h e  P a r i s  Peace  Conference 
in 1919 and cont inued  in 1920 and 1921. The p e r s i s t e n t  
d e l u s i o n s  of prominent groups  in A l l i e d  c o u n t r i e s  conce rn ing  
t h e  b a s i s ,  amount and mode of c o l l e c t i o n  of  t h e  German debt  and 
t h e  c a l c u l a t e d  vagueness  of both A l l i e d  and German n e g o t i a t o r s  
on t h i s  s u b j e c t  d id  not  improve t h e  German governm en t’ s chances 
of r a i s i n g  loans  e i t h e r  a t  home or ab ro ad .  On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  
t h e  cou rse  of r e p a r a t i o n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  b e f o r e  May 1921 was more 
l i k e l y  t o  encourage d i s in v e s t m e n t  in Germany in t h e  form of 
both c a p i t a l  export  by Germans and t h e  3 a l e  of marks by 
f o r e i g n e r s .
An account  of t h e  v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  
q u e s t i o n  b e f o r e  May 1921 must be g iven b e f o r e  any e s t i m a t e  can 
be made of  t h e i r  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  and psycholog­
i c a l  im pac t .  Once t h i s  impact has been a s c e r t a i n e d  i t  w i l l  be 
p o s s i b l e  t o  compare t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  problem w i th  t h e  o t h e r  
powerfu l  f a c t o r s  which c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of 
t h e  German government’ s e f f o r t s  t o  i n c r e a s e  i t s  i n t e r n a l  and
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e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  s t r e n g t h  b e f o r e  May 1921.
( a ) D e l i v e r i e s  under t h e  A r m is t i c e  b e f o r e  t he S ign a tu r e  of t h e  
V e r s a i l l e s  Treaty
The r e p a r a t i o n  problem exc i ted  u n f a v o u ra b le  comment 
w i t h i n  Germany soon a f t e r  th e  end of t h e  war.  Cons iderab le  
i l l - f e e l i n g  was aroused by t h e  p r o v i s io n s  of t h e  A rm is t i ce  of 
11 November 1918 and of t h e  subsequent  conven t ions  which 
pro longed i t  fo r  t h e  d e l i v e r y  by Germany of v a r io u s  k inds  of 
p r o p e r t y .  The demand f o r  r a i l w a y  equipment con ta ined  in t h e  
o r i g i n a l  A rm is t i c e  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  o b j e c t i o n a b l e  a t  a t im e  
when, a f t e r  fou r  yea rs  of war ,  t h e  German r a i lw a y  system was 
on th e  v e r g e  of exhaus t ion ."^’ The same could be sa id  of t h e  
p ro v i s io n s  of  t h e  TrW es  Convention of  16 January  1 9 1 9 ,^ ’which 
made t h e  r enew al  of t h e  A rm is t i c e  c o n d i t i o n a l  upon t h e  
d e l i v e r y  of  q u a n t i t i e s  of a g r i c u l t u r a l  equipment ( A r t i c l e  3) 
and ,  more im p o r ta n t ,  of t h e  g r e a t e r  p a r t  of t h e  German merchant 
f l e e t  ( A r t i c l e  5 ) .  Although i t  was s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  d e l i v e r y  of 
sh ip s  was in tended  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  supply ing  of  food t o  
Germany and t h a t  t h e  f i n a l  d i s p o s a l  of t h e  v e s s e l s  was not  
a f f e c t e d ,  t h e  u l t i m a t e  f a t e  of t h e  s h ip s  was obv ious .  This  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  d e l i v e r i e s  had not 
been foreshadowed in t h e  o r i g i n a l  A rm is t i c e  were enough t o  
a rouse  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e s e  demands in Germany. But t o  make 
m a t t e r s  worse  t h e  d e l i v e r y  of t h e  sh ip s  became l inked  dur ing  
t h e  co u r s e  of n e g o t i a t i o n s  between Janua ry  and March 1919 wi th  
1 • See above ,  pp.  45-6.
2.  R . I . I . A . ,  The German T r e a t y , pp.  288-91.
85
t h e  q u e s t i o n  of t h e  commenceraent of food im por ts  in to  Germany. 
The Germans i n s i s t e d  t h a t  no sh ips  were t o  he handed over 
u n l e s s  t h e  A l l i e s  e i t h e r  ag reed  t o  f i n a n c e  German food imports  
th ro u g h  c r e d i t s  or al lowed t h e  use of f o r e i g n  s e c u r i t i e s ,  gold 
and o th e r  l i q u i d  a s s e t s  which th e  German government had been 
ordered t o  r e t a i n  as a p ledge  f o r  r e p a r a t i o n  payments*1 2’ 
However, t h e  United S t a t e s  government was r e l u c t a n t  t o  p rov ide  
c r e d i t  and t h e  French government u n w i l l i n g  t o  permit  Germany 
t o  spend h e r  r e p a r a t i o n  p l e d g e s .  As a r e s u l t ,  t h e r e  was a 
dead lock  which caused both  t h e  s u r r e n d e r  of  t h e  sh ips  and t h e  
commencement of food d e l i v e r i e s  t o  be delayed  u n t i l  15 March
1919.
These even ts  d id  not  i n c r e a s e  German goo d -w i l l  
tow ards  t h e  A l l i e s ;  nor  did  they  c r e a t e  t h e  r i g h t  atmosphere 
f o r  speedy f i n a n c i a l  r e fo rm .  However, t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  
A rm is t i c e  d e l i v e r i e s  which occurred  in t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly 
r e v e a l e d  t h a t  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  demands of  t h e  A l l i e s  would not 
be by any means t h e  only o b s t a c l e  t o  t h e  im plementa t ion  of a 
programme of in c re as ed  t a x a t i o n  and government bor rowing .  A 
few days a f t e r  t h e  Assembly had met f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e ,  t h e  
r i g h t - w i n g  o p p o s i t i o n  groups moved an i n t e r p e l l a t i o n  which
1. A r t i c l e  X E  of t h e  A rm is t i c e  of 11 November 1918,  i b i d . ,
p. 276. Keynes r e f e r s  in t h i s  connec t ion  t o  "a supplement­
a ry  A rm is t i c e  of December 1918, which was n e g o t i a t e d  by 
French and Belg ian  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  w i thou t  t h e  knowledge 
of England or America” . J .M. Keynes, Two Memoirs, p .2 2 .
2.  Die Entwicklung de r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p. 8 . For an 
account  of n e g o t i a t i o n s ;  Brauns,  Nat ionalversammlung .
10 March 1919, V o l .  326 , p .  632 .
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censured  t h e  government f o r  i t s  conduct of t h e  A rm is t i c e
n e g o t i a t i o n s .  The p r o t e s t  of  V ögle r  (People*s  P a r t y ) ,  who
1.
spoke f i r s t  t o  th e  i n t e r p e l l a t i o n ,  t h a t  i n f l u e n t i a l  groups 
in A l l i e d  c o u n t r i e s  were c o n s p i r i n g  t o  r u i n  t h e  German 
economy was i n c i d e n t a l  t o  a b i t i n g  a t t a c k  upon t h e  government 
p a r t i e s  and above a l l  upon E r z b e r g e r ,  t h e  l e a d e r  of t h e  
German A rm is t i ce  Commission. The government,  V ög le r  compla ined,  
had n e i t h e r  f u l f i l l e d  i t s  promise  t h a t  i t  would n e g o t i a t e  
w i th  t h e  E n t e n t e  on an eq u a l  f o o t i n g  nor  had i t  shown any 
s p i r i t  in r e s i s t i n g  u n f a i r  A rm is t i ce  t e r m s .  The peace  had been 
l o s t  and German i n d u s t r y  had been c r ip p l e d  l a r g e l y ,  in  V ögle r  *s 
o p in i o n ,  because  E rz b e rg e r  had ,  f o r  p a r t i s a n  r e a s o n s ,  excluded
t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of German i n d u s t r y  from t h e  A rm is t i c e
2 .
n e g o t i a t i o n s .  in  h i s  r e p l y  t o  t h e s e  c h a r g e s ,  E r z b e r g e r  e i t h e r
■a
cons t rued  t h e  A rm is t i ce  terms i n  an o p t i m i s t i c  manner-'* or p leaded 
f o r c e  ma.ieure as t h e  reason  f o r  t h e i r  h a r s h n e s s .  V ö g le r ,  he 
remarked w r i l y ,  had " i n s i s t e d  on f o r g e t t i n g  t h e  no t  un im por tan t
4
f a c t  t h a t  (Germany) had u n f o r t u n a t e l y  l o s t  t h e  w a r" .  * But t h e  
most t e l l i n g  p a r t  of E rz b e rg e r* s  speech came when he c h a r a c t e r i s e d  
t h e  e f f o r t s  of heavy i n d u s t r y  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  t h e  A rm is t i ce  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  as a form of t e r r o r i s m  by t h e  e r s t w h i l e  govern ing  
c l a s s e s  which would be t o l e r a t e d  n e i t h e r  by R epub l ican  Germany nor
77 ibidTT 18 February  1919, V o l .  326 , " p .  ly zIF .
2.  For a summary of t h e  d i s p u t e  over t h i s  i s s u e  which occurred  
l a t e  in  1918 between E rz b e rg e r  and t h e  n o r t h - w e s t e r n  group 
of  t h e  V ere in  D eu tscher  E i s e n -  und S t a h l i n d u s t r i e l l e r  v id e :  
Memo of J a n .  1919 in G. Stresemann,  N a c h l a s s . 6917/138933-7»
3.  N a t i o n  a 1v e rs  ammlung. l 8 February  1919» V o l .  326,  p .  143.
4 .  i b i d . ,  p .  145. Cf.  M öl le r  (SPD), a t  p . 1 4 7 .
87
by t h e  A l l i e s . ^ *  The p a r t i s a n  and not  s t r i c t l y  a c c u r a t e  charge  
t h a t  t h e  i n t e r p e l l a t i o n  was mere ly  an a t t a c k  on t h e  government 
by heavy i n d u s t r y  was e l a b o ra te d  by o th e r  government speake r s  * 
and soon gained  wide cu r ren cy  in t h e  dem ocra t ic  p res s , - '*
That  so much of  t h e  d e b a t e  concern ing  t h e  A rm is t i c e  
d e l i v e r i e s  should have been absorbed in r e c r i m i n a t i o n  and 
c o u n t e r - r e c r i m i n a t i o n  of t h i s  s o r t  shows t h a t  t h e  r e a c t i o n  of  
t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly was t o  a l a r g e  ex ten t  de te rm ined  by 
pure ly  domest ic  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  t e n s i o n s .  I t  i s  u n d e n ia b le
t h a t  t h e r e  was from t h i s  t im e  onwards c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i s t r u s t  of
4,
A l l i e d  i n t e n t i o n s ;  bu t  t h i s  was only one of s e v e r a l  f a c t o r s  
which would de te rm ine  t h e  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  Assembly t o  
f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y ,
(b ) The R ep a ra t io n  Chapter  of t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y
The R epara t ion  Chapter" *as i t  was p re s e n te d  t o  t h e  
German government in May 1919 con ta ined  much t h a t  could have  
made both Germans and f o r e i g n e r s  e i t h e r  h e s i t a n t  or u n w i l l i n g  
t o  suppor t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s t o r a t i o n  of Germany, The "war 
g u i l t "  c l a u s e  ( A r t i c l e  231) appeared t o  b ase  t h e  A l l i e d  c l a im  
t o  r e p a r a t i o n  on an a s s e r t i o n  which was w ide ly  r ega rded  in 
Germany as  u n t r u e  and which had not  been accepted  by Germany 
in  t h e  p r e -  Armist i c e  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  The German Peace D e le g a t io n
77 i b i d . ,  p.  142.  '  "
2.  E . g .  G röber (Zen t rum ) , i b i d . ,  p,  148,
3.  Stresemann t o  V ö g le r ,  26 F ebruary  1919» N a c h l a s s ,
6917/137095-6.
4.  Scheidemann (SPD), Nationa lversam mlung< 26 March 1919»
V ol .  327 ,PP. 8ö7t809.
5 .  Vide  Appendix I .
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claimed w i th  j u s t i c e  t h a t  t h e  i n s i s t e n c e  of t h i s  A r t i c l e  
t h a t  t h e  war had "been imposed upon t h e  E n t e n t e  "by t h e  
a g g r e s s io n  of  Germany and h e r  a l l i e s "  was i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  
A t h e  Lansing Note of 5 November 1918, which e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e
A l l i e d  r i g h t  t o  r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  damage done by " th e  a g g re s s io n
1 *
of Germany by la n d ,  by sea and from t h e  a i r " .  In t h e  
l a t t e r  t h e  word " a g g re s s io n "  had t h e  l i m i t e d  sense  of " a t t a c k "  
or " in v a s io n "  whereas in A r t i c l e  231 i t  was used t o  connote 
German r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  w a r , T h i s  apparen t  l i n k a g e  
of Germany's r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n  with  h e r  a l l e g e d  "war g u i l t "  
i n e v i t a b l y  inc reased  t h e  r e l u c t a n c e  of many Germans t o  su p p o r t  
f i n a n c i a l  measures which would d i r e c t l y  or  i n d i r e c t l y  f a c i l i t a t e  
t h e  payment of r e p a r a t i o n ,
A second f e a t u r e  of t h e  R ep a ra t io n  Chapter  which 
encouraged doubt about t h e  f u t u r e  f i n a n c i a l  and economic 
v i a b i l i t y  of Germany was i t s  menacing vagueness  as  t o  t h e  
e x ten t  of Germany's l i a b i l i t y .  A r t i c l e  232 d e f in e d  t h e  damage 
f o r  which r e p a r a t i o n  was payable by quoting  t h e  words of t h e  
Lansing Note a l r e a d y  r e f e r r e d  t o  and adding t h e  p h r a s e ,  "and in 
g e n e r a l  a l l  damage, as  de f ined  in Annex I I  h e r e t o " .  Th is  
a d d i t i o n ,  which was made n e c e s s a r y  by t h e  i n c l u s i o n  of pens ions  
and s e p a r a t i o n  a l lowances  among t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  of damage, 
c r e a te d  an im pression  of a r b i t r a r i n e s s .  A r t i c l e  233 d e l e g a te d
1, Note of  F r e s id e n t  Wilson t o  t h e  German Government,  5 November
1918: in A, Luckau,  The German D e lega t ion  at  t h e  F a r i s  *
Feace Confe rence , p,  147*
2, German Notes of 13 May and 24 May 1919 on R e p a ra t io n s  and 
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y ;  German Coun te rp roposa l s  of 29 May 1919; 
i b i d . ,  pp.  241-2,  268-72,  3^8-9 .
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t o  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission t h e  f i n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
f i x i n g  t h e  amount,  form and mode of payment of  Germany's 
l i a b i l i t y .  But t h e  only d i r e c t i o n  given t o  t h e  Commission 
was t h a t  i t  should c o n s id e r  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  and c a p a c i ty  of 
Germany and g iv e  German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  an o p p o r tu n i ty  t o  
be h e a r d .  The p robab le  s i z e  of  Germany's t o t a l  o b l i g a t i o n  
was h i n t e d  a t  in a d e p r e s s i n g  manner by t h e  s t i p u l a t i o n  of 
p a r a ,  12(c)  o f  Annex I I  t h a t  bonds t o  t h e  v a l u e  of 100 b i l l i o n  
gold marks ( t h e  m a jo r i t y  of them c a r r y i n g  i n t e r e s t )  should be 
i s sued  by t h e  German government a t  i n t e r v a l s  t o  be determined 
by t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission, The in c l u s i o n  of pens ions  and 
s e p a r a t i o n  a l lowances  in  t h e  b i l l  and t h e  absence  of  any t i m e  
l i m i t  on payments a l s o  encouraged t h e  c o nc lu s ion  t h a t  Germany's 
o b l i g a t i o n  would be immense. The d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  of t h e  
German Peace D e lega t ion  w i th  a l l  t h e s e  f e a t u r e s  of  t h e  
R e p a ra t io n  Chapter  can be gauged from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  in i t s  
c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s  i t  o f f e red  t o  assume a f ix e d  t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y  
of  only 100 b i l l i o n  marks on t h e  c o n d i t io n  t h a t  t h i s  sum would 
r o t  bea r  i n t e r e s t  and t h a t  payments would not begin u n t i l  1927«^* 
I f  Germany’s f i n a n c i a l  l i a b i l i t y  were c a l c u l a t e d  in accordance  
w i th  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  l a i d  down in t h e  R ep a ra t io n  Chapter  she  
"would be conf ron ted  w i th  a s imply  f a n t a s t i c  sum, an ind e b ted n ess  
which ( she)  could not  hope t o  d i s c h a r g e  even w i th  g e n e r a t i o n s  
of  t h e  h a r d e s t  l a b o u r " .  The r e s u l t  of t h i s  would be t h a t  " th e  
German people  would f e e l  the m se lves  condemned t o  s l a v e ry "  and 
t h a t  "any a b i l i t y  and i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  pay t a x e s  would d i s a p p e a r " .
1 i b i d , ,  p .  353
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F ur the rm ore ,  i t  •would be im poss ib le  " to  f l o a t  new loans  a t  
home or a b r o a d . . .  .when t h e  s e r v i c e  of such a loan  would be 
j e o p a r d i s e d  by t h e  p rev ious  cha rge ,  of an a c t u a l l y  u n l im i t e d  
sum, upon a l l  p o s s i b l e  means of payment",
The f e a r s  of t h e  German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  about t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  im p l i c a t i o n s  of  t h e  R epa ra t ion  Chapter  ran p a r a l l e l  
t o  t h e i r  c o n v ic t io n  t h a t  t h e  d e t a i l e d  economic p ro v i s io n s  of 
t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Chapter  t o g e t h e r  w i th  t h e  o th e r  economic 
c l a u s e s  of  t h e  t r e a t y  would d e p r iv e  Germany of t h e  i n t e r n a l  and 
e x t e r n a l  economic s t r e n g t h  which was n e c e s s a r y  i f  she was t o  
s u r v i v e  as  a modern i n d u s t r i a l  s t a t e  or a t  any r a t e  t o  be 
capab le  of  paying r e p a r a t i o n /  * The s u r r e n d e r  of "such im por tan t  
means of p ro d u c t io n "  as  t h e  merchant  f l e e t  which was p r e s c r ib e d  
in  Annex I I I  would "unavo idab ly  lead t o  a break-down, and in  
consequence ,  t o  t h e  a b s o l u t e  impotence of t h e  German economic 
appara tus" , ' ' '*  The d e l i v e r y  of machinery ,  a g r i c u l t u r a l
equipment and l i v e s t o c k  demanded by Annex IV could e a s i l y  lead
4.
t o  t h e  " d i s o r g a n i s a t i o n  of Germany's i n d u s t r i a l  l i f e " .
In t h e  m a t t e r  of c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  (Annex V) Germany was w i l l i n g  
t o  d e l i v e r  a maximum of 20 m i l l i o n  t o n s  a year  t o  F rance ,  but  
t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  op t ions  p r o j e c t e d  fo r  sou thern  and e a s te rn  
European c o u n t r i e s  were " m a t e r i a l l y  im p o ss ib l e " . " *  In view of
1. i b i d . ,  p p . 382- 3 *
2. German Note of 13 May 1919? on Economic Q u e s t io n s ,  i b i d , ,  
p ,  243; German Coun te rp roposa l s  of 29 May 1919» i b i d . ,  
P .3 5 1 .
3,  i b i d . ,  p .  354.
4,  i b i d . ,  p.  346.
5* i b i d . ,  p .  358.
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a l l  t h e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  t h e  German government made i t s  
o f f e r  t o  pay r e p a r a t i o n  c o n d i t i o n a l  upon t h e  r e t e n t i o n  of  t h e  
German merchant  f l e e t ,  t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  of t h e  i n d u s t r i a l
1.
system and t h e  main tenance  of Germany’ s t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y .
A f u r t h e r  major sou rce  of a n x i e ty  t o  t h e  German 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  was t h e  a r b i t r a r y  power which t h e  R e p a ra t io n  
Chapter  appeared t o  g iv e  t o  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission. Grave 
f e a r s  were expressed  in t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e  about  t h e  a l l e g e d  
combined e f f e c t  of A r t i c l e  241 (a g e n e r a l  p r o v i s i o n  t h a t  
Germany should agree  t o  any l e g i s l a t i o n  n e c e s s a r y  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  
r e p a r a t i o n  payments)  and p a r a .  12(b) of  Annex I I ,  which gave 
t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission powers t o  examine and approve  t h e  
German system of t a x a t i o n .  These s t i p u l a t i o n s ,  t h e  Germans 
c o n s id e r e d ,  ’’would mean t h e  a b s o l u t e  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r o l  of
Germany by t h e  A l l i e s ,  and t h e  complete m as te ry  on t h e i r  p a r t
2.
over t h e  budget  of t h e  Empire" .  I f  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  
Commission was empowered both  t o  o rder  t h e  im p o s i t io n  of new 
t a x e s  and t o  de te rm ine  how t h e  revenues  of t h e  German s t a t e  
were t o  be spen t  "then  indeed (was) German democracy d e s t ro y e d  
a t  t h e  v e ry  moment when t h e  German p e o p le ,  a f t e r  mighty  e f f o r t s ,
3 .
was on t h e  po in t  of e s t a b l i s h i n g  i t " .
I t  was a l s o  f e a r e d  t h a t  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission 
would become economic as w e l l  as  f i n a n c i a l  d i c t a t o r  of Germany. 
Paragraph  4 of Annex IV d i r e c t e d  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission t o
1.  i b i d . ,  pp.  351 -2 .
2 . i b i d . ,  p.  383,
3 .  i b i d . ,  p.  385 .
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d ecide  how much machinery, a g r ic u l tu r a l  equipment and l i v e ­
stock could be demanded from Germany. Although i t  was s ta ted  
th a t  th e  Commission should "take in to  account such domestic 
requirements of Germany as i t  (deemed) e s s e n t ia l  for  the  
maintenance of Germany's s o c i a l  and economic l i f e " ,  th e  German 
rep r e se n ta t iv e s  objected t o  "the one-s idedness  of th e  
d e c is io n s  and povi er of th e  Commission". They th e r e fo r e  
suggested th a t  a German commission should be se t  up t o  consider
in p a r a l l e l  t o  the  Reparation Commission "the question  of th e
-1
r e h a b i l i t a t io n  of economic production". * A further fear
was expressed that the power given t o  th e  Reparation Commission
under paragraph 2 of A r t ic l e  240 t o  e l i c i t  information as to
th e  productive resources of Germany would enable i t  t o  pry
in to  German trade 3 ecr e t3 ,  above a l l  those  of th e  chemical 
2
industry.""’ F in a l ly ,  i t  was a l le g e d  th a t  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  
Reparation Commission under A r t ic l e  251 t o  decide how much 
food and raw m ater ia l were needed by Germany was "the negation  
of economic se lf -d e te r m in a t io n  and in i t ia t iv e " . ' '*  From a l l  
th e s e  observations th e  German r e p r e se n ta t iv e s  concluded that  
"the Reparation Commission and th e  extraordinary p len itude of  
power which the draft of th e  peace t r e a t y  provided for i t"  was 
th e  instrument by which Germany was t o  be subjected  t o  
"pressure and s u r v e i l la n c e  f i n a n c i a l l y ,  economically and 
p o l i t i c a l l y  in a manner unexampled in  the h is to r y  of the
1. ib i d . ,  p . 356
2 . i b i d . ,  p, 361
3 . i b i d . ,  p, 304
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c i v i l i z e d  w o r ld " .1. 2
The d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  of th e  German rep re se n ta t iv es  
with th e  s t ip u la t io n s  of th e  Reparation Chapter about the  
b a s is  and amount of Germany’ s reparation o b lig a t io n  and about 
th e  powers of th e  Reparation Commission was not diminished by 
th e  exchange of notes which took p lace  in May and June 1919*
In a sen se  t h i s  continued German d iscon ten t was u n r e a l i s t i c  
in view of th e  many s p e c i f i c  reassurances and genera l
p r o te s ta t io n s  of good in t e n t i  ore which were contained in the
2 #
A llied  Reply of l 6 June, * But both th e  or ig in  and th e  
continuance of German fea rs  can be understood i f  i t  i s  
r e a l i s e d  that both th e  draft Reparation Chapter and th e  A ll ie d  
Reply were shaped l e s s  by th e  idea of producing a reparation  
scheme which was p o l it ic a l ly  acceptab le  to  Germany or f in a n c ia l ly  
and econom ically p ra c t ic a b le  than by a concern t o  make 
a s s e r t io n s  and t o  e s ta b lish  claims which would not disappoint  
th e  exp ecta t ions  of A ll ied  public op in ion . I t  was th e  
am bigu ities  and d e fe c t s  caused by t h i s  preoccupation which 
o r ig in a l ly  caused the  German rep r e se n ta t iv e s  to  "read in to  th e  
con d it ion s  of peace, in c le a r  d e f ia n ce  of t h e i r  express term s,  
an in te n t io n  which was not th e r e " ,-*  And i t  was t h i s  same 
fa c to r  which u lt im a te ly  caused th e  German f in a n c ia l  and 
economic experts t o  report on 19 June t o  t h e ir  government that
1 . i b i d . ,  p. 382.
2 . i b i d . ,  pp. 411-72.
3* A l l i e d  Reply of l 6 June 1919» i b i d . ,  p. 447,
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t h e  A l l i e d  r e p l y  of 16 June expressed  ’’even more p o in t e d ly  
t h a n  t h e  Cond i t ions  of Peace p re sen te d  t o  us on May 7 t h e  
d e s i r e  of t h e  A l l i e s  t o  r u i n  Germany econom ica l ly  and t o  f o r c e  
h e r  t o  p ro v id e  t h e  A l l i e s  w i th  a l l  t h e  means t o  t h i s  end" !>
I t  was on t h e  q u e s t i o n  of ’’war g u i l t ” t h a t  t h e  A l l i e s  
proved l e a s t  ab le  t o  r e a s s u r e  t h e  German government.  
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y ,  A r t i c l e  231 had o r i g i n a l l y  been i n s e r t e d  in 
t h e  t r e a t y  on t h e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h a t  i t  was m ere ly  an a f f i r m a t i o n  
of Germany’ s t h e o r e t i c a l  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  c o s t  of  t h e  
war which did not  a f f e c t  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  r eco g n i se d  in A r t i c l e  
232, which t h e  p r e - A r m is t i c e  agreements imposed on t h e  A l l i e d  
r i g h t  t o  r e p a r a t i o n s .  The "war g u i l t "  c l a u s e  was t h e r e f o r e ,  in 
i t s  o r i g i n s ,  merely a sop t o  Anglo-French p u b l i c  opin ion  which 
was i r r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Chapte r .  * I t  was only when 
German n o t e s  and c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s  cha l lenged  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of 
A r t i c l e  231 and when t h e  A l l i e s ,  both out of g enu ine  c o n v ic t io n  
and f o r  p o l i t i c a l  r e a s o n s ,  defended i t  t h a t  a c l e a r  connec t ion  
came t o  be a f f i rm ed  between Germany’s r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n  
and h e r  a l l e g e d  moral  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  w ar .  * I t  i s  not  
s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t h e  German Peace D e leg a t io n  complained t h a t  in 
t h e  A l l i e d  Note of 16 June " t h e  fo u nda t ions  upon which th e
1. F i n a l  Report  of t h e  F i n a n c i a l  and Economic E x p e r t s  t o  t h e  
German Government,  19 June 1919» i b i d . ,  p ,  489.
2. P .M .B u rn e t t ,  R epara t ion  a t  t h e  P a r i s  Peace C o n fe re n c e ,
V o l .  1,  pp. 66-70.
3 . A l l i e d  Note of 20 May 1919 R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and R e p a ra t io n ;  
A l l i e d  Reply t o  t h e  German C o u n te rp ro p o s a l s ,  l6  June 1919? 
A.Luckau,  op. c i t . ,  pp. 254,  438-41.  For an e x h au s t iv e  
d i s c u s s i o n  of t h i s  t o p i c ,  v i d e ,  P .M .B u rn e t t , op,  c i t . ,
V o l .  1,  pp,  142-157.
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whole t r e a t y ,  d e v i a t i n g  from t h e  agreed Wilson programme,
(had) been b a s e d ,  v i z . ,  t h e  a s s e r t i o n  of Germany’ s s o l e  g u i l t  
f o r  t h e  World War, (had) been i n t e n s i f i e d  in a way t h a t  (was)
-i
both h a t e f u l  and d i s h o n o r a b l e ” . *
The A l l i e s  had l i t t l e  more success  in calming German 
f e a r s  on t h e  su b je c t  of t h e  t o t a l  r e p a r a t i o n  l i a b i l i t y .  Here 
again  t h e  f e a t u r e s  of  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Chapter  which were a 
source  of  concern t o  t h e  German government were l a r g e l y  t h e  
product  of  compromise des igned  t o  avoid g i v i n g  o f fence  t o  
A l l i e d  p u b l i c  op in ion .  B r i t i s h  and French r e l u c t a n c e  t o  name 
d e f i n i t e  f i g u r e s  which might d i s a p p o i n t  domestic  hopes had led  
t o  t h e  a dop t ion  of a p ro p o s a l  submitted t o  t h e  Counci l  of Four 
on 28 March 1919 t h a t  Germany’ s t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y  should not  be 
named in  t h e  t r e a t y  but  should be s e t t l e d  a t  a l a t e r  d a t e  by a 
" c e n t r a l  i n t e r a l l i e d  commission".  * S im i l a r  r easons  lay  behind 
t h e  i n c l u s i o n  of pens ions  among t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  of  damage. The 
French and B r i t i s h  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  had been u n w i l l i n g  f o r  f e a r  
of domestic  c r i t i c i s m  t o  agree  upon a d e f i n i t e  ma themat ica l  r a t i o  
t o  govern t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of r e p a r a t i o n  r e c e i p t s  between t h e  
v a r i o u s  b e n e f i c i a r i e s .  They had t h e r e f o r e  favoured t h e  idea 
of l e a v in g  d i s a g r e e a b l e  d i s c u s s i o n s  over t h e  q u e s t i o n  of 
a p p o r t io n m en t ,  l i k e  t h o s e  over Germany’ s t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y ,  t o  a 
commission which would,  in Lloyd George’ s words,  "examine t h e  
f ac t s" .~ '*  I t  became obv ious ,  however,  t h a t  t h e  p ro j e c t e d
1. Report  of  t h e  German Feace D e lega t ion  t o  t h e  German 
Government: A. Luckau,  op.  c i t . ,  p, 4-83.
2.  F . Mant oux, Les D e l i b e r a t i o n s  du C onse i l  des Oust r e , V o l .1 ,  
p.  58* Text  of t h e  K lo tz  p ro p o s a l '  in  T . i . B u r n e t  i , op. c i t . ,  
V o l .  1,  pp.  726-54.
3.  F.  Mantoux, op. c i t . ,  V o l .  1,  p.  6 l .
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commission which was t o  a l l o t  payments among t h e  A l l i e s
would be in f luenced  by t h e  r u l i n g  of t h e  t r e a t y  on what
c a t e g o r i e s  of damage were a d m i s s i b l e .  The B r i t i s h  d e l e g a t i o n
was, moreover,  f u l l y  aware t h a t  i f  only m a t e r i a l  damage was
admit ted  t h e  s ha re  of r e p a r a t i o n  acc ru in g  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h
Empire would be r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l .  * Accord ing ly ,  Lloyd George
in s e r t e d  a p r o v i s io n  f o r  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  of  pens ions  and
s e p a r a t i o n  a l lowances  in  a d r a f t  of t h e  Klotz  p ro p o s a l  which
2
he submit ted  t o  t h e  Counci l  of Four on 29 March. * The French 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  d id  not  oppose t h e  s u g g e s t i o n ,  probably  because  
of i t s  s t r o n g  e l e c t o r a l  a p p e a l . " *  F i n a l l y ,  W ilson ,  under
p r e s s u r e  from Lloyd George,  who " i n s i s t e d  u n q u a l i f i e d l y  f o r
t h e  i n c l u s i o n "  of  p e n s io n s ,  d i s r e g a rd e d  t h e  a d v i c e  of h i s
4.
l e g a l  a d v i s e r s  and supported  t h e  scheme.
One of  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  which led Wilson t o  agree  t o  X. 
t h e  i n c l u s i o n  of pens ions  was h i s  assumption t h a t  because  of
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a t ime l i m i t  on r e p a r a t i o n  payments t h e  e x t r a  
ca tegory  of damage would not  a f f e c t  t h e  t o t a l  sum paid by 
Germany but  only t h e  manner of  d i s t r i b u t i o n . " *  However, w i th i n  
fou r  days of t h e  d e c i s i o n  on p e n s io n s ,  t h e  t im e  l i m i t  - and w i th
i t  t h e  l a s t  v e s t i g e  of f i n a n c i a l  p r e c i s i o n  in t h e  R epa ra t ion
1. About 20/f, Cf.  P .M .B urne t t ,  op. c i t . ,  V o l .  1,  p. 6 l .
For Lloyd George’s awareness of t h i s  p o i n t :  E x t r a c t  from
Cable from House t o  Wilson r e g a r d i n g  a confe rence  with  
Lloyd George and Clemenceau,  7 March 1919> i b i d . ,  p,  6 6 l .
2. i b i d , ,  pp.  754-6.
3« i b i d . ,  pp,  6 l - 2 ,
4.  D u l l e s ’ Memorandum r e p o r t i n g  Wilson *s d e c i s i o n  on P ens ions ,  
1 A p r i l  1919, i b i d , ,  pp.  775-6.
5 .  Minutes of t h e  Counc il  of Four ,  5 A p r i l  1919» i b i d , ,  p,829> 
(D a v i s ) .
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Chapter  -  had been d i s c a r d e d .  The B r i t i s h  and French 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  on t h e  Counci l  of Four ,  u n c e r t a i n  as to  
Germany's c a p a c i t y  t o  pay w i t h i n  any p r e s c r ib e d  p e r io d ,  had 
been u n w i l l i n g  t o  run t h e  r i s k  of r ed u c in g  h e r  o b l i g a t i o n s  
unduly by s e t t i n g  a d a t e  a t  which payments should c e a se .
Th is  u n w i l l i n g n e s s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i th  American r e a d i n e s s  t o  
compromise,  had led t o  t h e  w aiv ing  of t h e  t ime l i m i t  and had 
caused Germany's t o t a l  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n ,  which now inc luded  
p e n s io n s ,  t o  be double d .
The deep domestic  and f o r e i g n  pess imism about Germany's 
f i n a n c i a l  f u t u r e  caused by t h e  d e t e rm in a t io n  of t h e  European 
A l l i e s  t o  r e s i s t  any l i m i t a t i o n  of h e r  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s  
could only have been a l l a y e d  by t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  f l o t a t i o n  of  a 
l a r g e - s c a l e  long - te rm  German i n t e r n a t i o n a l  lo a n .  Such a loan 
had in  f a c t  been proposed a t  P a r i s  in A p r i l  1919 by M*
Keynes as a p a r t  of h i s  g e n e r a l  "Scheme f o r  t h e  R e h a b i l i t a t i o n
2
of European C red i t  and f o r  F inanc ing  R e l i e f  and R e c o n s t r u c t i o n " .  
Keynes had suggested  t h a t  Germany should i s s u e  bonds wi th  a 
p r e s e n t  v a lu e  of 20 b i l l i o n  gold marks which were t o  bear  
i n t e r e s t  a t  4y£. These bonds were t o  be guaran teed  in t h e  f i r s t  
i n s t a n c e  by t h e  German government,  and a l s o ,  in  case  of Germany's 
i n a b i l i t y  t o  meet h e r  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  by " the  p r i n c i p a l  A l l i e d  and 
and A sso c ia ted  Governments,  by t h e  t h r e e  Scandinavian  Governments 
and by t h e  Governments of Holland and S w i tze r l an d " ," '  Of t h e
1. i b i d . ,  pp.  8 28-9*
2.  Text  in F ,M .B urne t t ,  op, c i t ,  , V o l .  I ,  pp.  1011-4.
3.  i b i d . ,  p.  1012.
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20 b i l l i o n  marks of  bonds i s sued  14.48 b i l l i o n s  were t o  be 
"paid over t o  t h e  A l l i e d  and A ssocia ted  Governments on account  
of t h e  sum due fo r  R e p a r a t i o n " ,  1,52  b i l l i o n s  were t o  be 
devoted  t o  d i s c h a r g i n g  Germany's d e b t s  t o  n e u t r a l s ,  and t h e  
remain ing  4 b i l l i o n s  were t o  be used by t h e  German government 
t o  pu rchase  food and raw m a t e r i a l s ,
Keynes’ scheme was des igned  f i r s t l y  t o  a s s i s t  Germany 
t o  pay t h e  20 b i l l i o n  gold marks demanded of  h e r  b e fo re  1 May 
1921 by A r t i c l e  235 of t h e  T re a ty  and secondly  t o  enable h e r  t o  
resume normal economic l i f e .  There can be no doubt t h a t  i t s  
im plem en ta t ion  would have done much t o  speed t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
and economic recovery  of Germany and a l s o  of t h e  o th e r  European 
e x - b e l l i g e r e n t s  f o r  which i t  p r o v i d e d / ' *  However, in o rder  t o  
become a r e a l i t y  i t  needed t h e  gua ran tee  of t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  
government,  which would encourage t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e nd ing  
p u b l i c ,  and above a l l  American i n v e s t o r s ,  t o  t a k e  up t h e  German 
government ' s  bonds .  The scheme was recommended e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  
t o  Wilson by Lloyd George,  who s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e s t o r a t i o n  of  Europe involved  so many r i s k s  and such l a rg e  
amounts t h a t  i t  could not  be l e f t  t o  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e . - ' *  But 
W ilson ,  a l th o u g h  a d m i t t i n g  t h e  need f o r  measures t o  " c l e a r  and 
improve" t h e  contused economic c o n d i t i o n s  of Europe,  cons idered  
t h a t  i t  would be im poss ib le  " to  s e c u re  from t h e  Congress of t h e  
United S t a t e s  a u t h o r i t y  t o  p l a c e  a f e d e r a l  g u a ran tee  on bonds
17“  i b i d . ,  p .  1013 .
2 , See pa rag raphs  l ( i i ) ,  l ( i i i ) ,  9: i b i d . ,  pp,  1012-3«
3« Lloyd George t o  Wilson ,  23 A p r i l  1919» i b i d . ,  p p . 1014-9,
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1
of European o r i g i n " ,  * The f i r s t  reason  he gave f o r  t h i s  was 
t h e  d o c t r i n a i r e  b e l i e f  of t h e  United S t a t e s  T r e a s u r y  t h a t  "such 
c r e d i t s  as  i t  (might)  be w ise  t o  g ran t  should be extended th rough  
t h e  medium of t h e  u s u a l  p r i v a t e  channels  r a t h e r  t h a n  th rough  t h e  
s e v e r a l  governments".  I t  was,  as  he put i t ,  t h e  d e s i r e  of t h e
T rea su ry  " t o  r e t i r e  at  t h e  e a r l i e s t  p o s s i b l e  moment from ' t h e
2.
banking  b u s i n e s s ” ' .  There  were a l s o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of  
domest ic  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i t i c s  behind W i l s o n ' s  r e j e c t i o n  of t h e  
scheme. In t h e  opin ion  of h i s  a d v i s e r s  t h e  American p u b l i c ,  
from whom 40 b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  of loans  and t a x e s  had been e x t r a c t e d  
in  t h e  p a s t  two y e a r s ,  had " reach ed ,  and perhaps  p a s s e d ,  t h e  p o in t  
of comple te  s a t u r a t i o n  in  r e s p e c t  of i n v e s t m e n t s " , - 5*
Apart  from h i s  d o c t r i n a i r e  and domest ic  p o l i t i c a l  
o b j e c t i o n s  t o  t h e  Keynes scheme, Wilson emphas ised  t h e  orima 
f a c i e  a b s u r d i t y  of America p ro v id in g  Germany w i th  working 
c a p i t a l  in o rd e r  t o  r e p l a c e  t h a t  which had been d e l i v e r e d  as 
r e p a r a t i o n  t o  t h e  A l l i e s ,  "How," he a s k ed ,  "can your e x p e r t s  
or ours  be  expected t o  work out a new p lan  t o  f u r n i s h  working 
c a p i t a l  t o  Germany when we d e l i b e r a t e l y  s t a r t  out by t a k i n g  
away a l l  Germany's pr e s e n t  c a p i t a l ? "  * T h i s  was a f i n a n c i a l l y  
j u s t i f i a b l e  a t t a c k  on t h e  b a s i c  idea of r e p a r a t i o n  and was an 
i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Chapter  of t h e  t r e a t y  in c re a s e d  
t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of t h e  German government in o b t a i n i n g  f o r e i g n  
f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e .  W i l s o n ' s  d i s l i k e  of r e p a r a t i o n  was
1, Wilson t o  Lloyd George,  5 May 1919» i b i d , ,  p p , 1127-8,
2.  i b i d . ,  p .  1128 .
3* i b i d . ,  p .  1129*
4.  i b i d .
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hov/ever by no means a v a l i d  f i n a n c i a l  reason f o r  r e j e c t i n g  
Keynes’ scheme, which sought t o  p rov ide  in c re a s e d  c a p i t a l  both 
t o  t h e  A l l i e s  and t o  Germany in  t h e  bes t  manner p o s s i b l e  in 
t h e  e x i s t i n g  p o l i t i c a l  c i r c u m s ta n c e s .  There  was,  moreover,  
l i t t l e  d ip l o m a t i c  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  W i lso n ’ s a t t i t u d e  s in c e  
t h e  American d e l e g a t i o n  had ,  however r e l u c t a n t l y ,  g iven i t s  
a s s e n t  t o  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  scheme envisaged in t h e  t r e a t y ,
Wilson may perhaps  have  w i thhe ld  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  backing of t h e  
United  S t a t e s  government p a r t l y  in t h e  hope of  persuad ing  t h e  
A l l i e s  t o  s o f t e n  t h e  te rms  of t h e  R epa ra t ion  Chap te r ,  But 
t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  reason  f o r  h i s  r e f u s a l  i s  r evea led  by h i s  
s ta t em en t  t h a t  t h e  American d e l e g a t i o n  had " f i n a l l y  (g iven)  
a s s e n t  t o  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  c l a u s e s  as drawn, only because  t h e  
r e p a r a t i o n  problem was one t h a t  c h i e f l y  concerned F rance ,
Great  B r i t a i n ,  Belgium, and t h e  o the r  European c o u n t r i e s ,  and 
not  America" ,  In o th e r  words ,  Wilson co n s id e re d  t h a t  he 
could both  consent  t o  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Chapter  and disavow any 
f i n a n c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  i t  in  t h e  same way a s ,  s ix  months 
l a t e r ,  t h e  United  S t a t e s  Sena te  was t o  a c q u ie s c e  in  t h e  p o s t ­
war world s e t t l e m e n t  w i thou t  assuming any d ip lo m a t ic  r e s p o n s ib ­
i l i t y  f o r  i t s  p r e s e r v a t i o n ,  W i l s o n 's  r e f u s a l  t o  endorse Keynes '  
scheme was no doubt encouraged by t h e  s i z e  and t h e  im prec is ion  
of A l l i e d  r e p a r a t i o n  demands,  j u s t  as  t h e  e v e n tu a l  r e f u s a l  of 
t h e  S ena te  t o  r a t i f y  t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y  was due p a r t l y  t o  a 
b e l i e f  in t h e  i n j u s t i c e  of many of i t s  p r o v i s i o n s .  But in both
1, i b i d , ,  p ,  1128
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cases th e  d e c is io n  t o  w ith d ra w  from  Europe was dete rm ined  t o  a 
v e ry  la rg e  e x te n t by e i th e r  f in a n c ia l  o r p a r t is a n  c o n s id e ra t io n s  
o f a p u re ly  dom estic n a tu re .
The p ressures  w h ich  caused th e  om iss ion  o f any f ix e d  
German l i a b i l i t y ,  th e  in c lu s io n  o f p e n s io n s , th e  w a iv in g  o f 
th e  t im e  l i m i t  and th e  absence o f any e x te rn a l f in a n c ia l  
a s s is ta n c e  t o  Germany made i t  u n l ik e ly  th a t  th e  A l l ie d  r e p ly  t o  
th e  German co u n te rp ro p o s a ls  would a l la y  th e  f in a n c ia l  fe a rs  w h ich  
had been aroused by th e  R e p a ra tio n  C h a p te r, E a r ly  in  June 1919
1.
W ilson  re -opened th e  Am erican campaign in  fa v o u r o f a f ix e d  sum. 
When th e  is s u e  was debated by th e  C o u n c il o f  Four on 9 June he 
s tre sse d  t h a t ,  in  th e  absence o f any f in a n c ia l  in te r v e n t io n  by 
th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  governm ent, a d e f in i t e  t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y  was
necessa ry  in  o rd e r to  encourage American bankers t o  advance
2.
money in d e p e n d e n tly  t o  E urope . * L loyd  George was however 
^  convinced th a t  "n o th in g  cou ld  be more dangerous than  t o  f i x  a 
t o t a l  sum", s in ce  i t  would in e v i t a b ly  be u n a cce p ta b le  to  e i th e r  
Germany o r t o  th e  A l l i e s . ' *  The F ra n c o -B r it is h  v ie w p o in t
c a r r ie d  th e  day and th e  te n ta t iv e  and h ig h ly  c o n d it io n a l German
4 .
o f f e r  o f 100 b i l l i o n  marks was sum m arily  r e je c te d .  The o n ly  
f in a n c ia l  concess ion  made t o  Germany was what Keyne3 re fe r re d  t o  
on 8 June as " th e  s i l l y  n o t io n  o f p ro m is in g  Germany t o  f i x  th e  
in d e m n ity  th re e  months hence (when th e  French e le c t io n s  w i l l  be
1. F . V iantoux, op. c i t , ,  V o l .  I I , p . 284.
2 . i b i d . ,  V o l .  I I ,  p . 356.
3 . i b i d . ,  V o l .  I I ,  p . 355.
4 . A. Luckau, op, c i t . ,  p . 446,
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o v e r l ) ,  she t o  t a k e  m a t t e r s  on t r u s t  in t h e  meantime" .  In 
more o f f i c i a l  language Germany was t o  be e n t i t l e d  "from t h e  
■ s i g n a t u r e  of t h e  T r e a ty  and w i th i n  t h e  ensuing  f o u r  m o n t h s . , ,  
t o  submit f o r  examination by t h e  A l l i e d  and A s s o c i a te d  Powers 
documents and p roposa ls  in o rd e r  t o  exped i te  t h e  work 
connec ted w i th  r e p a r a t i o n ,  and thus  t o  s h o r t e n  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
and t o  a c c e l e r a t e  t h e  d e c i s i o n s " .  *
I f  t h e  demand of t h e  German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  
p r e c i s i o n  was s id e - s t e p p e d  by t h e  A l l i e s ,  t h e  c la im  t h a t  t h e  
economic p r o v i s i o n s  of t h e  R epa ra t ion  Chapter  should be modif ied  
f e l l  on com ple te ly  d ea f  e a r s .  The A l l i e s  did  no t  see  f i t  t o  
e l a b o r a t e  on t h e i r  s c e p t i c a l  and unsympathe t ic  o b s e r v a t i o n s  of  
22 May on t h e  s u b je c t  of  d e l i v e r i e s  of c o a l  and sh ipp ing ,^*  but  
conf ined  themse lves  t o  g e n e r a l  r e a s s u ra n c e s  abou t  t h e  economic 
f u t u r e  of Germany. "The resumpt ion of German i n d u s t r y  (was) an 
i n t e r e s t  of t h e  A l l i e d  and A ssoc ia ted  Fowers as  w e l l  as  an 
i n t e r e s t  of  Germany. They ( t h e  A l l i e s )  (were)  f u l l y  a l i v e  t o  
t h i s  f a c t  and t h e r e f o r e  d e c l a r e ( d )  t h a t  t h e y  (would) not  w i thho ld  
from Germany commercial f a c i l i t i e s  withou t  which t h i s  resumption  
(cou ld )  no t  t a k e  p l a c e ,  but t h a t ,  s u b je c t  t o  c o n d i t i o n s  and 
w i th i n  l i m i t s ,  v;hich (cou ld )  not  be l a i d  down in  advance,  and 
s u b je c t  a l s o  t o  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  having due reg a rd  t o  t h e  
s p e c i a l  economic s i t u a t i o n  c r e a t e d  f o r  t h e  A l l i e d  and A sso c ia ted
1. Keynes t o  Smuts,  8 June 1919s Smuts F a p e r s .
2.  A l l i e d  Note of 22 June:  A. Luckau, op.  c i t . ,  p .  478.
3.  A l l i e d  Note of 22 May in r e p l y  t o  t h e  German Note of 13 May 
on Economic Q u e s t io n s ,  i b i d , ,  pp.  26O -I .
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c o u n t r i e s  l y  German a g g re s s io n  and t h e  w ar ,  t h e y  (were) 
p repared  t o  a f fo rd  t o  Germany f a c i l i t i e s  in  t h e s e  d i r e c t i o n s
•-J
f o r  t h e  common good".
In t h e i r  f i n a l  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  German government on 19 
June t h e  German f i n a n c i a l  and economic e x p e r t s  were unequ ivoca l  
in  condemning the  f i n a n c i a l  c l a u s e s  of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  C hap te r .  
Germany was being "burdened w i th  l i m i t l e s s  o b l i g a t i o n s  mere ly  
t o  pay t h e  pens ions  of v e t e r a n s  and t h e i r  dependents  in t h e  
enemy s t a t e s " . ^ *  " In s t e a d  of a maximum sum of one hundred 
b i l l i o n  gold m a r k s . , . t h e  German government (was) expec ted t o  
s ign  a b lank  check f o r  a sugges ted  amount which (cou ld )  neve r  
be p a i d " , ' ' ’ The economic p ro v i s io n s  of t h e  t r e a t y  of which 
t h e  d e l i v e r i e s  of s h ip p in g ,  machinery and c o a l  formed an 
im por tan t  p a r t ,  would reduce  Germany’s domest ic  c a p i t a l  s t r e n g t h  
and make h e r  a c t i v i t y  abroad im p o ss ib l e .  " I t  i s  in c o m p re h e n s ib l e , "  
t h e  German e x p e r t s  conc luded ,  " t h a t  a normal development of 
German economic l i f e  i s  supposed to  be p o s s i b l e  when t h i s  
c l e v e r l y  dev ised  system i s  economically  t h r o t t l i n g  h e r . . . . I f  t h e  
a t tem p t  i s  r e a l l y  made t o  e n fo rc e  t h e  t r e a t y ,  i t  w i l l  be 
im p o ss ib l e  t o  meet t h e  f i n a n c i a l  demands of t h e  A l l i e s  and th e  
r e s u l t  w i l l  be an "economic Balkans" in t h e  h e a r t  of Europe ,  
which w i l l  c r e a t e  en d le s s  u n r e s t  and c o n s ta n t  danger  of  i t s
4
s p re a d in g  t o  t h e  r e s t  of t h e  w o r ld " .
The A l l i e s  had r a t h e r  more success  in r e a s s u r i n g  t h e
1. A l l i e d  Reply of  June l 6 :  i b i d . ,  pp. 446-7.
2.  i b i d . ,  p.  489*
3 . i b i d . ,  p ,  490.
4.  i b i d . ,  pp,  492-3.
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German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  about  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h e  R epara t ion  
Commission, I t  was i n e v i t a b l e  t h a t  t h e  powers of t h i s  body,  
which owed i t s  e x i s t e n c e  l a r g e l y  t o  t h e  d e s i r e  of t h e  A l l i e s  t o  
pos tpone  d e c i s i o n s  on d e l i c a t e  a s p e c t s  of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  
problem, should be l o o s e l y  d e f i n e d .  But t h e  A l l i e d  r e p r e s e n t ­
a t i v e s  were i n h i b i t e d  by t h e  sympatheti c  h e a r i n g  which would be 
given by world opinion t o  any German cla im  t h a t  t h e  R epa ra t ion  
Commission was u n n e c e s s a r i l y  i n f r i n g i n g  upon German f i n a n c i a l  
s o v e r e ig n t y  or r e s t r i c t i n g  Germany's r i g h t  t o  economic s e l f -  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  They were t h e r e f o r e  quick t o  r e a s s u r e  t h e  
German government in t h e i r  r e p l y  of June l6 t h a t  t h e  R epara t ion  
Commission was not  in tended t o  have d e s p o t i c  power over German 
f i n a n c i a l  and economic a c t i v i t y .  A r t i c l e  241 was not  t o  be 
misunderstood as  a f i a t  t o  t h e  Commission t o  d i c t a t e  t h e  
domestic  l e g i s l a t i o n  of Germany. Nor did  p a r a ,  12(b) of Annex 
I I  g iv e  t h e  Commission power t o  p r e s c r i b e  or t o  en fo rce  t a x e s  
or  t o  de te rm in e  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of t h e  German b u d g e t . 1 234* On t h e  
s u b je c t  of t h e  Commission's economic powers t h e  A l l i e s  welcomed 
t h e  s u g g e s t io n  t h a t  a German r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  commission should be 
s e t  up in p a r a l l e l  t o  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission."* Any i n t e n t i o n  
of  u s in g  t h e  Commission as  a means of pry ing  i n t o  German t r a d e  
s e c r e t s  was v i g o r o u s ly  d e n i e d , “'* and t h e  d e n i a l  was fo rm a l ly
4.recorded  in a p r o t o c o l  annexed t o  t h e  t r e a t y .  * The s u g g es t io n
1. i b i d . ,  pp.  443-4.
2. i b i d . ,  p.  445.
3 .  i b i d . ,  p .  444.
4.  i b i d . ,  p.  478.
io5
that the Reparation Commission would violate Germany's
economic self-determination through its control of imports
of raw material and food under Article 251 was not directly
challenged. But the general assurance was given that the
Reparation Commission had been instructed "to take into account
the true maintenance of the social, economic and financial
structure of a Germany earnestly striving to exercise her full
power to repair the loss and damage she (had) caused",^*
German fears were by no means completely assuaged by
these reassurances. The German Peace Delegation in its final
report to the German government admitted "that the powers of
the Reparation Commission (had) been defined more clearly and
that the Commission (would) not interfere with the details of
the German financial administration". "But," it complained,
"these definitions are very vague and are not set forth in the
treaty itself" The Peace Delegation was anxious in particular
lest the Reparation Commission should have the power to demand
that public revenues intended for cultural expenditures should
be ear-marked for reparation payments. The German financial
and economic experts not only echoed the fears of the Peace
Delegation but also reiterated the charges that the Commission
had the right to demand forced labour from the German people
for an indefinite period and that its control of imports was
•3
an intolerable limitation on German freedom of action,-'* The
1. ibid., p. 443.
2. ibid., p, 485*3. ibid,, p. 4 8 9 .
R e p a r a t io n  Commission, t h e  ex p e r t s  s t i l l  i n s i s t e d ,  was one 
of  t h e  in s t ru m e n ts  by which Germany was t o  be "depr ived  of  
her  economic s o v e r e ig n t y  and economic s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n " .
The unabated d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  of t h e  German Peace 
D e le g a t io n  w i th  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Chapter ranked w i th  i t s  
d i s g u s t  a t  t h e  t e r r i t o r i a l  and economic p r o v i s i o n s  of t h e  
t r e a t y  as a major cause  of i t s  f i n a l  recommendation t o  t h e  
German government t h a t  t h e  t r e a t y  should not  be s ig n e d .  In 
making i t s  recommendation t h e  D e lega t ion  was f u l l y  aware of 
t h e  l i k e l y  consequences of r e f u s a l  t o  s ign  t h e  t r e a t y .  On 
1 June  1919 t h e  Commissioner-General  of t h e  D e l e g a t i o n ,  Dr.  
Simons, warned h i s  w ife  t h a t  t h e  p o l i c y  be ing  fo l lowed  by 
E rockdo r f f -R an tzau  and h im s e l f  might b r i n g  h e r  "hunger  and 
m i s e ry ,  and b r in g  Germany dismemberment and a n a rc h y " . " *
Yet, bo th  on t h i s  occasion  and t h r e e  weeks l a t e r  when th e y  
submit ted  t h e i r  f i n a l  adv ice  t o  t h e  German government ,  t h e  
German d e l e g a t e s  cons idered  t h a t  t h e  bes t  co u r s e  open t o  
Germany was r e f u s a l .
The recommendations of t h e  German Feace D e le g a t io n  on 
l8  and 19 June were in p a r t  t h e  l o g i c a l  consequence of  t h e  
d ip lo m a t ic  t a c t i c s  which ,  w i th  t h e  suppor t  of  t h e  S c h e i d esmann 
government,  t h e y  had employed a t  P a r i s .  From t h e  t im e  when t h e  
Draft T r e a t y  had been p re sen te d  t o  Germany, t h e  aim of t h e  
government and of t h e  German n e g o t i a t o r s  had been t o  convince
106.
1 . i b i d . ,  p .  492
2 . i b i d , ,  p . 131
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t h e  A l l i e s  by t h e  s t r e n g t h  of t h e i r  p r o t e s t s  t h a t  Germany 
would not  s ign  t h e  t r e a t y  u n l e s s  i t  mas r e v i s e d ,  p r e f e r a b l y  
by o r a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  so as t o  conform w i th  t h e  pre-ATmist ice  
ag reem en ts .  When t h e  u n y i e l d i n g  A l l i e d  r e p l y  of June l6 
s i g n a l l e d  t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h i s  p o l i c y  and when f e e l i n g  a t  Weimar 
was swinging  towards E r z b e r g e r ’ s p o l i c y  of bowing t o  fo r c e  
ma.i e u r e , bo th  t h e  government and t h e  Peace D e leg a t io n  were in 
a f a l s e  p o s i t i o n .  R a the r  tha n  make a t a c t i c a l  v o l t e  face  
both Scheidemann and t h e  d e l e g a t e s  r e i t e r a t e d  t h e i r  view's about 
t h e  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  of t h e  t r e a t y  and r e s i g n e d .  Simons summed up 
t h e  a t t i t u d e  of t h o s e  who to o k  t h i s  cou r se  when in h i s  l e t t e r  
of r e s i g n a t i o n  he d e c l a r e d  t h a t  he "would c o n s id e r  i t  h u r t f u l  
t o  t h e  f o r e i g n  s e r v i c e  i f  i t s  p o l i t i c a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  o f f i c i a l s  
gave t h e  im press ion  t h a t  t h e y  were not  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e
C -j
f a i l u r e  of  t h e  p o l i c i e s  pursued by them".
But t h e  r i g i d i t y  of t h e  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  German r e p r e s e n t ­
a t i v e s  was not  caused s o l e l y  by an empty concern  f o r  c o n s i s t e n c y .  
I t  was a l s o  born of a genu ine  b e l i e f ,  a r i s i n g  out of e i t h e r  t h e  
d e e p l y -h e ld  c o n v i c t io n s  or t h e  v i t a l  p e r s o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  of 
i n d i v i d u a l  members of t h e  D e l e g a t io n ,  t h a t  acc ep tan c e  of t h e  
t r e a t y  v;as u n t h i n k a b l e .  The f i e r c e l y  i d e a l i s t i c  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
j u r i s t ,  W a l t e r  Schücking,  could h a r d l y  agree  t o  accep t  a t r e a t y  of 
which,  in h i s  own words,  " s c a r c e l y  a s i n g l e  s t i p u l a t i o n  c o r r e s ­
ponded w i th  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  agreed upon",  and in which " ex p i r in g
1. Commissioner-General  Simons’ l e t t e r  of r e s i g n a t i o n  t o  
P r e s id e n t  E b e r t ,  June 22, 1919» i b i d , ,  pp.  495-6.
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world t h e o r i e s ,  emanating from i m p e r i a l i s t i c  and c a p i t a l i s t i c
A
t e n d e n c i e s ,  c e l e b r a t e ( d )  t h e i r . . . l a s t  h o r r i b l e  t r i u m p h " .  *
The a t t i t u d e  of t h e  l a w y e r - f i n a n c i e r ,  C ar l  M elch io r ,  ano the r  
one of t h e  s ix  German d e l e g a t e s ,  v;as s i m i l a r .  Melch ior  was, 
in Keynes’ words,  "a p r e c i s i a n ,  a s t r i c t  and u p r i g h t  m o r a l i s t ,  
a w orsh ipper  of t h e  T a b l e t s  of t h e  Law, a Rabbi .  The breach 
of p rom ise ,  t h e  breach of d i s c i p l i n e ,  t h e  decay of honourab le  
b e h a v i o u r ,  t h e  b e t r a y a l  of u n d e r t a k in g s  by t h e  one p a r t y  and t h e  
i n s i n c e r e  acc ep tan c e  by t h e  o th e r  of im poss ib le  c o n d i t i o n s  which 
i t  was no t  in tended t o  c a r r y  o u t . . . i t  was t h e s e  o f fences  a g a i n s t  
t h e  Word which so much wounded him",  '* I t  was h a r d ly  s u r p r i s i n g  
t h a t  a h i g h l y  moral  to n e  pervaded t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t  of t h e  Peace 
D e le g a t i o n .  "There i s  no one in Germany," i t  conc luded ,  "who 
b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h i s  imposed t r e a t y  can be put i n t o  p r a c t i c e .  As 
we see i t ,  hones ty  i s  t h e  b e s t  p o l i c y ,  a p r i n c i p l e  which does
■5
not permit  us t o  accep t  o b l i g a t i o n s  t h a t  could not  be met. "
I f  t h e  Peace D e le g a t io n  was s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  moral  
u n d e s i r a b i l i t y  of a c c e p t i n g  t h e  t r e a t y ,  i t  had a l s o  come t o  be 
a c u t e l y  consc ious  of t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  h u r d l e s  in t h e  way 
of a c c e p ta n c e .  The war g u i l t  c l a u s e  was e s p e c i a l l y  o f f e n s i v e  in 
t h i s  r e s p e c t .  "We a r e  made t o  p lay  a p a r t  whol ly  i n s i n c e r e , "  
complained th e  D e l e g a t i o n ' s  f i n a l  r e p o r t ,  "when, c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e
1. i b i d . ,  pp.  319- 2 0 , Schücking d r a f t e d  t h e  s e c t i o n  of t h e  
German c o u n te rp ro p o s a l s  of  May 29 e n t i t l e d  "Genera l  Remarks",  
from which t h e s e  words a r e  e x t r a c t e d .
2. J . 1" .Keynes , Two Memoirs, p.  70.  Melchior  d r a f t e d  t h e  German
Note of  May 13 on Economic Q ues t ions :  A Luckau,  op. c i t . ,
P.  78.
3. i b i d . ,  p .  488.
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t r u t h ,  we admit t h a t  in us l a y  t h e  s o le  g u i l t  f o r  t h e  war" .
The s c r u p l e s  of t h e  d e l e g a t e s  were almost  c e r t a i n l y  i n t e n s i f i e d
by t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of  a group of  l e a d in g  German i n t e l l e c t u a l s
known as  t h e  H e id e lb e rg e r  Vere in igung  which had been formed in
F ebruary  1919 l a r g e l y  f o r  t h e  purpose of  c h a l l e n g i n g  A l l i e d
2
a l l e g a t i o n s  about German war g u i l t  and war a t r o c i t i e s , ' *  I t  was 
s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  four  members of t h i s  group - Max 1/Veber, th e  
s o c i o l o g i s t ,  Hans Delb rück ,  t h e  h i s t o r i a n ,  A lb rech t  
M ende ls sohn-Bar tho ldy , a p r o f e s s o r  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law, and 
Count Max M ontgelas ,  a r e t i r e d  Bavar ian  g e n e r a l  -  were 
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  d r a f t i n g  t h e  German Note of May 24 on
3 *R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and R e p a r a t i o n s .
The p e r s o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  f i n a n c i a l  and economic 
e x p e r t s  of t h e  D e leg a t io n  were a f i n a l  reason  f o r  i t s  adamant 
r e f u s a l  t o  accep t  t h e  t r e a t y .  Ten out of t h e  e leven  s i g n a t o r i e s  
of  t h e  r e p o r t  which t h e  e x p e r t s ’ committee su b m i t ted  on June 19 
were l e a d e r s  of German i n d u s t r y ,  commerce and b a n k in g .  The 
e leven th  was t h e  d ip lo m a t ,  Otto  W i e d f e ld t ,  who was one of t h e  
d i r e c t o r s  of F r i e d r i c h  Krupp,  Essen ,  Men such a s  Wilhelm Cuno, 
B a l l i n ’ s s u cces s o r  as managing d i r e c t o r  of HAFAG, and Ewald 
H i l g e r ,  a l e a d in g  f i g u r e  in t h e  Upper S i l e s i a n  mining i n d u s t r y ,  
could n o t  be expected t o  s ign  a t r e a t y  which demanded t h e  
s u r r e n d e r  of t h e  German merchant  f l e e t  and t h r e a t e n e d  t o  sev e r
1, i b i d , ,  p.  488.
2,  i b i d . j p p .  46-53
3« i b i d . ,  p.  82 ,
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Upper S i l e s i a  from Germany, * On the  c o n t r a r y  t h e y  concluded 
t h a t  t h e  peace terms "would cu t  so d eep ly  i n t o  t h e  r o o t s  of  
(Germany*s) energy t h a t  t h e  obvious consequences  of a r e f u s a l  
t o  acc ep t  t h e  t r e a t y ,  such as t h e  planned occu p a t io n  of German 
t e r r i t o r y  and domestic  u n r e s t ,  (were) of minor im por tance ,  
however t e r r i b l e  t h e s e  consequences (might )  a p p e a r " . ^ *
I t  was only on t h e  q u e s t i o n  of whether  t o  s ign  th e  t r e a t y  
t h a t  t h e  r e a c t i o n  of t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly d i f f e r e d  n o t i c e a b l y  
from t h a t  of  t h e  Peace D e le g a t io n  in  May and June  1919» Although 
th e y  were i n e v i t a b l y  more s u p e r f i c i a l l y  expressed  tha n  t h o s e  of 
t h e  Peace D e le g a t io n ,  t h e  p r o t e s t s  of  t h e  Assembly about  t h e  
i n j u s t i c e  of th e  a s s e r t i o n s  and t h e  demands of t h e  A l l i e s  were 
vo iced  unanimously  and c o n t in u o u s ly  from 12 May, when t h e  t r e a t y  
was f i r s t  d i s c u s s e d ,  u n t i l  23 June ,  when t h e  d e c i s i o n  in favour  
of accep tance  was r e l u c t a n t l y  t a k e n . T h e  f a i l u r e  of  t h e  
Assembly t o  r e j e c t  t h e  t r e a t y  in s p i t e  of i t s  d i s t a s t e  f o r  A l l i e d  
te rms was a r e f l e c t i o n  p a r t l y  of t h e  t a c t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  and p a r t l y  
of t h e  composi t ion  and out look  of t h e  German l e g i s l a t i v e  body.
1. The o th e r  s i g n a t o r i e s  were: W, Beukenberg,  managing d i r e c t o r
of Bergbau u .  Htft ten-A.G.Phoen ix , a R hen i sh -W es tpha l i an  i ron  
combine; Georg Lttbsen, a d i r e c t o r  of t h e  Rhenish-West  p h a l i a n  
Coal S y n d ic a te ;  Emil Georg von S t a u s s ,  a d i r e c t o r  of t h e  
Deutsche Bank; Franz U rb ig ,  managing d i r e c t o r  of t h e  D is kon to -  
G e s e l l s c h a f t ;  Max Warburg, t h e  Hamburg f i n a n c i e r ;  Louis Hagen, 
a Cologne banker ;  P.H. W i t t h o e f f t ,  P r e s i d e n t  of t h e  Hamburg 
Chamber of Commerce; and P h i l i p p  Heincken,  a company d i r e c t o r .  
For b i o g r a p h i c a l  d e t a i l s :  Der Grosse B rockhaus , 1928; Neue 
Deutsche B io g r a p h ie , 1952- •
2. A. Luckau, op. c i t . ,  p.  490.
3.  Nationalversammlung, 12 May 1919> V o l .  327» pp« l O ß l - l l l l ;
22 June 1919 , i b i d . ,  p p . 1113-34; 23 June  1919 , i b i d . ,  pp.
1139-44.  The only n o t a b l e  d i s c o rd  in t h e  chorus  of p r o t e s t  
was caused by t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  of t h e  USPD t o  ag ree  w i th  t h e  
A l l ied  a s s e r t i o n  of  German war g u i l t .  E . g .  Haase (USPD),
12 May 1919» i b i d . ,  pp.  1102-5«
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The Assembly,  u n l i k e  t h e  Peace D e le g a t io n ,  bo re  t h e  u l t i m a t e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  immediate f a t e  of t h e  German n a t i o n .
Thus ,  when t h e  Scheidemann Cabinet  r e s ig n e d  a f t e r  having pursued 
an u n s u c c e s s f u l  p o l i c y ,  i t  f e l l  t o  a n o th e r  c a b i n e t ,  under  t h e  
l e a d e r s h i p  of th e  S o c i a l  Democrat Bauer,  t o  d ec id e  on t h e  b e s t  
co u r s e  open t o  Germany in t h e  e x i s t i n g  c i r c u m s ta n c e s .  The 
d e c i s i o n s  of t h e  Bauer Cabinet  on 22 and 23 June t o  s ign  t h e  
t r e a t y  were not  s imply a t a c t i c a l  i n e v i t a b i l i t y .  They were a l s o  
a r e f l e c t i o n  of t h e  out look  and s c a l e  of va lu e s  of t h e  m a jo r i t y  
of t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly,  which ,  u n l i k e  t h e  Peace D e le g a t io n ,  
d e s i r e d  peace more than  an immediate r e v i s i o n  of t h e  t r e a t y ,
This  p r e f e r e n c e  had not been obvious in May when a l l  p a r t i e s ,  
w i th  t h e  excep t ion  of t h e  USPD, had agreed t h a t  t h e  t r e a t y  was 
" u n a c c e p ta b l e ’' .  However t h e  d e s i r e  f o r  peace qu ick ly  man ifes ted  
i t s e l f  in  t h e  middle of June a f t e r  i t  had become c l e a r  t h a t  
con t inued  r e s i s t a n c e  would not  induce t h e  A l l i e s  t o  make s u b s t a n t i a l  
c o n c e s s i o n s ,  and would lead  merely t o  th e  resumpt ion  of h o s t i l i t i e s .
The C a b i n e t ,  which had w i th  only t h r e e  d i s s e n t i e n t s  r e j e c t e d
1.
E r z b e r g e r ’ s p lea  f o r  acc ep tanc e  e a r l y  in J u n e ,  was so evenly 
d iv ided  d u r in g  d i s c u s s i o n s  held on l8 June t h a t  P r e s id e n t  Eber t  
t r a n s f e r r e d  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  t h e  p a r t i e s .
On t h e  fo l low ing  day ,  a l though  t h e  Democratic P a r ty  decided  
unanimous ly  a g a i n s t  a c c e p t in g  t h e  t r e a t y ,  t h e  SPD voted 75 t o  35
in f avou r  of ac c e p ta n c e ,  as d id  a l l  but  16 members of t h e  Cen tre
2 .
P a r t y .  A f t e r  t h e  r e s i g n a t i o n  of Scheidemann,  who had voted in
1. A. Luckau,  op. c i t . ,  p.  105; K. E p s t e i n ,  Ma t t h i a s  E r zberg er 
and t h e  Dilemma of German Democracy, p.  318*
2.  A. Luckau,  op.  c i t . ,  p.  108.
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t h e  m i n o r i t y  at  t h e  SPD meet ing on 19 J u n e ,  t h e  Bauer C ab ine t ,  
which inc luded  no Democrats ,  had been formed.  On 22 June Bauer
ob ta ined  from t h e  Assembly a v o t e  of 237 t o  138 in  favour  of
1 .
a c c e p t i n g  t h e  t r e a t y .
The Assembly’ s ac c e p ta n c e  of t h e  t r e a t y  was a t  t h i s  
s t a g e  by no means u n c o n d i t i o n a l .  Both t h e  C e n t r i s t  vo te  of 
19 June and a l l  t h e  a f f i r m a t i v e  v o te s  ca s t  on 22 June had been 
f o r  a c c e p t i n g  t h e  t r e a t y  w i th  r e s e r v a t i o n s  as t o  A r t i c l e s  227- 
231* Elemen ts  in both  t h e  C en t re  P a r ty  and t h e  SPD ob jec ted  
s t r o n g l y  t o  t h e s e  ’’honour c l a u s e s "  f o r  both  p e r s o n a l  and p a r t i s a n  
r e a s o n s ,  and th e y  were encouraged t o  i n s i s t  on t h e s e  r e s e r v a t i o n s  
by E r z b e r g e r  who, perhaps because  of  h i s  d e s i r e  t o  win over 
waver ing C e n t r i s t s  t o  t h e  p o l i c y  of a c c e p ta n c e ,  had given  
m is lead ing  a s s u ra n c e s  t h a t  t h e  A l l i e s  were w i l l i n g  t o  r e s c in d  
t h e  a r t i c l e s  in  q u e s t i o n ,  * The dep th  of f e e l i n g  on t h i s  s u b j e c t  
was r e v e a l e d  on 23 June when t h e  Cent re  P a r ty  responded t o  t h e  
prompt A l l i e d  r e j e c t i o n  of t h e  r e s e r v a t i o n s  by v o t i n g  64 t o  14 
a g a i n s t  a c c e p t i n g  t h e  t r e a t y ,  * The p a r t i s a n  a s p ec t  of t h e  
C e n t r e ' s  concern  about  t h e  r e s e r v a t i o n s  became c l e a r  when, 
l a t e r  in t h e  same day ,  i t  suppor ted  u n c o n d i t i o n a l  a c c ep tan c e ,  but  
demanded t h a t  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  should d e c l a r e  p u b l i c l y  t h a t
4
t h e y  did  not  doubt t h e  p a t r i o t i s m  of t h o s e  who signed t h e  t r e a t y ,  *
1. N ationalversam mlung . 22 June  1919» V o l .  327» p p . 1136-8,
2. A, Luckau,  op, c i t . ,  p ,  110.
3. i b i d . ,  p.  111. The C e n t r e ' s  Cabinet  M in i s t e r s  E r z b e r g e r ,  
G i e s b e r t s ,  B e l l ,  and Mayer vo ted  with  t h e  m a j o r i t y .  A r t i c l e s  
227-30 concerned t h e  t r i a l  of t h e  K a ise r  and of German war 
c r i m i n a l s .
4. Nationalversammlung . 23 June 1919» V o l .  327» pp,1139-40 .
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The A l l i e d  r e j e c t i o n  of t h e  German r e s e r v a t i o n s  a l s o  
caused members of t h e  government t o  h e s i t a t e  about  s ig n in g  
t h e  t r e a t y  on o th e r  t h a n  p a r t i s a n  and p a t r i o t i c  g rounds .  I t  
appeared  p o s s i b l e  on 23 «June t h a t  u n c o n d i t i o n a l  accep tance  
might cause  t h e  army, which ob jec ted  s t r o n g l y  t o  t h e  
p r o v i s i o n s  in  A r t i c l e s  227-230 f o r  t h e  t r i a l  of t h e  K a ise r  
and of German war c r i m i n a l s ,  t o  cease  t o  suppor t  t h e  government,  
Noske,  t h e  S o c i a l  Democratic Defence M i n i s t e r ,  was so concerned 
about t h e  e f f e c t  of  t h e  d e f e c t i o n  of t h e  army upon pub l ic  o rde r  
t h a t  he remained opposed t o  s ig n in g  t h e  t r e a t y  u n t i l  he 
ob ta ined  a l a s t - m i n u t e  a s s u r a n c e  from Q u ar te r -M as te r  General  
Groener t h a t  t h e  army would remain l o y a l .
When faced with  t h e  t h r e a t  of t h e  resumpt ion  of  t h e  
war ,  t h e  m a j o r i t y  of t h e  Centre  P a r ty  and t h e  SFD had regarded  
only A r t i c l e s  227-231 as s u f f i c i e n t  reason  f o r  h e s i t a t i n g  t o  
s ign  t h e  t r e a t y .  Moreover,  t h e i r  m isg iv ings  about t h e s e  
a r t i c l e s  were r e l a t e d  t o  p a r t i s a n  f e a r s  and t o  t h e i r  concern 
f o r  t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  of p u b l i c  o rde r  in  Germany. The c o n t r a s t  
between t h e  a t t i t u d e  of t h o s e  who suppor ted t h e  Bauer 
Cabinet  and t h a t  of t h e  Peace D e leg a t io n  i s  c l e a r .  The 
D e le g a t i o n ,  t h e  Democrat ic  P a r ty  ( t o  which a g r e a t  number of 
t h e  d e l e g a t e s ’ a d v i s e r s  be longed)  and t h e  p a r t i e s  f u r t h e r  t o  
t h e  r i g h t ,  were p repared  t o  r i s k  t h e  consequences of r e f u s i n g  
t o  accep t  t h e  t r e a t y .  But t h e  m a j o r i t y  of t h e  Cent re  P a r ty
1. A. Luckau,  op. c i t . ,  p.  I l l
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and 3FD p r e f e r r e d  t o  r i s k  a c c e p ta n c e ,  provided t h a t  public
o rder  could be main ta ined  and th a t  t h e y  would not  be
s u b je c t e d  t o  damaging p a r t i s a n  a t t a c k s ,
The s t ro n g  d e s i r e  f o r  peace of t h e  Zentrum and 3FD
was a r e f l e c t i o n  of t h e i r  h i s t o r i c  i n t e r e s t s  and ou t look .  The
elements in t h e  Centre  F a r ty  whom E rz b e rg e r  r e p r e s e n t e d  were
concerned  l e s t  a renewal of  t h e  war would lead t o  t h e
1
s e p a r a t i o n  of Bavar ia from Germany. * And b o th  t h e  Centre and 
3FD were concerned t o  a v e r t  t h e  d i s l o c a t i o n  and u n r e s t  which 
an A l l i e d  in v a s io n  of Germany would b r in g  a b o u t .  The w i l l i n g -  
ness  of t h e  Cent re  and t h e  SPD t o  s ign  t h e  t r e a t y  was based 
upon p o s i t i v e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  t o o .  The ap p e a l  which t h e  Bauer 
Cabinet  addressed  t o  t h e  German people on June 24 recommended 
both ac c e p ta n c e  and f u l f i l m e n t  of t h e  t r e a t y  on t h e  n e g a t iv e  
grounds t h a t  t h i s  would p reven t  a " d e f e n c e l e s s  people from 
having t o  make f u r t h e r  s a c r i f i c e s  and endure added pains  of 
hun g e r" .  But i t  went on t o  sugges t  by im p l i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
p o l i c y  of " f u l f i l m e n t "  which i t  was advoca t ing  was d e s i r a b l e  
f o r  p o s i t i v e  r e a s o n s .  " I f  we do not  a l l  h e l p " ,  i t  a rgued ,
"our having  s igned t h e  t r e a t y  w i l l  be w o r t h l e s s .  We s h a l l  
t h e n  have no a m e l i o r a t i o n s ,  no r e v i s i o n s , a n d  no f i n a l  removal 
of t h e  g i g a n t i c  burden ." -* A few days l a t e r  t h e  German 
government expressed i t s  optimism about  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
1 . i b i d . ,  p.  105.
2.  Appeal of t h e  German Government t o  t h e  German Feop le ,
24 June 1919» i b i d . ,  pp. 496-7»
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t r e a t y  r e v i s i o n  in a more f o r t h r i g h t  f a s h i o n ,  "The German 
p e o p l e , "  i t  d e c l a r e d ,  " w i l l  u s e  every  means in  t h e i r  at tempt 
t o  meet t h e  terms of t h e  T r e a t y .  We b e l i e v e  t h e  E n te n te  w i l l ,  
in t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s ,  f in d  i t  n e c e ss a ry  t o  change some of
-I
t h e  te rms  which th e y  w i l l  see  a r e  im poss ib le  of e x e c u t io n " .
The c o n f id e n c e  of t h e  German government t h a t  t h e  t r e a t y  would 
be e i t h e r  r e v i s e d  or f l e x i b l y  i n t e r p r e t e d  was in pa r t  a 
r e f l e c t i o n  of i t s  f e e l i n g  t h a t  as  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of 
"dem ocra t ic "  Germany i t  would r e c e i v e  sympathe ti c  t r e a tm e n t  
from t h e  A l l i e s .  The i n f l u e n c e  of  t h i s  c o n f id e n ce  on t h e  
d e c i s i o n  of  t h e  Bauer Cabinet  t o  s ign  t h e  t r e a t y  was c l e a r l y  
c o n s i d e r a b l e .
I t  would be wrong t o  assume t h a t ,  because  t h e y  agreed 
with  t h e  Peace D e l e g a t i o n ’ s c o nc lu s ion  t h a t  t h e  t r e a t y  should 
no t  be s ig n e d ,  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t i e s  in t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly 
were i n f lu e n c e d  by e x a c t l y  t h e  same motives  as  t h e  D e le g a t io n .  
But t h e r e  was a s t r i k i n g  c o in c id e n c e  between t h e  views and 
i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  members of t h e  Democratic F a r t y ,  t h e  DVF and 
t h e  DNVP and th o s e  expressed  and r e p re s e n t e d  by t h e  D e le g a t io n .  
The prominence of f i n a n c i e r s  and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  in t h e  DDF,
DVF and DNVF ensured t h a t  t h e s e  p a r t i e s  would be h ig h ly  c r i t i c a l  
of t h e  f i n a n c i a l  and economic p ro v i s io n s  of t h e  t r e a t y .
Moreover,  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  t e n d e n c i e s  of t h e  m a j o r i t y  of  t h e i r  
members made them ex t remely  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  a s s e r t i o n s  which 
1. The Times (London),  30 June 1919» P» 13*
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t h e  t r e a t y  made and t o  t h e  in f r in g em en ts  of German 
s o v e r e i g n t y  and s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  which i t  seemed t o  
t h r e a t e n .  F i n a l l y ,  u n l i k e  t h e  Cen tre P a r t y  and t h e  SPD, 
t h e y  exper ienced  no f e e l i n g s  of r a p p o r t  w i th  t h e  A l l i e s  which 
made them h ope fu l  of prompt r e v i s i o n  of  t h e  t r e a t y .  On t h e  
c o n t r a r y ,  t h e y  agreed wi th  t h e  view of t h e  D e le g a t io n  t h a t ,  
s i n c e  Germany could never  hope t o  f u l f i l  t h e  t r e a t y ,  
a c c e p ta n c e  would e v e n t u a l l y  l a y  t h e  way open f o r  t h e  A l l i e s ,
"on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  t r e a t y ,  ( t o )  app ly  t h o s e  measures which 
t h e y  t h r e a t e n ( e d ) . . . . i n  t h e  case  of n o n -a c c e p ta n c e " • ! * The 
c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  a c c ep tan c e  of  t h e  t r e a t y  would a u t o m a t i c a l l y  
lead  t o  t h e  economic r u i n  and p o l i t i c a l  s u b ju g a t io n  of Germany
was c l e a r l y  expressed in  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly by spokesmen of
2 #
a l l  t h r e e  p a r t i e s  in q u e s t i o n .
The o p p o s i t i o n  of t h e  Democrats ,  t h e  DVP and t h e  DNVP 
t o  a c c e p t i n g  t h e  t r e a t y  was,  t h e r e f o r e ,  based t o  a l a r g e  ex ten t  
on genu ine  c o n v i c t i o n .  But t h e r e  a re  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  p a r t i s a n  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  were a l s o  im p o r t a n t .  Y/hen on 23 June t h e  
N a t i o n a l  Assembly empowered t h e  Cabinet  t o  accept  t h e  t r e a t y  
t h i s  was a c h i e v e d ,  not  by a v o t e  but  by a r e s o l u t i o n  moved by 
a DVP member t h a t  th e  v o te  of t h e  p revious  day ( f o r  accep tance
v 3*w i th  r e s e r v a t i o n s )  should be al lowed t o  s t a n d .  This  procedure
1. A. Luckau,  op. c i t . ,  p ,  490.
2. Nat ionalversammlum1 23:. 12 May 1919 > V o l .  327» pp.  1091-4 
(Haussmann; DDF); pp,  1100-2(Stresemann: DVP); p p . 1095-99 
( Posadowsky-Y ehner:  DNVP).
3.  i b i d . ,  23 June 1919, V o l .  327,  pp. 1140-1.
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i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  were elements  in  t h e  r i g h t - w i n g  p a r t i e s
who, d e s p i t e  t h e i r  p r o t e s t a t i o n s  t o  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  cons ide red
t h a t  a c c e p ta n c e  of t h e  t r e a t y  was i n e v i t a b l e .  The main
concern  of  t h e s e  groups was simply t h a t  t h e  t r e a t y  should be
-|
accep ted  w i thou t  t h e i r  own a f f i r m a t i v e  v o t e s .
The p r a c t i c a l  r e a c t i o n  of t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly t o  t h e  
R e p a ra t io n  Chapter  and t o  t h e  t r e a t y  in g e n e r a l  was, t h e r e f o r e ,  
d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  of t h e  German Peace D e le g a t i o n .  Although 
t h e  s u p p o r t e r s  of th e  Bauer Cabinet  f u l l y  endorsed t h e  
c r i t i c i s m s  of t h e  t r e a t y  which had been vo iced  by t h e  D e le g a t io n ,  
t h e y  were s t i l l  de te rm ine d ,  f o r  a v a r i e t y  of r e a s o n s ,  t h a t  t h e  
t r e a t y  should be accep ted  and t h a t  a genu ine a t tem pt  should be 
made t o  c a r r y  i t  o u t .  For t h e s e  members of t h e  N a t io n a l  
Assembly,  acc ep tan c e  of t h e  t r e a t y  i f  any th ing  inc reased  r a t h e r  
tha n  d e c re a se d  awareness  of t h e  need f o r  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  and 
economic r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  of Germany.
Even f o r  t h o s e  groups  in  t h e  Assembly which o f f i c i a l l y
suppor ted  t h e  Peace D e l e g a t i o n ’ s recommendation t h a t  t h e  t r e a t y
should no t  be s ig n e d ,  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  a c c ep tan c e  did  not
n e c e s s a r i l y  e n t a i l  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t ,  once t h e  t r e a t y  was
a c c e p te d ,  a t t e m p t s  at  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  and economic r e s t o r a t i o n  of
Germany were u s e l e s s  and u n d e s i r a b l e .  On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  in t h e
per iod  which fo l lowed  t h e  a c c e p ta n c e  of t h e  t r e a t y  t h e  Democrats
suppor ted  t h e  governm en t ' s  r e fo rming  programme and,  on
1. For E r z b e r g e r ’s views on t h e  behav iour  of t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  
g roups :  K, E p s t e i n ,  op. c i t . ,  p.  322*
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2 November, r e - e n t e r e d  t h e  C a b in e t ,  Even f o r  t h e  DVP and 
DNVP d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i th  t h e  t r e a t y  and d i s t r u s t  of A l l i e d  
i n t e n t i o n s  were only two of s e v e r a l  f a c t o r s  which de te rmined 
a t t i t u d e s  t o  th e  government ' s  f i n a n c i a l  and economic p o l i c y .
The p ro v i s io n s  of t h e  R epa ra t ion  Chapter  of t h e  
V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  moral  b a s i s  of r e p a r a t i o n ,  
t h e  s i z e  of Germany's r e p a r a t i o n  burden and t h e  powers of t h e  
R e p a ra t io n  Commission were such as  t o  cause g rave  d i s c o n t e n t  
and m i sg iv in g  among members of t h e  German Peace D e lega t ion  and 
a l s o  among many non-Germans who a t ten d ed  t h e  P a r i s  Peace 
Conference ,  The n e g o t i a t i o n s  a t  P a r i s  in 1919» f i r s t  amongst 
t h e  A l l i e s  and then  between A l l i e d  and German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  
did l i t t l e  t o  a l l a y  t h e  f e a r s  f o r  Germany's f i n a n c i a l  and 
economic f u t u r e  which t h e  te rm s  of  t h e  t r e a t y  had a ro u s e d .  On 
t h e  c o n t r a r y  th e y  caused d i s t a s t e f u l  emphasis on th e  s u b je c t  of 
Germany'3 ’’war g u i l t " ;  produced n e i t h e r  a r e d u c t io n  nor  a 
c l e a r e r  d e f i n i t i o n  of h e r  t o t a l  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n ;  punctured  
hopes of s o l u t i o n  of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  problem th rough  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f i n a n c i a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n ;  and only s l i g h t l y  r e a s s u re d  t h e  German 
Government on t h e  s u b j e c t  of t h e  powers of t h e  R epara t ion  
Commis s i o n ,
The ex p re s s io n s  of al arm and d e s p a i r  by Germany's 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  P a r i s  about  t h e  im p l i c a t i o n s  of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  
Chapter  g i v e  a m i s l e a d in g  im press ion  of t h e  p r a c t i c a l  psycholog­
i c a l  impact of t h e  terms of t h e  t r e a t y  on German f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y .  
3ecause  of  t h e i r  t a c t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  and because  of t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s
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and ou tlook  t h e  members of t h e  Committee of Economic Exper t s  
and of t h e  Peace D e leg a t io n  r e a c t e d  s h a r p ly  t o  t h e  R epara t ion  
Chapter  and adv ised t h e  German government a g a i n s t  s ign ing  t h e  
t r e a t y  on t h e  grounds t h a t  i t  "would r u i n  Germany. However, a 
m a jo r i t y  of t h e  members of t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly,  a l though 
t h e y  d i sapproved  of t h e  peace te rms as  s t r o n g l y  as t h e  German 
n e g o t i a t o r s  a t  P a r i s ,  was in t h e  l a s t  a n a l y s i s  w i l l i n g  t o  accept  
t h e  t r e a t y  e i t h e r  because  i t  p r e f e r r e d  acc ep tan c e  t o  t h e  
resumpt ion  of h o s t i l i t i e s  or because  i t  hoped t h a t  t h e  t r e a t y  
would n o t  be r i g o r o u s l y  e n fo rc e d .  The d e s i r e  f o r  peace and 
normal c o n d i t i o n s  and t h e  r e a d i n e s s  t o  gamble on t h e  r e v i s i o n  
of t h e  t r e a t y  which had caused t h e  Assembly's  acc ep tan c e  of 
t h e  t r e a t y  a l s o  preven ted  t h e  terms of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Chapter  
from p lunging  German f i n a n c i a l  p o l i cy  i n t o  a per iod  of d e s p a i r  
and p a s s i v i t y .  In f a c t ,  because  of t h e  g r a d u a l  and f l e x i b l e  
manner in which t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  p r o v i s io n s  of t h e  t r e a t y  were 
implemented,  i t  was some t ime b e f o r e  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  problem 
was t o  become t h e  most s e r i o u s  p s y c h o lo g i c a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
o b s t a c l e  t o  f i n a n c i a l  re fo rm  in  Germany.
( c ) De l i v e r i e s under  t h e  A rm is t i c e  between th e  S ig n a t u r e  and 
t h e  R a t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T rea ty
S ince  th e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a ty  did  no t  come i n t o  fo rce  
u n t i l  r a t i f i c a t i o n s  were exchanged by t h e  s i g n a t o r i e s ,  r e l a t i o n s  
between Germany and t h e  A l l i e s  cont inued  u n t i l  Jan u a ry  1920 t o  
be governed by t h e  terms of t h e  A rm is t i c e .  This  meant t h a t ,  
except  in  t h e  case  of c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  and d e l i v e r i e s  of o the r
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minor i t e m s ,  which began by s p e c i a l  ag reement,  t h e  p r o v i s io n s  
of  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Chapter  could not be s e t  i n t o  o p e r a t i o n . 1. 2
The r e p a r a t i o n  q u es t io n  t h e r e f o r e  had l i t t l e  d i r e c t  impact 
on German p o l i t i c s  in t h i s  p e r i o d .  The p r o v i s i o n s  of t h e  
t r e a t y  which in f a c t  aroused  most concern in Germany were t h o s e  
d e a l i n g  w i th  t h e  t r i a l  of  German war c r im in a l s  and t h e  
r e p a t r i a t i o n  of German p r i s o n e r s  of war .  There  were,  however,  
d i s p u t e s  between t h e  A l l i e s  and Germany over t h e  execu t ion  
of c e r t a i n  A rm is t i ce  p r o v i s i o n s  a f f e c t i n g  f u t u r e  r e p a r a t i o n  
payments.  These d i s p u t e s  must be examined because  a t  one s t a g e  
t h e y  provoked i l l - f e e l i n g  which may have in f luenced  a t t i t u d e s  
in  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly.  The m a t t e r s  which gave  most t r o u b l e  
were t h e  expor t  of German a e r o n a u t i c a l  m a t e r i a l ,  d e lays  in t h e  
d e l i v e r y  of merchant  sh ipp ing  and t h e  s c u t t l i n g  of  t h e  German 
f l e e t  a t  3capa Flow.
The d i s p u t e  over a e r o n a u t i c a l  m a t e r i a l  had been 
d ragg ing  on f o r  months.  German expo r ts  of war m a t e r i a l  of any 
kind had been p r o h i b i t e d  by t h e  B ru s se l s  Conference on 13-14  
March 1919* On fo u r  o cca s ions  s in c e  t h e n  t h e  Supreme Counci l  
had reminded t h e  German government t h a t  t h e  expor t  of 
a e r o n a u t i c a l  m a t e r i a l  which had been manufactured  f o r  war
p
purposes  was not a l l o w e d . ' *  The German government had in i t s  
r e p l i e s  of  8 September and 12 October en te red  r e s e r v a t i o n s
1. C. Bergmann, The H i s to r y  of R e p a r a t i o n s , p,  26,
2.  7 A ugust ,  26 August ,  30 September,  l8  October 1919* 
Documents on B r i t i s h  F o re ign  P o l i c y , 1919-1939» S e r i e s  I ,  
V o l .  I I ,  p .  109,  Note 15* (H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as DBFF.)
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1
a g a i n s t  t h e  r u l i n g  of t h e  Supreme C ounc i l .  These 
r e s e r v a t i o n s  were grounded on t h e  c la im  t h a t  t h e  i s s u e  should 
be subm it ted  t o  t h e  A e r i a l  S u p e rv i s io n  Commission, which would 
only be se t  up a f t e r  t h e  t r e a t y  had come i n t o  f o r c e ;  and on 
t h e  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  between w a r l i k e  and 
p e a c e f u l  a e r o n a u t i c a l  m a t e r i a l .  Meanwhile German a e r o n a u t i c a l  
m a t e r i a l  had cont inued t o  be exported t o  Denmark, Holland and 
Sweden -  much t o  t h e  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  of t h e  A l l i e s  who cons ide red
t h a t  i t  ought t o  have  been r e s e rv e d  f o r  d e l i v e r y  t o  themselves
2 .
as r e p a r a t io n .
The d isagreem ent over t h e  d e l iv e r y  of sh ip p in g  o r ig in a te d  
from another d e c i s i o n  of th e  B r u sse ls  Conference o f  March 1919» 
which postponed th e  d e l iv e r y  t o  th e  A l l i e s  of 14 o i l  t a n k e r s .
The reason  f o r  t h e  postponement ( l a t e r  d i s p u te d )  was e i t h e r  
t h a t  t h e y  were not  needed by t h e  A l l i e s  or t h a t  they  were 
in tended  t o  be used t o  t r a n s p o r t  o i l  t o  Germany. * On 
27 September t h e  Supreme Counci l  revoked t h i s  d e c i s i o n  and 
ordered t h a t  t h e  sh ips  be d e l i v e r e d  t o  A l l i e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  
a l though  i t  was ru l e d  t h a t  th e y  might be used f o r  one more 
voyage t o  convey o i l  t o  Germany. However, a t  t h e  end of October  
t h e  sh ip s  were s t i l l  " r e t a i n e d  a t  Hamburg on t h e  p r e te n c e  of a 
sym pathe t ic  s t r i k e  in t h a t  p o r t " .
The most important d i s p u t e  was over th e  A l l i e d  c la im  t o
77 ib i d . ,  V o l .  I I ,  pp. 109-11.
2. i b i d . ,  V o l .  I I ,  p. 109.
3. i b i d . ,  V o l .  I ,  pp.  805-8.
4 . i b i d . ,  V o l .  I I ,  p. 111 .
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400,000 t o n s  of  German docks and o the r  m a t e r i a l  as  compensation 
f o r  t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  of t h e  German f l e e t  a t  Scapa Flow on 21
June 1919* In a no te  of 28 June t h e  A l l i e s  had r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e
1.
s c u t t l i n g  of t h e  f l e e t  as  a v i o l a t i o n  of t h e  A rm is t ice*  But 
t h e  c l a im  t o  r e p a r a t i o n  had not been fo rmula ted  u n t i l  October 
when, w i th  t h e  p rospec t  of t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n  of t h e  A rm is t i ce  
th ro u g h  t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  t r e a t y ,  t h e  A l l i e s  had become
i n t e n t  on pun ish ing  t h e  German government fo r  an a c t  f o r  which
2.
t h e y  b e l i e v e d  i t  t o  be r e s p o n s i b l e .
A l l i e d  com pla in t s  and claims concern ing  t h e s e  and o the r  
i n s t a n c e s  of n o n - f u l f i l m e n t  or v i o l a t i o n  of  t h e  A rm is t i ce  te rms 
were summarised in a p r o t o c o l  forwarded t o  t h e  German government 
on 1 November 1919* A cover ing  n o te  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  s i g n a t u r e  
of t h e  p r o t o c o l  by Germany was t o  be a p r e - c o n d i t i o n  of t h e  
r a t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  t r e a t y .  By t h i s  means t h e  A l l i e s  sought  t o  
ach ieve  a prompt r a t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  t r e a t y  w i th o u t  a l lowing  
Germany t o  evade h e r  A rm is t i c e  o b l i g a t i o n s  which would 
o th e rw ise  have lapsed  as soon as  t h e  t r e a t y  came i n t o  f o r c e .
The A l l i e s  appea r  t o  have been p a r t i c u l a r l y  concerned t h a t ,  
a f t e r  t h e  s i g n a t u r e  of t h e  p r o t o c o l  and t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  
of t h e  t r e a t y ,  th e y  would cease  t o  possess  t h e  means of 
coe rc in g  Germany which t h e y  enjoyed under t h e  A r m i s t i c e .  The 
f i n a l  pa rag raph  of t h e  p r o t o c o l  t h e r e f o r e  s t a t e d  t h a t  in  case  
of n o n - f u l f i l m e n t  of t h e  o b l i g a t i o n s  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  A l l i e d  and
1. Vide:  D ra f t  Note of 2 December 1919» i b i d . ,  V o l .  I I ,  p .  474.
2. S i r  Eyre Crowe, in t h e  Supreme C ounc i l ,  29 October  1919» 
i b i d . ,  V o l .  I I ,  pp. 99-100.
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A ssoc ia ted  Powers re s e rv ed  t h e  r i g h t  " to  have r e c o u r s e  t o  any
c o e r c iv e  measures m i l i t a r y  or o the r  which the y  (might)  deem 
' ' 1
a p p r o p r i a t  e ,
T here  were no o f f i c i a l  German comments on t h e  p r o to c o l  
u n t i l  l a t e  in November. Both t h e  t im in g  and t h e  t o n e  of t h e  
German r e p l y  were i n f lu e n c e d  by th e  course  and t h e  outcome of
t h e  f i r s t  a t t e m p t s  of t h e  United S t a t e s  Senate  t o  r a t i f y  t h e
2 .
t r e a t y . " *  In t h e  speech which he made t o  t h e  Supreme Counci l  
on 1 December t h e  German spokesman von Lersne r  re fu s ed  t o  
ag ree  e i t h e r  t o  t h e  proposed r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  t h e  Scapa Flow 
i n c id e n t  or t o  t h e  p r o v i s io n  f o r  t h e  con t inuance  of m i l i t a r y  
s a n c t i o n s .  On t h e  c o n t r a r y  he claimed t h a t  t h e  f a i l u r e  of  t h e  
United S t a t e s  t o  r a t i f y  th e  t r e a t y  and t h e  consequent  absence  
of American r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from t h e  A l l i e d  Con t ro l  Commissions 
which would be s e t  up in Germany when t h e  t r e a t y  came in t o  
f o r c e  was s u f f i c i e n t  cause  f o r  compensatory concess ions  
a f f e c t i n g  t h e  t r i a l  of German war a in i ina l s  and t h e  r e p a t r i a t i o n
a 3.
of German p r i s o n e r s  of war s t i l l  in  French cu s to d y .  i o n  
L e r s n e r 1s s tand  made such an im press ion  t h a t  on 2 December 
S i r  Eyre Crowe f o r e c a s t  t o  Curzon t h a t  "very g rave  d e c i s i o n s "  
might s h o r t l y  have t o  be t a k e n  in o rder  t o  o b ta in  German 
agreement t o  t h e  p r o t o c o l  and t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  t r e a t y .  
However, t h e  A l l i e s  soon became aware t h a t  von L ersne r  had
1. i b i d . ,  V o l .  U ,  p .  146.
2. The S ena te  r e j e c t e d  a r a t i f i c a t i o n  motion on 19 November.
3.  DBFP, V o l .  n ,  pp. 473- 4 .
4 . i b id . ,  V o l .  V, p.  879.
4 .
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exceeded h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n s  and t h a t  t h e  German government was 
in  f a c t  w i l l i n g  t o  s ign  t h e  p r o t o c o l . - *  They t h e r e f o r e  took 
g r e a t  pa ins  t o  fo rm u la te  t h e i r  r e p ly  in a way which would cause  
t h e  German Cabinet  l e a s t  em barrassm en t .1"* Thus t h e  A l l i e d  Note 
of 8 December,  w h i l e  s t a n d i n g  f i rm  a g a i n s t  von L e r s n e r ' s  c la im  
f o r  compensation on account  of t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  
t o  r a t i f y  t h e  t r e a t y ,  conceded t h a t  i t  was u n d e s i r a b l e  t o  
r e t a i n  m i l i t a r y  s a n c t io n s  in p e a c e - t im e .  Moreover,  a l though  
t h e  demand f o r  dock m a t e r i a l  was not d ropped,  t h e  no te  s t a t e d  
t h a t  t h e  A l l i e s  were ready  t o  examine, " in  a s p i r i t  of equ i ty "  
any German claims  of s p e c i a l  h a r d s h ip  caused by t h e  d e l i v e r i e s  
r e q u e s t e d . 3 *
The r e p ly  of t h e  German government on 14 December 
acknowledged t h e  A l l i e d  concess ion  on t h e  s u b je c t  of  m i l i t a r y  
s a n c t i o n s  and d i s c la im ed  any r i g h t  t o  b a rg a in  with  t h e  A l l i e s  
over t h e  e x t r a d i t i o n  of German war c r im in a l s  as  a r e s u l t  of 
American n o n - r a t  i f  i c a t  ion of t h e  t r e a t y .  On t h e  v i t a l  q u e s t i o n  
of dock m a t e r i a l  i t  showed w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  compromise.  Although 
i t  con t inued  t o  deny i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  what had occurred  
a t  Scapa Flow, t h e  government d e c l a r e d  i t s e l f  r e a d y ,  in t h e  
i n t e r e s t  of t h e  "prompt r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of peac e" ,  t o  make good 
t h e  damage caused t o  t h e  A l l i e s  by t h e  i n c i d e n t .  But ,  t a k in g
1. Derby t o  Curzon,  5 December 1919 > i b i d , ,  V ol .  V, pp.893*^» 
The German government’s r e l u c t a n c e  t o  de l a y  t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  
of t h e  t r e a t y  by p r o t e s t i n g  a g a i n s t  t h e  p r o t o c o l  was 
d o u b t l e s s  inc reased  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  A r t i c l e  214 of t h e  
t r e a t y  prov ided  t h a t  t h e  r e p a t r i a t i o n  of p r i s o n e r s  of war 
should be c a r r i e d  out "wi th  t h e  g r e a t e s t  r a p i d i t y ” .
2.  Crowe t o  Curzon,  5 December 1919> i b i d . ,  V o l .  V, p. 894.
3* i b i d . ,  V o l .  I I ,  pp.  496- 8 .
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up t h e  A l l i e d  o f f e r  t o  examine cases  of h a r d s h i p ,  t h e  government 
d e c l a r e d  t h a t  i t  would submit d a t a  immedia te ly  t o  dem ons t ra te  
t h a t  t h e  d e l i v e r y  of 400,000 to n s  of dock m a t e r i a l  would 
"compromise in an i r r e p a r a b l e  way t h e  economic l i f e  of Germany 
and would end by exc lud ing  a l l  p o s s i b i l i t y  of f u l f i l l i n g  t h e
o th e r  enormous o b l i g a t i o n s  which t h e  T r e a ty  impose(d) on
1 *
Germany". S ince  t h e  A l l i e s  in  t h e i r  t u r n  agreed t o  t h i s  
course  of  a c t i o n ,  d e t a i l e d  n e g o t i a t i o n s  which e v e n t u a l l y  le d  
t o  a c o n s id e r a b l e  r e d u c t io n  in  t h e  amount of m a t e r i a l  demanded 
were begun,  and t h e  way was c l e a r e d  f o r  t h e  s i g n a t u r e  of t h e  
p r o t o c o l  and t h e  exchange of r a t i f i c a t i o n s  of t h e  t r e a t y  on 
10 Ja n u a ry  1920#'*
The n o te  exchange occasioned  by t h e  q u e s t i o n  of 
A rm is t i c e  d e l i v e r i e s  did  not  a t  f i r s t  have much impact on 
German o p in i o n .  At t h e  end of November 1919 Genera l  Malcolm, 
t h e  B r i t i s h  M i l i t a r y  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  in B e r l i n ,  emphasised t h e  
apa thy  of t h e  m a jo r i t y  of t h e  German people about  f o r e ig n  
a f f a i r s  -  " t h e r e  a r e  no f o r e i g n  p o l i t i c s "  - and remarked upon 
t h e  r a r i t y  of  d i s c u s s i o n  about  t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  United  S t a t e s
3.
S ena te  t o  r a t i f y  t h e  t r e a t y .  A week l a t e r  he r e p o r te d  t h a t  
t h e r e  was " a b s o l u t e l y  no p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  in t h e  r e c e n t  exchange 
of n o t e s " .  Although one c l a s s  of  t h e  p o p u la t io n  f e l t  s t r o n g l y
77 i b i d . ,  V o l .  I I ,  pp.  539-41 .
2.  i b i d . ,  V o l .  I I ,  p. 533* The r e d u c t io n  was san c t io n ed  by 
t h e  A l l i e s  a f t e r  i t  was proved by German e x p e r t s  t h a t  
t h e  e s t i m a t e  of t h e  t o t a l  tonnage  of German dock m a t e r i a l  
upon which t h e  A l l i e d  c la im  f o r  400,000 t o n s  had been 
based was e x ag g e ra ted ,  i b i d . ,  V ol ,  I I ,  pp,  643-5*
3« Report  of 27 November 1919 i b i d . ,  V ol .  V I ,  pp.  426-31
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about t h e  s u r r e n d e r  of dock m a t e r i a l ,  and a n o th e r  " r a t h e r  l a r g e r  
c l a s s "  f e l t  "more s t r o n g l y "  about  t h e  e x t r a d i t i o n  of  war 
c r i m i n a l s ,  t h e  only s u b je c t  about which t h e r e  was any u n i v e r s a l  
f e e l i n g  was t h e  q u es t i o n  of t h e  r e p a t r i a t i o n  of German p r i s o n e r s  
of war from F ran ce .  The government " a c t i n g  under  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  
of one c l a s s  or a n o th e r "  w ro te  no tes  and a t tem p ted  t o  n e g o t i a t e  
but  t h e r e  was no u n i t e d  n a t i o n a l  f e e l i n g  behind i t .
I t  was not  u n t i l  t h e  second week in  December t h a t  t h e  
d i s p u t e  a roused  any u n fa v o u ra b le  r e a c t i o n  in Germany. On 11 
December Malcolm observed t h a t  " the  f e e l i n g  of  resentm ent a g a i n s t  
t h e  E n t e n t e  (was) becoming more and more b i t t e r " .  " L a t t e r l y , "  
he went on,  " th e  idea has  been growing up even among r e s p o n s i b l e  
men t h a t  i t  i s  u s e l e s s  f o r  Germany’s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  t o  s ign  
t h e  l a t e s t  p r o t o c o l ,  f o r  as  soon as t h e y  have done s o ,  t h e  
E n t e n t e  w i l l  sp r ing  upon them some f r e s h  demand w i th  t h e  d e f i n i t e  
i n t e n t i o n  of s t r a n g l i n g  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  and economic l i f e  of t h e  
c o u n t r y . "  C le a r ly  Malcolm cons idered  t h a t  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
over t h e  p r o t o c o l  had caused t h e  growth of a n e g a t i v e  a t t i t u d e  
towards  f u l f i l m e n t  of t h e  t r e a t y  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  of t h e  German 
Peace D e leg a t io n  in June 1919« He even went so f a r  as  t o  r e p o r t  
a rumour,  in f a c t  f a l s e ,  t h a t  t h e  Fore ign  R e l a t i o n s  Committee of 
t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly had on t h e  p rev io u s  day decided  t o  r e f u s e
t o  s ign  t h e  p r o to c o l  and t o  o f f e r  no r e s i s t a n c e  t o  any m i l i t a r y
2 .
a c t i o n  which t h e  E n te n te  might u n d e r t a k e .
1.  Report  of  4 December 1919» i b i d . ,  Y o l .  VI ,  pp .4£6-C.
2 .  Report  of  11 December 1919» i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I ,  p ,  5C2.
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The harden ing  of German opinion commented upon by 
Malcolm was almost c e r t a i n l y  connected w i th  d e c l a r a t i o n s  in 
f av o u r  of p a s s iv e  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  A l l i ed  r e p a r a t i o n  demands which 
were made a t  t h i s  t ime by r i g h t - w i n g  speakers  d u r in g  f i s c a l  
d e b a t e s  in t h e  N a t io n a l  Assembly.  These arguments were most 
f o r c e f u l l y  expressed  by t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t  Hugenberg on 9 December 
d u r ing  t h e  d eb a te  on t h e  second read ing  of t h e  R e ich s n o to p fe r  
( ’’N a t i o n a l  Emergency Levy") ,  t h e  c e n t r e - p i e c e  of E r z b e r g e r ' s  
programme of f i s c a l  re fo rm .  A f t e r  s t a t i n g  h i s  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  
t h e  Reichsno t  opf e r  on o th e r  g rounds ,  Hugenberg d e c l a r e d  i t  
was u n p a t r i o t i c  t o  suppor t  t h e  levy s in c e  i t s  y i e l d  would be 
c o n f i s c a t e d  by t h e  A l l i e s ,  R a the r  than  p lace  German f in a n c e s  
a t  t h e  mercy of t h e  E n t e n t e  th rough  such measures i t  would be 
p r e f e r a b l e ,  in  h i s  op in io n ,  t o  al low t h e  A l l i e d  armies  t o
-j
occupy t h e  Ruhr,
Although Hugenberg ' s  speech had no e f f e c t  on t h e  
e v e n t u a l  shape of t h e  measure be ing  d e b a t e d ,  i t  c r e a te d  such an 
immediate s e n s a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  s i t t i n g  of t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly 
had t o  be suspended f o r  a q u a r t e r  of an hour;  and i t  almost 
c e r t a i n l y  had a bad e f f e c t  on t h e  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  German pub l i c  
tow ards  paying t a x e s .  The warnings of  Hugenberg and o th e r  
r i g h t - w i n g  speakers  about  t h e  c o n f i s c a t o r y  i n t e n t i o n s  of t h e
A l l i e s  were g iven  added p o in t  by c u r r e n t  and p a s t  d i s p u t e s  on
2 .
t h e  s u b je c t  of A rm is t i ce  d e l i v e r i e s .  However, in a s s e s s i n g
1. N a t i o n a lv e r s a n m lu n e . 9 December 1919» V ol ,  331» P-3932-7*
2.  E ,g ,  Hugenberg 's  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  s u r r e n d e r  of  t h e  merchant
f l e e t :  i b i d , ,  p. 3936 •
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the impact of both the Hugenberg outburst and the note exchange 
on German attitudes to financial reform it should not be 
forgotten that in both this and previous debates on the 
Reichsnot opf er the right-wing parties based their opposition
•j'
primarily on domestic financial and social considerations.
This enabled government speakers to accuse the Right of arousing 
groundless suspicion of the Allies merely in order to prevent 
the passage of taxation measures to which it really objected 
for self-interested reasons. Thus the relative psychological 
significance of the general reparation question was reduced* 
Moreover, the immediate unfavourable impact of the note exchange 
in November and December was soon mitigated by the prompt and 
amicable settlement of the dispute over dock material.
(d) Coal Deliveries before May 1921
It has already been observed that coal was a vital 
factor in the German domestic economy and that it was also, if 
exported, an important source of foreign exchange. Reparation 
coal deliveries were, after the deliveries of railway rolling 
stock and shipping made under the Armistice, the most notable 
form of reparation payment before May 1921. They were therefore 
likely to have some influence on domestic and foreign attitudes 
to Germany’s financial future.
The provisions of the Coal Annex of the Reparation
1. See below, pp, 249-56
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C hapter of t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T rea ty ^ w ere  c e r t a i n l y  not such as 
t o  encourage German economic or f i n a n c i a l  optim ism . I t  was 
s t i p u l a t e d  ( l )  t h a t  Germany should d e l i v e r  7 m i l l i o n  to n s  of 
c o a l  t o  F rance  a n n u a l ly  fo r  t e n  y e a rs  p lu s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  
between t h e  c u r re n t  and t h e  p re-w ar p ro d u c t io n  of t h e  
d e v a s ta te d  mines of t h e  Nord and t h e  Fas de C a la is  ( t h i s  
a d d i t i o n a l  amount not t o  exceed 20 m i l l i o n  to n s  in  any y e a r ) ;
(2) t h a t  Germany should d e l i v e r  t o  Belgium 8 m i l l i o n  to n s  of 
c o a l  a n n u a l ly  fo r  t e n  y e a r s ;  (3 ) t h a t  Germany should make 
sh ipm ents  t o  I t a l y  of 4 .5  m i l l i o n  to n s  in  1919-20, r i s i n g  t o  
8 ,5  m i l l i o n  to n s  by 1923-4; and (4) t h a t ,  i f  t h e  R ep a ra tio n  
Commission d i r e c t e d ,  Luxemburg should r e c e iv e  from Germany t h e  
same amount of German c o a l  as  she had consumed b e fo re  t h e  w ar .  
The t r e a t y  th u s  envisaged r e p a r a t io n  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  of over 
40 m i l l i o n  to n s  a y e a r .  S in ce  t h i s  sc h e d u le  was q u i t e  beyond 
th e  c a p a c i t y  of t h e  German c o a l  in d u s t r y  in  i t s  weakened p o s t ­
war c o n d i t i o n ,  and s in c e  t h e  German government was n a t u r a l l y
2
anx ious no t t o  encourage t h e  A l l i e s  in  t h e i r  e x p e c ta t io n s ,  * 
t h e  r e a c t i o n  of t h e  German Peace D e le g a t io n  was in e v i t a b l y  
h ig h ly  u n fa v o u ra b le .  The German C ou n te rp ro p o sa ls  of 29 May 1919 
approved in  g e n e ra l  of t h e  id e a  of com pensating F rance  f o r  h e r  
d im in ish ed  c o a l  p ro d u c t io n .  However, th e y  summarily d ism issed
1, Annex Vs See Appendix I .  The German government had a l r e a d y  
a g re e d ,  in  th e  Luxemburg P ro to c o l  of 25 December 1918 t o  
supp ly  “ s u f f i c i e n t  c o a l  and coke t o  t h e  m e t a l l u r g i c a l  
i n d u s t r i e s  of L o r r a in e " ,  R ,C , , V, p .  93* But t h e  q u a n t i t i e s  
d e l iv e r e d  in  1919 under t h i s  agreement were r e l a t i v e l y  
i n s i g n i f i c a n t ,  C, Bergmann, op, c i t . ,  p , 27*
2 ,  B e r ic h t  des  A usschusses f ü r  V o lk s w ir t s c h a f t  Aber d i e  Lage 
im Kohlenbergbau und d ie  K ohlenversorgung , l 6 June 1919>
N ationalverSam m lung, V o l ,  335» Anl, 386 , PP* 234-5*
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th e  n o tio n  of d e l iv e r ie s  of more than  20 m illio n  to n s  a y e a r .
Even t h i s  amount could be d e liv e re d  on ly , they  m ain ta ined , i f  
th e  mines of th e  Saar and Upper S i le s ia  remained in  German 
hands and i f  th e  causes of th e  low le v e l  of German post-w ar 
coal p roduction  were removed. In th e  l a t t e r  connection i t  
was e s s e n t ia l  th a t  th e re  should be in c reased  im ports of food 
and raw m a te r ia ls  in to  Germany, and t h a t ,  once th e  necessa ry  
housing had been p rov ided , th e  number of German m iners should 
be in creased  so as to  b a lan c e  th e  sh o rten in g  of s h i f t s  from 
8J- t o  7 h o u rs .
In view of th e  d ivergence  between th e  p ro v is io n s  of th e  
Coal Annex and th e  id eas  of th e  German Peace D elegation  i t  was 
t o  be expected th a t  th e  co a l q u estion  would cause serio u s  
f r i c t i o n  between th e  A llie s  and Germany. But in  p ra c tic e  th i s  
f r i c t i o n  was avoided fo r  a co n sid e rab le  period  because of th e  
powers g iven to  th e  R epara tion  Commission to  in te rp re t  th e  Coal 
Annex in  a f l e x ib le  manner. Paragraph 10 of th e  Coal Annex 
a u th o rised  th e  Commission to  determ ine w hether th e  d e l iv e r ie s  
demanded would " in te r f e r e  unduly w ith  th e  in d u s t r ia l  requirem ents 
of Germany" and " to  postpone or to  cancel d e l i v e r i e s . . . " .  The 
Commission was not slow to  use  i t s  d is c r e t io n a ry  powers. On
3 Ju ly  1919 th e  Commission on th e  O rgan isation  of th e  R epara tion
2.
Commission was d ire c te d  by th e  Supreme Council to  approach 
th e  German government on th e  su b je c ts  of ( l )  re p a ra t io n  in  kind
1. A. Luckau, op. c i t . ,  p . 356•
2 . H enceforth  CORC. Appointed by th e  Supreme Council on
1 Ju ly  1919: DBFP. V ol. V, p . 60 N ote.
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and th e  p ro v is io n  of labour t o  re p la c e  p r iso n e rs  of war;
(2) su p p lie s  in  kind mentioned in  th e  t r e a ty ;  and (3) th e  
supply of raw m a te r ia ls  to  Germany,^* In th e  r e s u l t in g  
n e g o tia tio n s  about advance d e l iv e r ie s  and about th e  amount 
of co a l which was to  be d e liv e red  a f t e r  th e  t r e a ty  had come 
in to  fo r c e ,  * th e  CORC in  p ra c t ic e  agreed to  co a l shipments 
which were f a r  below th e  le v e l  s t ip u la te d  in  th e  Coal Annex,
I t  a lso  expressed no o b je c tio n  to  most of th e  co n d itio n s  which 
th e  German a u th o r i t ie s  a tta ch ed  to  th e  commencement of 
d e l iv e r ie s .
The le v e l of coal d e l iv e r ie s  and th e  term s on which 
th e  German re p re s e n ta t iv e s  in s is te d  in Ju ly  1919 were v i r t u a l ly  
th e  same as th o se  contained  in  th e  German coun terp ro p o sals  of 
May, The German Coal Commission advised th e  government th a t  
d e l iv e r ie s  should not exceed 12 m illio n  to n s  a year w hile  
p roduction  remained a t i t s  estim ated  e x is t in g  le v e l  of 100 
m illio n  to n s ,  but th a t  th e y  could r i s e  to  18 m illio n  to n s  when 
annual output was 112 m illio n  to n s  and to  21 m illio n  to n s  when 
t o t a l  p roduction  had reached 124 m illio n  to n s .  The Commissioners 
in s is te d  th a t  th e y  subm itted t h i s  schedule  only under compulsion 
and th a t  i t s  execution would lead t o  " se r io u s  d is tu rb a n ce s  in  
th e  economic l i f e  and th e  i n te r io r  p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n  of 
Germany” • They s t ip u la te d  f u r th e r  th a t  a l l  Upper S ile s ia n  co a l
1. ib id ,
2 , P a ra , 10 of Annex V d ire c te d  th a t  Germany was to  be given
30 days n o tic e  of d e l iv e r ie s  requ ired  of h e r befo re
1 January  1920 and 120 days n o t ic e  of d e l iv e r ie s  a f t e r  th a t
d a te .
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should remain at Germany’s d isp o sa l, that there should be
no d e liv e r ie s  to  Germany’s eastern and south-eastern
neighbours, that Germany should continue to  rece iv e  100,000
ton s of coa l a month from th e  Saar,^*and that there should
be adequate f a c i l i t i e s  for  transporting coa l from the east
to  th e  west of Germany. F in a lly , they assumed th a t the A llie s
would grant " a ll f a c i l i t i e s  for cred it for food stu ffs  for th e
mining d is t r ic t s  and fo r  th e  necessary m aterials for the
2
ex p lo ita tio n  of th e  mines".
The German government fu l ly  endorsed th e  views of i t s
exp erts, which i t  transm itted to  th e  CORC on 12 July,although
i t  was more hopeful about Germany’ s future capacity  to  d e liv e r
c o a l. A covering le t t e r  predicted th at output would be
9 m illio n  ton s in July and th at th is  would enable d e liv e r ie s  at
a ra te  of 16 m illion  tons a year. The conviction  was a lso
expressed th a t , i f  "the present s ta te  of a f fa ir s  in Germany"
was maintained and i f  th e  A ll ie s  encouraged German production
through th e supply of raw m ateria ls and fo o d stu ffs , Germany
would be ab le to  d e liv er  at a ra te  of 20 m illio n  tons by 
o
autumn.
The V e r sa ille s  Protocol of 29 August 1919 vhich was 
th e  outcome of th ese  early  n ego tia tion s over th e  coal question  
appears to  have complied with German w ishes in almost every 
respect.^* In th e  f i r s t  p la ce , although the Protocol d irected
1. On d e liv e r ie s  to  Germany from the Saar in 1919s see above, 
pp. 42- 4 .
2 . DBFP, V ol. V, p. 63 .
3 . Lersner t o  Loucheur, 12 July 1919» ib id . ,  p. 62.
4. For te x t  of th e  V e r s a ille s  Protocol: ib id . ,  V o l. V ,pp.33^-7»
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th a t  Germany should make advance d e l iv e r ie s ,  no d e f in i te  
amount was m entioned. On th e  co n tra ry  i t  was e x p l ic i t ly  
s ta te d  th a t  in  order to  prevent economic d is lo c a t io n  and 
consequent p o l i t i c a l  t r o u b le s ,  Germany would "begin co al 
d e l iv e r ie s  only in  accordance w ith  th e  measure of in c rease  
of p ro d u c tio n " . The schedule of compulsory d e l iv e r ie s ,  
which would begin a f t e r  th e  t r e a ty  was r a t i f i e d ,  was, i t  is  
t r u e ,  more severe  th an  th a t  suggested by th e  German Coal 
Commission. Paragraph 3 of th e  P ro to co l d ec la red  th a t  th e  
R epara tion  Commission would be requested  to  demand co a l a t 
th e  r a t e  of 20 m illio n  to n s  a year in  th e  f i r s t  s ix  months 
a f t e r  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of th e  t r e a t y .  As p roduction  ro se  
above i t s  p resen t le v e l  d e l iv e r ie s  were to  in c re a se  in  th e  
fo llow ing  manner:
(m illio n  to n s )
Gross
Production









However, t h i s  schedule  was la rg e ly  a piece of French p o l i t i c a l  
"window d re s s in g "  and was no t intended to  be en fo rced . A 
l e t t e r  w r i t te n  to  Stresemann a few months l a t e r  by S tu tz , th e  
German Commissioner fo r  Coal D is tr ib u t io n ,  re v e a ls  th a t  th e re  
was a v e rb a l agreement th a t  th e  maximum monthly d e liv e ry  
which would be in s is te d  upon would in  p ra c t ic e  be 1 m illio n  to n s
1.
1. S tu tz  t o  S tresem ann, 24 January  1920, N ach lass . 6935/l40066f
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The e f f e c t  of t h i s  agreement -was r e f l e c t e d  in a German 
d e l e g a t e ’ s l e t t e r  t o  t h e  GORC a few days be fo re  t h e  s i g n a t u r e  
of t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  P r o t o c o l .  The w r i t e r  s t r e s s e d  t h e  need bo th  
f o r  A l l i e d  conf idence  t h a t  Germany would "execu te  as f a r  as 
p o s s i b l e  t h e  c o n d i t io n s  of  peace"  and f o r  German conf idence  t h a t  
t h e  CORC would "do eve ry th in g  t o  m a in ta in  pub l i c  and economic 
o rde r  in Germany". The n e g o t i a t i o n s  of t h e  pas t  few weeks 
had ,  he s t a t e d ,  s a t i s f i e d  t h i s  need.  The German d e l e g a t i o n
would t h e r e f o r e  a d v i s e  t h e  government,  t h e  Coal S ynd ica te  and
1.
t h e  German workers t o  beg in  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  a t  once.  Three 
days l a t e r  Bergmann, a n o th e r  Qerman r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  informed 
t h e  CORC t h a t  t h e  German government had approved i t s  e x p e r t s '  
recommendations .  "We hop e , "  he added,  " t h a t  t h e  R ep a ra t io n  
Commission w i l l  not i n s i s t  on t h e  q u a n t i t i e s  l a i d  down a t  
p r e s e n t  i f  t h e  coa l  p ro d u c t io n  f a l l s  below i t s  p re s en t  l e v e l ,
but  t h a t  i t  w i l l  t a k e  i n t o  account  t h e  changed s i t u a t i o n ,  as  you
2 ,
have a l r e a d y  p e r s o n a l l y  a s su red  u s . "
On most i s s u e s  which a f f e c t e d  t h e  amount of coa l  which 
remained a t  Germany’ s d i s p o s a l  t h e  P ro to c o l  sa feguarded  German 
i n t e r e s t s .  I t  r u l e d  t h a t  Germany should not  be forced  t o  
d e l i v e r  c o a l  t o  h e r  e a s t e r n  and s o u t h - e a s t e r n  ne ighbours ;  and 
i t  d i r e c t e d  t h a t  Germany should  con t in u e  t o  r e c e i v e  100,000
3.
t o n s  of c o a l  a month from t h e  S a a r .  I t  was only on t h e  
q u e s t i o n  of t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of Upper S i l e s i a n  c o a l  t h a t  t h e
1. Schmidt t o  Loucheur,  23 August 1919» PBFP, V o l .  V, pp.338-9*
2. Bergmann t o  Loucheur,  26 August 1919» i t  i d . ,  V o l .  V, p.  335« 
3« P a ra .  5» Clauses 7> 9»
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P ro to co l ran  coun ter to  German w ishes by s ta t in g  th a t  th e  
f i n a l  d e c is io n  in t h i s  m a tte r  was to  r e s t  w ith  th e  In te rn a tio n a l  
Coal Conference*1 234* But by ag reeing  to  th e  P ro to co l th e  German 
government c e r ta in ly  had not mortgaged to  th e  A llie s  any 
c o n sid e ra b le  p a rt of Germany's fu tu re  co a l p ro d u c tio n .
The German government was given added in c e n tiv e  to  
sign  th e  P ro to co l by th e  hope of fu r th e r  A llied  co n cessio n s .
The CORC had made i t  c le a r  th a t  i t  would not Mta k e  up any
2.
q u estion  b e fo re  th a t  of co a l had been d e a l t  w ith*'. * This 
im plied presumably th a t  th e  CORC would not broach p o in ts  ( l )  
and (3) of i t s  term s of re fe re n c e , which a f fe c te d  th e  v i t a l  
is su e s  of th e  r e p a t r ia t io n  of German p riso n e rs  of war and th e  
supply of raw m a te r ia ls  to  Germany, u n t i l  th e  P ro to co l was 
accep ted . I t  was l a t e r  a s s e r te d  by th e  German government th a t  
i t s  a sse n t to  th e  V e r s a i l le s  P ro to co l had been a quid pro quo 
fo r th e  A llie d  d e c is io n  on 29 August to  begin th e  r e p a t r ia t io n
of German p riso n e rs  of war.^* Whatever th e  t r u t h  of t h i s
4
a s s e r t io n ,  which was c o n tra d ic te d  by th e  F rench , ‘th e r e  was a 
c le a r  connection  between th e  German governm ent's s ig n a tu re  of 
th e  P ro to co l and i t s  hopes concerning th e  supply of food and 
raw m a te r ia ls  by th e  A l l ie s .  These hopes were based upon 
A r t ic le  235 of th e  V e r s a i l le s  T rea ty  which s t ip u la te d  th a t  th e re  
were p r io r  claim s upon th e  fund c o n s ti tu te d  by re p a ra tio n  
d e l iv e r ie s  in  re sp ec t f i r s t l y  of payments fo r  th e  co st of th e
1. P a ra . 5» Clause 6 .
2. M inutes of 7th Meeting of th e  CORC, 28 August 1919» DBFP. 
V o l. V, p . 333.
3 . i b i d . ,  V o l. V, p . 793.
4 . German Note of 27 November 1919» i b i d . ,  V o l. I I , p p .458-61.
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arm ies of occupation and secondly of payments fo r  su p p lies
of food and raw m a te r ia ls  which were considered  by A llied
powers to  be e s s e n t ia l  t o  enable Germany to  meet h e r
re p a ra t io n  o b lig a t io n s . The P ro to co l i t s e l f  m erely s t ip u la te d
th a t  th e  A ll ie s  would p rov ide  Germany w ith  f a c i l i t i e s  fo r
o b ta in in g  food su p p lie s  and raw m a te r ia ls  d e s tin ed  fo r  th e
co a l f i e l d s .  * But on 28 August th e  German re p re s e n ta t iv e
Bergmann, a f t e r  a co n v ersa tio n  w ith  Loucheur on th e  previous
day, had forwarded to  th e  CORC a document e n t i t le d  "Measures
fo r  th e  In c rease  of th e  P roduction  of Coal in German Mines” .
T his con tained  a l i s t  of fo o d s tu f f s ,  c lo th in g  and working
m a te r ia ls  needed in  th e  mining d i s t r i c t s  which "might be
d e liv e red  by th e  E n ten te” , and requested  an A llied  c re d it  of
o200 m illio n  gold marks in  o rd er to  fin an ce  such a scheme.
The German government had th e re fo re  agreed to  th e  
V e r s a i l le s  P ro to co l on th e  co n d itio n  th a t  i t  would be g ran ted  
c r e d i ts  in  o rd er to  o b ta in  v i t a l  im ports and in  th e  hope th a t  
th e  r e p a t r ia t io n  of p r iso n e rs  of war would be ex p ed ited . I t  
had , in  a d d i t io n ,  been given  to  understand th a t  th e  A llie s  
would i n s i s t  on th e  d e liv e ry  of only a r e l a t i v e ly  sm all amount 
of c o a l .  I t  was h a rd ly  su rp r is in g  th a t  th e  r e p a ra t io n  co a l 
n e g o tia tio n s  of Ju ly  and August aroused very l i t t l e  adverse  
comment by th e  op p o sitio n  p a r t ie s  in  th e  N a tio n a l Assembly.
On 31 J u ly , re p re s e n ta t iv e s  of th e  DVP and DNVP had moved an 
in te r p e l la t io n  which enquired what a c tio n  th e  government
1. P a ra . 5> C lause 10.
2 . E n e l, in  Bergmann t o  Loucheur, 28 August 1919» DBFP.
V o l. V, pp. 401-3.
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proposed t o  take  t o  counter th e  coal c r i s i s  which was looming, 
f i r s t l y ,  because of th e  drop in Ruhr coal p roduction ; secondly , 
because of t h e  d e l iv e r i e s  envisaged in th e  Coal Annex of th e  
t r e a t y ;  and f i n a l l y ,  because of th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
r e s u l t i n g  from th e  post-war d i s lo c a t io n  of th e  German ra ilw ay  
system, * When th e  i n t e r p e l l a t i o n  was debated on 15 August 
t h e r e  was l i t t l e  emphasis upon re p a ra t io n  d e l iv e r i e s  as a 
p o s s ib le  major cause of th e  coa l c r i s i s .  On th e  co n tra ry  
Hugenberg, th e  main speaker t o  th e  i n t e r p e l l a t i o n ,  r e fe r re d  t o  
Germany’s fu tu r e  coal o b l ig a t io n s  to  th e  E n ten te  as an added 
in c e n t iv e  t o  h igher production  r a th e r  than  as an in to le r a b le  
burden. In h is  opinion th e  main th r e a t  t o  th e  German coal 
in d u s try  came from th e  s t r i k e r s  and a g i t a to r s  on th e  coal 
f i e l d s  and ra i lw a y s ,  * The re p ly  of Schmidt, t h e  M in is ter  
fo r  Economic A f f a i r s ,  to  th e  i n t e r p e l l a t i o n  showed t h a t  th e  
question  of re p a ra t io n  d e l iv e r i e s  was causing th e  government 
l i t t l e  p o l i t i c a l  embarrassment. A fte r  d ism iss ing  th e  f ig u r e  
of 45 m il l io n  tons  p rescr ibed  by th e  Coal Annex as q u ite  
im p ra c t ic a b le ,  Schmidt repo rted  w ith  evident assu rance  on th e  
government’s c u rre n t  n e g o t ia t io n s  f o r  d e l i v e r i e s  a t  an 
annual r a t e  of 20 m il l io n  t o n s .  Shipments of even t h i s  reduced 
s i z e ,  he p re d ic te d ,  might not prove t o  be feasib le .-^*  Both th e  
lack of concern of th e  opposit ion  and th e  confiden t assurances 
of t h e  government would not have been p o ss ib le  i f  t h e  A l l ie s
1. In terp e lla tio n  of Heinze, Amstadt and others (63 s ign at­
o r ie s ) ,  31 July 1919> Nationalversammlung. V o l.338, Anl.739»
2. i b i d . ,  15 August 1919, V ol. 329, P. 2467.
3 . i b i d . ,  p . 2471.
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had been e x e r t in g  s e r io u s  p r e s s u r e  on Germany t o  d e l i v e r  
l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of c o a l .  I t  was a r e f l e c t i o n  of th e  
u n tro u b le d  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  N a t io n a l  Assembly t o  t h e  q u e s t io n  
of r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  t h a t  i t  r e g i s t e r e d  no fo rm al 
p r o t e s t  a g a in s t  them . The on ly  r e s o l u t i o n  of t h i s  body which 
was su b m it ted  t o  t h e  CORC in  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  over t h e  
V e r s a i l l e s  P ro to c o l  was one which sugges ted  p r a c t i c a l  s te p s  
which should  be ta k e n  t o  in c r e a s e  c o a l  p r o d u c t io n .
The f l e x i b i l i t y  of t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  P ro to c o l  and th e  
hopes e n t e r t a i n e d  by t h e  German government had preven ted  th e  
q u e s t io n  of c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  from becoming an i s s u e  in  German 
p o l i t i c s  in  August 1919* D e l i v e r i e s  con tinued  t o  a ro u se  
c o m p a ra t iv e ly  l i t t l e  comment in  t h e  N a t io n a l  Assembly b e fo re  
t h e  Spa C onference in  J u ly  1920. * But t h i s  was l a r g e ly  
b ecau se  t h e  A l l i e s  r e f r a i n e d  from making r i g i d  demands f o r  
c o a l .  In t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of 1920 t h e  French government grew 
more and more determ ined  t o  demand d e l i v e r i e s  on t h e  s c a le  
envisaged in  t h e  t r e a t y .  S ince  t h e  A l l i e s  had made l i t t l e  
p ro g re s s  in  t h i s  pe r iod  tow ards  p ro v id in g  what t h e  Germans 
co n s id e re d  t o  be t h e  p r e - r e q u i s i t e s  f o r  l a r g e  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s ,  
t h e  way was prepared  fo r  a dead lock  over t h e  c o a l  q u e s t io n  
which might w e l l  have ex e r ted  a harm fu l e f f e c t  on Germany*s 
i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c e s .
The f i r s t  m a t te r  in  which t h e  A l l i e s  f a i l e d  t o  l i v e  up
1 . R e s o lu t io n  of 15 August 1919j i b i d . ,  V o l .  3389 A nl. 878; 
c f .  DBFP, V o l .  V, p . 401, Note 11.
2 . See above, pp . 59-60 .
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t o  German e x p e c ta t io n s  was t h e  f a c i l i t a t i o n  of t h e  supp ly  of 
raw m a t e r i a l s  and f o o d s tu f f s  t o  t h e  mining d i s t r i c t s .
Bergmann*s l e t t e r  of 28 August 1919 r e q u e s t in g  c r e d i t s  t o  
f in a n c e  im ports  was co n s id e re d  by t h e  CORC on 4 September]*
A d r a f t  r e p l y  which was d is c u s s e d  on 11 September con ta ined  a 
p ro p o s a l  t h a t  c r e d i t s  should be g ran te d  t o  Germany f o r  25% 
of t h e  v a lu e  of c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  up t o  1 .6  m i l l i o n  to n s  a month 
and f o r  40^ of th e v a lu e  of any d e l i v e r i e s  above t h a t  f i g u r e .  
However, in  th e  r e p ly  f i n a l l y  adopted on 17 September t h e r e  
was no r e f e r e n c e  t o  such a scheme because ,  in  th e  words of 
Loucheur, "F rance  could not ag ree  t o  pay Germany f o r  d e l i v e r i e s  
in  k in d ” . The French view was t h a t  Germany should  u s e  any 
gold and fo r e ig n  s e c u r i t i e s  which remained to  h e r  t o  f in a n c e  
h e r  e s s e n t i a l  im p o r ts .  ^*As a r e s u l t  of t h e  French a t t i t u d e ,  
t h e  German government had t o  be c o n te n t  w ith  t h e  perm iss ion  
g ra n te d  t o  i t  on 29 August t o  s e l l  or p led g e  s e c u r i t i e s  t o  t h e
4 #
v a lu e  of £20 m i l l io n  f o r  t h e  purpose  of pu rch as in g  food .
S in ce  i t  was a t  t h i s  t im e  u n d e s i r a b l e  fo r  Germany t o  d im in ish  
h e r  r e s e r v e s  any f u r t h e r  t h i s  meant in  p r a c t i c e  t h a t  h e r  food 
im ports  had t o  be paid f o r  in  paper  m arks. T h is  s o lu t io n  met 
w i th  t h e  d i s a p p r o v a l  o f  B radbury , t h e  B r i t i s h  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
on th e  CORC, and alm ost c e r t a i n l y  prompted a B r i t i s h  memorandum 
(su b m it ted  t o  th e  CORC on 25 September) which urged t h a t  t h e
1 .  DBFP. V o l.  V. p p .  3 9 8 - 4 0 0 .
2. i b i d . ,  V o l .  V, pp. 507, 537.
3 . i b i d . ,  V o l .  V, p p .535-6 .
4 . The l e t t e r  of 29 August g r a n t in g  t h i s  pe rm iss io n  i s  r e f e r r e d  
t o  in t h e  d r a f t  r e p l y  d is c u s s e d  on 11 September; i b i d . ,
V o l .  V, p .  508 .
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d e c is io n  as to  whether Germany should re c e iv e  c r e d i t s  should 
not be l e f t  to  th e  R epara tion  Commission, which was only a 
l iq u id a t in g  body, but should be made e i th e r  by th e  Supreme Economic 
Council or by th e  Economic S ec tion  of th e  League of N ations.^*
However, th e  upshot of th e  d iscu ss io n s  on t h i s  p o in t in  ensuing
2 #
weeks was th a t  d e c is io n s  a f fe c t in g  th e  fin an c in g  of Germany’ s 
e s s e n t ia l  im ports remained th e  p re se rv e  of th e  R eparation  
Commission* * This meant in  th e  f i r s t  p lace  th a t  c o n s id e ra tio n  
of th e  q u estio n  was d e fe rred  u n t i l  th e  R epara tion  Commission 
was s e t up a f t e r  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of th e  t r e a ty  on 10 January  
1920* I t  meant fu r th e r  th a t  th e  d ec is io n  as t o  w hether Germany 
should re c e iv e  c r e d i ts  re s te d  w ith  a body which proved to  be 
dominated by th e  narrow French view th a t  Germany should not in 
any sense  be paid fo r  h e r  re p a ra t io n  d e l iv e r ie s .  On 4 March 
1920 th e  R epara tion  Commission ru led  a g a in s t th e  fin an c in g  of 
German im ports out of re p a ra t io n  d e l iv e r ie s  u n le s s  th e  German
government f i r s t  took s tep s  t o  l iq u id a te  fo r  t h i s  purpose a l l
4 .
fo re ig n  s e c u r i t i e s  in th e  po ssess io n  of i t s  n a tio n a ls*
There had been some prospect th a t  th e  qu estio n  of 
g ra n tin g  c r e d i t s  to  Germany would be tak en  out of th e  hands of 
th e  R epara tion  Commission by th e  A llied  heads of government a t 
th e  F i r s t  Conference of London, which sa t from February to  
A p ril 1920. During d isc u ss io n  of a French p roposa l fo r  r a is in g  
an in te r n a t io n a l  loan on th e  s e c u r i ty  of re p a ra t io n  payments,
T. ib id ., V ol. V, pp. 579-83*
2. i b i d . ,  V ol. V, pp. 600-2, 746-9.
3 . i b i d . ,  V o l. V I, pp. 3^2-51.
4 . i b i d . ,  V o l. V II , p . 432, N ote.
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th e  q u estio n  of Germany’ s c a p a c ity  to  pay re p a ra t io n  was
1.
inevitably raised. Lloyd George seized the opportunity to  
point out that Germany could not pay reparation unless her 
economic a ctiv ity  was restored. This in turn could never 
occur while the Germans were short of food and raw materials. 
"The immediate step," he concluded, "was to  find credits to  
enable them to l iv e , and u n til that had been done it  was
n e i th e r  b u s in e s s lik e  nor humane to  ta lk  of borrowing on a
2 .
s ta rv in g  and bankrupt p e o p le ."  On 1 March Lloyd G eorge's 
sug g estio n  was inco rp o ra ted  in  a d ra f t  d e c la ra t io n  by th e  
Conference w hich, a f t e r  d i r e c t in g  th e  R epara tion  Commission 
to  proceed imm ediately w ith  th e  f ix in g  of Germany's t o t a l
3 .
l i a b i l i t y  and th e  assessm ent of h e r c a p a c ity , in s tru c te d  i t
" to  ta k e  s tep s  in  accordance w ith  A r t ic le  235 of 
th e  T rea ty  to  enable Germany to  o b ta in  e s s e n t ia l  
fo o d s tu ffs  and raw m a te r ia ls ,  and , i f  n e ce ssa ry , 
to  a u th o rise  her t o  r a i s e  a loan abroad fo r  t h i s  
purpose w ith such p r io r i ty  as th e  commission may 
th in k  n ecessa ry " .
However, on 8 March, because of French insistence, th is  passage
4.
was d e le ted  and ano ther one s u b s t i tu te d  which m erely
" (to o k ) n o te  of th e  in v i ta t io n  addressed to  Germany 
by th e  (R eparation ) Commission on 4 March to  ta k e  
th e  necessary  s te p s  t o  enable a l l  s e c u r i t i e s  
re p re se n tin g  in te r e s t s  in  u n dertak ings in n e u tra l  
c o u n tr ie s  which a re  in  th e  possess io n  of th e  German 
governm ent, th e  German s ta t e s  or German n a t io n a ls ,  
t o  be app lied  t o  th e  purchase of fo o d s tu ffs  and 
raw m a te r ia ls ,  in  th e  s p i r i t  of th e  p ro v is io n  of 
A r t ic le  235 of th e  T rea ty  of V e r s a i l le s " .
1* For the French proposal: ib id ., Vol. VII, p. 41; for the 
discussion on 28 February: ib id ., Vol. VII, pp.285-90.
2 . i b i d . ,  V o l. V H , p p .289-90.
3 . i b i d . ,  V o l. V II , p . 432.
4. Declaration by the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference 
on the economic condition of the World. H. of C. PapersT 
1920, Cmd. 646. Cf. DBFP, Vol. VII, pp.392, 432-3.
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The d e c is io n  of th e  London Conference to  re le g a te  a l l  
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  in t h i s  m a tte r  to  th e  R eparation  Commission 
in  e f fe c t  meant th a t  no c r e d i t s  would be g ran ted  to  Germany 
under A r t ic le  235 fo r s e v e ra l  more months. Such p a ten t evasion 
by th e  A ll ie s  of u n d ertak in g s  entered in to  in th e  V e rs a i l le s  
P ro to co l not only d i r e c t ly  harmed Germany’s fin a n c es  by 
in c re a s in g  h e r  e x te rn a l f lo a t in g  debt but could a lso  have 
lowered both  dom estic and fo re ig n  confidence in  Germany's 
fu tu re  f in a n c ia l  v i a b i l i t y .  The l a t t e r  development was in  
fa c t  only avoided in  th e  f i r s t  h a l f  of 1920 because th e  
p rospect of th e  Spa Conference kept a l iv e  hopes of a g en e ra l 
adjustm ent and se ttlem en t of Germany's re p a ra t io n  o b l ig a t io n s .1 23* 
A f u r th e r  source  of annoyance, e sp e c ia lly  t o  f in a n c ia l ly  
i n f l u e n t i a l  Germans, was th e  co n tin u a l f r i c t i o n  between A llied  
re p a ra t io n  ex p erts  and th e  R henish-W estphalian Coal S yndicate  
over th e  q u estio n s  of th e  t r a n s p o r ta t io n  and p r ic in g  of co a l 
d e l iv e r ie s .  The Coal S ynd ica te  had fo r  a number of years 
c o n tro lle d  th e  p ro d u c tio n , p r ic in g ,  tra n s p o r t  and m arketing of 
co a l mined in  th e  Ruhr d i s t r i c t .  * I t  was th e re fo re  understand ­
ab le  th a t  in  th e  n e g o tia tio n s  which had preceded th e  s ig n a tu re  
of th e  V e r s a i l le s  P ro to co l in  August 1919 i t  bad attem pted to  
ba rg a in  w ith  th e  A llie s  about th e  q u an tity  and th e  p r ic e  of th e  
coal t o  be d e l i v e r e d . T h e  German government had on th i s
1. See below, p. 149.
2. A.H.Stockder, Regulating an Industry: The Rhenish-
Westphalian Coal Syndicate. 189^-1929, passim.
3 . DBFP. V ol. V, p. 272.
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occasion o v er-ru led  th e  Coal S yndicate  and signed th e  
P ro to c o l . T his did n o t ,  however, imply i t s  approval of th e  
p ro v is io n  in  th e  P ro to co l th a t  f i n a l  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  
re g u la tin g  t r a n s p o r ta t io n  problems a r is in g  out of co al 
d e l iv e r ie s  should r e s t  w ith an A llied  T ransport Commission.1 23*
On th e  c o n tra ry , one of th e  German re p a ra t io n  n e g o tia to rs  
had s ta te d  e x p l ic i t ly  th a t  " i t  would be dangerous t o  make 
m o d if ica tio n s  now in th e  e x is t in g  t r a d e ,  and t r a n s p o r t  of 
co a l s i tu a t io n ,  or to  make new in s t i tu t io n s  which would c re a te  
com petition  w ith  in te re s te d  Germans". The v o lu n ta ry  
c o lla b o ra t io n  of th e  Coal S ynd ica te  was, he i n s i s t e d ,  v i t a l .
The S y nd ica te  was "ready to  undertake  to  th e  g re a te s t  ex ten t 
p o s s ib le , d e l iv e r ie s  to  th e  A llie s  in  s p i te  of a l l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
provided th a t  th e s e  d e l iv e r ie s  (were) c a r r ie d  out in  th e  u su a l 
m anner". But i f  new o rg a n isa tio n s  were c rea ted  " p ra c t ic a l
d i f f i c u l t i e s  (would) r e s u l t  which (would) put th e  execution
2
of d e l iv e r ie s  in  grave dan g er" .
A d isp u te  over th e  q u estio n  of th e  t r a n s p o r ta t io n  of 
co a l had a r is e n  as e a r ly  as October 1919> when th e  low le v e l  
of th e  Rhine made i t  n ece ssa ry  t o  reduce th e  load of co a l­
c a rry in g  barges by h a l f .  On 2 October 1919 th e  CORC received  
a re p o rt from i t s  re p re s e n ta t iv e  a t Essen th a t  Läbsen, th e  
d i r e c to r  of th e  Coal S y n d ica te , had refused  to  co -opera te  
when requested  to  in te n s i fy  d e l iv e r ie s  of co a l by r a i l .^ *
1. P ara . 5» C lauses 3 and 4; i b i d . ,  V o l. V, p . 336.
2 . Bergmann to  Loucheur, 26 August 1919» i b i d , ,  V ol. V,
P. 335.
3 . i b i d . ,  V o l. V, p . 602.
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A few weeks l a t e r  i t  was r e p o r t e d  t h a t  t h e  Coal S y n d ica te  
would not  a l low French ,  I t a l i a n  and Belg ian  ba rges  t o  load 
r e p a r a t i o n  co a l  a t  t h e  Rhine po r t  of  R u h r o r t . On 9 November 
a sub-commit tee  of t h e  CORC which had been s e t  up at  Essen 
as a r e s u l t  of t h e s e  developments met t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
of t h e  German coa l  i n d u s t r y  and government.  The Germans 
j u s t i f i e d  t h e i r  a c t i o n  on th e  g e n e r a l  grounds t h a t ,  because  
of t h e  n o n - r a t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  t r e a t y ,  d e l i v e r i e s  under  t h e  
V e r s a i l l e s  P r o to c o l  were e n t i r e l y  v o lu n t a r y ;  and t h a t  the  
A l l i e s  had f a i l e d  t o  keep t h e i r  promises concern ing  t h e  
r e p a t r i a t i o n  of  p r i s o n e r s  of war .  With p a r t i c u l a r  r e f e r e n c e  
t o  t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  they  claimed t h a t  p a r a .  6 of 
t h e  Coal Annex re s e rv ed  t o  t h e  German government t h e  s u p e rv i s io n  
of t h e  t r a n s p o r t  of co a l  as  f a r  as  t h e  f r o n t i e r .  * The Coal 
S y n d i c a t e ' s  r e a l  reason  f o r  i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  d e l i v e r i e s  should 
as f a r  as  p o s s i b l e  be made by w ate r  was t h e  s t i p u l a t i o n  of 
paragraph 6(b) of t h e  Coal Annex t h a t  coa l  d e l i v e r e d  by sea 
should be c r e d i t e d  t o  Germany's r e p a r a t i o n  account  a t  export  
p r i c e s .  The l a t t e r  were w e l l  above t h e  i n t e r n a l  German p r i c e ,  
a t  which d e l i v e r i e s  by land or i n t e r n a l  waterway were v a l u e d .  
Thus i t  was in  Germany's i n t e r e s t  t o  sh ip  as much coa l  as 
p o s s i b l e  in  ba rges  by sea  t o  Rotterdam so t h a t  i t  could be 
c r e d i t e d  a t  expor t  p r i c e s .  The S y n d i c a t e ' s  motive f o r  r e f u s i n g  
t o  a l low f o r e i g n  barges  t o  load at  Ruhrort  was, accord ing  t o  a 
Belg ian  d e l e g a t e  t o  t h e  CORC, simply t o  p r e s e r v e  t h e  pre-war
1.  i b i d . ,  V o l .  V, pp.  757-8
2 .  i b i d . ,  V o l .  V, p .  793*
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German monopoly in t r a f f i c  on t h e  Rhine .
The c l a s h  between A l l i e d  and German views on t h e s e  
p o i n t s  was a source  of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  t o  both  s id e s  th roughou t  
t h i s  p e r i o d .  D iscu ss io n s  bo th  about t h e  p r i c e  t o  be c r e d i t e d  
f o r  c o a l  d e l i v e r e d  v ia  Ro tterdam and about  t h e  c o n t r o l  of
s h ip p in g  on t h e  Rhine consumed much of t h e  R epara t ion
2 .
Commission’ s t im e  in March and A p r i l  1920. But n e i t h e r  of  
t h e s e  d i s p u t e s  was s e t t l e d  u n t i l  the y  were r e s o lv e d  in a 
manner f a v o u r a b l e  t o  France  in t h e  Wiesbaden Agreement of 
7 October 1 9 2 1 .3 ’
A f i n a l  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  i s s u e ,  which in June 1920 led 
t o  a d ram a t ic  d im inu t ion  of German c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s ,  was t h e  
q u e s t i o n  of t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of Upper S i l e s i a n  c o a l .  The 
V e r s a i l l e s  P r o to c o l  had r u l e d ,  c o n t r a r y  t o  German w is h e s ,  t h a t  
d e c i s i o n s  in  t h i s  m a t t e r  should be l e f t  t o  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Coal Confe rence .  In November 1919 a sub-commission of t h e  
European Coal  Commission had recommended t h a t ,  pending a 
d e c i s i o n  by t h e  R ep a ra t io n  Commission and t h e  Upper S i l e s i a n  
P l e b i s c i t e  Commission, Upper S i l e s i a ’ s monthly output  should  
be d i s t r i b u t e d  so t h a t  ( l )  Upper S i l e s i a  r e t a i n e d  whatever 
q u a n t i t y  t h e  P l e b i s c i t e  Commission judged n e c e s s a ry ;  (2)  A u s t r i a  
r e c e iv e d  200,000 t o n s ;  ( 3) Poland r e c e iv e d  250,000 t o n s ;  
and (4)  Germany re c e iv e d  th e  remainder .^*  On 6 February  1920 
t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission informed t h e  German government
1. Bemelmans, i b i d . ,  V o l . v ,  p .  79 4 .
2. R.C• ,  V. pp.  96-8:  C. Bergmann, op. c i t , ,
3. C. Bergmann, op. c i t . , P. 31 .
4. R .C. ,  V,  p .  94; DBFP , V o l .  I I ,  pp.  323-4,
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th a t  i t  had approved t h i s  recommendation and t h a t ,  in a d d itio n , 
20,000 to n s  of Germany*s monthly share were to  be d e liv e red  
to  I ta ly .^ *  German d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  was brought to  a p itch  when, 
on 29 May, th e  R eparation  Commission c o n d itio n a lly  increased  
Po land*sshare  of Upper S i le s ia n  coal from 250,000 to  450,000 
to n s  a month. * The German government*s response  was to  
o rd er th e  a r b i t r a r y  red u c tio n  of re p a ra tio n  d e l iv e r ie s  from 
th e  Ruhr by 10,000 to n s  a day.^* The d i s t r ib u t io n  of Upper 
S i le s ia n  co a l was th e re fo re  an is su e  of some im portance to  
th e  German government which could e a s i ly  he igh ten  th e  impact 
of re p a ra t io n  co a l d e l iv e r ie s  on German p o l i t i c s .
The pre-Spa period was not only n o ta b le  fo r  th e  absence 
of any agreement between th e  A llie s  and Germany on th e  q u estio n s  
of c r e d i t s ,  t ra n s p o r ta t io n  and p ric in g ,an d  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  
of Upper S ile s ia n  c o a l. I t  was a lso  a tim e  of mounting French 
d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  a t th e  amount of co a l which Germany was 
d e l iv e r in g .  The low le v e l  of v o lu n ta ry  d e l iv e r ie s  b e fo re  th e  
r a t i f i c a t i o n  of th e  t r e a t y  and th e  c lash  w ith th e  Coal S ynd icate  
in November 1919 over th e  qu estio n  of t r a n s p o r t  had provoked 
Loucheur, th e  Chairman of th e  CORC, to  announce th a t  "co erc iv e
4 #
m easures of th e  most severe  kind were under c o n s id e ra tio n " .
Some agreement appears to  have been te m p o ra rily  achieved a t  a
1. R .C .. V, p. 95« On 27 February d e liv e r ie s  to  I ta ly  were 
raised  to  40,000 to n s .
2. The R epara tion  Commission wished to  s a t i s f y  Poland*s 
in c reased  need fo r  co a l during  h e r war w ith  R u ss ia .
C. Bergmann, op. c i t . ,  p . 29*
3. i b i d . ,  p . 30 .
4. 27 November 1919, DBFP. V o l. V, p . 824, Note 4.
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conference held at Essen in December 1919* But the
persistent smallness of deliveries early in 1920 after the
t r e a t y  had been r a t i f i e d  soon provoked a n o th e r  French
outburst. The V ersailles Protocol figure of 1.6 million
to n s  was th e  o f f i c i a l  r a t e  in  J an u a ry  1920. But d e l i v e r i e s
„ 2 .in th is month came to no more than 450,000 tons. On 13 
February at the Conference of London, Millerand claimed that 
the January deliveries had been only 300,000 tons and accused 
the Germans of deliberate default. He went on to  claim that, 
by virtue of their right under Article 18 of Annex II of the 
Reparation Chapter to  enforce the execution of the treaty, the
3.A l l i e s  should  occupy t h e  Ruhr. Such an a c t io n  wa3, however, 
e f f e c t i v e l y  postponed by Lloyd George who, a f t e r  em phasising 
th e  bad l i v i n g  c o n d i t io n s  in  Germany and t h e  a c u te n e ss  of t h e  
t r a n s p o r t  s h o r ta g e ,  managed t o  ge t  t h e  q u e s t io n  of Germany’ s 
a l le g e d  d e f a u l t  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  R ep a ra t io n  Commission.
Although i t  c o n s i s t e n t l y  f ix ed  h igh  m onthly d e l iv e r y
r a t e s ,  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission s t i l l  d id  n o t  in  p r a c t i c e
£
expect shipments of more than a million tons a month. *
19 F eb rua ry  1920 i t  r a i s e d  th e  sch ed u le  from 1 .6  m i l l io n  to n s
6 •
t o  2.3 m i l l i o n  t o n s .  Then, a f t e r  spending F eb ruary  and March
h e a r in g  t h e  German p r o t e s t s  which t h i s  d e c i s io n  a ro u se d ,  t h e
7 •Commission lowered t h e  r a t e  f o r  A p r i l  t o  1 .6  m i l l i o n  t o n s .
1. C. Bergmann, op. c i t . ,  p. 27*
2. "Die Konferenz in Spa", Reichstag. Vol. 3^3» Anl.l87, p.65»
3. DBFP. Vol. VII, pp.26, 32.
4 . ib id ., Vol. VII, pp.33,36.
5. see above, p.
6. R*C., V, p. 95 _
7 . C. Bergmann, op. c i t . ,  p .2 o .
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The figures which it named for subsequent months were 2.1 
million tons (May), 2,3 million tons (June), and 2,4 million 
tons (July).^* However, none of these figures were seriously 
proposed since, according to Carl Bergmann, the German 
reparation expert, the Commission expressed deep gratification 
when, in May 1920, deliveries approached a million tons. •
The Allies could not, however, sustain such a double- 
faced policy indefinitely. Actual coal deliveries in the first 
seven months of 1920 amounted to about six million tons. This 
represented a delivery rate which was one-quarter of that 
envisaged in the treaty, one-half of that demanded by the 
Reparation Commission and slightly less than the amount un- 
officially expected. * It was not surprising that there was 
increasing discontent, especially in France, at Germany*s 
performance. On 18 April 1920 at the San Remo Conference, 
Millerand again advocated the occupation of the Ruhr as a means 
of forcing Germany to fulfil both the Coal Annex and her other
4#
treaty obligations. * Lloyd George once more counselled 
restraint. An occupation of the Ruhr would not, in his opinion, 
make the Germans carry out their promises* The best plan, he 
suggested, would be "to invite the Germans to Paris and put to 
them a regular questionnaire in regard to reparation,
1. R.C*. V. p. 229.
2. C. Bergmann, op. cit., p. 29. According to Bergmann a sub­
committee of the Reparation Commission concluded before Spa 
that the official schedule was impossible: DBFP» Vol.VIII,
p. 5o8.3* For amounts delivered and delivery schedules: R*C.. V,p.229* 
4. DBFP. Vol. Vin, p.7.
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d isa rm am ent,  c o a l ,  e t c * ,  and p re s s  them on each p o in t  as  
t o  what th e y  would do and demand e x p l a n a t i o n s " .1* The 
upsho t of t h i s  s u g g e s t io n  was, in s h o r t ,  t h a t  on 26 A p r i l  
1920 t h e  A l l i e s  in v i te d  t h e  German government t o  send 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  t o  a co n fe ren ce  which was t o  be h e ld  a t  Spa*
The impact upon German op in ion  of t h e  A l l i e d  
i n v i t a t i o n  t o  t h e  Spa Conference was, somewhat p a r a d o x ic a l ly ,  
by no means un fav o u rab le*  Although th e  A l l ie d  Note of 26 
A p r i l  rebuked Germany f o r  h e r  v a r io u s  f a i l u r e s  t o  f u l f i l  
t h e  t r e a t y  and th r e a te n e d  t h e  occupa tion  of an a d d i t i o n a l  
p a r t  of German t e r r i t o r y ,  i t  a l s o  con ta ined  t h e  f i r s t  adm ission  
by t h e  A l l i e s  t h a t  d i r e c t  d i s c u s s io n  of t h e  t r e a t y  between 
heads of governments was n e c e s s a ry  in  o rd e r  t o  s e c u re  i t s  
e x e c u t io n .  Furtherm ore , i t  con ta ined  th e  a s s u ra n c e  th a t  
t h e  A l l i e s  were not ig n o ra n t  of t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w ith  which 
t h e  German government was face d  and th a t  th e y  " ( d id )  not 
in ten d  t o  i n s i s t  upon a to o  l i t e r a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  
t r e a t y " ,  * Because t h e  A l l ie d  i n v i t a t i o n  co n ta in ed  s ta te m e n ts  
such as t h e s e ,  K ilm arnock, t h e  B r i t i s h  charge  d ’a f f a i r e s  in  
B e r l i n ,  was a b l e  t o  r e p o r t  on 1 May t h a t  i t s  r e c e p t io n  had 
added something t o  t h e  German governm ent’ s p r e s t i g e ,^ *
In t h e  c o n s id e r a b le  i n t e r v a l  which e lapsed  b e fo re
1. i b i d . ,  Vol* V I I I ,  p .  8 .
2* For s l i g h t l y  v a r i a n t  re a d in g s  of t h e  t e x t  of t h i s  Notes 
H* of C* P a p e r s . 1920, Cmd. 1325* p .9 4 :  "Die Konferenz 
in  S pa" ,  l o c .  c i t . ,  p .22s DBFP, V o l.  V I I I ,  p p .209-10.
For a commentary: C, Bergmann, op. c i t . ,  p p ,3 2 -3 .
3* Kilmarnock t o  Curzon, May 1 , 1920, DBFP. V o l .  IX, p .4 5 8 .
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t h e  Spa C onference began on 5 Ju ly^  * t h e r e  was a number of 
d i s p u te s  between th e  German government and t h e  R ep ara tio n  
Commission which caused t h e  Spa Conference t o  open in  an 
atm osphere  of i n q u i s i t i o n  r a t h e r  th a n  one of f r i e n d l y  
d i s c u s s i o n .  F r i c t i o n  was caused f i r s t l y  by an in t e r r u p t io n  
in  t h e  d e l i v e r y  of h o rs e s  t o  Belgium, and second ly  by t h e
e lu siv en ess  of Dutch-owned, German-built merchant ships which
2.
had been claimed as  r e p a r a t i o n ,  * F i n a l l y ,  on 15 Ju n e ,  th e  
German government a r b i t r a r i l y  reduced  r e p a r a t io n  c o a l  
d e l i v e r i e s  from th e  Ruhr, T h is  a c t io n  so ex asp e ra ted  th e  
R e p a ra t io n  Commission t h a t  on 30 June -  f i v e  days b e fo re  t h e  
opening of t h e  Spa Conference -  i t  fo rm a l ly  n o t i f i e d  t h e  
A l l ie d  governments t h a t  Germany had d e f a u l t e d .
The e f f e c t  of t h e s e  e v e n t s ,  and of o theis  connected 
w ith  t h e  disarmament q u e s t io n ,  was obvious d u r in g  t h e  e a r ly  
p ro cee d in g s  of th e  c o n fe re n c e .  In t h e  disarmament n e g o t i a t i o n s  
which occurred  between 5 and 9 J u l y ,  t h e  A l l i e s  were in t e n t  
on adm onishing and c o e rc in g  Germany r a t h e r  th a n  on d i s c u s s in g  
p o s s ib le  ways o f  h e lp in g  h e r  t o  ex ec u te  t h e  t r e a t y .  As a 
r e s u l t ,  t h e  German D e le g a t io n  was n o t ,  in  t h e  op in ion  of t h e
German Foreign M inister Simons, given s u f f ic ie n t  opportunity
4.
t o  s t a t e  i t s  c a s e .  The same was t r u e  of t h e  p roceed ings  
when, on t h e  a f te rn o o n  of 9 J u l y ,  th e  co n fe ren c e  tu rn ed  t o  t h e  
q u e s t io n  of c o a l .
1. The conference was postponed because of th e  Reichstag  
e lec tio n s  in June, ib id . ,  V o l. V III, p. 253*
2. C. Bergmann, op. c i t . ,  p p .3 8 -9 .
3 . PBFP. V o l. V III, p p .398- 9 .
4 . Simons on 8 July 1920; ib id . ,  V ol. V III , p. 484.
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A f te r  Bergmann, t h e  German co a l  e x p e r t ,  had a t tem pted  
b r i e f l y  t o  e x p la in  th e  la g  in  d e l i v e r i e s , ^ *  M ille ran d  launched 
a fo rm al a t t a c k  on Germany f o r  her  f a i l u r e  t o  d e l i v e r  co a l  at 
t h e  r a t e  r e q u i r e d  by th e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission which was, he 
s t r e s s e d ,  f a r  lower th a n  t h a t  p re s c r ib e d  by t h e  t r e a t y ,  * He 
concluded h i s  ind ic tm en t by p re s e n t in g  t h e  German d e le g a t io n  
w ith  a p r o to c o l  which w'as des igned  t o  ensure  " th e  com plete 
e x e c u t io n "  by Germany of h e r  c o a l  o b l ig a t io n s  under th e  t rea ty ,"^ *  
The document demanded t h a t  Germany should r e c o g n i s e  " the  
a b s o lu t e  p r i o r i t y  over a l l  o th e r  d e l i v e r i e s "  of r e p a r a t io n  
sh ip m e n ts .  I t  went on t o  d i r e c t  t h a t  a permanent d e le g a t io n  
of th e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission should be s e t  up in  B e r l in  t o  
s u p e rv is e  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of c o a l  by th e  German a u t h o r i t i e s .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  R ep a ra t io n  Commission was i n s t r u c t e d  t o  " n o t i f y  
t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t e d  Powers any i n f r a c t i o n  of th e  p r i n c i p l e s  
adopted ( i n  t h e  p r o t o c o l ) ,  and ( to )  recommend any f u r t h e r  s te p s
4.
n e c e s s a ry  t o  secure  th e  d e l i v e r i e s  under t h e  p r i o r i t y  s t a t e d , , " .  
When on th e  fo l lo w in g  morning (10 J u ly )  t h e  German 
d e l e g a t i o n  accep ted  t h e  A l l i e d  i n v i t a t i o n  t o  comment upon 
M il le ran d * s  charges  and upon th e  p ro to c o l  i t  o b je c ted  s t r o n g ly  
t o  t h e  adm onitory  p rocedu re  which had been adopted by t h e  A l l i e s ,  
Simons a s s e r t e d  t h a t  t h e  c o n fe ren c e  would be a w aste  of t im e  
i f  t h e  A l l i e s  m ere ly  rebuked Germany f o r  h e r  d e f a u l t  and did
77 i b i d . ,  V o l .  V II I ,  p,  50Ö.
2.  i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  pp. 509-11 .
3* The p r o to c o l  had been d r a f t e d  a t  t h e  C onference of B ru sse ls  
on 2 and 3 J u ly ;  i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  p . 421,
4 . i b i d . ,  V o l.  V I I I ,  pp.512-3«
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not a l low  t h e  German e x p e r t s  t o  d is c u s s  means of execu ting  
t h e  c o a l  c la u s e s .^ *  Hugo S t i n n e s ,  th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  
German c o a l  owners, h in te d  r a t h e r  b l u n t l y ,  b e fo r e  he was 
b rough t t o  o r d e r ,  t h a t  t h e  A l l ie s *  d i c t a t o r i a l  methods
in d ic a te d  t h a t  th e y  were ’’s ic k  beyond reco v e ry  w ith  t h e
2 .
d is e a s e  of v i c t o r y " .  * F i n a l l y ,  Hu8, who r e p re s e n te d  t h e  
German m in e r s ,  en te red  a p l e a ,  in more m oderate  language , 
f o r  "a j o i n t  c o n s u l t a t i o n  of e x p e r t s " .^ *
In t h e  i n t e r - A l l i e d  d i s c u s s io n s  which follow ed 
im m ediate ly  a f t e r  th e  German r e p ly  had been r e c e iv e d ,  Lloyd
George, e a g e r  t o  avoid a r u p tu r e  in  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  supported
4 .
th e  German re q u e s t  f o r  d i s c u s s i o n .  M ille ran d  a t  f i r s t  adhered  
t o  t h e  id ea  of simply imposing th e  p ro to c o l  on t h e  grounds 
t h a t  t h e  t r e a t y ,  as  i n t e r p r e t e d  by th e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission, 
should be executed  r a t h e r  th a n  d i s c u s s e d .  However, he 
e v e n tu a l ly  y ie ld e d  t o  Lloyd G eorge’ s v iew poin t when he had 
been assu red  t h a t  th e  p r o to c o l  would be a p p l ie d  i f  t h e  e x p e r t s '
5.
d i s c u s s io n  produced no s a t i s f a c t o r y  r e s u l t .  M i l l e r a n d 's  
co n cess io n  appeared t o  have been more a p p a re n t  th a n  r e a l  
when, on th e  fo llow ing  d ay ,  t h e  A l l ie d  Coal E x p e r ts  
recommended t h a t  t h e  p ro to c o l  should not be m odified  and t h a t
77 i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  p .  520.
2 . i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  p .  521.
3 . i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  p .  523; "Die Konferenz in  Spa" , l o c .  
c i t . ,  p .  64.
4 . DBFP. V o l.  V I I I ,  p .  531.
5. ibid., V o l.  V I I I ,  p. 533.
6 .  5*30 p.m. on 11 J u l y .
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t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission "was a lone  q u a l i f i e d  and competent"
t o  f i x  a programme f o r  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s ! *  However, t h e  German
d e l e g a t i o n  stood  f i r m ,  and re fu se d  t o  submit any g e n e ra l
r e p a r a t io n  scheme t o  t h e  Conference u n le s s  t h e  c o a l  q u e s t io n ,
which was " th e  c e n t r a l  problem in  t h e  economic l i f e  of
2
Germany", was d isc u sse d  f u r t h e r ,  * On t h e  fo l lo w in g  morning 
(12 J u ly )  a f t e r  Lloyd George had once more s t r e s s e d  t h e  
u n d e s i r a b i l i t y  of t h e  co n fe ren c e  b reak in g  up "w ith  th e  
mere im p o s i t io n  of te rm s  upon Germany", M ille ran d  agreed 
t h a t  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission should be s h o r t - c i r c u i t e d  
and t h a t  a p lan  f o r  d e l i v e r i e s  a t  a r a t e  of 2 m i l l i o n  to n s  
over a s ix-m onth per iod  should be subm itted  t o  th e  German 
d e l e g a t io n .^ *
The A ll ie d  d e c i s io n  t o  submit a c o a l  d e l iv e r y  scheme 
t o  t h e  German d e l e g a t io n  f o r  i t s  comment ensured th a t  th e  
d i r e c t  d i s c u s s io n s  promised in  t h e  Note of 26 A p r i l  1920 
would in  f a c t  t a k e  p la c e .  T h is  im portan t development d id  not 
b r in g  about an immediate s e t t le m e n t  of t h e  c o a l  q u e s t io n .
On th e  c o n t r a r y ,  d i r e c t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a t  f i r s t  m ere ly  brought 
t o  t h e  s u r f a c e  t h e  h i t h e r t o  submerged d i s p u te  between A ll ie d  
and German e x p e r t s  over t h e  q u e s t io n  of t h e  s i z e  of German 
d e l i v e r i e s  and t h e  c o n d i t io n s  under which th e y  could be made. 
But e v e n t u a l l y ,  a f t e r  t h e  co n fe re n c e  had a lm ost r u p tu r e d ,
1. i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  p .  561; "Die Konferenz in  Spa", l o c .  
c i t . ,  p « 6 7 «
2 . Simons, 5*30 p.m. on 11 J u ly ;  DBFP. V o l .  V I I I ,  p ,5 6 0 .
3 .  i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  p .  565 (Lloyd G eorge); p p .569-70 
( M i l l e r a n d ) .
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a compromise agreement was reached  which,  on t h e  one hand,
removed A l l i e d  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  about  t h e  s i z e  of coa l
d e l i v e r i e s  and ,  on the  o th e r  hand,  p a r t l y  met German wishes
on t h e  s u b je c t  of c r e d i t s  f o r  p rocu r ing  food and raw
m a t e r i a l s  and on t h e  s u b je c t  of t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of Upper
S i l e s i a n  c o a l .  The Spa Agreement was in t h e  end accep ted
by t h e  German government,  p a r t l y  because  of t h e  A l l i ed  t h r e a t
of s a n c t i o n s ,  but  p a r t l y  a l s o  because  A l l i e d  concess ions
enabled t h e  government t o  s e c u r e  enough domest ic  suppor t  t o
f u l f i l  i t .  The f a c t  t h a t  t h e  government enjoyed t h i s
suppor t  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  impact of t h e  Spa
Agreement was by no means as u n f o r t u n a t e  as t h e  p r o t e s t s  of
r ig h t - w i n g  spokesmen would make i t  appea r .
When t h e  f i g u r e  of 2 m i l l i o n  to n s  was sugges ted  t o
him on t h e  a f t e rn o o n  of 12 J u l y ,  Simons ' r e sponse  had been
t o  propose a schedule  which began a t  only 1 .1  m i l l i o n  tons
and ro s e  a f t e r  s e v e r a l  months t o  1.7  or 1 .8  m i l l i o n  t o n s .
D e l i v e r i e s  even a t  t h i s  r a t e  would,  he i n s i s t e d ,  be c o n d i t i o n a l
upon an improvement in t h e  food supply  and t h e  housing of
t h e  m i n e r s . D e s p i t e  A l l i e d  a ppea ls  no advance was made on
t h e s e  f i g u r e s  on t h e  f o l l o w i n g  day (13 J u l y )  a l t h o u g h  Simons
s t a t e d  t h a t  d e l i v e r i e s  could be in c reased  i f  Upper S i l e s i a  
2
remained German. * I t  seemed on t h e  morning of 14 J u ly  t h a t
1. i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  p .  576 .
2 .  i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  pp.  590-6
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t h e  gap  between A ll ied  and German views was u n b r id g e a b le ,  
and t h e  co n fe ren c e  was on t h e  p o in t  of b reak in g  u p .  Even 
Lloyd George had swung round r e l u c t a n t l y  in  suppo rt of 
French p la n s  f o r  occupying t h e  Ruhr.
On th e  a f te rn o o n  of 14 J u ly  Lloyd George made a
f i n a l  e f f o r t  t o  reach  an agreement in  a p r i v a t e  in te rv ie w
2
w ith  Simons. In th e  e a r l y  s ta g e s  of t h i s  in te rv ie w  th e  
B r i t i s h  Prime M in is te r  s t r e s s e d  r e p e a te d ly  t h a t  t h e  A l l i e s  
r e a l l y  in tended  t o  occupy t h e  Ruhr i f  a more a t t r a c t i v e  
German o f f e r  were not made. Simons r e p l i e d  t h a t  such t h r e a t s  
would not induce him t o  s ig n  a c o a l  agreement which was not 
a c c e p ta b le  t o  t h e  German m iners  and em ployers .^* T h is  may 
have been p a r t l y  b l u f f  bu t i t  was a l s o  based on th e  r e a l i s t i c  
c o n s id e r a t io n  t h a t ,  u n le s s  t h e  government enjoyed adequa te  
dom estic  s u p p o r t ,  i t s  a t tem p t t o  f u l f i l  any c o a l  agreement 
would i n e v i t a b l y  end in  d e f a u l t  and th e  im p o s i t io n  of s a n c t io n s  
by t h e  A l l i e s .  Agreement t o  t h e  A l l ie d  demands as  th e y  stood 
would t h e r e f o r e  postpone  t h e  occu p a tio n  of t h e  Ruhr f o r  only 
a s h o r t  p e r io d .  The b a s ic  reason  f o r  th e  deadlock  was, in  
Simons' w ords , t h a t  t h e  German government "was not s tro n g  
enough to  overcome i n t e r n a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  u n le s s  t h e  A l l i e s  
would make one more o f f e r  t o  b r in g  over t h e  m i n e r s " .4 *
I t  was in  re sp o n se  t o  Simons' ap p ea l  f o r  f u r t h e r  A l l ie d
1. i b i d . , _V ol7 V I I I ,  p p .602-5 .
2. i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  p p .617-22.
3. i b i d . ,  V o l .  V i n ,  p .  619.
4. i b i d .
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c o n c e ss io n s  t h a t  Lloyd George p roposed , in  a r a t h e r  o b liq u e  
manner, a scheme f o r  f in a n c in g  Germany's e s s e n t i a l  im ports 
which changed th e  whole complexion of t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  "From 
t h e  p o in t  of view of Germany," he h i n t e d ,  " th e  w ise  co u rse  
would have been t o  have ta k e n  r i s k s  and t o  have undertaken  t o  
d e l i v e r  2 m i l l i o n  to n s  of c o a l  per  month, provided  th e y  got 
c r e d i t s  f o r  t h e  purpose of food f o r  t h e  m iners  ab ro ad .  For 
i n s t a n c e ,  supposing th e  d i f f e r e n c e  between th e  German i n t e r n a l  
p r i c e  f o r  c o a l  and th e  export p r i c e  f o r  c o a l  was u t i l i s e d  f o r  
t h i s  p u rp o s e .  They might a l s o  ask f o r  a s s i s t a n c e  in  th e  
m a t te r  of lo a n s  and f e r t i l i s e r s .  Could n o t  t h e  German 
government make some p ro p o s a l  of t h i s  k in d ? "
Lloyd G eo rg e 's  p ro p o s a l  was no t made on t h e  spur of t h e  
moment t o  keep  t h e  co n fe ren ce  a l i v e .  I t  sprang  from th e  
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  which he had f o r  some tim e  shared w ith  th e  
German government bo th  a t  th e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  A l l i e s  t o  a s s i s t  
c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  by p ro v id in g  c r e d i t s  and a t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
Germany was c r e d i te d  f o r  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  on h e r  r e p a r a t io n  
account a t  a r t i f i c i a l l y  low dom estic  p r i c e s .  Hfhen defend ing  h i s  
p ro p o sa ls  a t  an i n t e r - A l l i e d  co n fe ren c e  on th e  fo llo w in g  d ay ,  
Lloyd George s t r e s s e d  t h a t  Germany could only d e l i v e r  l a r g e  
q u a n t i t i e s  of c o a l  or fo o t  a huge r e p a r a t i o n  b i l l  i f  she was 
enabled t o  o b ta in  food and o th e r  e s s e n t i a l  im p o r ts ,  " . . . I I .  
M ille ran d  knew q u i t e  w e l l , "  he i n s i s t e d ,  " th a t  c o a l  was t h e  only  
a r t i c l e  of export which the- Germans had t o  exchange f o r  food 
f o r  th e m s e lv e s .  HS/hen we took  away 2 m i l l i o n  to n s  of c o a l  from
1. i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  p .  620
157.
Germany i t  was e q u iv a le n t  t o  th e  co rresp o n d in g  amount of 
food which Germany n e e d e d , . . .W e  had promised t o  supply  food 
t o  Germany and t o  h e lp  s t a r t  h e r  i n d u s t r i e s  a t  San Remo.
Our i n t e r e s t  was t o  s e t  Germany on h e r  f e e t ,  and we could 
not ge t  r e p a r a t io n  w ith o u t  doing s o , ” * Lloyd G eorge’s 
concern on th e  second s u b je c t  -  th e  lowness of t h e  p r i c e  
a t  which Germany was c r e d i t e d  f o r  h e r  d e l i v e r i e s  -  had been 
re v e a le d  when on 14 J u ly  t h e  p ro je c te d  o ccupa tion  of t h e  
Ruhr was be ing  d i s c u s s e d .  He s t a t e d  t h a t  he would support 
t h i s  o p e ra t io n  only  i f  Germany were c re d i te d  w ith  th e  f u l l  
market p r i c e  of t h e  c o a l  which was t o  be e x t r a c t e d .  # In 
th e  f i r s t  p la c e  world op in ion  had t o  be c o n s id e re d .  " I f  
we u s e  t h e  sword t o  compel Germany t o  s e l l  ( s i c )  c o a l  a t  £2 
per  to n  below t h e  market p r i c e ,  t h e  p u b l ic  op in ion  of t h e  
whole world would be sh o ck ed ."  There was a l s o  th e  q u es t io n  
of th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of r e p a r a t io n  r e c e i p t s  amongst th e  A l l i e s .  
I t  was " e q u iv a le n t  t o  p r e s e n t in g  France w ith  an annual sum 
of £33 , 600,000 f o r  which she would be under no o b l ig a t io n
3.
t o  accoun t t o  th e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission or t o  anyone e l s e " .  
F i n a l l y ,  i t  was a m a t te r  of f a i r n e s s  t o  Germany. " . . .T h e y  must 
not open th e m se lv es  t o  t h e  charge  th a t  th e y  were d e p r iv in g  
Germany of £33>000,000 per annum which would o th e rw ise  be
4
used  by h e r  in  feed in g  her  p o p u la t io n ,"  *
77 i b i d . ,  V o l.  V I I I ,  p .  631.
2 . i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  p .  603.
3 . i b i d . ,  V o l.  V I I I ,  p.607.
4. i b i d .
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A f i n a l  f e a t u r e  of t h e  scheme which recommended i t  t o  
Lloyd George was t h a t  i t  t i e d  th e  s i z e  of th e  c r e d i t s  t o  he 
g ra n te d  t o  Germany to  t h e  amount of c o a l  which she d e l iv e r e d .  
T h is  would " s t im u la te  not on ly  t h e  m in e rs ,  but a l s o  everyone 
e l s e  t o  do t h e i r  b e s t " . 1* The scheme in o th e r  words ensured 
t h a t  th e  government would en joy  th e  dom estic  support which, 
acco rd in g  t o  Simons, i t  would o th e rw ise  have la c k e d .
S in ce  t h e  Lloyd George p ro p o sa l  was in tended  by i t s  
a u th o r  t o  remedy th o s e  a s p e c t s  of c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  which had 
been most o b je c t io n a b le  t o  t h e  German government in  th e  
p reced ing  months, i t  i s  not s u r p r i s in g  t h a t  t h e  German 
d e l e g a t io n  se ized  upon i t  a lm ost w ith  a l a c r i t y .  On th e  evening 
of 14 J u ly  t h e  A l l i e s  r e c e iv e d  a new German communication in  
t h e  form of a q u e s t io n n a i r e  which o ffe re d  d e l i v e r i e s  a t  a r a t e  
of 2 m i l l i o n  to n s  over a s ix -m onth  period  ( p a r a ,  1 ) ,  and which 
in c o rp o ra te d  Lloyd G eorge’s scheme fo r  c r e d i t s  equal t o  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  between th e  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  p r i c e  of German 
c o a l  ( p a r a .  2 ) .  The Germans a l s o  sugges ted  t h a t  t h e  d r a f t  
p ro to c o l  should not be imposed d u ring  t h e  per iod  of th e s e  
d e l i v e r i e s  ( p a r a .  3 ) ;  t h a t  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  d i s t r i b ­
u t io n  of Upper S i l e s i a n  c o a l  should be r e s to r e d  t o  Germany 0£  
t h a t  Germany should be gu aran teed  a t  l e a s t  1 .5  m i l l i o n  to n s  of 
S i l e s i a ’ s monthly output ( p a r a . 4 ) ;  t h a t  t h e  A l l i e s  should 
i n s t i t u t e  a Mixed Commission a t  Essen t o  e n q u i re  in to  c o n d i t io n s  
in  th e  mining d i s t r i c t s  ( p a r a .  5 ) ;  and t h a t  th e  A l l i e s  should
1. i b i d . ,  V o l.  V I I I ,  p .  632
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p ro v id e  c r e d i t s  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  im p o r ta t io n  of food and raw 
m a te r i a l s  t o  t h e  non-m ining d i s t r i c t s  of Germany ( p a r a ,  6 ) .
But F r a n c o - I t a l i a n  o p p o s i t io n  t o  th e  new scheme had 
s t i l l  t o  he reckoned w i th .  On t h e  morning of 15 J u ly  M ille rand  
o b je c te d  t h a t ,  s in c e  t h e  con tem pla ted  advances r a i s e d  th e
p r i c e  of r e p a r a t io n  c o a l ,  Lloyd George had in f a c t  proposed
2
a r e v i s i o n  of t h e  t r e a t y ,  * The I t a l i a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,
Count S f o r z a ,  whose government was opposed t o  any s u b s t a n t i a l  
in c r e a s e  in  t h e  cos t of r e p a r a t io n  c o a l ,  sugges ted  th a t  t h e  
advances g ra n te d  t o  Germany should not exceed 5 gold marks 
a to n ,^ *  The A ll ie d  Coal E x p e r ts  favoured  S f o r z a ' s  p ro p o sa l  
and su g g es ted  t h a t  th e  r a i s i n g  of f u r t h e r  funds f o r  
p ro v is io n in g  t h e  mining p o p u la t io n  should be l e f t  t o  th e  
mixed commission which i t  was in tended  t o  s e t  up a t  E ssen , 
Bowing t o  t h i s  w eight of o p in io n ,  Lloyd George suggested  as 
a compromise t h a t  o u t r ig h t  payments t o  Germany should be 
l im i te d  t o  5 gold marks a to n  and t h a t  t h e  rem ainder of th e  
proposed advance (up t o  about 40 gold marks) should ta k e  t h e  
form of a lo a n .  But he i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e  d e t a i l s  of th e  
advances t o  be g ran ted  by t h e  l a t t e r  method should be f ix ed  
im m ediately  by t h e  con fe rence  r a t h e r  th a n  by some f u tu r e  
commission,-^* As a r e s u l t ,  t h e  German o f f e r  was r e d ra f t e d
1. i b i d , ,  V o l,  V I I I ,  p .  6 l 6 .  A fo rm a l ly  d r a f t e d  p ro p o sa l  was 
subm itted  on t h e  fo l lo w in g  m orning, i b i d . ,  V o l.  V I I I ,
p .  628 .
2 . i b i d . ,  V o l.  V I I I ,  p .  623.
3 .  i b i d . ,  V o l.  V I I I , p p .  624, 627.
4 . i b i d . ,  V o l.  V I I I ,  p .  634.
5 .  i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  p .  629.
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so t h a t  t h e  second p a ra g ra p h ,  which d e a l t  w ith  th e  qu es tio n  
of p r i c e s ,  d id  not appea r  t o  a l t e r  t h e  p r i c e  p ro v is io n s  of 
t h e  Coal Annex of th e  t r e a t y .  I t  m erely  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  
Germany should  be c r e d i t e d  f o r  h e r  coa l d e l i v e r i e s  a t  th e  
i n t e r n a l  p r i c e ;  and added t h a t ,  in  o rder  t o  en su re  t h a t  t h e  
c o a l  should be p ro p e r ly  s o r t e d ,  t h e  r e c i p i e n t s  should pay 
a cash premium of 5 gold marks a t o n ,  Lloyd G eorge’s scheme 
f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  advances in  t h e  form of a lo a n ,  a lthough  
r e t a i n e d ,  was r e le g a te d  t o  t h e  s i x t h  p a ra g ra p h .
The r e t e n t i o n  of even t h i s  m odified  c r e d i t  scheme was 
d e a r ly  b o u g h t .  In th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  Great B r i t a i n ,  a lthough
she r e c e iv e d  no German c o a l ,  agreed  to  supp ly  24^ of th e  money
2 .
1 e n t  t o  Germany under t h e  new paragraph  6 , * S econdly , t h e  
p ro p o sa l  in  th e  o r i g i n a l  s ix th  parag raph  f o r  c r e d i t s  t o  f in a n c e  
im ports  needed by t h e  German p o p u la t io n  o u ts id e  th e  mining 
a re a  was s h e lv e d .  The A l l i e d  Coal E x p er ts  had d e c la re d  t h a t ,  
a l th o u g h  th e y  p e r s o n a l ly  welcomed a scheme of t h i s  k in d ,  th e y  
were not competent t o  d e a l  w ith  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  q u e s t io n s  which
"5
i t  r a i s e d .  M ille rand  f o r  h i s  p a r t  b l u n t l y  i n s i s t e d  t h a t
"what he had agreed t o  was t o  su p p ly  food f o r  t h e  c o a l  m in e rs ,
4 ,
and not f o r  t h e  whole of German in d u s t r y " .  In t h e s e  
c i rc u m s ta n c e s ,  Lloyd George was fo rced  t o  d e l e t e  t h e  paragraph  
and t o  inform  t h e  German d e l e g a t io n  th a t  t h e  q u e s t io n  would be
1 . For t e x t  of Lloyd G eorge’s compromise p ro p o s a l :  i b i d . ,
V o i .  V I I I ,  P. 635 .
2 . i b i d . ,  V o l.  V I I I ,  pp , 629-32 .
3. i b i d . ,  V o l.  V n i ,  p .  635.
4 . i b i d . ,  V o l.  V I I I ,  p .  631.
d e a l t  w ith  in  l a t e r  d i s c u s s io n s  about t h e  g e n e ra l  r e p a r a t io n
problem .^* F i n a l l y ,  i t  was agreed th a t  advances under th e  
new p a rag raph  6 were t o  be made only  in  r e s p e c t  of c o a l  which 
was d e l iv e r e d  overland  (o r  by i n t e r n a l  waterway) and f o r  which 
Germany w as, in  acco rdance  w ith  p a ra .  6 (a )  of t h e  Coal Annex 
of t h e  T r e a ty ,  c r e d i te d  a t  t h e  German i n t e r n a l  p r i c e .  * T h is  
e f f e c t i v e l y  removed th e  in c e n t iv e  f o r  t h e  German government t o  
in c r e a s e  i t s  d e l i v e r i e s  bv s e a , w hich, under  p a r a .  6 ( b ) ,  were
3 •c r e d i te d  on r e p a r a t io n  account a t  t h e  h ig h e r  e x t e r n a l  p r i c e .  
Thus, a l th o u g h  th e  c r e d i t  scheme was t o  h e lp  Germany t o  
surmount h e r  immediate s h o r ta g e  of f o r e ig n  exchange, i t  perhaps 
h inde red  h e r  e f f o r t s  t o  d i s c h a rg e  h e r  r e p a r a t io n  debt on 
advantageous te rm s .
I t  was not s u r p r i s in g  t h a t  th e  German d e le g a t io n  
expressed  d i s i l lu s io n m e n t  a t  t h e  m o d i f ic a t io n s  which had been 
in tro d u ced  so qu ick ly  i n t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  Lloyd George p ro p o s a ls .  
I t  was k e e n ly  d is a p p o in te d  t h a t  t h e  bulk of t h e  c r e d i t s  g ran te d  
under th e  agreement would t a k e  t h e  form of loans  r a t h e r  th a n  
o u t r ig h t  paym ents. At t h e  f i n a l  s e s s io n  of t h e  con fe rence  
on 16 J u l y ,  Simons, d o u b t f u l  as  t o  Germany’s a b i l i t y  t o  repay  
t h e  advances she was t o  r e c e i v e ,  argued t h a t  th e y  should be 
d e b i te d  t o  h e r  r e p a r a t i o n  a c c o u n t .  Although t h i s  was in  f a c t  
done some months l a t e r ^  Simons was fo rced  t o  d e f e r  f o r  th e
1 .  i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  p .  646.
2 . ’’Die Konferenz in  Spa” , l o c .  c i t . ,  p .  17.
3 .  For e a r l i e r  German e f f o r t s  t o  in c re a s e  sea d e l i v e r i e s :  see 
above ,pp .  144-5*
4. Agreement of 28 December 1920, R.C. .  V, p .1 0 0 .  T h is  meant 
t h a t  t h e  A l l ie d  advances became o u t r ig h t  cash payments f o r  
t h e  c o a l  d e l i v e r e d .
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t im e  b e in g  t o  th e  op in ion  o f  D e la c ro ix ,  t h e  chairman of
t h e  C onference , t h a t  " i t  would be b e s t  t o  le a v e  th e  s e t t le m e n t
of t h e  r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  and t h e  c o n d i t io n s  of repayment t o  t h e
fu tu r e ” . * Simons a l s o  p r o te s te d ,  again without su ccess ,  at
t h e  om ission from t h e  agreement of any scheme f o r  t h e  p ro v is io n
2
of c r e d i t  t o  p a r t s  of Germany o th e r  th a n  t h e  mining d i s t r i c t s .  * 
The German d e l e g a t io n  seems t o  have been w i l l i n g  t o  
compromise on most of t h e  o th e r  su g g e s t io n s  which i t  had put 
forward in  i t s  communications of 14 and 15 J u l y .  The A ll ie d  
P r o to c o l ,  t o  which th e  Germans had o b jec ted  so v i o l e n t l y ,  was 
r e t a i n e d .  However, t h e  f i r s t  p a ra g ra p h ,  which had accorded 
a b s o lu t e  p r i o r i t y  t o  A l l ie d  c o a l  r e q u ire m e n ts ,  was d e l e t e d ,  
and m o d i f ic a t io n s  were in t ro d u ced  in  o th e r  s e c t io n s  so  t h a t ,  
in  M i l l e r a n d 's  w ords, i t  "now re p re s e n te d  l i t t l e  more th a n  
an arrangem ent f o r  th e  exchange of com nunications on th e  sub­
j e c t  of c o a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  between Germany and t h e  A l l i e s " .
Thus Simons, a lthough  he co n s id e red  t h a t  " i t  would add t o  red 
t a p e " ,  made no f u r t h e r  fo rm al p r o t e s t  a g a in s t  i t . ^ '
The German p ro p o sa l  concern ing  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of 
Upper S i l e s i a n  co a l  had been coun te red  w ith  an A l l ie d  s u g g e s t io n  
t h a t  t h e  m a t te r  should be  r e f e r r e d  t o  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commission 
on which Germany was r e p r e s e n t e d .  The German d e le g a t io n  ap p ea rs  
t o  have approved of t h i s  p ro p o s a l  and t o  have been w i l l i n g  t o
77 DBFP7 v o i . ~ V I H .  pp. 6 18-9 .
2. i b i d . ,  V o l.  V I I I ,  p .  647.
3 . i b i d . ,  V ol.  V I I I ,  pp. 6 46 -8 .
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r e l y  on t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n  of Lloyd George t h a t  " i t  was eq u a l ly  
in t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  A l l i e s  and of Germany t h a t  th e  Commission 
should work in  an e q u i ta b le  and im p a r t i a l  m anner"• The German
It
D e le g a t io n ,  Lloyd George had added , might f e e l  s u r e  t h a t  th e s e  
c o n s id e r a t io n s  would be b e fo re  t h e  Commission, and t h a t  t h e  
A l l i e s  would see  t h a t  in  t h i s  m a t te r  Germany was given f a i r  
piay*1 *
S in ce  th e  A l l i e s  f u l l y  approved of t h e  idea  of a Mixed 
Commission a t  Essen t o  e n q u ire  in to  t h e  s t a t e  of t h e  mining 
d i s t r i c t s ,  t h e  only rem ain ing  cause  of d i s p u te  was a seventh  
c l a u s e ,  which had been added by th e  A l l i e s  t o  t h e  German 
p ro p o s a l  of 15 Ju ly*  T h is  th r e a te n e d  t h e  o ccupa tion  of t h e  Ruhr 
i f ,  by November 1920, i t  was found t h a t  t h e  d e l i v e r i e s  f o r  t h e
o
months August t o  O ctober had no t reached  6 m i l l i o n  t o n s .  * 
However, an open c la sh  was a v e r te d  when t h e  A l l i e s ,  r e f l e c t i n g  
t h a t  t h e i r  power t o  occupy t h e  Ruhr was u n a f fe c te d  by German 
o p in io n ,  allowed t h e  German government t o  e n te r  r e s e r v a t io n s
3 .
on t h i s  po in t*
C le a r ly  t h e  main sou rce  of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  t o  th e  German
d e le g a t io n  in  th e  c lo s in g  s ta g e s  of th e  co n fe ren ce  was th e
a l t e r a t i o n  of t h e  scope of t h e  Lloyd George c r e d i t  scheme* The
s e r io u s n e s s  of t h i s  d i s c o n te n t  can be gauged from th e  f a c t  t h a t
t h e  D e le g a t io n 's  unanimous f i n a l  recommendation t o  t h e  German
71 i b i d . ,  V o l.  V I I I ,  p .  63&* Lloyd G eo rg e 's  d e c l a r a t i o n  was 
p r in te d  in  th e  German W hite Book on t h e  Spa Conference:
"Die Konferenz in  Spa", l o c .  c i t . ,  p .  80.
2. DBFF, V o l.  V I I I ,  p . 644.
3* i b i d . ,  V o l.  V I I I ,  p .  642.
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1
government was a g a in s t  a c c e p t in g  t h e  Spa Agreement. In 
r e a c t i n g  so d e c i s i v e l y  t o  t h e  F r a n c o - I t a l i a n  amendments t o
t h e  o f f e r  of 14-15 J u l y ,  t h e  D e leg a t io n  was in f lu e n c e d  by t h e
2 .
pow erfu l i n d u s t r i a l i s t  group amongst i t s  co rps  of e x p e r t s .
T h is  g roup , which had an obvious p e r s o n a l  i n t e r e s t  in  keep ing  
t h e  l e v e l  of c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  as  low as  p o s s i b l e ,  had been 
te m p o r a r i l y  o verru led  when t h e  D e le g a t io n 's  hopes about th e  
c r e d i t  schemes were a t  t h e i r  h i g h e s t .  Some of t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  
th e m se lv es  may even have swung over in  favou r  of acc ep tan c e  on 
t h e  c o n d i t io n  of a gua ran teed  supp ly  of Upper S i l e s i a n  c o a l .  
However, a f t e r  t h e  o r i g i n a l  c r e d i t  p ro p o sa ls  h ad ,  t o  a l l  
i n t e n t s  and p u rp o ses ,  been em asculated and a f t e r  th e  A l l i e s  
had f a i l e d  t o  g iv e  a f i rm  g u a ra n te e  co n ce rn in g  Upper S i l e s i a n  
c o a l ,  t h e  n e g a t iv e  views of t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  r e a s s e r te d  
th e m se lv es  and in f lu e n c e d  th e  f i n a l  d e c i s io n  of t h e  D e le g a t io n .^ *  
D e s p i te  t h e  recommendation of t h e  D e le g a t io n ,  t h e  Cabinet 
dec ided  t o  accep t  t h e  Spa Coal Agreement. Even Simons swung
1. S ta tem en t by S ch o lz ,  t h e  M in is te r  f o r  Economic A f f a i r s ,  on 
21 J u l y .  N ach lass  6934/139900.
2 . The most prominent of t h e s e ,  a p a r t  from S t in n e s ,  were H i lg e r ,
Läbsen, and V /iedfe ld t who had a l l  been members of t h e  
Committee of F in a n c ia l  and Economic E x p e r ts  a t  F a r is  in  May- 
June 1919» see aboveppJ09-10.0n th e  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  
i n d u s t r i a l i s t  g roup amongst t h e  e x p e r t s :  Stresemann on 26
J u ly  1920 a t  DVP m e e tin g ,  N achlass  6929/139033* For o th e r  
members of corps of e x p e r ts  a t  Spa: Simons, 26 J u ly  1920,
R e ic h s ta g . V o l.  344» p. 256.
3* C ar l  Bergmann g iv e s  t h e  im pression  t h a t  t h e  S t in n e s  group
c o n s i s t e n t l y  opposed d e l i v e r i e s  of 2 m i l l i o n  to n s :  C.Bergmann, 
op. c i t . ,  p .4 1 .  However, Sch o lz ,  th e  DVP M in is te r  f o r  
Economic A f f a i r s ,  who opposed t h e  C a b in e t 's  f i n a l  d e c i s io n  t o  
accep t t h e  Spa Coal Agreement, claimed th a t  he had been swung 
t e m p o r a r i l y  t o  fav o u r  d e l i v e r i e s  of 2 m i l l i o n  to n s  by h i s  
hopes concern ing  t h e  o r i g i n a l  c r e d i t  p ro p o sa ls  and t h e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of Upper S i l e s i a n  c o a l .  N ach lass  6934/^39900.
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round a t  t h e  l a s t  moment and voted in  fa v o u r  of acc ep tan c e .^ *
The d e c i s io n  appears  t o  have been g r e a t l y  in f lu e n c e d  by W ir th ,  
who, in  Scholz* o p in io n ,  played ’’e ine  ganz u n g lü c k l ic h e  R o l l e " .
I t  wa s  a l s o  in  l i n e  w ith  t h e  views of t h e  f i n a n c i e r  group 
among t h e  co rps  of e x p e r t s ,  t h e  most prominent of whom were 
R athenau , Bonn, Dernburg and M elch io r .  * The immediate 
c o n s id e r a t io n  which in f lu e n c e d  bo th  t h e  f i n a n c i e r s  and th e  
C abinet was t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of a v e r t in g  an o ccupa tion  of 
t h e  Ruhr.""* But t h e  p le a  of f o r c e  m a ie u re , which was s t r e s s e d  
by t h e  C hance llo r ,  Fehrenbach, when he defended t h e  governm ent 's  
a c t io n  in  t h e  R e ic h s ta g , *was used p a r t l y  as  a d efence  a g a in s t  
p a r t i s a n  a t t a c k  and does no t p ro v id e  a com plete  e x p la n a t io n  f o r  
t h e  govern m en t 's  d e c i s i o n .  During h i s  c r u c i a l  in te rv iew  
w ith  Lloyd George on 14 J u l y ,  Simons had been unim pressed 
by t h e  t h r e a t  of a Ruhr occu p a tio n  because  he cons idered  t h a t  
t h e  consequences of t h i s  would no t be d i f f e r e n t  from th e  
economic ch ao s ,  d e f a u l t  and im p o s i t io n  of A l l ie d  s a n c t io n s  
which would have fo llow ed  from acc ep tan c e  of t h e  A l l ie d  c o a l  
te rm s as th e y  th e n  s to o d .  * Lloyd G eorge 's  c r e d i t  p ro p o s a l s ,  
mauled as  th e y  became, tran s fo rm e d  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  by s t r e n g th e n in g
1. S c h o lz ,  i b i d .
2 . On th e  views of t h i s  group a t  Spas Stresem ann t o  Warburg
26 J u ly  1920, N a c h la s s . 6929/139028/9; Stresem ann on 26 J u ly  
1920, i b i d . ,  6929/ 139032/ 3 . On t h e  sym pathe tic  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between W irth  and t h e  " f i n a n c i e r "  group : Cremer, 27 J u ly
1920, a t  DVP m e e tin g ,  ib id .,  6 9 2 9 /l3 9 0 5 8 f .
3* Stresemann on 26 J u ly  1920, ib id ., 6929/139033»
4. R e ic h s ta g . 26 J u ly  1920, V o l .  344, p . 254; 27 J u l y ,  1920,
V o l.  344, p .  302.
5. See above , p .l5 5 .
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t h e  p o s i t i o n  of th e  German government s u f f i c i e n t l y  t o  make 
i t  w o r th w h ile  t o  a t tem p t t o  a v e r t  a Ruhr occupa tion  by 
f u l f i l l i n g  A ll ie d  demands. The g o v e rn m e n ts  hope t h a t  th e  
Spa Coal Agreement could in  f a c t  be f u l f i l l e d  was re v e a le d  in 
a speech by th e  C h a n c e l lo r ,  Fehrenbach , on 26 J u l y ,  A f te r  
a d m it t in g  t h a t  a number of e x p e r t s  cons idered  t h a t  th e  
Agreement was im p o ss ib le ,  Fehrenbach claimed t h a t  t h e r e  were 
many o th e r s  who thought t h a t  t h e  n e c e s s a ry  p ro d u c t io n  could 
be a t t a i n e d  Hby d in t  of t h e  utm ost e x e r t i o n ,  and by t h e  f u l l e s t  
u se  of t e c h n i c a l  in g e n u i ty " ,  3h t h e s e  c i rc u m s ta n c e s ,  "when 
faced  w ith  t h e  t h r e a t  t h a t  n o n -acc ep tan c e  of th e  Coal Agreement 
would endanger n a t i o n a l  u n i t y ,  every  o p p o r tu n i ty  had to  be 
s e iz e d  t o  a v e r t  t h e  m ajor c a ta s t ro p h e " ,^ *  On t h e  fo llo w in g  day 
Fehrenbach l i s t e d  t h e  d e t a i l e d  reasons  f o r  t h e  governm ent’ s 
optim ism . In t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  Germany could expect t o  r e c e iv e  
a s u b s t a n t i a l  s h a re  of Upper S i l e s i a ’ s c o a l  o u tp u t .  In t h e  
second p la c e ,  t h e  p ro v is io n s  in  t h e  Agreement f o r  an improved 
supp ly  of food and c lo th in g  t o  t h e  mining d i s t r i c t s  would 
g iv e  t h e  m iners  an in c re a s e d  w i l l  and c a p a c i ty  t o  work.
F in a lly , th e domestic German coal supply could be improved 
by ( l )  th e  increased use of l ig n it e ;  (2) s tr ic t e r  economy;
(3) measures against blackmarketing; and (4) improvements 
in th e method of d is tr ib u tio n , * C learly th e  German 
government’s d ec ision  to  accept th e Spa Agreement was not
1. R eich stag , 26 July 1920, V ol. 344, p. 255
2. ib id . ,  27 July 1920, V o l. 344, p. 305.
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sim ply  an a c t  of p a s s iv e  obed ience  t o  A l l ie d  demards u n re l i e v e d  
by any hope t h a t  f u l f i lm e n t  was p o s s i b l e .
The co n cess io n s  co n ta in ed  in  t h e  Spa Agreement had 
a n o t i c e a b l e  e f f e c t  on th e  r e a c t io n  of t h e  German p a r t i e s .
The l e f t - w i n g  o p p o s i t io n  groups -  th e  U5PD and SPD -  would 
alm ost c e r t a i n l y  have supported  t h e  s ig n a t u r e  of t h e  Agreement 
in  any c a s e ,  on t h e  grounds t h a t  i t  av e r te d  an occupa tion  of 
t h e  Ruhr,^* But t h e  p ro v is io n s  f o r  r a i s i n g  t h e  s ta n d a rd  of 
l i v i n g  of t h e  m iners  gave added p o in t  t o  t h e  o p p o s i t io n  of 
t h e s e  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t - i n d u s t r i a l i s t  p o l ic y  of 
r e s i s t a n c e .  Both t h e  M a jo r i ty  and t h e  Independent S o c i a l i s t s  
even went so f a r  a s  t o  p ledge  t h e  German w orkers t o  p o s i t i v e  
c o -o p e ra t io n  in  t h e  f u l f i lm e n t  of t h e  Agreement, * The only  
d i s s e n t i e n t  v o ic e  on t h e  l e f t  was t h a t  of t h e  Communist,
C la ra  Z e tk in ,  who s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  Agreement would b e n e f i t  on ly  
French and German c a p i t a l i s t s  and would in c r e a s e  t h e  m isery  of 
t h e  German p r o l e t a r i a t , ^ "
The a t t i t u d e s  of t h e  t h r e e  government p a r t i e s  a l s o  
r e f l e c t e d  in  v a ry in g  d e g re e s  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  f a v o u ra b le  te rm s of 
t h e  Agreement, A r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  C en tre  P a r ty  (Spahn) 
s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e  d e l iv e r y  r a t e  s t i p u l a t e d  by th e  Agreement 
(24 m i l l i o n  to n s  a y ea r)  was more f a v o u ra b le  th a n  t h a t  of 29 
m i l l i o n  to n s  which had been f ix e d  by th e  R ep a ra t io n  Commission 
in  J u l y ,  T h is  r e d u c t io n ,  t o g e t h e r  w ith  t h e  c r e d i t s  g ran ted
U  S tam pfer~(SPD), 27 J u ly  1920, i b i d . ,  V o l .  344, p . 271.
2 ,  S tam pfer (SPD), i b i d . ,  p . 272; B re i t s c h e id  (USPD), i b i d . ,  
p .  281.
3 .  i b i d . ,  28 J u ly  1920, V o l .  344, p . 331.
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by th e  A l l i e s  and t h e ' p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  dom estic  c o a l  
p ro d u c t io n  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  could be im proved, j u s t i f i e d  t h e  
g o v ern m en t 's  p o l i c y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  s in c e  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  'would 
have been an occupa tion  of t h e  Ruhr. Spahn r e v e a le d  one of 
t h e  re a so n s  f o r  h i s  optimism when he c o n g ra tu la t e d  th e  
m in e r s '  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  f o r  t h e i r  r e c e n t  d e c i s i o n  a t  Bochum 
t o  p ro lo n g ,  f o r  t h e  d u r a t io n  of t h e  Spa d e l i v e r y  scheme, t h e
1.
overtim e agreement which th e y  had made in  t h e  p re v io u s  F eb ru a ry .  
Because of t h e i r  c o n n ec t io n s  w ith  in d u s t r y ,  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of 
t h e  D em ocratic  P a r ty  were l e s s  e n t h u s i a s t i c  about t h e  outcome
A
of t h e  Spa C onference . Haussman dep lored  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  
in c re a s e d  d e l i v e r i e s  cou ld  have on in d u s t r y ,  and placed  more
emphasis th a n  Spahn on t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  government had only
2 .
c a p i t u l a t e d  t o  f o r c e  ma.ieure. But he reminded t h e  R eichstag»  
perhaps w ith  some r e l i e f ,  t h a t  S tresem ann, t h e  spokesman f o r  
t h e  DVP, which was on t h e  r ig h t -w in g  of t h e  government c o a l i t i o n ,  
had s t a t e d  t h a t  " th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of f u l f i l m e n t  was not an 
a b s o lu t e  but a r e l a t i v e  q u e s t io n 1' .  E v e ry th in g  depended, 
t h e r e f o r e ,  upon t h e  e x te n t  t o  which German i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t y
3 •could s a f e l y  be c u r t a i l e d .
S tresem ann’s views about th e  Spa Agreement were th o s e  
of t h e  m odera te  s e c t io n  of t h e  DVP. T his  group was under no 
i l l u s i o n s  t o  t h e  d e s p e r a t e  need of German in d u s t r y  f o r  c o a l .^ *
U  i b i d . ,  27 J u ly  1920, V o l .  344, p . 2 8 ^
2. i b i d . ,  28 J u ly  1920, V o l .  344, p p .321-2 .
3. i b i d . ,  p. 325.
4 .  S tresem ann , 28 J u ly  1920, i b i d . ,  V o l.  344» p .  314*
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I t  was a l s o  c r i t i c a l  of t h e  German d e l e g a t io n  f o r  having
f a i l e d  t o  o b ta in  more A l l ie d  co n cess io n s  -  above a l l ,  a fo rm al
1 •agreement as  t o  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of Upper S i l e s i a n  c o a l .
However, i t  adm itted  t h a t  Germany, because  of h e r  w eakness, had
2 .
no a l t e r n a t i v e  bu t t o  a t tem p t t o  comply w ith  A l l i e d  demands; 
and i t  was w i l l i n g  t o  suspend f i n a l  judgment on t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  
of f u l f i l m e n t  u n t i l  i t  was seen how much Upper S i l e s i a n  co a l  
Germany, in  f a c t ,  r e c e iv e d .^ *  S tresem ann, in  t h e  cou rse  of 
c o u n te r in g  N a t i o n a l i s t  c r i t i c i s m  of t h e  Spa c r e d i t  scheme, even 
a s s e r t e d  t h a t  "no governm ent, even a N a t i o n a l i s t  one, would have 
r e j e c t e d  t h e  A l l ie d  o f f e r  of 5 gold m arks” ,  * B u t,  f o r  th e  
most p a r t ,  t h e  DVP m o d e ra te s ,  r e f r a i n e d  from p o s i t i v e  support 
and vo iced  only  r e l u c t a n t  and c o n d i t io n a l  a p p ro v a l  of th e  Spa 
Agreement, The op in ion  of t h e  m odera tes  p r e v a i l e d  l a t e  in 
J u ly  over t h a t  of t h e  v o c a l  r ig h t -w in g  group w ith  th e  p a r ty  led  
by S t in n e s  which f i rm ly  m a in ta ined  t h a t  t h e  Agreement should
not have been accep ted  because  of i t s  c r i p p l i n g  e f f e c t  on
5 #
German i n d u s t r y .  T h is  s e c t i o n  demanded f u r t h e r  t h a t  th e  DVP
6 .
members of t h e  Cabinet should r e s ig n  from o f f i c e  in  p r o t e s t .
The m odera tes  were not swayed from t h e i r  o p in io n  t h a t  th e  
i n t e r e s t  of t h e  n a t i o n ,  i f  no t of t h e  p a r t y ,  would be b e t t e r
1. i b i d . ,  p .  313? Stresem ann a t  DVF m eeting  on 26 J u ly  1920, 
N a c h la s s « 6929/139031; Stresem ann t o  W arburg, 26 J u ly  1920, 
i b i d . ,  6929 /139028/9 .
2 . Heinze and Brtlninghaus on 26 J u ly  a t  DVP m e e t in g ,  i b i d , ,  
6929/139044.
3 .  S tresem ann , 28 J u ly  1920, R e i c h s ta g . V o l.  344, p .  313*
4. i b i d . ,  p . 314.
5 .  S tinne3  on 21 J u ly  1920, N a c h la s s . 6934/139^93*
6 .  E .g .  Cremer a t  DVF m eeting  on 27 J u l y ,  i b i d . ,  6929/139053*
170
served  by rem ain ing  in  t h e  government.^"* But Stresemann f e l t  
c o n s t r a in e d  t o  inform  t h e  R e ic h s ta g  t h a t  S ch o lz ,  t h e  DVP 
M in is te r  f o r  Economic A f f a i r s ,  had n o t  p e r s o n a l ly  favoured
a c c e p ta n c e ,  but had m ere ly  bowed t o  th e  op in ion  of t h e  m a jo r i ty
2 .
of t h e  C a b in e t ,  S tresem ann’ s e f f o r t  t o  appease  t h e  r i g h t -  
wing of h i s  p a r ty  provoked a rebuke  from th e  Democratic P a r ty ,  
which r e s e n te d  such an a t tem p t by th e  DVP t o  d i s s o c i a t e  i t s e l f  
from t h e  p o l i c y  of t h e  government t o  which i t  s t i l l  be longed .^*  
The only  p a r l i a m e n ta ry  p a r ty  of im portance  which was 
u n e q u iv o c a l ly  opposed t o  t h e  Spa Coal Agreement was t h e  DNVP, 
The N a t i o n a l i s t  spokesman, H oe tzsch ,  a s s e r te d  b l u n t l y  t h a t  
d e l i v e r i e s  a t  a r a t e  of 2 m i l l i o n  to n s  a month would cause 
economic chaos in Germany. The op in ion  of t h e  German e x p e r ts  
a t  Spa had been t h a t  Germany could no t d e l i v e r  more than  1 .1  
m i l l i o n  t o n s .  Y e t,  H oetzsch com pla ined , th e  government had 
u n acc o u n tab ly  fo llow ed t h e  a d v ice  of e x p e r ts  such as Bonn and 
Rathenau who h ad ,  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  r e a s o n s ,  advocated a t te m p t in g  
d e l i v e r i e s  a t  t h e  h ig h e r  r a t e  demanded by t h e  A l l i e s ,  * The 
N a t i o n a l i s t s  m a in ta ined  f u r t h e r  t h a t  t h e  s ig n a t u r e  of an 
im p o ss ib le  agreement was i n c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  German n a t io n a l
5.
honour; and t h a t  n a t i o n a l  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t io n  would be 
f lo u te d  by t h e  new A l l ie d  commissions which were t o  be se t  up 
under t h e  te rm s of t h e  Agreement in  E ssen ,  B e r l in  and Upper 
S i l e s i a . ^ *  F i n a l l y ,  t h e y  expressed  doubts  abou t th e  r e a l
77 K a rd o r f f ,  26 J u ly  1920, i b i d , ,  6929/139040.
2 . R e ic h s ta g . 28 J u ly  1920, V o l.  344, p. 314.
3 . Haussmann, 28 J u ly  1920, i b i d . ,  V o l .  3^4, p . 424.
4 . i b i d . ,  27 J u ly  1920, V o l .  344, p p .294,296.
5 .  i b i d . ,  p .  294.
6. i b i d . ,  p. 295.
171
worth of t h e  A l l ie d  f i n a n c i a l  c o n ce ss io n s .^ *  The more 
c o n f id e n t  a t t i t u d e  of a l l  t h e  o th e r  p a r t i e s  about t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of f u l f i l m e n t ,  t h e i r  lack  of concern  about t h e  
p ro je c te d  A ll ie d  com m issions, and t h e i r  hopes t h a t  t h e  A l l ie d  
c r e d i t s  would prove t o  be a u s e f u l  source  of f o r e ig n  exchange, 
seem t o  d im in ish  t h e  f o r c e  of t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t s '  o b je c t io n s  t o  
t h e  Agreement. The DNVP r e a c t io n  must in  f a c t  be exp la ined  
l a r g e l y  in  te rm s  of i t s  xenophobia and i t s  extrem e p o s i t i o n  in  
t h e  German p o l i t i c a l  spectrum  which made i t  u n l i k e ly  t h a t  i t  
would have t o  implement t h e  p o l i c i e s  w hich , e i t h e r  openly or 
i m p l i c i t l y ,  i t  a d v o ca ted .
Thus th e  Spa Coal Agreement evoked a v io l e n t  n e g a t iv e  
r e a c t io n  only from th e  DNVP and t h e  S t in n e s  group w ith in  
t h e  DVP, and con ta ined  f e a t u r e s  which made i t  r e l a t i v e l y  
a t t r a c t i v e  t o  t h e  w o rk in g -c la s s  p a r t i e s .  Thus i t s  e f f e c t  on 
German p u b l ic  f in a n c e  th ro u g h  i t s  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  impact on 
German p o l i t i c s  should not be o v e r - e s t im a te d .  I t  i s  c l e a r  
from th e  R e ic h s ta g  d eb a te s  t h a t  t h e  p ro to c o l  which was signed  
a t  Spa on t h e  s u b je c t  of disarmament -  a t o p i c  of deep 
s i g n i f i c a n c e  in  German dom estic  p o l i t i c s  -  aroused  f a r  g r e a t e r  
p a s s io n s  in  a l l  p a r t i e s  th a n  d id  th e  q u e s t io n  of c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s .
I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  Spa Coal Agreement was h e a v i ly  
c r i t i c i s e d  in  t h e  R e ic h s ta g  in  t h e  l a s t  q u a r t e r  of 1920. In 
h i s  budget speech a t  t h e  end of O ctober,  Fehrenbach r e f e r r e d  
t o  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  as  t h e  most sev e re  o rd e a l  t o  which th e  
German economy had ever been s u b je c t e d .  The Spa Agreement had
1. ib id
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thus fa r  been f u l f i l l e d ,  but o n ly , he em phasised, at th e  p r ic e  
of co n sid era b le  economic d is lo c a t io n .  "One b la s t  furnace a f te r
another would be blown o u t, in d u stry  and tran sp ort were 
su ffe r in g  from a severe  f u e l  sh o rta g e , and th e  number of 
unemployed was in crea sin g  con tin u ou sly" . The co a l shortage  
brought about by reparation  d e l i v e r ie s ,  he concluded, r ig h t ly  
or w rongly, was causing chaos in every part of German economic 
l i f e .^ *  A month la t e r  members of th e  N a tio n a lis t  and P eo p le ’s 
p a r t ie s  claim ed th a t th e  Spa Agreement was part of a d e lib e r a te  
A llie d  plan to  d estroy  Germany. * Even th e  M ajority S o c ia l is t  
Weis jo in ed  in th e  chorus of p r o te s t ,  although h is  d i s s a t i s f a c ­
t io n  arose  from th e  somewhat confused idea that th e  fore ign
exchange obtained by Germany under th e  Spa Agreement had been 
spent not on food and c lo th in g  fo r  th e  miners but on m eeting  
o b lig a t io n s  under th e  C learing Agreements in s t itu te d  by 
A r tic le  296 of th e  V e r s a i l le s  T reaty.^*
The p revalence of such com plaints seems to  in d ic a te  
th a t towards th e  end of 1920 co a l d e l iv e r ie s  were having an
4#
in c r e a s in g ly  u n d esirab le  p sy ch o lo g ica l impact in Germany.
1 . Fehrenbach, 27 October 1920, i b i d . ,  V o l. 3^5» P. 787*
For a l e s s  coloured account o f th e  economic e f f e c t s  of th e  
Spa Agreement, se e  above, p p .5 8 , 6 0 -7 .
2 . i b i d . ,  24 November 1920, V o l. 345> R eichert (DNVP), p .1230; 
Zapf (DVP), p . 1232.
3 . As Simons pointed o u t, Weis ’ com plaint was r e a l ly  not th a t  
th e  miners had been denied th e  n e c e s sa r ie s  of l i f e  which 
th ey  had been prom ised, but t h a t ,  because of th e  absorption  
of fo r e ig n  exchange by A r t ic le  298 , e s s e n t ia l  imports had 
been financed by th e  dangerous method of s e l l in g  paper marks? 
ib id . ,  24 November 1920, V o l. 345» P* 1221.
4 . D isputes over d e l iv e r ie s  o f l iv e s to c k  and th e  A llie d  attem pt 
t o  d estroy  d ie s e l  engines as w a r -lik e  m ateria l a ls o  caused 
i l l - f e e l i n g  at t h i s  tim es c f .  Simons, 29 October 1920, ib id . ,
V o l. 345, p. 858.
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This  impact would not  have been so f tened  much by awareness 
t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  amount of  c o a l  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  German domestic 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  had not  been n o t i c e a b l y  reduced by t h e  Spa 
Agreement.  Nor would t h e  f o r c e  of t h e  c o m p la in t s  which were 
made have been d im in ished  n o t i c e a b l y  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  th e y  
came mainly  from N a t i o n a l i s t s  and from i n t e r e s t e d  r ig h t -w i n g  
i n d u s t r i a l  g ro u p s ,  * Nor ,  f i n a l l y ,  would t h e  a g i t a t i o n  a t  
t h e  end of  November have  l o s t  a g r e a t  d e a l  of  i t s  domestic  
e f f e c t  because  i t s  t o n e  was des igned  t o  pe r su ad e  t h e  A l l i e s  
not  t o  renew t h e  Spa Agreement when i t  exp i red  in  January  
1921,^" What did in f a c t  d e p r i v e  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  of much of 
t h e i r  p s y c h o lo g i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  in t h i s  pe r iod  was t h e  growing 
p re o c c u p a t io n  of  t h e  German p u b l i c  w i th  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of 
Germany’s t o t a l  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n .  The c r i t i c i s m  of t h e  
Spa Agreement in October and November was mere ly  p a r t  of a 
g e n e r a l  s torm of i n d i g n a t i o n  which had been aroused  by t h e  
p r e d i c t i o n  of W i r th ,  t h e  F inance  M i n i s t e r ,  t h a t  t h e  t r e a t y  
budget  f o r  1920-1 would amount t o  41 b i l l i o n  paper  marks,
W i r t h ’ s f i g u r e s ,  and,  l a t e r ,  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  which th e y  had 
been des igned  t o  sway, became t h e  dominating  i n f l u e n c e  on 
domestic  and f o r e i g n  a t t i t u d e s  t o  Germany’s f i n a n c i a l  f u t u r e .  
Thus i t  was r e l a t i v e l y  un im por tan t  t h a t  a t  t h e  end of January
1, See above ,  p p . 5 7 - 8 .
2,  For th e  com pla in t s  o u t s i d e  t h e  R e i c h s t a g  a t  t h i s  t i m e ,  see 
above,  pp.  60-1;  p.  6 l  Note 1.
3* N e g o t i a t i o n s  on t h i s  s u b j e c t  began on 8 December 1920:
Die Entwicklung d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e « p . l 5 ,  Cf, R e i c h s t a g , 
29 November 1920,  V o l ,  3^6> Scholz ( M i n i s t e r  f o r  Economic 
A f f a i r s ) ,  p .  133^5 R e i c h e r t  (DNVP), p .  134-95 Hugo (DVP), 
p • 1 3 6 7; i b i d . ,  2 December 1920, Hamm (DDP), V o l ,  346» 
p .1444.
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1921 t h e  German government pub lished  a p e s s im i s t i c  memorandum 
on th e  s i z e  of pos t-S pa  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s ;  * and t h a t  t h e
d e l i v e r y  r a t e  of 2,2  m i l l i o n  to n s  a month which was s e t  -  b u t
2 .
not in  p r a c t i c e  enforced  -  by t h e  R ep a ra t io n  Commission
aroused  h o s t i l e  comment from S ch o lz ,  t h e  German M in is te r  f o r
3.
Economic A f f a i r s ,  By t h e  beg inn ing  of 1921, t h e  a t t e n t i o n  
of t h e  German p u b lic  had been absorbed co m ple te ly  by t h e  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  which were ta k in g  p la c e  on t h e  s u b je c t  of Germany's 
r e p a r a t io n  l i a b i l i t y .
T hus ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  t h r e a t e n i n g  te rm s of t h e  Coal Annex, 
t h e  q u e s t io n  of r e p a r a t io n  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  d id  not have any 
no tew orthy  impact on German f i n a n c i a l  p o l i t i c s  in  t h e  period  
b e fo re  May 1921. B efore  t h e  m iddle of 1920, German d i s c o n te n t  
was minimised l a r g e l y  because  t h e  A l l i e s ,  in  p r a c t i c e ,  only 
i n s i s t e d  on d e l i v e r i e s  which were much s m a l le r  th a n  th o s e  
envisaged in  t h e  t r e a t y .  A c r i s i s  did  occur over t h e  c o a l  
q u e s t io n  a t  t h e  Spa C onference in  J u ly  1920 when t h e  A l l i e s ,  
a f t e r  hav ing  f a i l e d  in  p rev io u s  months t o  a s s i s t  Germany 
e i t h e r  to  in c re a s e  h e r  c o a l  p ro d u c t io n  or t o  s o lv e  h e r  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  problem s, demanded a sh a rp  r i s e  in  d e l i v e r i e s .
But t h e  b re a k -u p  of t h e  co n fe ren ce  was a v e r te d  and A l l ie d  
c la im s were met a f t e r  i t  had been agreed t o  p ro v id e  Germany 
w ith  c r e d i t s  f o r  h e r  e s s e n t i a l  im ports and a f t e r  a v e r b a l  
a s s u ra n c e  had been g iv e n  as t o  t h e  f u tu r e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of
1. The T im es . 5 F ebruary  1921, p . 8.
2 . C. Bergmann, op. c i t . ,  p .  46, For t h e  R e p a ra t io n  
Commission's d e l iv e r y  sch ed u le s  R.C. . V, p . 229*
3 . S ch o lz ,  4 February  1921, R e ic h s ta g , V o l .  347» p . 2404.
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Upper S i l e s i a n  c o a l .  Because of  t h e s e  A l l i e d  concess ions  
and because  of t h e  g e n e r a l  p reo cc u p a t io n  wi th  t h e  ques t ion  
of d isarmament ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  e f f e c t  of t h e  Spa Agreement on 
German op in ion  does not  appear  t o  have been bad .  When a 
powerful  a g i t a t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  Agreement developed a few 
months l a t e r ,  t h e  p s y c h o lo g i c a l  impact of t h e  c o a l  qu es t io n  
was overshadowed by t h a t  of n e g o t i a t i o n s  over Germany’s t o t a l  
r e p a r a t i o n  l i a b i l i t y .
( e ) N e g o t i a t i o n s  over t h e  Genera l  R epara t ion  Ques t ion before  
Nay 1921
The f a i l u r e  of a l l  a t t e m p t s  t o  Temedy t h e  menacing 
im p rec i s io n  of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Chapter  about Germany’s t o t a l  
r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n  was t h e  most p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  d i s t u r b i n g  
a spec t  of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  problem b e f o r e  May 1921.  The 
u n c e r t a i n t y  c r e a t e d  he lped  both  t o  g e n e r a t e  f i n a n c i a l  pessimism 
w i th i n  Germany and t o  keep  t h e  mechanism of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c r e d i t  jammed. For u n t i l  Germany's t o t a l  o b l i g a t i o n  was 
f ix e d  a t  a r e a s o n a b le  f i g u r e  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  t o  a s s u r e  e i t h e r  
German p o l i t i c i a n s  or i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c a p i t a l i s t s  of  Germany’s 
f u t u r e  f i n a n c i a l  and economic v i a b i l i t y .
The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  f ix in g  th e  amount and the  mode 
of payment of Germany’ s t o t a l  reparation l i a b i l i t y  had in th e  
f i r s t  in s ta n c e  been delegated by th e  framers of th e  V e r s a i l l e s  
Treaty t o  th e  Reparation Commission.'1'* A r t ic l e  233 of the  
t r e a t y  had d irected  t h a t ,  a f t e r  examining claims to  reparation
1. See above,Pp. 88-9*
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and a f t e r  g iv i n g  t h e  German government a j u s t  o p p o r tu n i ty  
t o  be h e a rd ,  t h e  Commission should b e f o r e  1 May 1921 inform 
Germany of h e r  o b l i g a t i o n s .  However, in June 1919 > t h e  
A l l i e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  F a r i s  had ,  in t h e i r  r e p l y  t o  t h e  
German c o u n t e rp ro p o s a l s  of 29 May, expressed t h e  view t h a t  
i t  would be advantageous  t o  a r r i v e  "as soon as  p o s s i b l e  at  
t h e  f ixed  and d e f i n i t e  3um which (shou ld )  be payab le  by 
Germany and accepted  by t h e  A l l i e s " . ^ *  For t h i s  reason t h e  
A l l i e d  Note of  22 June 1919 and a P ro to c o l  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  >. 
t r e a t y  had in v i t e d  t h e  German government " to  submit documents 
and p ro p o s a l s  in o rde r  t o  e x p e d i t e  t h e  work connec ted  wi th
2 .
r e p a r a t i o n  w i th i n  fou r  months of  t h e  s i g n a t u r e  of t h e  T r e a t y " ,  
Th is  i n v i t a t i o n  opened t h e  way f o r  t h e  s e v e r a l  a t t e m p t s  which 
were made in  t h e  per iod  b e f o r e  May 1921 t o  by -p as s  t h e  
R e p a ra t io n  Commission and t o  a r r i v e  a t  a "lump sum" r e p a r a t i o n  
s e t t l e m e n t  by d i r e c t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  between t h e  A l l i e d  and 
German governments .  I t  was only in t h e  e a r l y  months of 
1921, a f t e r  d i r e c t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  had ended in r u p t u r e ,  t h a t  
t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission a t t e n d e d  s e r i o u s l y  t o  i t s  d u t i e s  
under  A r t i c l e  233 and dev i sed  t h e  London Schedule of Payments,  
which was t r a n s m i t t e d  t o  Germany on 5 May 1921.
The de lay  in t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  t r e a t y  u n t i l  
J anuary  1920 prec luded any a t tem pt  a t  a prompt lump sum 
s e t t l e m e n t .  Moreover,  in  t h e  e a r l y  months of 1920, n e i t h e r  
t h e  A l l i ed  nor  t h e  German governments seemed p a r t i c u l a r l y
1. A. Luckau,  op.  c i t . ,  p. 4 l 8 .  See above,  pp.  101-2.
2.  A. Luckau,  op.  c i t , ,  p.  478,
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eager t o  broach t h e  s u b j e c t .  The French government was 
however aware t h a t ,  i f  i t s  r e p a r a t i o n  claims a g a i n s t  Germany 
were t o  be s p e e d i l y  r e a l i s e d ,  i t  was n e c e s s a ry  t h a t  3ome 
f i g u r e  -  i f  only a p r o v i s i o n a l  one -  should be named as 
Germany's t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y , ^ *  Thus ,  al though he c l e a r l y  
envisaged t h a t  any e a r l y  s e t t l e m e n t  should be a r r i v e d  at  
th rough  t h e  o f f i c e s  of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission, E i l l e r a n d  
f e l l  in w i th  Lloyd G eorge 's  p ro p o s a l  a t  San Remo in A p r i l  
t h a t  t h e  German government should be a r r a ig n e d  a t  t h e  Spa 
Conference f o r  i t s  a l l e g e d  f a i l u r e  t o  make any p roposa ls  
w i th i n  fou r  months of t h e  s i g n a t u r e  of t h e  t r e a t y .  Accordingly  
t h e  i n v i t a t i o n  t o  t h e  Spa Conference addressed t o  t h e  German 
government complained t h a t ,  b e s id e s  he r  o th e r  v i o l a t i o n s  of 
t h e  t r e a t y ,  Germany had " taken  no s t e p s ,  as  was provided  f o r  
under  t h e  p r o t o c o l  t o  t h e  t r e a t y ,  towards  a s c e r t a i n i n g  h e r  
l i a b i l i t i e s  under  t h e  head of r e p a r a t i o n  or tow ards  making
2
p ro p o s a ls  f o r  f i x i n g  t h e  t o t a l  amount she could t h u s  pay” .
S ince  t h e  German government would be obliged  by t h i s  a c c u s a t io n  
t o  put forward a p ro p o s a l  of  some s o r t  a t  Spa,  i t  became 
n e c e s s a ry  f o r  t h e  A l l i e s  t o  ag ree  upon a r e p a r a t i o n  scheme 
which they  c o u ld ,  i f  t h e y  w ished ,  u se  as a c o u n te r  t o  any 
German s u g g e s t i o n s .  At t h e  Conference of Hythe on 15 and 16 
May, s e v e r a l  B r i t i s h  schemes in v o lv in g  sums of  100 t o  120 
b i l l i o n  marks were d i s c u s s e d  and r e f e r r e d  t o  a pane l  of
1.  Marsal  on 13 F ebruary  1920 a t  t h e  London Conference ,
DBFF, V o l .  V I I ,  p.  41.
2.  Note of 26 A p r i l  1920,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  p .  210.
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e x p e r t s  f o r  f u r t h e r  examination."^* On 20 June a t  a second 
co n fe ren c e  a t  Hythe t h e  e x p e r ts  subm itted  a p lan  f o r  payments 
a t  a r a t e  of 3 b i l l i o n  gold marks a year  between 1921 and 1926 ,
6 b i l l i o n s  a year  between 1926 and 1931 and 7 b i l l i o n s  a y e a r  
between 1931 and 1963 -  a t o t a l  of 269 b i l l i o n  gold marks t o  
be paid over a period  of 42 y e a r s .  I t  was recommended t h a t  
Germany should r a i s e  f o r e ig n  loans  in  o rd e r  t o  l i q u i d a t e  h e r  
o b l ig a t io n s  s p e e d i ly ;  and t h a t  i n d u s t r i a l  sh a re s  and th e
r e c e i p t s  from customs should be pledged as  s e c u r i t i e s  f o r  h e r
2,
paym ents, * These p ro p o s a ls  were approved in  p r i n c i p l e  by t h e  
heads of governments a t  a m eeting  a t  Boulogne on th e  fo l lo w in g  
day . I t  was however agreed t h a t  th e  A l l i e s  should  make no 
f i n a l  d e c i s io n  on any schemes mooted a t  Spa u n t i l  t h e  R ep a ra tio n  
Commission had been c o n s u l t e d , -'*
M eanwhile, t h e  German government had in t im a te d  t h a t  i t  
favoured  d i r e c t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  over i t s  r e p a r a t io n  o b l i g a t i o n s .
On 26 A p r i l  1920 W irth  d e c la re d  in  t h e  N a t io n a l  Assembly t h a t  
a prompt s e t t le m e n t  of h e r  r e p a r a t io n  debt would be e n t i r e l y  
t o  Germany’ s ad v an tag e .  P robab ly  w ith  an eye t o  t h e  co n te n ts  
of t h e  A l l ie d  i n v i t a t i o n  of t h e  same day t o  t h e  Spa C onference, 
he a l s o  announced t h a t  a German p ro p o sa l  would be subm itted  
b e fo re  10 May 1920, and th u s  im plied  t h a t  t h e  four-m onth p e r io d  
s t i p u l a t e d  in  th e  p r o to c o l  t o  th e  t r e a t y  ran  no t from t h e  d a t e
4,
of t h e  s ig n a t u r e  of t h e  t r e a t y  but from t h a t  of i t s  r a t i f i c a t i o n .
1. i b i d , ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  p p . 261-78.
2.  i b i d . ,  V o l ,  V I I I ,  p p . 331-3* The a n n u i t i e s  did  not in c lu d e  
t h e  c o s t s  of t h e  armies  of  o ccu p a t io n .
3 .  i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  p p . 359-61.
4.  Nat iona lversam m lung , V o l .  333> P* 5445.
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The A l l i ed  Note of 26 A p r i l  obv ious ly  p rec luded
t h e  submiss ion  of any German scheme b e f o r e  t h e  Spa C on fe ren c e . ’*’
In any c a s e  i t  soon became c l e a r  t h a t ,  because  of t h e
d i f f i c u l t y  of e s t i m a t in g  Germany's f u t u r e  c a p a c i t y  and
because  of t h e  danger of  o f fen d in g  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  pub l i c
o p in i o n s ,  b o th  t h e  A l l i e d  and t h e  German governments in
p r a c t i c e  p r e f e r r e d  vague and temporary  formulae  r a t h e r  t h a n
an immediate and p r e c i s e  s e t t l e m e n t .  Th is  became obvious
in June when t h e  Germans, Bergmann and M e lch io r ,  d i scussed
w i th  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission t h e  form of t h e  German o f f e r
t o  be made a t  Spa.  The main s u g g e s t io n  which emerged was t h a t ,
in  o rd e r  t o  preven t  any o f f e r  from appea r ing  to o  low, t h e r e
should be p ro v i s io n  f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  Germany's payments in
2
accordance  with  a " p r o s p e r i t y  in d e x " .  * F l e x i b i l i t y ,  i f  not  
s tu d ie d  im p r e c i s io n ,  was t h e  k e y -n o te  of t h e  v a r io u s  memoranda 
which were l a i d  b e f o r e  t h e  Spa Conference by t h e  German 
government a few weeks l a t e r .  In a document d e a l i n g  w i th  
Germany's t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y  and c a p a c i t y  t o  pay,  t h e  only 
f i g u r e s  c i t e d  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  amount which,  i t  was c la im ed ,  
had a l r e a d y  been paid under  A r t i c l e  235; and t o  t h e  30 -year  
t im e  l i m i t  which ,  i t  was i n s i s t e d ,  should be imposed upon 
r e p a r a t i o n  payments.  Only g e n e r a l  recommendations were made 
about a minimum a n n u i t y ,  about  Germany's t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y  and
3.
about t h e  u s e  of a " p r o s p e r i t y  in d e x " .  Other memoranda
1 . R ± c .> V , p p . 28- 9 .
2.  C. Bergmann, op. c i t . ,  p .  36 .
3.  "Die Konferenz in Spa" ,  R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  363» Anl.  187» 
p p . 89-90 .
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which d e a l t  w i th  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  of d e l i v e r i e s  in k ind  and 
wi th  t h e  problem of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g  t h e  d e v a s t a t e d  a r e a s  were 
of a s i m i l a r l y  g e n e r a l  c h a r a c t e r .  * When t h e  A l l i e s  d i s cu s s ed  
t h e  German p ro p o s a ls  on 12 J u l y ,  both Lloyd George and 
M i l l e rand  were r e l u c t a n t  t o  mention d e f i n i t e  f i g u r e s ,  t h e  
former f o r  p o l i t i c a l  r easons  and t h e  l a t t e r  because  of h i s  wish
t o  avoid t r e s p a s s i n g  on t h e  p rov ince  of t h e  R ep a ra t io n
2.
Commission. * Nor were t h e  speeches  of t h e  German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
on t h e  fo l l o w in g  day any more p r e c i s e .  Bergmann submit ted  an 
incomple te  summary of d e l i v e r i e s  t o  t h e  a l l e g e d  v a l u e  of  20 
b i l l i o n  gold marks which had a l r e a d y  been made by Germany.
W i r th ,  t h e  German Finance  M i n i s t e r ,  s t r e s s e d  t h e  u n l i k e l i h o o d  
of an a n n u i ty  of 3 b i l l i o n  gold marks which,  he po in ted  o u t ,  
was equa l  t o  t h e  e n t i r e  paper-mark e x p e n d i tu r e  of t h e  German 
government on o rd in a ry  a c c o u n t .  F i n a l l y ,  M elch ior  s t a t e d  openly 
t h a t  i t  would be u n d e s i r a b l e  t o  r i s k  an impasse by naming any 
s p e c i f i c  f i g u r e ;  and emphasised t h a t  t h e  shape of  any 
r e p a r a t i o n  agreement would, in any c a s e ,  depend upon t h e  f a t e  
of Upper S i l e s i a . “ * I t  was no t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  was no 
f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  g e n e r a l  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  a t  Spa.
But on 16 J u l y ,  t h e  l a s t  day of  t h e  co n fe r e n c e ,  D e la c ro ix ,  
t h e  chai rman ,  opened t h e  way f o r  f u r t h e r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  by 
p ropos ing  t h a t  t h e  German memorandum should be r e f e r r e d  t o  a 
s p e c i a l  commission,  composed of A l l i e d  and German
1. i b i d . ,  p p . 91- 3*
2.  DBFF. V o l .  V I I I ,  pp.  566,  569-70.
3. ibid., pp .  586-7.
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  •which should meet a t  Geneva in a few weeks '  
t i m e , ’1 2'*
There  was com para t ive ly  l i t t l e  comment in t h e  
R e ic h s ta g  about t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  Spa Conference t o  g r a p p le  
w i th  t h e  g e n e r a l  q u e s t i o n  of  r e p a r a t i o n .  This  was however 
due l e s s  t o  any optimism about  t h e  r e s u l t  of t h e  p r o j e c t e d  
Geneva con fe renc e  t h a n  t o  p r eo cc u p a t io n  w i th  t h e  i s s u e s  of 
disarmament and c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s .  In h i s  speech on 26 J u ly  
t h e  German Fore ign  M i n i s t e r ,  Simons, expressed  t h e  hope t h a t  
a t  Geneva t h e  l i m i t s  of  Germany's c a p a c i t y  t o  pay would become 
c l e a r ,  * But an exchange between Simons and t h e  S o c i a l i s t ,  
S ta m pfe r ,  on t h e  fo l low ing  day r e v e a l e d  t h a t  t h e  Fore ign  
M i n i s t e r ' s  conf idence  was d i s t i n c t l y  l i m i t e d , 3 4 So f a r  as  i t  
was e x p re s s e d ,  t h e  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  Geneva ranged 
from s c e p t i c i s m  of t h i s  t y p e  t o  f rank  pessimism on t h e  extreme 
r i g h t  and l e f t .  * But i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  a t  t h i s  s t a g e  t h e  f i x i n g  
of Germany's  t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y  was by no means a major s u b j e c t  of 
conce rn .
1. i b i d . ,  p .  641,
2. Re i c h s t a g , V o l .  3^4,  P* 266.
3.  Stampfer (SPD), 27 J u ly  1920,  i b i d . ,  Vol.  344,  p.  273: "Die 
V e r t r e t e r  d e r  deu tschen  Regierung werden d o r t  ( a t  Geneva) 
mit den V e r t r e t e r n  d e r  b ü r g e r l i c h e n  Regierungen d e r
west eu ropä ischen  S t a a t e n  Zusammentreffen,  und ich  w i l l  
h o f f e n ,  dass  d i e  Z u v e r s i c h t ,  d i e  Herr  Dr, Simons b e z ü g l i c h  
d i e s e r  Verhandlungen g e ä u s s e r t  h a t -  ( R e ic h s m in i s t e r  des  
Auswärt igen Dr.  Simons: Die l e i s e  Hoffnung!)  -  d i e  l e i s e
Hoffnung,  k o r r i g i e r t  Herr  M i n i s t e r  Dr.  Simons -  dass  s i c h  
d i e s e  l e i s e  Hoffnung e r f ü l l e n  w i r d . "
4 .  i b i d , ,  V o l .  3^4,  Haussman (DDl), p.  320; Spahn (Zentrum) ,
p ,  286; Stresemann (DVP), p.  310; Hoetzsch (DNVF), p .301 ,  
B r e i t s c h e i d  (USFD), p.  282.
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Developments in t h e  next  few months ensured t h a t  when 
t h e  R e i c h s t a g  reassembled a f t e r  i t s  summer r e c e s s  much more 
emphasis would be placed upon t h e  g e n e r a l  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n .  
The f i r s t  r ea son  f o r  t h i s  was t h e  repea ted  postponement of 
t h e  Geneva c o n fe ren c e .  During c o n v e r s a t io n s  w i th  t h e  I t a l i a n  
Prime M i n i s t e r ,  G i o l i t t i ,  on 22nd August ,  Lloyd George 
a t t r i b u t e d  t h i s  p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n  t o  French p r e s s u r e .  "Germany," 
he s a i d ,  "was l i k e  a bankrupt  who could not  pay t h e  whole 
claim a g a i n s t  him. This  would become c l e a r  a t  Geneva, and 
France  would th e n  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i r  e have t o  fa c e  t h e  p o s i t i o n  
of having t o  accep t  something l e s s  t h a n  t h e  f u l l  c la im .  M. 
M il le rand  could not  f a c e  t h e  Chamber with tha t ." ' ' "*  Because 
of t h i s  p o l i t i c a l  t i m i d i t y  and because  of  French i n s i s t e n c e
t h a t  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  should be s e t t l e d  by t h e  R ep a ra t io n
2 .
Commission r a t h e r  t h a n  by a con fe renc e  of e x p e r t s ,  no meeting 
of t h e  type  envisaged a t  Spa took p la c e  u n t i l  December 1920.
A f u r t h e r  cause f o r  German d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  was t h a t  
t h e r e  was no d i s c u s s i o n  of r e p a r a t i o n  a t  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
F i n a n c i a l  Conference held  a t  B ru s se l s  in Sept ember-Oct ober 1920 
under  t h e  a u s p i c e s  of t h e  League of N a t i o n s .  I t  had o r i g i n a l l y  
been expec ted  t h a t  the  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  would be d e a l t  w i th  
a t  Spa,  and in any case t h e r e  was c o n s id e r a b l e  o p p o s i t i o n  (above 
a l l  from France)  t o  any d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  t r e a t y  by an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b o d y . ' 1 23* The r e s u l t  of t h i s  a r t i f i c i a l  l i m i t a t i o n  
of t h e  agenda was t h a t  t h e  recommendations of t h e  Conference in
77 D3FP, V o l .  V I I I ,  pT 761.
2 .  i b i d . ,  V o l .  V I I I ,  p p . 792- 4 , 806.
3 .  A .J .T oynbee ,  Survey of I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s .  1920-23>P*43*
f avou r  of r e t r e n c h m e n t ,  balanced budgets  and t h e  funding of 
f l o a t i n g  d e b t s  were r a t h e r  u n r e a l  when a p p l i e d  t o  Germany.
The words w i th  which T i r t h  opened h i s  speech on t h e  
budget  f o r  1920 r e v e a l e d  t h a t  by t h e  end of October t h e  
r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  was hav ing  an inc re ased  impact  upon German 
f i n a n c i a l  p o l i t i c s . ' 1'*
’’The l a s t  occas ion  on which t h e r e  was d i s c u s s i o n  
in  t h i s  House on t h e  s u b je c t  of f e d e r a l  f inanc e  
was j u s t  b e f o r e  t h e  Spa Conference.  At t h a t  t im e  
we expected  t h a t  an approach would a t  l a s t  be made 
a t  Spa t o  t h e  problem of f i x i n g  our t r e a t y  
o b l i g a t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  l i m i t s  of  Germany's c a p a c i t y  
t o  pay.  The n e g o t i a t i o n s  did  not  fo l low  t h e  course  
which we hoped.  The c e r t a i n t y  which we need f o r  a 
f a r - r e a c h i n g  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  has  s t i l l  not been 
p ro v id e d .  Spa has added t o  Germany's economic 
burden w i thou t  red u c in g  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  which 
p r e v a i l s . "
W i r t h ’ s speech  a l s o  con ta ined  seve re  c r i t i c i s m  of t h e  B ru s se l s  
F i n a n c i a l  Conference .  The p r i n c i p l e s  of  p u b l i c  f i n a n c e  which 
t h e  con fe renc e  had expounded were ,  "Wirth conceded,  unex ce p t io n ­
a b l e ;  b u t ,  because  of  t h e  e f f e c t s  of war,  d e f e a t ,  r e v o l u t i o n ,  
t h e  a r m i s t i c e  and t h e  peace t r e a t y ,  t h e  recommendations which 
i t  made, e s p e c i a l l y  in  r e s p e c t  of  r a i s i n g  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  
l o a n s ,  were mere ly  counse ls  of  p e r f e c t i o n  f o r  Germany. The
main r ea son  f o r  t h i s  l a ck  of  r e a l i s m  was t h e  f a i l u r e  of  t h e
2#
Conference t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  peace t r e a t y .
"The f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  was t o  be no d i s c u s s i o n  of  t h e  
economic and f i n a n c i a l  im p l i c a t i o n s  of  t h e  Peace 
T r e a t y ,  which i s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  sou rce  of  a l l  
f i n a n c i a l  problems and d i s t r e s s ,  made i t  immediately 
obvious t h a t  t h e  B ru s s e l s  Conference could not so lv e  
t h e  o v e r - a l l  f i n a n c i a l  m a l a i s e . "
183.
1. W i r th ,  27 October 1920,  Reichs tag . . V o l .  3^5» P* 790 
2• i b i d .
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During t h e  co u r s e  of t h e  budget d e b a t e s  of t h e  next  
few weeks,  o th e r  s peakers  a l s o  dep lored  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
e f f e c t s  of  t h e  n o n - s e t t l e m e n t  of  Germany's r e p a r a t i o n  
o b l i g a t i o n s . ' 1  2’ However, t h e  p a r t  of  W i r t h ' s  speech which 
produced most echo in t h e  R e ic h s ta g  was not  t h a t  in which 
he d e a l t  w i th  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  Germany’s t o t a l  r e p a r a t i o n  
l i a b i l i t y  but  h i s  comments on t h e  s i z e  of t h e  budge ta ry  
burden which had a l r e a d y  been imposed upon Germany by 
d e l i v e r i e s  under  A r t i c l e  235 of  t h e  t r e a t y .  He p r e d i c t e d  
t h a t  t h e  cos t  of exec u t in g  t h e  t r e a t y  in t h e  budge ta ry  
y e a r  1920-21 would amount t o  41 b i l l i o n  marks,  or  more th a n  
t h e  t o t a l  o r d in a r y  e x p e n d i tu r e  of t h e  f e d e r a l  government.
From t h i s  f i g u r e  he concluded t h a t  t o  c o n t in u e  r e p a r a t i o n
2payments even a t  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  r a t e  was im p o s s ib l e .  *
" I t  must be s t a t e d  q u i t e  c a t e g o r i c a l l y :  no
s t a t e  could b e a r  burdens  such as t h e s e .  There 
i s  no f in an c e  m i n i s t e r  in t h e  world who could 
p ledge  h im s e l f  t o  cover  t h e s e  huge sums and 
domest ic  e x p e n d i tu r e  as  w e l l  out of t a x a t i o n .
I t  would be com ple te ly  im p o s s ib l e . "
There  can be no doubt t h a t  T i r t h ’ s e s t i m a t e  of t h e  German
government ' s  c u r r e n t  r e p a r a t i o n  burden played a g r e a t  p a r t
in  in duc ing  t h e  a t t i t u d e  of f i n a n c i a l  pessimism which most
speake r s  e i t h e r  expressed  or  commented upon in  t h e  ensuing
1.  Trimborn (Zentrum),  28 October 1920, i b i d . ,  V o l .  3^5> 
p.  821; Simons,  29 October  1920, V o l .  345> P* 882; 
Heim (B a y .V .P . ) ,  29 October 1920,  V o l .  3^5> P* 897; 
Scholz (DVP), 29 November, 1920, Vol.  346, p.  1332.
2.  W i r th ,  27 October 1920,  i b i d . ,  V ol .  345, p.  795.
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debat  e .
The p s y c h o lo g i c a l  impact of F i r t h * s  remarks was almost
c e r t a i n l y  he igh tened  by h i s  e f f o r t s  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e
n e g o t i a t i o n s  which were imminent in t h e  s u b j e c t  of  t h e  g e n e ra l
r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n .  F i r t h  de c l a re d  t h a t  he had long been
aware of t h e  need f o r  propaganda t o  spread  r e c o g n i t i o n  of
Germany’ s f i n a n c i a l  d i f  f i c u l t i e s ,  *and he openly r e f e r r e d  t o
t h e  budget  f o r  t h e  e x ec u t io n  of t h e  t r e a t y  as a means of
meet ing  t h i s  need .  The t r e a t y  budget  was, in h i s  words ,  " th e
b e s t  propaganda weapon ( A g i t a t i o n s m i t t e l )  which t h e  German
people  had a t  i t s  d i s p o s a l ” . I t  should t h e r e f o r e  be "made
known t o  m i l l i o n s  of  peop le  a l l  over t h e  world"* * W i r t h ' s
d e s i r e  t o  u s e  t h e  budget  as  an in s trum ent of propaganda may
have prompted him t o  make t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between t h e  g e n e r a l
b u d g e t ,  t h e  t r e a t y  budget  and t h e  budget  of  t h e  pub l ic
u t i l i t i e s  which,  by t r e a t i n g  t h e  huge d e f i c i t s  of t h e  l a t t e r
s e p a r a t e l y ,  emphasised t h e  importance of  e x p e n d i tu r e s  a r i s i n g
out of t h e  t r e a t y  as  a g a i n s t  r o u t i n e  domestic  e x p e n d i tu r e s .
Moreover,  a l though  i t  i s  p robab ly  not  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  e s t i m a t e s
f o r  t h e  t r e a t y  budget were d e l i b e r a t e l y  i n f l a t e d ,  W i r t h ’s
U  i b i d . ,  H e l f f e r i c h  (DNVP), 4 November 1920,  V o l .  345» 
p p . 951/2 ;  Quaatz (DVF), 4 November 1920, V o l .  3^5» 
p p . 9^2,9^7;  Dit tmann (U3PD), 5 November 1920,  V o l .  3^5> 
p.990;  Dernburg (DDF), 5 November 1920,  V o l . 3^5» p*1002; 
S c h r e ib e r  (Zent rum),  24 November 1920, V o l .  345» p •1221; 
Zapf(DVP), 24 November 1920,  V o l .  345, p.  1232. The 
Communist, Lev i ,  as  one would perhaps  e x p e c t ,  de sc r ib e d  
t h i s  p e s s i m i s t i c  a t t i t u d e  most v i v i d l y :  i b i d , ,  5 November 
1920,  V o l .  345, p,  1002.
2.  i b i d . ,  4 November 1920,  V o l .  345» p.  9&2.
3 .  i b i d . ,  27 October 1920,  V o l .  345, p.  793.
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eage rness  t o  impress world op in ion  p robably  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  
t h e  l a r g e  d i s c r e p a n c y  between es t im ated  and a c t u a l  e x p e n d i tu r e  
under  t h i s  head , '1 2'* Thus ,  p a r t l y  because  of  t h e  cont inued  
u n c e r t a i n t y  as  t o  Germany’s t o t a l  o b l i g a t i o n  and p a r t l y  because  
of t h e  German government’s d e s i r e  t o  c r e a t e  a sym pathe t ic  
atmosphere  abroad f o r  f u t u r e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  on t h i s  s u b j e c t ,  t h e  
r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  was beg inn ing  t o  ex e r t  an i n c r e a s i n g l y  
u n fa v o u ra b l e  p s y c h o lo g i c a l  e f f e c t  upon German f i n a n c i a l  
p o l i t i c s .  The g e n e r a l  d e c l i n e  in conf idence  in  Germany's 
f u t u r e  which occurred  a t  t h i s  t im e  was, i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  r e f l e c t e d
in  a t em porary  slump in  t h e  e x t e r n a l  va lue  of t h e  mark in l a t e
2 .
October and e a r ly  November 1920.
From t h e  end of  O ctober ,  F r a n c o - B r i t i s h  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
a t  l a s t  gave promise of d e f i n i t e  p ro g re s s  tow ards  a c a b i n e t -  
l e v e l  r e p a r a t i o n  s e t t l e m e n t  . J * I t  was ag reed  t h a t  a p r e l i m i n ­
a ry  meet ing of  A l l ied  and German t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t s  should  be 
convened a t  B ru s s e l s  in  December f o r  t h e  purpose  of r e p o r t i n g  
t o  t h e  v a r io u s  governments and t o  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission 
on t h e  s u b je c t  of Germany’ s t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y .  A f t e r  t h e
1. Actua l  ex p e n d i tu re s  a r i s i n g  out of t h e  t r e a t y  in 1920-21 
amounted t o  25*6 b i l l i o n  paper  marks: H .J .M oul ton  and 
C.E.McGuire,  op. c i t . ,  p p . 170-1 .  For a S o c i a l i s t  
c r i t i c i s m  of t h e  d i s c r e p a n c y :  K e i l  (SPD), R e i c h s t a g .
1 March 1921,  V o l .  347, p .  2563.  For A l l i e d  c r i t i c i s m ,  
and t h e  German r e p l y  t h e r e t o :  "Weissbuch. . . f iber  d i e
Verhandlungen auf  d e r  Konferenz zu London vom 1 .  b i s  7« 
März 1921" ,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  366, Anl.  1640,  p p . 5 0 ,  54 .
2.  Die Entwicklung d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p .  15*
3» Curzon t o  Derby,  26 October 1920, DBFP. V o l .  X, pp .5 3 5 -6 ;  
Derby t o  Curzon,  29 October 1920,  i b i d . ,  p p , 540-1;
Memo by B l a c k e t t ,  4 November 1920,  i b i d . ,  p p . 449-50;
Derby t o  Curzon,  10 November 1920, i b i d , ,  p.557> Derby t o  
Curzon,  11 November 1920,  i b i d . ,  p.  558.
B ru s se l s  ex p e r t s  had subm it ted  t h e i r  r e p o r t s ,  and a f t e r  t h e  f a t e  
of Upper S i l e s i a  had become known, a f u r t h e r  conference  was t o  be 
held a t  Geneva a t  which t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  would be d i s c u s s e d  
and s e t t l e d  as had been promised a t  Spa. The d e c i s i o n s  of t h i s  
co n fe rence  were t o  be t r a n s m i t t e d  t o  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission 
which would then  p roceed ,  in accordance  w i th  t h e  t r e a t y ,  t o  
announce t h e  amount and manner of German payments.
The B ru s se l s  c o n fe re n c e  of e x p e r t s  took p la c e  between l6 
and 22 December 1920. The p o l i c y  of t h e  German government on t h i s  
occas ion  was,  in  t h e  words of Lord D’Abernon,  not t o  o f f e r  a lump 
sum or t o  propose a scheme of payments,  but " to  i n v i t e  ( th e )  
d e l e g a t e s  t o  examine ( t h e )  whole f i n a n c i a l  and economic p o s i t i o n  
of Germany t o g e t h e r  w i th  ( t h e )  German d e l e g a t e s  in o rder  t o  a r r i v e  
a t  (a )  workable  and e l a s t i c  scheme which (would) c o n s o l i d a t e  
German f i n a n c e ,  avoid t h e  danger  of bankruptcy and prov ide  ( t h e )
1.
b es t  r e s u l t  fo r  (h e r )  c r e d i t o r s  a v a i l a b l e  in t h e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s" .  
The con fe renc e  opened w i th  speeches  by S ch ro ed e r ,  a S e c r e t a r y  of 
S t a t e  t o  t h e  T re a s u r y ,  and H avens te in ,  t h e  P r e s id e n t  of t h e  
Reichsbank,  on t h e  s t a t e  of t h e  German budget and of t h e  mark 
exchange.  * On t h e  fo l l o w in g  day a n o th e r  German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
(Bergmann) l a i d  down, in a speech which on h i s  own admiss ion 
con ta ined  no th ing  p a r t i c u l a r l y  new, t h e  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  which 
should govern any r e p a r a t i o n  scheme, Germany's l i a b i l i t y  was t o  
be f i x e d  as soon as p o s s i b l e  a t  a f i g u r e  which would not d r i v e
1. D'Abernon t o  Curzon, 9 December 1920, i b i d . ,  p.  5^1.
2. Sammlung von Aktens tücken  Aber d i e Verhandlungen auf  d e r
Sac h v e r s t a n d ig e n k o n fe re n z  zu B rü s se l  vom l 6 .  b i s  22 .
Dezember 1920. pp.  13-15» Of. C. Bergmann, op.  c i t . ,  p .4 7 .
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h e r  t o  f i n a n c i a l  d e s p a i r .  Payments should be l i m i t e d  t o  a 
per iod  of t h i r t y  y e a r s  and should  be made e n t i r e l y  in kind u n t i l  
Germany’ s e x t e r n a l  and i n t e r n a l  f in a n c e s  had been s e t  in  o r d e r .
I f  Germany’ s f i n a n c i a l  v i a b i l i t y  was t o  be m a in ta ined  s e v e r a l  
c o n c e s s i o n s ,  a p a r t  from t h e  f a c i l i t a t i o n  of l o a n s ,  would have t o  
be made by t h e  A l l i e s .  The c o s t s  of t h e  armies  of occupa tion  
would have  t o  be reduced;  Germany should r e t a i n  Upper S i l e s i a ;  
German p r i v a t e  p ro p e r ty  held  in  A l l i e d  c o u n t r i e s  should be 
r e l e a s e d ;  t h e  c l e a r i n g  agreements  under  A r t i c l e  296 of t h e  
T r e a ty  should be executed l e s s  r i g o r o u s l y ;  Germany should be 
al lowed t o  keep s u f f i c i e n t  merchant  sh ipp ing  t o  enable h e r  t o
c a r ry  on h e r  t r a d e  and should enjoy economic e q u a l i t y  w i th  o th e r
1.
n a t i o n s .  Most of t h e s e  su g g es t io n s  had been made t o  l i t t l e
e f f e c t  by t h e  German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a t  Spa a few months e a r l i e r .
However, t h e  f u l l e r  d i s c u s s i o n  which was p o s s i b l e  at  B russe ls
2
appea rs  t o  have  impressed t h e  A l l i e d  e x p e r t s .  * A month l a t e r  t h e y  
r e p o r t e d  t o  t h e  Supreme Counci l  in favour  of r educ ing  t h e  co s t s  of 
t h e  armies  of occupa t ion  t o  240 m i l l i o n  gold marks a y e a r ,  waiving 
f u r t h e r  d e l i v e r i e s  of  merchant  sh ip p in g  and r e s t r i c t i n g  r e p a r a t i o n  
payments almost  e n t i r e l y  t o  d e l i v e r i e s  in k ind .^*
D e s p i t e  t h e  p ro g re s s  made a t  B russe ls  on t h e s e  s id e  
i s s u e s ,  t h e r e  was s t i l l  l i t t l e  p ro spec t  of an agreement 
upon t h e  c e n t r a l  q u e s t i o n  of Germany's t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y .
1. i b i d . ,  pp.  47-9;  Sammlung von A k te n s tü c k e n . , . . , p p . 16-17»
2.  For t h e  d e t a i l e d  A l l i e d  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  on f i n a n c i a l  t o p i c s  
p re sen te d  t o  t h e  German D e le g a t io n :  i b i d . ,  pp .60 -71 .  For 
t h e  German d e l e g a t e s '  r e p l i e s :  i b i d . ,  p p . 72-232.
3.  Document s r e l at i f s  aux R e p a r a t i o n s , V ol .  I ,  pp.  72-6;
C. Bergmann, op. c i t . ,  p .  56 .
L arge ly  because  of B r i t i s h  p r e s s u r e  f o r  an e a r l y  s e t t l e m e n t ,  
s e v e r a l  f i g u r e s  were d i s c u s s e d  in fo rm a l ly  by t h e  expe r t s  of 
both s i d e s  d u r ing  meetings  a t  B ru s se l s  and F a r i s  b e fo re  and 
a f t e r  Christ inas 1920. However, a p lan  drawn up e a r l y  in 
Janua ry  which envisaged 30 a n n u i t i e s  of 3 b i l l i o n  marks 
(p lu s  a d d i t i o n a l  payments in  accordance  w i th  any in c r e a s e  in 
German p r o s p e r i t y )  and which provided  f o r  t h e  r e l e a s e  of 
s e q u e s t r a t e d  German p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y ,  was r e j e c t e d  by German, 
E n g l i s h  and French e x p e r t s  in  t u r n . ' 5'*
The i m p o s s i b i l i t y  of  b r i d g i n g  t h e  gap between A l l i e d  
and German views on Germany’s p r e s e n t  and f u t u r e  c a p a c i ty  
prompted t h a t  French f i n a n c i a l  e x p e r t ,  Seydoux,  t o  put  forward 
on 7 Jan u a ry  1921 a scheme f o r  a p r o v i s i o n a l  f i v e - y e a r
r e p a r a t i o n  s e t t l e m e n t  w hich ,  in  i t s  o r i g i n a l  form, involved
2 .
a n n u i t i e s  of 3 b i l l i o n  marks.  * Out of r e c o g n i t i o n  f o r  t h e  
op in ion  of both  A l l i e d  and German ex p e r t s  t h a t  s u b s t a n t i a l  
cash payments were t e m p o r a r i l y  im poss ib le  f o r  Germany, t h e  
scheme con ta ined  d e t a i l e d  s u g g e s t io n s  f o r  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
of d e l i v e r i e s  in  k i n d . “1* T h i s  p roposa l  was a t  f i r s t  r e j e c t e d  
by t h e  German government f o r  t a c t i c a l  reasons  which were 
advanced l a r g e l y  by t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i s t  g roup w i t h i n  t h e  DVP.
The p r e v a i l i n g  German view was t h a t  a prompt r e a l i s t i c  
s e t t l e m e n t  of Germany’s t o t a l  o b l i g a t i o n  a t  a t im e  when she
1. i b i d , ,  p.  52.
2. For t h e  h i s t o r y  of t h e  Seydoux proposa ls  Jacques  Seydoux, 
De V e r s a i l l e s  au F lan  Young;, p p . 37-40;  Simons, R e i c h s t a g . 
1 February 1921,  V o l .  347 , p .  2300; C. Bergmann, op. c i t .  
PP.52-5.
3.  J .  Seydoux, op. c i t . ,  pp*39-40*
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was in a weakened condition would be le s s  onerous than a 
settlem ent which was arrived at f iv e  years la te r  when the  
German economy had recovered.'1 23'* However, prompted by B ritish  
and French rep resen tatives in B er lin , the German Foreign 
M inister, Simons, obtained on 15 January th e  general approval 
of th e  German Cabinet for a temporary settlem en t, although 
there was no agreement on th e  sums involved or on the
2 ,
general conditions upon which such an arrangement would h in ge. 
But further progress in th is  d irectio n  was halted abruptly 
by th e  action  of th e  A llied  Supreme Council when, on 24 January, 
i t  met unexpectedly in Paris to  d iscu ss the questions of 
reparation and disarmament. Although th e B russels experts 
took th e  opportunity to  present a report which recommended 
some of the concessions for which the German government had 
asked and which incorporated a revised  version  of th e Seydoux 
payments p lan , th e ir  suggestions went u n h e ed ed O n  28 January 
the Supreme Council, without reference e ith er  to  th e Brussels  
experts or to  th e  German government, adopted a reparation  
scheme which envisaged payments of 226 b i l l io n  gold marks 
over a period of 42 years. These payments were to  be made 
in an n u ities which, a fter  11 years, rose to  th e enormous 
figu re  of 6 b i l l io n  marks. The basic an n u ities for the f i r s t  
f iv e  years were th e  same as those in the amended Seydoux
1. C. Bergmann, op. c i t . ,  p. 55«
2. Simons, R e ich s ta g . 1 February 1921, V o l.  3^7 > pp .2299-2300; 
"Weissbuch.. .vom 1 . b is  7« März 1921", l o c , c i t , ,  p. 3;
C. Bergmann, op. c i t . ,  p. 55.
3.  For th e  B russels ex p erts’ recommendation in favour of a 
temporary settlem en t, R.C. .  V, p. 27.
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p ro p o s a l ;  but  a p r o v i s io n  f o r  an a d d i t i o n a l  l evy  of l2/£ 
of t h e  annua l  v a l u e  of German expo r ts  ensured t h a t  t h e  
amount t o  be demanded would,  in p r a c t i c e ,  be much g r e a t e r .
What was more,  t h e  c o s t s  of m a in ta in in g  t h e  A l l i e d  armies  
of occupa t ion  and t h e  A l l i e d  Con t ro l  Commissions were not 
inc luded  in  t h e s e  f i g u r e s . ' 1'*
The Supreme C o u n c i l ’ s d i s r e g a r d  f o r  t h e  views of t h e  
B ru s s e l s  e x p e r t s  shows t h a t  t h e  P a r i s  R e s o lu t io n s  were more 
a r e f l e c t i o n  of t h e  i n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  embarrassment of t h e  
Briand government t h a n  t h e y  were of any s e r i o u s  i n t e n t i o n  
of r e a c h in g  an economica lly  v i a b l e  s e t t l e m e n t  of t h e  
r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n .  For t h i s  reason  t h e  R e s o lu t io n s  under ­
s t a n d a b l y  caused a s e n s a t i o n  in  Germany and provoked a 
h i g h l y  u n fa v o u ra b le  r e a c t i o n  from t h e  German government.  A 
major cause  of co m p la in t ,  a p a r t  from t h e  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  of t h e  
sum demanded, was t h e  co n fu s in g  and embarrassing  f l u c t u a t i o n  
of A l l i e d  p o l i c y  on t h e  q u e s t i o n  of a p r o v i s i o n a l  as  opposed 
t o  a f i n a l  s e t t l e m e n t  of Germany’ s o b l i g a t i o n s .  "Seldom," 
Simons d e c l a r e d  t o  t h e  R e ic h s ta g  on 1 F eb ru a ry ,  "has any 
p o l i t i c a l  d i s c u s s i o n  c r e a te d  as  much confus ion  e i t h e r  th rough  
i t s  conduct  or through i t s  r e s u l t s  as  has t h e  r e c e n t  
con fe renc e  in P a r i s . . . .Peop le  had j u s t  r ecovered  from t h e i r  
s u r p r i s e  a t  Germany’s p re p a re d n e ss  t o  a c c e p t ,  under c e r t a i n  
c o n d i t i o n s ,  t h e  Seydoux p ro p o s a l  as  a b a s i s  f o r  f u r t h e r  
n e g o t i a t i o n s .  But a t  t h e  very  o u t s e t  of t h e  P a r i s  d i s c u s s i o n s
1. For t e x t  of P a r i s  R e s o l u t i o n s :  "Weissbuch. . .vom 1 .  b i s  7* 
März 1921",  l o c .  c i t . ,  p p . 6-24 .
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came t h e  speech of t h e  French F inance M i n i s t e r ,  Doumer, which 
com ple te ly  abandoned t h e  Seydoux Flan and mentioned an
-j #
e x o r b i t a n t  f i g u r e  as  Germany’ s t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y , ' *  * A f u r t h e r  
f e a t u r e  of  t h e  P a r i s  R e s o lu t io n s  which d i s s a t i s f i e d  Simons 
was t h a t  t h e y  v i o l a t e d  t h e  T re a ty  of  V e r s a i l l e s  in s e v e r a l  
impor tan t  r e s p e c t s .  They had been communicated t o  Germany 
b e f o r e  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  of  t h e  B ru s se l s  f i n a n c i a l  ex p e r t s  had 
been completed and t h u s  b e f o r e  Germany had been gran ted  t h e  
j u s t  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  s t a t e  h e r  case  which had been p r e s c r ib e d  
by A r t i c l e  233 of ' the t r e a t y .  Other v i o l a t i o n s  of t h e  t r e a t y  
had been committed,  Simons c la im ed ,  by t h e  e x ten s io n  of t h e  
payment per iod  beyond 30 y e a r s ,  by t h e  d i r e c t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
German government should i s s u e  bonds t o  t h e  v a l u e  of 226 
b i l l i o n  marks (as  opposed t o  t h e  100 b i l l i o n  marks mentioned 
in t h e  t r e a t y ) ,  and by t h e  in f r ingem en t  of German economic 
s o v e r e ig n t y  which was t h r e a t e n e d  by t h e  proposed 12^ expor t
le vy  and t h e  p r o j e c t e d  u s e  of customs r e c e i p t s  f o r  r e p a r a t i o n
2.
purposes .  F i n a l l y ,  Simons p r o t e s t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  v e r b a l  
t h r e a t  of s a n c t i o n s  which had been made by Lloyd George a t  
P a r i s  when he d e c l a r e d  t h a t  f a i l u r e  by Germany t o  accep t  t h e  
R e s o lu t io n s  or t o  make s u i t a b l e  c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s  would 
p r e c i p i t a t e  a f u r t h e r  occupa t ion  of t h e  Rhineland and t h e  
c r e a t i o n  of a customs b a r r i e r  between t h e  occupied t e r r i t o r y  
and t h e  r e s t  of  Germany,"*
1. Re ichs tag : , 1 F ebruary  1921,  V o l .  347,  p,  2299«
2.  i b i d . ,  p p . 2302- 3 .
3.  i b i d . ,  p.  2304,
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In view of a l l  t h e s e  u n d e s i r a b l e  f e a t u r e s ,  t h e  
P a r i s  R e s o lu t io n s  could n o t ,  Simons conc lued ,  be accepted  
as a b a s i s  f o r  f u r t h e r  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  I t  was t h e r e f o r e  
incumbent upon t h e  German government t o  make simple and c l e a r  
c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s  which would be  c i rcumscr ibed  s t r i c t l y  by 
Germany’s c a p a c i t y  t o  pay .  I f  t h e s e  c o u n te rp ro p o s a l s  offended 
A l l i e d  p u b l i c  opin ion  t h i s  would be t h e  f a u l t  of t h e  A l l i e d  
s ta tesm en  who had p a in ted  a f a l s e  p i c t u r e  of Germany’s 
c a p a c i t y  t o  pay and who had stunned t h e  German people  with  
t h e i r  r e c e n t  p ro p o s a l s .^ *
Simons'  speech in d i c a t e d  t h a t ,  as  a r e s u l t  of t h e  P a r i s  
R e s o l u t i o n s ,  t h e  s h o r t - l i v e d  t r e n d  of t h e  German p o l i c y  in  
favour  of a temporary  s e t t l e m e n t  had been r e v e r s e d .  Not only 
did  t h e  German government now d e s i r e  an immediate agreement 
upon Germany's t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y ;  i t  was a l s o  prepared  t o  
n e g o t i a t e  on t h e  s u b je c t  in a manner which could e a s i l y  lead  
t o  a d i p l o m a t i c  r u p t u r e .
The i n d i g n a t i o n  expressed  in Germany conce rn ing  t h e  
P a r i s  R e s o lu t io n s  was so v o c a l  t h a t  one obse rv e r  l i kened  i t  t o
t h e  o u tc ry  which g r e e t e d  t h e  d r a f t  of t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a ty
2 .
in May 1919* * In t h e  R e i c h s t a g  most of t h e  p a r t i e s  appear  
t o  have  suppor ted  t h e  s h i f t  of German r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y  in 
t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of  a t r i a l  of s t r e n g t h  w i th  t h e  A l l i e s ,  On 2 
February  S c h i f f e r  p r o t e s t e d  on b e h a l f  of t h e  t h r e e  government 
p a r t i e s  t h a t  t h e  A l l i e d  demands were c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  V e r s a i l l e s
17 i b i d .  ,_ p.  2305.
2. Lord D'Abernon,  An Ambassador of P e a c e . V o l . I ,  p .  121.
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T r e a t y  and t h a t  t h e y  were incom pa t ib le  w i th  t h e  economic 
s u r v i v a l  and honour of G e r m a n y . O f  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  s p e a k e r s ,  
t h e  M a j o r i t y  S o c i a l i s t  M ül le r  d ec la red  t h a t  no German govern-
2 .
ment, w ha teve r  i t s  co m p o s i t io n ,  could accep t  t h e  A l l i e d  demands; 
and Hergt (DNVP) emphasised h i s  p a r t y ' s  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  any 
n e g o t i a t i o n s  whatsoever  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  P a r i s  R e s o l u t i o n s / '  
Only on t h e  extreme l e f t  was t h e r e  any r e a l  c r i t i c i s m  of t h e  
government.  The Independent  S o c i a l i s t  Ledebour a t tack e d  
Simons f o r  d e c l a r i n g  t h a t  t h e  only p o s s i b l e  b a s i s  f o r  d i s c u s s i o n  
would be t h e  German c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s  and s t r e s s e d  t h a t  d i s c u s s i o n s  
of any 3o r t  would be w o r th w h i le .  * The Communist, Lev i ,  a l s o  
c r i t i c i s e d  t h e  uncompromising a t t i t u d e  of t h e  government.  In 
view of Germany' s  weakness v i s - a - v i s  t h e  A l l i e s ,  t h e  only 
r e a l i s t i c  course  f o r  h e r  was t o  seek an a l l i a n c e  with  t h e  Sov ie t  
Union.
Apart from t h e  s t r o n g  suppor t  i t  r e c e iv e d  in  t h e  
R e i c h s t a g ,  o th e r  f a c t o r s  encouraged t h e  government ' s  new p o l i c y .  
The i n f l u e n c e  of t h e  r i g h t - w i n g  of  t h e  DVP, which had delayed  
t h e  C a b i n e t ' s  ap p ro v a l  of  t h e  Seydoux P la n ,  almost  c e r t a i n l y  
r e a s s e r t e d  i t s e l f / *  The a d v i s a b i l i t y  of a f i r m  stand a g a i n s t  
t h e  P a r i s  R e s o lu t io n s  was a l s o  probab ly  in c re a s e d  in  t h e  eyes 
of t h e  government by i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  government 
was not  s q u a r e ly  behind French r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y .  At t h e  end
1. R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  347> P» 2310.
2 . i b i d . ,  p.  2310.
3 . i b i d . ,  p.  23I I .
4.  i b i d . ,  p.  2312.
5 .  i b i d . ,  pp.  2316- 8 .
6 . Cf. B r e i t  scheid  (USPD), 5 March 1921,  i b i d . ,  Vol.  348,
p p . 2668-9;  12 March 1921,  i b i d . ,  p.  2868.
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of F e b r u a r y ,  Stresemnnn re c e iv e d  a r ep o r t  of a s t a t em en t  by 
Kilmarnock ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  Charge d ’A f f a i r e s  in  B e r l i n ,  t o  th e  
e f f e c t  t h a t  B r i t i s h  suppor t  f o r  French p o l i c y  depended t o  a 
l a r g e  ex t e n t  upon Lloyd George’ s e g o t i s t i c a l  d e s i r e  t o  
p r e s e r v e  t h e  Anglo-French A l l i a n c e ,  "* The in f e r e n c e  t o  be 
drawn was t h a t  a r e s o l u t e  German stand would cause  A l l i ed  
p o l i c y  t o  be s u b s t a n t i a l l y  m o d i f ied ,
The r e v e r s a l  of German p o l i cy  was r e f l e c t e d  in th e  
manner in which t h e  German government prepared  i t s  co u n te r ­
p ro p o s a l s  t o  t h e  P a r i s  R e s o lu t io n s  which were t o  be p resen ted  
t o  a con fe renc e  a t  London a t  t h e  end of F eb ru a ry .  At t h e  
c lo se  of t h e  P a r i s  Conference t h e  German government re fused  
an i n v i t a t i o n  by t h e  A l l i e d  E x p e r t s  t o  renew t h e  d e t a i l e d
d i s c u s s i o n s  a t  B ru s se l s  which had been i n t e r r u p t e d  by t h e
2 m
a c t i v i t i e s  of t h e  Supreme C o u n c i l , - * This  meant t h a t  t h e r e  
was t o  be no p r e l i m i n a ry  c o n t a c t  between A l l i e d  and German 
ex p e r t s  b e f o r e  t h e  London Conference assembled.
The German government e n t ru s t e d  p r e p a r a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
London Conference t o  a Committee of Exper t s  whose members 
i n c lu d e d :  S t i n n e s ,  LÜbsen, V o g le r ,  Rathenau ,  M elch io r ,
W iedfe ld t  and Cuno, T h i s  group promptly p re sen te d  a r e p o r t  
which p r e d i c t e d  t h a t  in  o rd e r  t o  pay t h e  maximum a n n u i ty  of 
6 b i l l i o n  marks envisaged in t h e  P a r i s  R e s o l u t i o n s ,  Germany 
would have t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  v a l u e  of he r  expo r ts  from i t s
1 • N a c h l a s s . 7003/142526/-
2 .  J .  Seydoux,  op,  c i t . ,  pp .43 -4 ;  A .J .Toynbee,  op. c i t , ,  p .128
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es t im a te d  1920 l e v e l  of 5 b i l l i o n  gold marks t o  t h e  u n l i k e l y
1,
f i g u r e  of 40 b i l l i o n  gold marks .  But t h e  German Exper t s  
found i t  im p o ss ib le  t o  ag ree  upon c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s  which were 
t o  be p r e s e n te d  t o  t h e  A l l i e s ,  As a r e s u l t ,  t h e  scheme which 
was a c t u a l l y  proposed a t  London was drawn up by Simons h im s e l f  
w i th  t h e  aid  of a sm al l  group of  "very  exper i enced  and c a p a b le  
men" and was adopted by t h e  Cabinet  on 25 F ebrua ry  b e fo re  t h e  
E x p e r t s  had voiced t h e i r  o p in io n ,  * The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of t h e  
Cabinet  and of Simons h im s e l f  f o r  t h e  form of t h e  c o u n te r ­
p ro p o s a l s  was i n c re a s e d  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  no German f i n a n c i a l  
e x p e r t s  a t t e n d e d  t h e  London Conference .  The p r e c i s e  e f f e c t  of  
t h i s  upon t h e  German o f f e r  cannot  be gauged .  But t h e  absence  
of German e x p e r t s  a t  London was due t o  p r e s s u r e  from t h e  DVP, 
which regarded  t h e  e x c l u s i o n  of a l l  a d v i s e r s  as  t h e  only means 
of p r e v e n t in g  t h e  c o n c i l i a t o r y  Bonn and Rathenau from a t t e n d in g  
t h e  c o n f e r e n c e .  * I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  c e r t a i n  t h a t  t h e  r i g h t -w in g  
of  t h e  Cabinet  was e x e r t i n g  a t  l e a s t  a n e g a t i v e  i n f l u e n c e  upon 
t h e  conduct  of t h e  German d e l e g a t i o n  a t  London.
A f u r t h e r  symptom of t h e  s t a t e  of German op in ion  and 
of t h e  government ' s  changed p o l i c y  was t h a t  in  mid-February  
Simons d e l i v e r e d  speeches  in  South Germany in which he not  only 
rep u d ia te d  t h e  P a r i s  R e s o lu t io n s  but  a l s o  re-opened t h e
4
h ig h l y  inflammable q u e s t i o n  of Germany's a l l e g e d  "war g u i l t " .
1.  "W eissbuch . , .vom 1,  b i s  7* März 1921" ,  l o c , c i t , ,  p*32.
2 .  Simons,  12 March 1921,  R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  3^8,  P* 2841.
3 .  Stresemann t o  Wagner, 31 March 1921,  N a c h l a s s , 7002/142242/3
4 .  G.Zwoch, Die E r f f l l lungs -und  V e r s t ä n d i g u n g s p o l i t i k  de r  
Weimar er  Re pub1i k . p.  17.
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In r e p l y  t o  subsequent  l e f t - w i n g  c r i t i c i s m ,  Simons claimed 
t h a t  h i s  speeches  had r e f l e c t e d  r a t h e r  t h a n  s t i r r e d  up 
South German f e e l i n g  on t h i s  subject .^"* He even s t a t e d  t o  
t h e  B r i t i s h  Ambassador t h a t  i t  would have been " f a t a l  not 
only f o r  t h e  government but a l s o  f o r  t h e  s u c c e s s  of 
n e g o t i a t i o n s  i f  he had not  t o  some ex t e n t  taken  t h e  popula r  
v iew” *“ • Whatever may have been t h e  p r e c i s e  motive 
u n d e r ly i n g  them, Simons ' speeches  a r e  an o th e r  i n d i c a t i o n  both 
of t h e  un fav o u rab le  popula r  r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e  F a r i s  R e s o lu t io n s  
and of t h e  government ' s  p repa redness  t o  cause t h e  breakdown 
of t h e  imminent n e g o t i a t i o n s  in  London.
The a t t i t u d e  of t h e  German government and t h e  manner 
in which i t s  c o u n t e rp ro p o s a l s  were framed e x p l a in s  t h e  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  gap between A l l i e d  r e p a r a t i o n  demands and th e  
German o f f e r  which was made by Simons a t  London on 1 March.
The P a r i s  R e s o lu t io n s  had envisaged t o t a l  payments of 226 
b i l l i o n  gold marks over a pe r iod  of 42 y e a r s ,  in  a n n u i t i e s  
r ang ing  from 2 t o  6 b i l l i o n  marks .  Simons proposed t h a t  t h e  
German o b l i g a t i o n  should be f ix e d  a t  50 b i l l i o n  marks.
20 b i l l i o n s ,  he a l l e g e d ,  had a l r e a d y  been paid by means of 
d e l i v e r i e s  under  A r t i c l e  235* Of t h e  remaining 30 b i l l i o n s ,  
a t h i r d  could be l i q u i d a t e d  w i t h i n  f i v e  y e a r s  by means of an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  loan ;  and t h e  r e s i d u e ,  which was t o  bear  
i n t e r e s t  a t  5/£> could be am ort ized  over t h e  fo l l o w in g  25 y e a r s .
1.  R e i c h s t a g . 12 March 1921, V o l .  3^8>pP. 2874-5.
2.  Lord D'Abernon,  op.  c i t . ,  V o l .  I ,  p .  126.
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On t h e  assumption t h a t  i n t e r e s t  payments on t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
loan would be a t  t h e  r a t e  of 5/£> t h e  annua l  f i n a n c i a l  burden 
imposed upon Germany by t h i s  scheme would be about  1 .5  
b i l l i o n  mark3 , ^ ’
Apart from t h e  sm al lness  of t h e  German o f f e r ,  t h e  
manner in which i t  was p re s e n te d  was c e r t a i n  t o  be o f f e n s iv e  
t o  t h e  A l l i e s .  The most o b j e c t i o n a b l e  f e a t u r e  was Simons* 
p a t e n t l y  f a l l a c i o u s  a t tem pt  t o  r e l a t e  h i s  p r o p o s a l s  t o  th e  
P a r i s  R e s o l u t i o n s .  The f i g u r e  of 50 b i l l i o n s  wa3 der ived  
by d i s c o u n t in g  t h e  P a r i s  a n n u i t i e s  a t  t h e  r a t e  of in o rde r  
t o  a r r i v e  a t  t h e i r  " p r e s e n t  v a l u e " .  But s i n c e  t h e  German 
government did  not in tend  t o  make an immediate lump sum 
s e t t l e m e n t  of r e p a r a t i o n ,  t h i s  sca l ing-down was i n d e f e n s i b l e .
A f u r t h e r  t e n d e n t i o u s  a s p e c t  of t h e  scheme was t h e  deduc t ion  
of 20 b i l l i o n  marks on account  of d e l i v e r i e s  un d e r  A r t i c l e  235* 
Simons produced no evidence  t o  suppor t  t h i s  f i g u r e ,  even 
though t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission had a few days b e f o r e  
es t im ated  t h e  va lue  of t h e s e  d e l i v e r i e s  a t  only 8 b i l l i o n s ,  * 
Yet a no the r  obvious f law in t h e  German p r o p o s a l  from t h e  
A l l i e d  p o in t  of view was t h a t ,  whereas in c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  
" p re s e n t  v a lu e "  of t h e  P a r i s  a n n u i t i e s  a d i s c o u n t  r a t e  of 
8% had been u sed ,  t h e  r a t e  of 5/£ was sugges ted  in  connec t ion  
w i th  Germany*s i n t e r e s t  payments on h e r  o u t s t a n d i n g  r e p a r a t i o n  
o b l i g a t i o n s .
1. For t h e  t e x t  of t h e  German c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s :  "Weissbuch, . ,
vom 1.  b i s  7« März 1921",  l o c . c i t . ,  p p . 148-51« For 
Simons’ speech a t  London on 1 March: i b i d . ,  p p . 136-44.
See a l s o  R e i c h s t a g « 12 March 1921, V o l .  3^8,  p.  2841.
2 .  See below, p.  210.
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Other  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  f e a t u r e s  of t h e  German o f f e r  
were t h a t  i t  was c o n d i t i o n a l  upon t h e  r e t e n t i o n  of Upper 
S i l e s i a  by Germany; and t h a t  i t  con ta ined  no p ro v i s io n  f o r  
a d j u s t i n g  German payments in  accordance  wi th  in c re as ed  
German p r o s p e r i t y .
The form and c o n te n t  of t h e  German c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s ,  
t o g e t h e r  w i th  Simons* d e n i a l s  of German "war g u i l t "  in 
p rev ious  weeks,  ensured a v i o l e n t  A l l i ed  r e a c t i o n  a t  London.
On 3 March Lloyd George,  speak ing  on b e h a l f  of t h e  A l l i e s ,  
d ism issed  t h e  German o f f e r  as  unworthy of c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  A f t e r  
s t r e s s i n g  t h e  connec t ion  between Germany's o b l i g a t i o n  t o  pay 
r e p a r a t i o n  and h e r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  war ,  he poin ted  out  
t h a t  German t a x a t i o n  was l i g h t e r  th a n  t h a t  in A l l i ed  c o u n t r i e s .
He t h e r e f o r e  announced t h a t  s a n c t i o n s  would be imposed u n l e s s  
a more a c c e p t a b l e  German o f f e r  was rece ived  b e f o r e  7 March.
This  adamant ine  A l l i e d  re sponse  caused an immediate 
change in t h e  t a c t i c s  of t h e  German d e l e g a t i o n .  In t h e  
fo l low ing  days Simons made s e v e r a l  p ro p o sa l s  which e i t h e r
modified the A llied payments scheme or constitu ted  a fresh
2 .
approach t o  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n .  His f i r s t  s u g g e s t io n  
was t h a t  t h e  d u r a t i o n  of t h e  P a r i s  scheme should be reduced 
from 4-2 t o  30 y e a r s .  But t h i s  p ro p o sa l  was shelved  when 
t h e  A l l i e s  i n s i s t e d  on t h e  im poss ib le  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
a n n u i t i e s  should be 3 b i l l i o n  gold marks and,  in a d d i t i o n ,  an
1. "l/Veissbuch.. .vom 1.  b i s  7* M®rz 1921",  l o c .  c i t , ,  p p , 152-67«
2.  The account  h e r e  g iven  i s  based on t h a t  of  Simonsj Re i c h s t a g . 
12 March 1921,  V o l .  348, p p . 2844-6.
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u n s p e c i f i e d  v a r i a b l e  sum. Simons at tempted  next  t o  ob ta in  
agreement upon a d e f i n i t e  programme f o r  t h e  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  
of t h e  d e v a s t a t e d  a r e a s  in  F ra n c e .  However, p ro g r e s s  in t h i s  
d i r e c t i o n  was blocked by F r a n c e ' s  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  p resence  
of German labour  c o l o n i e s  upon h e r  s o i l  and by t h e  u n w i l l i n g n e s s  
of French i n d u s t r y  t o  be dep r ived  of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  c o n t r a c t s  
by Germany. F i n a l l y ,  Simons rev ived  n e g o t i a t i o n s  on t h e  
s u b j e c t  of  a p r o v i s i o n a l  s e t t l e m e n t .  An i n i t i a l  s u g g es t io n  of 
a te mporary  payments p lan  based on t h e  f i r s t  f i v e  a n n u i t i e s  
envisaged in t h e  German c o u n t e rp ro p o s a l s  was promptly r e j e c t e d  
by t h e  A l l i e s .  A more generous  o f f e r  of f i v e  a n n u i t i e s  of 
3 b i l l i o n  marks on t h e  c o n d i t i o n  of success  in f l o a t i n g  an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  loan was a l s o  r e j e c t e d  because  i t  con ta ined  
no p r o v i s i o n  f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  v a r i a b l e  payments.  Simons 
t h e r e f o r e  r e v e r t e d  t o  t h e  s c h e d u le  l a i d  down in t h e  P a r i s  
R e s o lu t io n s  - two a n n u i t i e s  of 2 b i l l i o n s  fo l lowed  by t h r e e  
a n n u i t i e s  of  3 b i l l i o n s  -  and combined t h i s  w i th  a promise 
of  an a d d i t i o n a l  sum eq u a l  t o  t h e  y i e l d  of t h e  proposed 12^ 
expor t  l e v y .  However, t h e  A l l i e s  were s t i l l  d i s s a t i s f i e d ,  
even when t h i s  o f f e r  was g i l d e d  w i th  Simons ' u n d e r t a k in g  - 
given a t  t h e  e l ev en th  hour  w i thou t  t h e  knowledge of t h e  German 
Cabinet  -  t h a t  Germany would g u a ra n t e e  t h e  s u c c e s s  of any 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  loan which was t o  be r a i s e d .  The reasons  f o r  
con t inued  A l l i e d  d i s a p p r o v a l  were Simons ' i n s i s t e n c e  on 
r e t a i n i n g  Upper S i l e s i a  and h i s  f a i l u r e  t o  name a gua ran teed
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minimum a n n u i ty  f o r  t h e  l a s t  25 y ea rs  of any scheme.
The f a i l u r e  of t h e s e  l a s t - m i n u t e  e f f o r t s  t o  ach ieve  a 
t em pora ry  s e t t l e m e n t  and t h e  consequent  b reak -up  of t h e  London 
Conference on 7 March were obv ious ly  not due t o  any German 
i n t r a n s i g e n c e  in t h e  l a s t  few days of t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  The 
p o l i c y  of t h e  German Cabinet  had in f a c t  s o f ten ed  n o t i c e a b l y  
a f t e r  t h e  opening of t h e  c o n f e r e n c e ,  and Simons’ e f f o r t s  t o  
o b ta in  a temporary  s e t t l e m e n t  had re c e iv e d  i t s  f u l l  s u p p o r t .
Even h i s  p ledge  t h a t  Germany would g u a ran tee  t h e  success  of
t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  loan  o p e r a t i o n  was r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y  endorsed
2,
by t h e  C a b in e t ,  *
The C a b i n e t ’s more c o n c i l i a t o r y  a t t i t u d e  was r e f l e c t e d  
and perhaps in  some deg ree  caused by inc reased  c r i t i c i s m  of 
t h e  governm en t ' s  r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y  in t h e  R e ich s tag  a t  t h e  
t im e  of t h e  London Conference ,  During a budget  deba te  on 1 
March t h e  M a jo r i t y  S o c i a l i s t ,  K e i l ,  had po in ted  out the  
m i s l e a d in g  gap between W i r t h ' s  e s t im a te  of government e x p e n d i tu r e  
a r i s i n g  out of t h e  t r e a t y  and t h e  d i sbursements  a c t u a l l y  made.
The d i s c r e p a n c y  between t h e  42 b i l l i o n  paper  marks budge ted and 
t h e  17 b i l l i o n  paper  marks a c t u a l l y  spen t  up t o  1 December 1920 
would lower th e  con f idence  of t h e  A l l i e s  in Germany’s good 
f a i t h .  K e i l  a l s o  c r i t i c i s e d  a S e c r e t a r y  of S t a t e ,  S ch roede r ,  
f o r  h i s  s ta tem en t  a t  t h e  B ru sse l s  Conference in December t h a t
1, C f , Lloyd George on 7 March 1921: "Weissbuch, , .vom 1,  b i s  7«
März 1921” , l o c .  c i t . ,  p.  182.
2.  Simons,  12 March 1921,  Re ich s t ag : . V o l ,  3^£ , P* 2846.
The r i g h t - w i n g  of t h e  DVF, however,  d isapproved  of Simons ' 
o f f e r  a t  a p a r t y  meet ing on 8 March, K a c h l a s s . 7003/142563/5 .
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German d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n  had been pushed t o  i t s  u t t e r m o s t  
l i m i t .  There  was, on t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  K e i l  c la im ed ,  widespread 
popula r  i n d i g n a t i o n  a t  what even o f f i c i a l  c i r c l e s  r e f e r r e d  
t o  as " th e  grand f i a s c o ” of p r o p e r ty  t a x a t i o n . 1  23*
More such outspoken c r i t i c i s m ,  which t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t
K e l f f e r i c h  condemned as a ”s t a b  in the  back" of t h e  German
2 .
d e l e g a t i o n  a t  London (o f  which Schroeder  was a member),* 
was expressed  in t h e  next  few days .  A pparen t ly  because  of 
p r e s s u r e  from t h e  Lef t ,  Fehrenbach r e l u c t a n t l y  gave t h e  
R e ic h s ta g  a vague a s s u ra n c e  on 5 March t h a t ,  a l though  Simons 
would not s ign  any agreements  which t h e  German n a t i o n  could 
no t  b e a r ,  he would exp lo re  w i t h i n  p r e s c r ib e d  l i m i t s ,  every 
a v a i l a b l e  avenue of n e g o t i a t i o n ,  * In t h e  deba te  
p r e c i p i t a t e d  by t h i s  d e c l a r a t i o n ,  t h e  M a jo r i ty  S o c i a l i s t  
Mülle r  i n s i s t e d  on t h e  need f o r  a compromise s e t t l e m e n t  a t  
London both in o rde r  t o  a v e r t  A l l i ed  s a n c t i o n s  and in o rder  
t o  a l l a y  t h e  growing d i s t r u s t  of Germany’s i n t e n t i o n s  which 
had been revea led  in Lloyd George’ s speech on 1 March. The 
Independent  S o c i a l i s t ,  B r e i t  s c h e id ,  a l though  a d m i t t i n g  t h e  
a b s u r d i t y  of t h e  P a r i s  R e s o l u t i o n s ,  condemned more s e v e re l y  
t h a n  t h e  p reced ing  s p e a k e r ,  t h e  " p a t r i o t i c "  and p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  
in e p t  p o s t u r e  adopted by t h e  German government a t  t h e  opening
1. R e i c h s t a g , V o l .  347 > p.  2563*
2.  i b i d . ,  1 March 1921, V o l .  347 , p.  2571.
3.  i b i d . ,  5 March 1921, V o l .  348,  p .  2656. Fehrenbach had on 
t h e  p rev ious  day r e fu s e d  a r e q u e s t  by t h e  USPD and VKP 
f o r  a government d e c l a r a t i o n  on t h e  London Conference:  
i b i d . ,  4 March 1921,  V o l .  348,  p.  2646.
4.  M ül le r (SPD ) , i b i d . ,  5 March 1921,  V o l .  348,  pp .2657,  2660.
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of t h e  London Conference .  B r e i t s c h e i d  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  
c r i t i c a l  of t h e  huge c o n t r a s t  between t h e  f i g u r e s  of 50 and 
226 b i l l i o n  marks; and of t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  German 
c o u n t e rp ro p o s a l s  t o  mention any s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  t h e  12/£ 
export  levy  demanded in  t h e  P a r i s  R e s o l u t i o n s .  He a l s o  
dep lo red  t h e  absence  of  any c o n c i l i a t o r y  German d e c l a r a t i o n  
conce rn ing  t h e  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  of t h e  d e v a s ta t e d  a r e a s  in 
t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  of t h e  Confe r ence.^* G re a te r  e f f o r t s  
should now be made t o  ensu re  t h e  s uccess  of t h e  Conference 
a l t h o u g h ,  in B r e i t  s c h e i d ' s  o p in io n ,  a l a s t i n g  European 
s e t t l e m e n t  could only be achieved  th rough  t h e  good o f f i c e s  
of t h e  o rgan ised  working c l a s s  of each co u n t ry .  * S to e c k e r ,  
t h e  Communist spokesman,  agreed with  B re i t  scheid  1 s c r i t i c i s m s  
of t h e  government’ s p o l i c y  but  d i f f e r e d  by p r e d i c t i n g  t h a t  
t h e  f i n a l  s o l u t i o n  of E u ro p e ' s  economic t r o u b l e s  would be 
achieved  not  th rough  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  and r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  but  
t h ro u g h  t h e  break-down of t h e  system of c a p i t a l i s t i c  n a t i o n a l  
s t a t  e s •
I f  t h e  Left o p p o s i t i o n  groups were i n c r e a s i n g l y  
c r i t i c a l  of t h e  government’ s r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y ,  t h e  t o n e  of 
t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  government p a r t i e s  themse lves  
was f a r  more moderate t h a n  i t  had been a month e a r l i e r .  Some 
resen tm en t  was expressed a t  t h e  i n s i s t e n c e  of t h e  Left  on a
1. i b i d . ,  p p . 2668-9.
2. i b i d . ,  p.  2670.
3 .  i b i d . ,  p .  2681
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d e b a te  w h i l e  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  in London were s t i l l  in 
p r o g r e s s . T h e r e  were a l s o  p r o t e s t s  a g a i n s t  Lloyd George’ s 
a s s e r t i o n  of German "war g u i l t " .  * But even t h o s e  who f e l t  
s t r o n g l y  on t h e s e  p o in t s  emphasised t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of some 
s o r t  of compromise agreement a t  London. Stresemann,  f o r  one,  
expressed  t h e  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  
was i n e v i t a b l e  i r r e s p e c t i v e  of t h e  success  of t h e  London 
n e g o t i a t i o n s .  "The day of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , "  he  d e c l a r e d ,
" w i l l  come, because i t  must come."
The DNVP was t h e  only p a r t y ,  ap a r t  from t h e  VKP, 
which remained as u n c o n c i l i a t o r y  as  i t  had been a t  th e  
b e g inn ing  of F eb ru a ry .  I t s  spokesman,  H e r g t , a t t a c k e d  t h e  
l e f t - w i n g  groups  f o r  a t t e m p t in g  t o  undermine t h e  u n i t e d  
n a t i o n a l  f e e l i n g  of p rev ious  weeks,  and i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  German c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l ,  which had g iven  so much 
o f fe n c e  t o  t h e  A l l i e s ,  should  remain t h e  only b a s i s  f o r  
n e g o t i a t i o n . ^ *
The f u r t h e r  growth of  t h i s  moderate a t t i t u d e  in 
German p o l i t i c s  was i n t e r r u p t e d  by t h e  r u p t u r e  of t h e  London 
Conference on 7 March and t h e  A l l i e d  announcement on th e  
fo l l o w in g  day t h a t  s a n c t i o n s  would be a p p l i e d .  The measures 
which were t o  be r e s o r t e d  t o  were:  ( l )  t h e  occupa t ion  of
1. Stresemann (DVP), i b i d . ,  p .  2671; S c h i f f e r  (DDP), i b i d . ,  
p .  2677; Trimborn (Zentrum),  i b i d . ,  p.  2661.
2 .  Stresemann (DVP), i b i d . ,  p p . 2672-5; S c h i f f e r  (DDP), p.2679*
3 .  i b i d . ,  p.  2777.
4. i b i d . ,  pp.  2661-5.
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Duisburg, Ruhrort and D üsseldorf; (2) th e  ere c t io n  of a 
customs b a rr ier  around th e  Rhineland; and ( 3 ) the  levy ing  
of a tax on German imports in to  A ll ied  c o u n tr ie s .  * These 
were s u f f i c i e n t  t o  cause a resurgence of th e  n a t io n a l i s t  
f e e l i n g  of th e  previous month. The German d e le g a tio n  was 
g e n e r a l ly  acclaimed on i t s  return to  B erlin  fo r  i t s  r e fu s a l  
t o  g iv e  way t o  A ll ied  p ressu re .  * And when Simons reported  
on h is  a c t i v i t i e s  at London t o  th e  R eichstag on 12 March 
h is  to n e  was n o ticeab ly  d i f f e r e n t  from that of th e  government 
p a r t ie s  a week e a r l i e r .  Although he did not c lo s e  the door 
on fu ture  n e g o t ia t io n s ,  Simons predicted that th e s e  would 
be made more d i f f i c u l t  by th e  impact of A ll ied  sanctions  on 
th e  p o l i t i c a l  atmosphere and economic capacity  of Germany.“'* 
Simons’ firm er stand rece ived  strong support from th e  
government p a r t ie s ,  whose spokesman, Trimborn, even went so 
far  as t o  d ec la re  that a l l  past German reparation o f fe r s  were 
v o i d . 1 234. It was a good in d ic a t io n  of th e  changed circumstances  
th a t  V estarp , speaking on b eh a lf  of th e  N a t io n a l is t  Party,  
expressed approval of th e  outcome, although not th e  conduct,  
of th e  London Conference. The r e je c t io n  of Simons' various  
c o n c i l ia to r y  proposals by th e  A l l i e s  was "a p ie c e  of luck - 
more luck perhaps than we have deserved” . As could be
expected , Westarp was more fo r th r ig h t  than Simons or th e
1 . "Weissbuch. . .vom 1. b is  7* März 1921” , l o c . c i t . ,  p , l6 4 ;
A.J.Toynbee, op. c i t . ,  p. 131» Note 2.
2. E, Eyck, G eschichte der " eimarer Republik. V o l .  1, p .242 .
3 . R e ic h s ta g . 12 March 1921, V o l.  348> PP* 2847-8.
4. i b i d . ,  pp. 2849-50.
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government p a r t i e s  on t h e  s u b j e c t  of  t h e  f u t u r e  p o l i c y  t o  be 
pursued by Germany. He advocated complete a b s t e n t i o n  from 
n e g o t i a t i o n s  u n t i l  t h e  A l l i e d  s a n c t i o n s  had been revoked ,  
and even urged a mild form of p a s s iv e  r e s i s t a n c e  w h i le  t h e y  
remained in f o r c e . ^ *
The new s i t u a t i o n  c r e a t e d  by t h e  im p o s i t io n  of  
s a n c t i o n s  a f f e c t e d  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of t h e  Left  g ro u p s .  The 
M a jo r i ty  S o c i a l i s t  Weis absolved  t h e  German d e l e g a t i o n  of 
any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  f i n a l  r u p t u r e  a t  London, which
2 .
he a t t r i b u t e d ,  w i th  some j u s t i c e ,  t o  French i n t r a n s i g e n c e .
But he c ons ide re d  t h a t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  should be resumed as soon 
as p o s s i b l e  and was h ig h l y  c r i t i c a l  of t h e  advoca te s  of 
p a s s i v e  r e s i s t a n c e .  However, in view of Germany's l i m i t e d  
c a p a c i t y  t o  pay r e p a r a t i o n  and t h e  imminence of  h e r  f i n a n c i a l  
b an k ru p tc y ,  t h e  whole q u e s t i o n  should be r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  
League of N a t io n s . " 5*
The Independent  S o c i a l i s t s  p laced t h e  blame f o r  t h e  
breakdown of t h e  London Conference sq u a re ly  upon t h e  German 
d e l e g a t i o n .  Simons'  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  r ig h t - w i n g  N a t i o n a l i s t  
op in ion  had caused him t o  approach t h e  London Conference 
in  t h e  s p i r i t  of a f i n a n c i a l  lawyer r a t h e r  than  t h a t  of  a 
s t a t e s m a n .  He had f o r  t h i s  reason  been unaware of t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  need of t h e  Briand government f o r  a paper 
r e p a r a t i o n  s e t t l e m e n t  of a t  l e a s t  220 b i l l i o n  marks,  A
1. i b i d . ,  pp.  2863-4.
2.  i b i d . ,  p.  2851.
3. i b i d . ,  p.  2858.
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p o l i c y  of conceding t o  t h i s  demand and of banking upon 
subsequen t  r e v i s i o n  of h e r  o b l i g a t i o n s  was t h e  only one which 
was r e a l i s t i c  f o r  Germany in  h e r  p re s e n t  weakened c o n d i t i o n .
In f i v e  y e a r s ’ t im e  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  would have been 
t ran s fo rm e d  by t h e  advent  of  more l i b e r a l  governments in 
England and France ,^*  But ,  a l though  t h e  Independent  S o c i a l i s t s  
were c r i t i c a l  of t h e  government’ s h a n d l in g  of t h e  London 
Conference ,  t h e y  r ecogn i sed  t h a t  t h e  im pos i t ion  of s a n c t i o n s  
had made t h e  resumption of n e g o t i a t i o n s  more d i f f i c u l t  fo r  
any German government,  whe ther  i t  was drawn from t h e  Right  or 
t h e  L e f t .  In f a c t ,  t h e  only means of a ch iev in g  a r e p a r a t i o n
s e t t l e m e n t  was now, in  B r e i t s c h e i d ' s  op in ion ,  th rough
2 .
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a r b i t r a t i o n .
The Communist, L ev i ,  d iv ided  t h e  blame f o r  t h e  c u r r e n t  
r u p t u r e  in n e g o t i a t i o n s  e q u a l ly  between t h e  Germans who had 
c o n s i s t e n t l y  sabotaged t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a ty  and t h e  French 
who wanted t o  ob ta in  a Rhine f r o n t i e r  and t o  c r i p p l e  t h e  
German economy. He went on t o  r e i t e r a t e  h i s  opin ion  t h a t  
Germany should s o lv e  h e r  problems by conclud ing  an a l l i a n c e  
w i th  t h e  USSR.
The lack  of i n f l u e n c e  of  t h o s e  who did not  suppor t  
t h e  governm en t ' s  p o l i c y  was r e v e a l e d  in t h e  v o t e  at  t h e  end 
of t h e  d e b a t e  on 12 March.  A Communist r e s o l u t i o n  advoca t ing  
t h e  resumpt ion  of r e l a t i o n s  w i th  Russ ia  and an Independent
7~  B r e i t s c h e i d  (USFD), i b i d . ,  pp.  2869-70.
2.  i b i d . ,  p .  2874.
3 .  i b i d , ,  pp .  2876-81.
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S o c i a l i s t  motion c e n s u r in g  German r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y  were 
both  r e j e c t e d ;  and a motion of conf idence  in t h e  government 
was passed by 268 t o  49 .
The im pos i t ion  of s a n c t i o n s  on 8 March marked t h e
end of d i r e c t  c a b i n e t - l e v e l  r e p a r a t i o n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a r i s i n g
out of t h e  A l l i e d  i n v i t a t i o n  of 22 June 1919» In "the next
seven weeks t h e  German government made s e v e r a l  a t t e m p t s  t o
o b ta in  i m p a r t i a l  a r b i t r a t i o n  of  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  and
a l s o  n e g o t i a t e d  w i th  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission as t h a t  body
proceeded w i th  t h e  t a s k  a l l o t t e d  t o  i t  by t h e  t r e a t y  of
f i x i n g  Germany's t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y  b e f o r e  1 May 1921.  F a i l u r e
t o  s e c u re  an a r b i t r a t o r  and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  a t  i t s  d e a l in g s
wi th  t h e  R ep a ra t io n  Commission encouraged t h e  German government
t o  a t t e m p t ,  on 24 A p r i l ,  t o  renew d i r e c t  r e p a r a t i o n  n e g o t i a t i o n s
th rough  t h e  good o f f i c e s  of t h e  P r e s i d e n t  of t h e  United S t a t e s ,
However, a l l  hopes of f r e s h  n e g o t i a t i o n s  were s h a t t e r e d  when,
on 28 A p r i l ,  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission communicated t o  t h e
German government i t s  d e c i s i o n  t h a t  Germany's r e p a r a t i o n  debt
should be f ix e d  a t  132 b i l l i o n  gold marks.
The German ques t  f o r  an i m p a r t i a l  a r b i t r a t o r  began
with a p r o t e s t  on 10 March t o  t h e  Counci l  of t h e  League of
2N at ions  a g a i n s t  t h e  A l l i e d  s a n c t i o n s ,  * Uhen t h i s  met with  no 
r e s p o n s e  an appea l  was addressed  on 23 March t o  t h e  United  
S t a t e s  government This  appea l  was, however, framed only in
1 .  i b i d . ,  pp .  2882-3.
2.  A,J«Toynbee,  op, c i t . ,  p .  17*
3 .  i b i d . ,  p .  132.
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g e n e r a l  t e rm s  and i t  was not  u n t i l  20 A p r i l ,  a f t e r  an 
a t tem pt  t o  s e c u re  Fa p a l  m ed ia t ion  had m i s c a r r i e d  * t h a t  
P r e s id e n t  Harding was a c t u a l l y  i n v i t e d  t o  a r b i t r a t e .  In a 
n o te  of  22 A p r i l ,  Harding d e c l in e d  t h i s  i n v i t a t i o n  but 
o f f e r e d  t o  pass  on t o  t h e  A l l i e s  any German p ro p o sa ls  which 
he cons ide red  a r e a s o n a b le  b a s i s  f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n .  I t  was in 
r e sp o n se  t o  t h i s  o f f e r  t h a t  t h e  German government made i t s  
g e s t u r e  of t r a n s m i t t i n g  a new r e p a r a t i o n  p ro p o s a l  on 24 
A p r i l ,  But t h i s  p ro p o s a l  was brushed a s i d e  f i r s t  by t h e  
d e c i s i o n  of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission on 27 A p r i l  and 
s u b se q u en t ly  by a United  S t a t e s  Kote of 3 May which d e c l a r e d
t h a t  t h e  German scheme was not  an a c c e p ta b l e  b a s i s  f o r
2.
n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i th  t h e  A l l i e s ,
The n e g o t i a t i o n s  between th e  German government and 
t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission in  March and A p r i l  1921 a t t r a c t e d  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  a t t e n t i o n  because ,  w i th  t h e  approach of  1 May 
1921, and in t h e  absence  of any c a b i n e t - l e v e l  r e p a r a t i o n  
s e t t l e m e n t ,  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of t h e  Commission grew 
p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  g r e a t e r .  In t h e  course  of i t s  t a s k  of  
a s s e s s i n g  Germany'3  t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y  t h e  Commission had t o  
s e t t l e  t h e  s u b s i d i a r y  q u e s t i o n  of t h e  v a l u e  of Germany’s 
p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p a r a t i o n  payments under  A r t i c l e  235 of th e  
t r e a t y .  The d iv e rg e n ce  between A l l i e d  and German opinion 
on t h i s  s u b j e c t  had become n o t i c e a b l e  e a r l y  in 1921. The
1. Simons,  26 A p r i l  1921,  R e i c h s t a g , V o l ,  349» P* 3417»
2.  i b i d . ,  3 May 1921, V o l .  349, p.  3543.
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incomple te  summary of d e l i v e r i e s  submit ted  by Bergmann t o  
t h e  Spa Conference in J u l y  1920 had been supplemented by a 
German memorandum to  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission on 20 January
1921 which claimed t h a t  payments a l r e a d y  made amounted t o
1.
21 b i l l i o n  marks.  On 26 February  th e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission
r e p l i e d  t h a t  t h e  German f i g u r e  was an o v e re s t im a te  of 13
b i l l i o n  marks ,  and t h a t  an a d d i t i o n a l  payment of 12 b i l l i o n s
was t h e r e f o r e  n e c e ss a ry  b e f o r e  Germany had f u l f i l l e d  h e r  20
b i l l i o n  mark o b l i g a t i o n  under  A r t i c l e  235« Subsequent
n e g o t i a t i o n s  did l i t t l e  t o  c l o s e  t h e  gap between t h e s e
e s t i m a t e s .  Simons’ speech on 1 March a t  t h e  London Conference
made no r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  Commission’s v a l u a t i o n ;  and a German
Note of 14 March d i s p u te d  i t ,  A peremptory demand, by t h e
R e p a ra t io n  Commission on 15 March f o r  payment of t h e  o u t s t a n d in g
12 b i l l i o n s  ( t h e  f i r s t  b i l l i o n  by 23 March: t h e  remainder  t o
be r a i s e d  th rough  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  loan)  was ignored by t h e
German government.  A cco rd ing ly ,  on 24 March, t h e  R epa ra t ion
Commission d e c l a r e d  Germany t o  be in d e f a u l t  in r e s p e c t  of he r
o b l i g a t i o n s  under  A r t i c l e  235« However, s i n c e  both  the  demand
and t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n  w'ere in tended  l a r g e l y  as a b e l a t e d
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  im p o s i t io n  of s a n c t i o n s  on 8 March, t h e y
did not lead to  any p o s i t i v e  a c t i o n .  On 16 April  th e  Reparation
Commission made t h e  more r e a l i s t i c  demand t h a t  t h e  R e ich sb an k ’s
gold and s i l v e r  r e s e r v e s  s h o u ld ,  on pain of t h e i r  c o n f i s c a t i o n ,
1. The f o l l o w in g  account  of n e g o t i a t i o n s  about  A r t i c l e  235 
i s  drawn from: R .C. .  V, p p .14-23« See a l s o ,  A.J.Toynbee,
op. c i t , ,  p p , 137-^0 .
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be t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  R e ich sb an k ’ s branches  a t  Cologne and 
Coblenz.  On 22 A p r i l  t h e  German government r e fu s e d  t h i s  
r e q u e s t  bu t  o f f e red  in s te a d  t h a t  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission’s 
c o n t r o l  over t h e  expor t  of gold from Germany^’should be 
pro longed  from 1 May t o  1 October 1921. ’ Th i s  concess ion  
did  no t  s a t i s f y  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission, which on 25 A p r i l  
r e v e r t e d  t o  i t s  e a r l i e r  demand f o r  a prompt payment of one 
b i l l i o n  marks -  t h i s  t im e  b e f o r e  30 A p r i l  1921.  The German 
government was ready  in p r i n c i p l e  t o  comply with  t h i s  more 
l i m i t e d  r e q u e s t  and s t a t e d  t h a t  an o f f e r  of an immediate 
payment of one b i l l i o n  marks was p a r t  of t h e  scheme which i t  
had t r a n s m i t t e d  t o  P r e s id e n t  Harding on 24 A p r i l .  However, 
t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission could brook no f u r t h e r  d e l a y ,  and 
on 3 May i t  announced t h a t  Germany was in d e f a u l t  in  r e s p e c t  
bo th  of t h e  immediate payment which had been d e m a n d e d  of he r  
and of a f u r t h e r  sum of 11 b i l l i o n  marks.  But t h i s  d e c l a r a t i o n  
of d e f a u l t ,  l i k e  t h a t  of 24 March, was regarded  by t h e  
R e p a ra t io n  Commission more as  a formal  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
d i s c i p l i n a r y  measures t h a n  as a p r e lu d e  t o  an a t tem p t  t o  
c o l l e c t  t h e  sums o u t s t a n d i n g .  The u l t ima tum which was t r a n s ­
m i t te d  t o  Germany on 5 May wi th  t h e  London Schedule of Payments 
advanced t h e  d e f a u l t  under  A r t i c l e  235 as a reason  f o r  t h e  
t h r e a t  of f u r t h e r  s a n c t i o n s :  but  i t  sugges ted  no way of
remedying t h i s  d e f a u l t .  Moreover,  a l though  a demand f o r  t h e
1. Under A r t i c l e  248 of  t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y ,
2.  A law t o  t h i s  e f f e c t  was passed on 28 A p r i l :  R e i c h s t a g .
V o l .  3^9,  PP. 3461-2.
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payment of one b i l l i o n  gold marks w i t h i n  25 days was inc luded  
in t h e  London Schedu le ,  no e x p l i c i t  r e f e r e n c e  was made in t h i s  
con tex t  t o  A r t i c l e  235« S ince  t h e  m a t t e r  was n ev e r  r a i s e d  
s u b s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  f i n a n c i a l  outcome of t h e  d i s p u t e  
over t h e  v a l u e  of Germany’s p r e l i m i n a r y  payments was n e g l i g i b l e .  
But such f r i c t i o n  between t h e  R ep a ra t io n  Commission and t h e  
German Cabinet  must have had an u n d e s i r a b l e  e f f e c t  on German 
o p in io n .
More i l l - f e e l i n g  was ge n e ra te d  between t h e  German 
government and t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission in March and A p r i l  
by t h e  manner in which t h e  l a t t e r  co n su l t ed  t h e  fo rmer  when 
i t  was a d j u d i c a t i n g  on t h e  c la im s  f o r  r e p a r a t i o n  which had 
been subm it ted  t o  i t . " *  The h i t h e r t o  l e i s u r e l y  work of t h e  
Commission in t h i s  sphere  had been i n t e n s i f i e d  from t h e  end 
of  January  1921 when i t  had become c l e a r  t h a t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
over a lump sum s e t t l e m e n t  were u n l i k e l y  t o  succee d .  This  meant 
t h a t  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  e s t i m a t i n g  Germany's t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y  
b e f o r e  1 May 1921,  in acco rdance  w i th  A r t i c l e  233 of t h e  t r e a t y ,  
would devo lve  upon t h e  Commission. Thus a d e a d l i n e  f o r  t h e  
submiss ion of c la im s  was s e t  a t  12 F eb rua ry ,  and t h o s e  which 
had been r ece iv ed  t o  t h a t  d a t e  were r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  German War 
Burdens Commission (K r iegs la s tenkom m iss ion )  f o r  i t s  c r i t i c i s m .  
Subsequen t ly  an o p p o r tu n i ty  was g iven  t o  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of  
t h e  German government t o  p r e s e n t  t h e i r  c a s e  t o  t h e  R epa ra t ion  
Commission. These h e a r in g s  were completed on 12 A p r i l ,  b u t ,
1. The remainder  of t h i s  parag raph  i s  based on R.C . , V, p p .3 1 -4 .
a l though  t h e y  had extended over 90 h o u r s ,  t h e  head of t h e  
German d e l e g a t i o n  (Ruppel)  complained t h a t  t h e y  had been 
i n a d e q u a te .  Thus ,  on 22 A p r i l  1921, t h e  German government 
fo rm a l ly  denied  t h a t  i t  had been accorded t h e  " j u s t  
o p p o r tu n i ty  t o  be hea rd"  which i t  had been promised in 
A r t i c l e  233*
I t  was a g a i n s t  t h i s  background of f a i l u r e  t o  s ecu re  
i m p a r t i a l  a r b i t r a t i o n  and growing d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i th  t h e  
b ehav iou r  of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission t h a t  t h e  German 
g o v e r n m e n t s  p roposa l  of 24 A p r i l  should be v iewed.  I t  
seemed l i k e l y  t h a t  a r e p a r a t i o n  scheme was about  t o  be 
imposed upon Germany by a body over which t h e  German govern­
ment had l i t t l e  i n f l u e n c e  and which i t  had l i t t l e  cause t o  
t r u s t .  Moreover,  s i n c e  t h i s  scheme would almost c e r t a i n l y  
be beyond Germany's c a p a c i t y  i t  would lead i n e v i t a b l y  t o  t h e  
im p o s i t io n  of  s a n c t i o n s .  In t h e s e  c i rcum stances  t h e r e  seemed 
t o  be every  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  a d e s p e r a t e  l a s t  e f f o r t  t o  
ach i e v e  a r e p a r a t i o n  s e t t l e m e n t  th rough  c a b i n e t - l e v e l  
n e g o t i a t  i o n s .
The German p ro p o s a l  was something more t h a n  a 
h a s t y  a t tem p t  t o  s t a l l  o f f  a d e c i s i o n  by t h e  R ep a ra t io n  
Commission. I t  a l s o  expressed  a new d e s i r e  t o  convince  A l l i e d  
and n e u t r a l  op in ion  of t h e  s i n c e r i t y  of Germany's d e s i r e  t o  
pay as  much r e p a r a t i o n  as she p o s s ib ly  c ou ld .  "The government 
Simons d e c l a r e d  t o  t h e  R e i c h s t a g ,  " i s  of t h e  op in ion  t h a t  in 
f o rm u la t in g  t h i s  p ro p o s a l  i t  should go t h e  l i m i t  of Germany's
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c a p a c i t y  t o  pay r e p a r a t i o n .  This  i s  n e c e s s a ry  because  our 
pas t  e s t i m a t e s  of our f i n a n c i a l  and economic p o s i t i o n  have 
u n f o r t u n a t e l y  an tagon ised  almost  everybody in t h e  w or ld .  As 
f a r  as  we can g a t h e r ,  i t  i s  t h e  v e r d i c t  of world opin ion t h a t  
Germany i s  u n d e r e s t i m a t in g  h e r  c a p a c i t y . S i m o n s ’ concern  
about  Germany’s r e p u t a t i o n  abroad seems t o  have been f i r s t  
a roused  d u r ing  h i s  v i s i t s  t o  S wi tze r land  and o the r  n e u t r a l  
c o u n t r i e s  in March and A p r i l .  I t  had been sharpened by t h e  
apparen t  imminence of s a n c t i o n s  a t  t h e  end of A p r i l .  Germany's 
moral  p o s i t i o n  would be c o n s id e r a b ly  weakened in  t h e  event  
of p u n i t i v e  measures by t h e  A l l i e s  i f  i t  was g e n e r a l l y  
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  she had been seek ing  t o  evade h e r  o b l i g a t  ions  • 
The German o f f e r  would be worth  making i f  i t  did  any th ing  t o  
remove t h e s e  c o n v i c t i o n s  even though ,  as  Simons p r e d i c t e d ,  i t  
might not  be accepted  by t h e  A l l i e s . J *
The German d e s i r e  t o  appease  A l l i e d  and n e u t r a l  
op in ion  was r e f l e c t e d  in t h e  form taken  by t h e  new o f f e r .  In 
t h e  c o u n te rp ro p o s a l s  which i t  had made a t  London, t h e  German 
d e l e g a t i o n  had been concerned only t o  e s t a b l i s h  a maximum 
f i g u r e  which ,  in i t s  p r e s e n t  s t a t e ,  Germany could be s u re  of 
pay ing .  Th is  had accounted  f o r  t h e  lowness of t h e  f i g u r e s  
mentioned and f o r  t h e  omiss ion  of any scheme f o r  a d j u s t i n g
4 #
payments t o  any f u t u r e  improvement of th e  German economy.
1. R e i c h s t a g . 22 A p r i l  1921,  V o l .  349» p.  3376•
2.  Simons, 26 A p r i l  1921,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  349» P« 3418.
3.  i b i d . ,  p.  3423.
4 .  Simons,  12 March 1921,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  3 4 9 , p .  2843.
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By c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  German p ro p o s a l  of 24 A p r i l  did  not name a 
f ix e d  sum. Ins tead  i t  sugges ted  a f l e x i b l e  scheme of 
a n n u i t i e s  which would v a ry  in accordance with  t h e  amount 
which could be r a i s e d  by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  loan and a l s o  in 
accordance  w i th  Germany’ s p r o s p e r i t y . ^ *  The c o n t r a s t  wi th 
t h e  London p roposa l  was he igh tened  by t h e  optimism i m p l i c i t  
in  t h e  scheme conce rn ing  Germany's c a p a c i t y  t o  pay,  above 
a l l  in r e s p e c t  of t h a t  p a r t  of t h e  a n n u i t i e s  which would not 
be covered by l o a n s .  Simons even admitted  t o  t h e  R e ichs tag  
t h a t  t h e  Cabinet  did not  ye t  know how t h i s  money was t o  be 
r a i s e d .  " I t  was in f a c t , "  he d e c l a r e d ,  "something of a l e ap  in 
t h e  d a r k ,  and t h e  C a b i n e t ' s  d e c i s i o n  t o  make t h i s  l e a p  was
2.
governed more by p o l i t i c a l  th a n  by t e c h n i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . "  
Another example of t h i s  p o l i t i c a l l y - i n d u c e d  optimism was t o  be 
found in  t h e  assumption t h a t  i t  would be p o s s i b l e  t o  r a i s e
•5
f o r e i g n  loans  a t  4 ^ , " " F u r t h e r  ev idence  of a g e n e r a l  d e s i r e  t o  
p l a c a t e  A l l i e d  opin ion were t h e  p ro p o s a l  f o r  r e c o n s t r u c t i n g  
t h e  d e v a s t a t e d  a r e a s  ( p a r a .  V) and t h e  o f f e r  of one b i l l i o n  
gold marks in f i n a l  s e t t l e m e n t  of Germany's o b l i g a t i o n s  under  
A r t i c l e  235 ( p a r a .  V I I ) . 1 234 *
There a r e  some i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  new p o l i c y  embodied 
in t h e  German o f f e r  of 24 A p r i l  was an i n s i n c e r e  re sponse  t o  
t h e  t a c t i c a l  demands of t h e  moment. In th e  d e b a t e  in th e
1. Faras  I I  t o  IV of t h e  German o f f e r :  Simons,  26 A p r i l  1921,
i b i d . ,  V o l .  3^9,  PP. 3^15,  3420.
2.  i b i d . ,  p .  34-20.
3 .  Cf. t h e  c r i t i c i s m  of F rö l ich (V K P ) , 27 A p r i l  1921,  i b i d , ,  
V o l .  349, p .  3452 .
4 .  Simons,  26 A p r i l  1921,  i b i d . ,  V ol ,  3^99 P* 34-21,
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R e i c h s t a g  on 27 A p r i l ,  R i e s s e r  (DVP), t h e  spokesman fo r  t h e  
government p a r t i e s ,  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e  o f f e r  had been made 
only b ecause  of Germany's h o p e l e s s  p o s i t i o n .  I t  had been 
s o l e l y  in o rd e r  t o  a v e r t  f r e s h  use  of f o r c e  by t h e  A l l i e s  
t h a t  t h e  government p a r t i e s  had "with a heavy h e a r t ,  but  in 
f u l l  c o n s c io u s n es s  of t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y "  approved t h e  
ap p e a l  t o  P r e s id e n t  H a r d i n g . H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  ap o lo g ia  was 
p robab ly  des igned  l a r g e l y  t o  b lun t  t h e  a t t a c k s  of t h e  r i g h t -  
wing o p p o s i t i o n ,  which was in no doubt t h a t  t h e  German o f f e r  
was t h e  product  of a genu ine  p o l i c y  of " e x c e s s iv e  s e l f - d e n i a l "  
( S e l b s t ü b e r b i e t  e n ) ; t h a t  i t  involved  im poss ib le  sums; and 
t h a t  i t  would b r in g  about i n t o l e r a b l e  i n f r i n g e m e n t s  of German 
economic s o v e r e i g n t y .  * More im press ive  ev idence of t h e  
p o s s i b l e  i n s i n c e r i t y  of t h e  government ' s  o f f e r  was t h e  
s c e p t i c i s m  which was vo iced  by t h e  Left o p p o s i t i o n  g roups .
Coming as t h e y  did a f t e r  weeks of de lay  in seek ing  a s e t t l e m e n t ,  
t h e  governm en t ' s  p ro p o s a l s  were condemned on t h e  grounds t h a t  
t h e y  r e p r e s e n t e d  an i n c o n s i s t e n t  c a p i t u l a t i o n  t o  th e  t h r e a t  of 
f o r c e .  The im p l i c a t i o n s  of t h i s  p o l i c y ,  in p a r t i c u l a r  t h e
n e c e s s i t y  f o r  a programme of i n t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  r e fo rm ,  had
3.
n o t ,  i t  was complained,  been r e a l i s t i c a l l y  th ough t  o u t .  Such 
an i r r e s p o n s i b l e  p o l i c y  was tan tamount t o  "a game of chance 
w i th  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  German people" .^*
IT i b i d . ,  27 A p r i l ’ 1921 , V o l .  3* 2349,  p.  3425.
2.  H e l f f e r i c h  (DNVF), i b i d . ,  pp.  3437-9.
3.  B r e i t s c h e i d  (USFD), i b i d , ,  p.3445;  F r ö l i c h  (VKF), i b i d . ,  
p .  3^52.
4.  i b i d . ,  pp.  3450,  3452.  N,B, The M a jo r i ty  S o c i a l i s t s  gave
u n c r i t i c a l  suppor t  t o  t h e  government ' s  o f f e r :  Mülle r  (SPD),
i b i d . ,  p .  3426-32 .
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But ,  d e s p i t e  t h e s e  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  b e l a t e d  German 
o f f e r  of 24 A p r i l  was made l a r g e l y  f o r  s h o r t - s i g h t e d  t a c t i c a l  
r easons  and t h a t  i t  was i m p r a c t i c a b l e ,  im por tan t  members of t h e  
government approved of t h e  o f f e r  both on lo n g - t e rm  p o l i t i c a l  
grounds and because  t h e y  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  i t  need not  i n e v i t a b l y  
lead t o  f i n a n c i a l  and economic d i s a s t e r .  On 27 A p r i l ,  Stresemann 
s t a t e d  in t h e  R e ic h s ta g  t h a t  i t  was im poss ib le  t o  p r e d i c t  whether  
or not  t h e  German p ro p o s a ls  were r e a l i s t i c  because  so much 
depended on p s y c h o lo g i c a l  f a c t o r s .  * He went on t o  s t r e s s  t h a t  
t h e  p r o p o s a l s  were p o l i t i c a l l y  d e s i r a b l e  not  only f o r  t h e  s h o r t ­
te rm  purpose of keep ing n e g o t i a t i o n s  a l i v e  but  a l s o  because  t h e y  
r e p r e s e n t e d  a s t e p  towards  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  of Europe.  A f t e r  r e p e a t i n g  h i s  c o n v i c t i o n ,  
which he had p r e v io u s l y  expressed  on 5 March, t h a t  such 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  was i n e v i t a b l e ,  Stresemann prophes ied  t h a t  i t  
would be achieved not only th rough  government a c t i o n  but a l s o  
th rough  t h e  c o - o p e r a t i o n  of t h e  l e a d e r s  of c a p i t a l  and labou r  
of each c o u n t ry .  I t  was, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  th o ro u g h l y  f e a s i b l e  t h a t  
economic l e a d e r s  of F rance  and Germany such as Loucheur,
S chne ide r - C r e u s o t , S t i n n e s  and o th e r s  should come t o g e t h e r  t o
2 .
d i s c u s s  t h e i r  common economic problems.
That  Stresemann,  who r e p r e s e n t e d  t h e  r ig h t - w i n g  of t h e  
government c o a l i t i o n ,  should have suppor ted  in  such a p o s i t i v e  
manner a German r e p a r a t i o n  p ro p o s a l  which went much f u r t h e r  th a n  
any p rev ious  German o f f e r  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  were i n f l u e n t i a l
\
1. i b i d . ,  p.  3468.
2.  i b i d . ,  pp .  3468-9
218
elements  w i t h i n  Germany which favoured  an a t tempt t o  c lo se  
t h e  widen ing  r i f t  between t h e  A l l i ed  and German p o s i t i o n s  on 
t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  i s s u e .  D e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  o f f e r  of 24 
A p r i l  was ignored  by t h e  A l l i e s ,  t h i s  group a s s e r t e d  i t s  
i n f l u e n c e  in Germany in t h e  next  few months,  and made a 
s t r i k i n g  but  u n s u c c e s s f u l  b id  t o  r e s o lv e  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  problem. 
The emergence of t h e  " f u l f i l m e n t "  group in German 
p o l i t i c s  a t  t h e  end of A p r i l  emphasises t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  of t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  impact of g e n e r a l  r e p a r a t i o n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  in th e  
per iod  up t o  1 May 1921.  I t  has  been seen how t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  
q u e s t i o n  had not become an impor tan t  i s s u e  in German p o l i t i c s  
u n t i l  l a t e  in  1920, l a r g e l y  because  of t h e  r e l u c t a n c e  of both 
s i d e s  (ev inced  at  Spa) t o  e n t e r  i n t o  formal  n e g o t i a t i o n s  which 
might g iv e  o f fe n c e  t o  t h e i r  e l e c t o r a t e s  and might lead  t o  
d ip lo m a t ic  r u p t u r e .  Once i t  had been agreed t o  begin 
p r e l i m i n a r y  f a c t - f i n d i n g  d i s c u s s i o n s  a t  B r u s s e l s ,  t h e  impact of 
t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  problem had become more marked.  There had been 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  pessimism about Germany's e x i s t i n g  and f u t u r e  
r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s  in  t h e  budget  d eba te s  of October and 
November 1920.  The l i m i t e d  te rm s  of r e f e r e n c e  of t h e  B ru sse l s  
Conference ,  when i t  e v e n t u a l l y  met in December 1920, had f o r  
t h e  t im e  be ing  preven ted  an open r i f t  between Germany and t h e  
A l l i e s  on t h e  d e l i c a t e  q u e s t i o n  of Germany's c a p a c i t y  t o  pay.  
There had ,  in f a c t ,  been some agreement on s u b s i d i a r y  i s s u e s  
amongst t h e  B ru s s e l s  e x p e r t s ;  and i t  had even seemed t h a t  
subsequen t  d i s c u s s i o n s  in  Janua ry  1921 would y i e ld  a temporary
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s e t t l e m e n t ,  which would enab le  t h e  p o l i t i c a l l y  e x p l o s i v e
i s s u e  of Germany’ s t o t a l  l i a b i l i t y  t o  be she lved  u n t i l  t h e
p o l i t i c a l  and economic s t a t e  of Europe was more s e t t l e d .
But t h e  r e l u c t a n c e  of t h e  German government t o  agree  t o  a
temporary  s e t t l e m e n t  and t h e  d e s p e r a t e  need of t h e  French
Cabinet  f o r  a d ip lo m a t ic  t r ium ph  had r e s u l t e d  in t h e  Supreme
C o u n c i l ' s  a dop t ion  of t h e  d i s a s t r o u s  P a r i s  R e s o lu t io n s  on
28 Janua ry  1921.  This  had caused t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  t o
be removed from t h e  hands of f i n a n c i a l  e x p e r t s  and t h r u s t
i n t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a ,  where i t  had remained from th e n  on.
But a l th o u g h  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  now dominated German
p o l i t i c s ,  i t  did  not produce a un i fo rm ly  u n fav o u rab le  r e a c t i o n
in  t h e  R e i c h s t a g . I n  f a c t ,  in t h e  per iod  b e f o r e  1 May 1921,
t h e  r e s p o n s e  of t h e  German government t o  developments had been
t o  a l t e r n a t e  between two c o n f l i c t i n g  forms of p o l i c y .  I t s
r e p l y  t o  t h e  P a r i s  R e s o lu t io n s  in  January  and t o  t h e  im pos i t ion
of s a n c t i o n s  in March had been t o  stand f i rm  a g a i n s t  t h e  A l l i e s
and t o  a p p ea se  outraged domest ic  op in ion .  The m a n i f e s t a t i o n s
of t h i s  p o l i c y  had been t h e  co u n te rp ro p o sa l s  which had been
p resen te d  a t  t h e  London Conference and t h e  d e lay  in re -o p en in g
r e p a r a t i o n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i th  t h e  A l l i e s  in March and Apri l*
However, t h e s e  measures had aroused  antagonism and s u s p i c io n
abroad which had s e r i o u s l y  weakened Germany's d ip lo m a t ic
p o s i t i o n .  Thus on two occas ions  t h e  German government had,
1. Nor ,  t o  judge  from t h e  r e l a t i v e  s t a b i l i t y  of t h e  mark in 
t h e  e a r l y  months of 1921, did  i t  cause any n o t i c e a b l e  f a l l  
in  f o r e i g n  con f idence  in  Germany.
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w i th  t h e  a p p ro v a l  of t h e  R e i c h s t a g ,  adopted  t h e  r e v e r s e  p o l i c y  
of making c o n c i l i a t o r y  p r o p o s a l s .  Both in  t h e  l a t e r  s tag es  
of t h e  London Conference and in t h e  l a s t  week of A p r i l  1921 
t h e  dominant  f e e l i n g  in t h e  R e ic h s ta g  was t h a t  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  
problem could bes t  be re s o lv ed  by c o - o p e r a t i n g  w i th  t h e  A l l i e s  
and by r e a s s u r i n g  t h e  world of Germany's good f a i t h .  Thus,  
a l though  r e p a r a t i o n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  undoubted ly  had an u n f o r t u n a t e  
p s y c h o lo g i c a l  e f f e c t  on German f i n a n c i a l  p o l i t i c s  in  October-  
November 1920 and in February  1921, t h e i r  impact could w e l l  
have been s a l u t a r y  a t  v a r io u s  t im es  from Karch 1921 onwards.
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SECTION V
GERMAN ÜCMI.5TIC AND FOREIGN FINANCIAL FCLICY BEFORE FAY 1921
During t h e  war y e a r s  t h e  German government had not been 
s u c c e s s f u l  in  abso rb ing  t h e  inc re ased  purchas ing  power r e l e a s e d  
in t h e  community by l a r g e  p u b l i c  e x p e n d i tu r e  and by a l i b e r a l  
and cheap p r i v a t e  c r e d i t  p o l i c y .  I t  had a l s o  been unable  t o  
p reven t  t h e  growth of Germany’ s e x t e r n a l  f l o a t i n g  d e b t .  Only 
t h e  a r t i f i c i a l l y  r e s t r a i n e d  w ar - t im e  domestic  demand f o r  goods 
had p reven ted  s e v e re  i n t e r n a l  i n f l a t i o n ;  and temporary  
p s y c h o lo g i c a l  f a c t o r s  such as  t h e  hope of v i c t o r y  had been t h e  
s o le  bulwark a g a i n s t  s u b s t a n t i a l  e x t e r n a l  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  
mark. In t h e  f i r s t  t h i r t y  months of peace ,  domest ic  government 
e x p e n d i tu r e s  had remained h igh  and t h e  ba lance  of t r a d e  had 
continued  t o  be u n fa v o u r a b l e .  Moreover,  t h e  German government,  
w h i le  m a in t a i n in g  a p o l i c y  of cheap p r i v a t e  c r e d i t ,  proved t o  
be even l e s s  capab le  t h a n  d u r in g  t h e  war of a b s o rb in g  t h e  
excess  pu rch as in g  power of t h e  German pub l i c  and of c o n s o l i d a t i n g  
t h e  mark h o ld i n g s  and balances  of f o r e i g n  c r e d i t o r s .  With t h e  
removal  of w ar - t im e  r e s t r a i n t s  on domestic  demand and with  t h e  
spread of t h e  f i n a n c i a l  pessimism induced by d e f e a t ,  r e v o l u t i o n  
and t h e  peace t e r m s ,  v i o l e n t  p r i c e  i n f l a t i o n  and e x t e r n a l  
d e p r e c i a t i o n  were i n e v i t a b l e .
Many con tem pora r ie s  blamed t h e  h igh  l e v e l  of government 
ex p e n d i tu re  and t h e  e x t e n t  of t h e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  f o r  Germany’s 
pos t-war  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t a b i l i t y .  Although t h i s  was in  a sense  
a v a l i d  o b s e r v a t i o n ,  t h e s e  phenomena were not t h e  r e s u l t  of  a
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r a d i c a l l y  m is taken  government f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y .  On t h e  
c o n t r a r y ,  in  view of t h e  economic d i s l o c a t i o n  which p r e v a i l e d  
t h e  o u t l a y  of t h e  government was e i t h e r  s o c i a l l y  o r ,  on c e r t a i n  
a s s u m p t io n s ,  economica lly  j u s t i f i a b l e ;  and t h e  import s u rp lu s  
was t o  a l a r g e  e x ten t  u n a v o i d a b le .  The inadequacy of t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c i e s  of pos t -w ar  German governments l a y  in 
e i t h e r  t h e  absence  or t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  n e c e s s a ry  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  
measures f i r s t l y  t o  i n c r e a s e  r e g u l a r  p u b l i c  r e v e n u e s ,  secondly  
t o  p r e s e rv e  domestic  p u b l i c  c r e d i t  and t h i r d l y  t o  ob ta in  
f o r e i g n  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e .  As a r e s u l t  of t h e s e  om iss ions ,  
t h e  excess  pu rchas ing  power of t h e  German community was not  
absorbed by economica lly  and s o c i a l l y  r a t i o n a l  government 
a c t i o n  but  by economica lly  d i s t o r t i n g  and s o c i a l l y  r u t h l e s s  
p r i c e  i n f l a t i o n .  A f u r t h e r  consequence was t h a t  t h e  c la ims 
of  f o r e i g n  c r e d i t o r s  on Germany were not c o n s o l i d a t e d  on a 
lo n g - t e rm  b a s i s  but  were r a p i d l y  wiped out by i n d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  
exchange d e p r e c i a t i o n .
In t h e  per iod  b e f o r e  Kay 1921 t h e  i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of 
German domest ic  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  was due l a r g e l y  t o  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and l e g i s l a t i v e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  which were t h e  
legacy  of t h e  war and t h e  a f t e r m a t h .  R e p a ra t io n  d e l i v e r i e s  
and n e g o t i a t i o n s  c e r t a i n l y  added t o  t h e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  by 
d e c r e a s i n g  t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  of c e r t a i n  Germans t o  pay t a x e s  
and t o  lend t o  t h e  government.  But t h e  impor tance  of t h e  
r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  in t h i s  r e s p e c t  must not  be e x a g g e ra te d ,  
s in c e  t h e  m a j o r i t y  of t h e  p a r t i e s  in t h e  R e ic h s ta g  approved
223
of t h e  idea  of  " f u l f i l m e n t "  f o r  most of t h e  pe r io d  b e f o r e  
May 1921.^* In so f a r  as  t h e  success  of German domestic  
f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  was a f f e c t e d  by p o l i t i c a l  and p s y c h o lo g i c a l  
f a c t o r s  i t  was in f a c t  i n f lu e n c e d  f a r  l e s s  by t h e  impact of 
t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  t h a n  by t h e  c l eavages  of opin ion 
which had been n o t i c e a b l e  in t h e  war and pre-war  p e r i o d ,  over 
economic,  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s  of a p u re ly  domestic  
k i n d .
The f a i l u r e  of Germany's domestic  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  
was a l s o  caused by t h e  s t e a d y  e x t e r n a l  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of  t h e  
mark which u p se t  a l l  a t t e m p t s  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  r e a l  va lue  of 
p u b l i c  revenues  and t o  f l o a t  domest ic  loans  in t h e  per iod 
b e f o r e  May 1921.  This  d e p r e c i a t i o n  was caused in t h e  l a s t  
a n a l y s i s  by t h e  p e r s i s t  ent German t r a d e  d e f i c i t  and by t h e  
exodus of c a p i t a l  from Germany a f t e r  t h e  war .  The r e p a r a t i o n  
problem aggrava ted  s h o r t - t e r m  exchange i n s t a b i l i t y  by 
encouraging  s p e c u l a t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  mark.  I t  could a l s o  have 
been p a r t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  long- te r ra  d e p r e c i a t i o n ,  not  only 
th rough  i t s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  but  a l s o  by 
provoking c a p i t a l  f l i g h t  and by r educ ing  Germany's chances of  
o b ta in in g  t h e  l a r g e - s c a l e  f o r e i g n  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  which 
was n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  permanent r e s t o r a t i o n  of h e r  e x t e r n a l  
f i n a n c e s .  However, c a p i t a l  f l i g h t  was caused by a complex s e t  
of p s y c h o lo g i c a l  f a c t o r s .  Moreover,  s u b s t a n t i a l  f o r e ig n  
a s s i s t a n c e  would only have become a v a i l a b l e  i f  t h e  United
1. See above ,  S ec t ion  IV » passim
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government had been p repa red  t o  j o i n  in g u a r a n t e e in g  a loan 
of  German o r i g i n .  Although t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  he lped  t o  
d i s c o u r a g e  t h e  American a u t h o r i t i e s  from t a k i n g  t h i s  cou r se  
of a c t i o n ,  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  w i thd raw a l  of t h e  U nited  S t a t e s  
government from Europe was, l i k e  i t s  d ip lo m a t ic  c o u n t e r p a r t ,  
l a r g e l y  t h e  r e s u l t  of p u r e ly  domestic developments  over which 
e ven t s  in Europe had v e r y  l i t t l e  i n f l u e n c e .  I t  was because  
of t h e s e  domestic  deve lopments ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  b ecause  of  t h e  
r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n ,  t h a t  t h e  l e v e l  of mark exchange and t h e  
success  or f a i l u r e  of t h e  e f f o r t s  of t h e  German government t o  
a c h i e v e  domest ic  f i n a n c i a l  reform came t o  depend h e a v i l y  on 
t h e  buying  and s e l l i n g  of t h e  mark by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s p e c u l a t o r s .
Befo re  t h e  middle  of  1919 t h e r e  was l i t t l e  p ro g re s s  
tow ards  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  c u r r e n t  r e v e n u e .  The 
programme which was in t roduced  by Scheidemann t o  t h e  newly 
convened N a t i o n a l  Assembly on 13 Feb ruary  1919 r e f e r r e d  in 
g e n e r a l  te rm s  t o  t a x e s  on income and war p r o f i t s  and a l s o  
t o  t a x e s  on p ro p e r ty  which were in tended  to  reduce  t h e  p u b l i c  
d e b t .^ *  However, n e i t h e r  in F inance  M i n i s t e r  S c h i f f e r ' s  
Memorandum of 12 March 1919 which f o r e c a s t  s h a r p l y  in c re a s e d
o r d in a r y  (as  opposed t o  e x t r a o r d i n a r y )  e x p e n d i tu r e s  in t h e
2.
coming y e a r ,  *nor in t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly’s d e b a t e s  on
1. N a t i o n a l v erSammlung. V o l .  326,  p. 45.
2.  i b i d . ,  V o l .  335, Anl.  158.
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r  ! •supplements t o  the  budget fo r  I 9I 0- I 9 and on th e  budget
2 .
fo r  1919-20 * did any s p e c i f i c  tax  proposals emerge* The only  
f i s c a l  measure 'which was carr ied  through at t h i s  time was an 
amendment which d iverted  th e  y ie ld  of th e  War Tax of 1916 
from i t s  o r ig in a l  purpose of reducing th e  German war debt 
t o  th a t  of covering th e  d e f i c i t s  in th e  ordinary budget in  
th e  la s t  th r e e  years of th e  war.-"*
The German governm ents  in a b i l i t y  t o  introduce new 
ta x e s  in a prompt manner went hand in hand w ith  i t s  ta r d in e s s  in 
c re a t in g  adequate f i s c a l  machinery and in preventing  tax  
evas ion . The o b sta c le  t o  immediate o r g a n is a t io n a l  reforms 
was that th e  new c o n s t i t u t io n ,  which was to  provide the le g a l  
b a s is  for  an increase  in f e d e r a l  f i s c a l  powers, was not adopted 
u n t i l  Ju ly  1919» It was th e r e fo r e  understandable t h a t ,  although  
fundamental changes in f i s c a l  machinery were foreshadowed in
4
th e  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  d eb a tes ,  no a c tu a l measures were introduced.  
There was l e s s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  the fa c t  that th e  various  
budget d e b a te s ,  although providing th e  occas ion  for  c r i t i c i s m  
of tax  evaders, y ie lded  no immediate remedial l e g i s la t io n ," *
It was not u n t i l  June th a t  th e  law of 26 Ju ly  1918 against tax  
evasion was made more e f f e c t i v e  through an amendment o b lig in g
7  ^ 27 March 1919, ibid . ,  V o l .  327, p p .827-627
2. S c h i f f e r ,  9 A pril 1919, i b i d . ,  V o l.  327 , p p .904-12.
3. 11 A pril 1919, i b i d . ,  V o l .  327, p. 988.
4. On th e  concentration  of f i s c a l  powers in th e  hands of th e
fe d e r a l  government envisaged by A r t ic l e s  8 and 80-5 of th e  
draft c o n s t i tu t io n :  F reuss ,  24 February 1919, i b i d , ,
V o l .  326, p. 287.
5 .  S c h i f f e r ,  15 February 1919, i b i d . ,  V o l .  326 , p. 97;
9 A pril 1919, i b i d . ,  V o l ,  327, pp. 909-10 .
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banks t o  rev e a l  d e t a i l s  of a l l  d ep o s its  made with them s in ce
1.
th e  outbreak of war.
The main reason , apart from th e  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  f a c to r ,  
for the  f i s c a l  in e r t ia  of th e s e  months was th e  lack of 
l e g i s l a t i v e  t im e. The tax  proposals which were even tu a lly  
introduced by Erzberger in Ju ly  1919 had been drafted in th e  
f i r s t  h a lf  of 1919 when S c h if f e r  (November 1918 t o  A pril 1919)
2 .
and Dernburg (A pril 1919 t o  June 1919) were Finance M in is te r s ,  
But both the P ro v is io n a l Government and th e  Scheidemann cabinet  
had been preoccupied in t h is  period with th e  rudimentary ta sk s  
of r e - e s t a b l i s h in g  law and order, d ra ft in g  th e  Weimar 
c o n s t i tu t io n  and p a r t ic ip a t in g  in a rm is t ic e  and peace 
n e g o t ia t io n s .  This had made i t  im possib le  fo r  them t o  find  
tim e t o  in troduce p o t e n t ia l ly  c o n tro v er s ia l  f i s c a l  l e g i s l a t i o n . “" 
The delay in th e  in troduction  of tax  reforms was a ls o  
encouraged by the p e r s is t e n c e  of war-time a t t i tu d e s  to  
f in a n c ia l  p o l ic y .  During th e  course of th e  war th ere  had been 
in c r e a s in g ly  widespread acceptance of "nominalist" monetary 
th eo ry ,  which emphasised th e  lack of r e la t io n  between th e
quantity  and the  va lu e  of money and stressed  th e  p a s s iv i ty  of
4.
th e  process of c r e d it  c r e a t io n .  The r e l a t i v e  s t a b i l i t y  of  
both in te r n a l  p r ic e s  and th e  ex tern a l va lu e  of th e  mark during  
a period of huge government expenditures and rapid p rivate
77 i b i d . ,  23 June 1919, V o l.  327, pp. 1144-7.
2. K. E p s te in ,  Matthias .Erzberger and th e  Dilemma of German 
Democracy. p. 338•
3. Cf. S c h i f f e r ,  on th e  lack of l e g i s l a t i v e  tim e in A pril 1919s 
8 July  1919, N ationa 1versammlung. V o l .  327, P. 1395«
4. See above, pp. 12-15.
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c r e d i t  expansion had prov ided  apparen t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  t h e  
views of ex treme i n f l a t i o n i s t s  such as F r i e d r i c h  Bendixen,
K ar l  E l s t e r ,  and Rudolf  D a lb e rg ,  whose w r i t i n g s  enjoyed g r e a t
1.
p o p u l a r i t y  in t h e  war and pos t -w ar  y e a r s .  As a r e s u l t ,  t h e r e  
was l i t t l e  awareness  in t h e  e a r l y  pos t -w ar  y e a r s  of t h e  dangers
of t h e  p re s en ce  of l a r g e  amounts of excess p u rch as in g  power in
2 .
t h e  community, According t o  S chach t ,  who was r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  s t a b i l i s i n g  t h e  mark in 1923, t h i s  lack  of  awareness was 
f u r t h e r  encouraged a f t e r  t h e  war by "a number of l e ad in g  
German econom is ts ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h o s e  concerned w i th  i n d u s t r y ,  
(who) regarded  i n f l a t i o n  as t h e  bes t  means of escap ing  from 
t h e  economic consequences  of t h e  war,  and cons ide red  t h a t , 
e s p e c i a l l y  in  t h e  wages q u e s t i o n s ,  which had become urgen t  
th ro u g h  t h e  reduced p r o d u c t i v i t y  of labour  and t h e  g e n e r a l  
i n c r e a s e  in c o s t s  of p r o d u c t i o n ,  t h i s  expedient  o f f e r e d  t h e  
s im p le s t  solut ion"," '* The p re v a l e n c e  of views of t h i s  s o r t  was
t o  p reven t  t h e  d i s c o u n t  r a t e  of t h e  Reichsbank from being
4.
r a i s e d  above 3% u n t i l  J u l y  1922.  I t  could a l s o  have s lackened 
t h e  i n i t i a l  impetus t o  f i s c a l  re form in  t h e  e a r l y  pos t -w ar  
p e r i o d •
Such f i n a n c i a l  d i s c u s s i o n  as t h e r e  was in  t h e  N a t i o n a l  
Assembly b e f o r e  t h e  middle  of 1919 c e r t a i n l y  r e v e a le d  an
1. H.3 . E l l i s ,  German Monetary Theory,  1905-3^« p p .4 0 -1 ,  l8 0 .
2.  C, B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op.  c i t . ,  pp.42-3»
3. K. S chach t ,  ’’The D iscount  P o l i c y  of t h e  R e ichsbank" ,  MGCRE« 
7 December 1922,  p .  689*
4.  i b i d , ,  p ,  69O, Schacht  r e c o r d s  t h a t  h i s  advocacy of a 
Fore ign  Exchange Commission in  January  1920 won him "no 
p o p u l a r i t y " ,  i b i d .
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igno rance  of t h e  f i s c a l  needs  of t h e  government which was 
bo rne  e i t h e r  of  p re o c c u p a t io n s  in o th e r  d i r e c t i o n s  or e l s e  
of w ar- induced  i n f l a t i o n a r y  a t t i t u d e s  of  t h e  ty p e  which have 
been d e s c r i b e d .  Soon a f t e r  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly had met,  
S c h i f f e r ,  t h e  F inance  M i n i s t e r ,  spoke c r i t i c a l l y  of t h e  
p r e v a l e n c e  of " n o m i n a l i s t i c ” ideas  du r ing  t h e  war and complained
t h a t  t h e  h e e d l e s s  f i n a n c i a l  optimism of t h e  war y e a r s  s t i l l
1.
p re v a i l e d  amongst broad s e c t i o n s  of t h e  German p eo p le .  His 
a s s e r t i o n  was j u s t i f i e d  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  no group in t h e  
N a t i o n a l  Assembly except  t h e  Independent  S o c i a l i s t s  p r o t e s t e d
a t  t h e  governm en t ' s  d e l a y  in b r in g i n g  down d e t a i l e d  f i s c a l
2 .
l e g i s l a t i o n ,  * Even S c h i f f er*s Memorandum of 12 March re c e iv e d  
l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  from t h e  Assembly^*and t h e  s peakers  in  t h e  
budget  d e b a t e  on 10 A p r i l  were s u r p r i s i n g l y  unaware of t h e  
g r a v i t y  of  Germany's f i n a n c i a l  problems.  The M a jo r i ty  
S o c i a l i s t ,  Hoch, was s u f f i c i e n t l y  i l l - i n f o r m e d  t o  advoca te  t h a t
t h e  budget  f o r  1919-20 should be based on t h e  l e v e l  of
4.
government e x p e n d i tu r e  and income in  1913* The N a t i o n a l i s t ,  
S c h u l t z ,  a l s o  revea led  incomprehension by d e c l a r i n g  t h a t  
S c h i f f e r * s e s t i m a t e  of  19 b i l l i o n  marks f o r  t h e  ex p e n d i tu re  of  
t h e  f e d e r a l  and s t a t e  governments in t h e  coming year  was l i k e  
a " f a i r y  t a l e " . 1 2345 *
1. S c h i f f e r ,  15 February  1919> Nationalversammlung;. Vol.  326 
pp.  91,  9^.
2. Haase (USPD), 15 February  1919,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  3^6,  p. 100,
3.  See S c h i f f e r ' s  complaint  on t h i s  s u b j e c t :  i b i d . ,  9 A p r i l
1919, V o l .  327,  p.  904.
4.  i b i d . ,  10 A p r i l  1919, V o l .  327,  p p . 928-9.
5 .  i b i d . ,  p.  941.
229
In view of t h e  i n e r t i a  of t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly t h e r e  
was l i t t l e  cause  f o r  p r o t e s t  by t h o s e  groups  who opposed r a d i c a l  
f i s c a l  r e fo rm  e i t h e r  because  of t h e  t h r e a t  of r e p a r a t i o n  
payments or  f o r  domestic  r e a s o n s .  The only occas ion  f o r  a la rm 
among t h e s e  groups had been when, in t h e  course  of  December 1918 
and January  1919, S c h i f f e r  a i r e d  p roposa ls  f o r  t h e  immediate 
im p o s i t io n  of a c a p i t a l  ga ins  levy by t h e  p r o v i s i o n a l  governm en t . ”^ 
A r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of German i n d u s t r y  such as  Stresemann had 
o b je c ted  t o  t h i s  scheme b o th  because  i t  would d e p r iv e  i n d u s t r y  
of v i t a l l y  needed working c a p i t a l  and because  t h e  wealth d r a in e d  
o f f  i n t o  t h e  T rea su ry  would be p re sen te d  t o  t h e  E n te n te  "on a 
s i l v e r  p l a t t e r " .  * The p ro p o s a l  had a l s o  encountered o p p o s i t i o n  
on p a r t i c u l a r i s t  grounds from t h e  Finance  M i n i s t e r s  of Bavaria 
and Saxony who, i t  was l a t e r  a l l e g e d ,  had caused i t  t o  be 
she lved .^*  However, in succeed ing  months o p p o s i t i o n  of  t h i s  t y p e  
was not  r e a l l y  c a l l e d  f o r .  On 14 February  a spokesman for  t h e  
extreme Right c r i t i c i s e d  t h e  g e n e r a l  p lans  f o r  t a x e s  on income 
and c a p i t a l  con ta ined  in t h e  government’ s programme on t h e  grounds
4 #
of t h e  s h o r t a g e  of c r e d i t  in Germany. * A month l a t e r  t h e  same 
speaker  expressed  t h e  f e a r  t h a t  a c o n f i s c a t o r y  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  
would d i s l o c a t e  German economic l i f e  by d e s t r o y i n g  con f idence  in
5.
t h e  s e c u r i t y  of p r o p e r t y .  But in th e  absence of any s p e c i f i c
1. On 9 December 1918 S c h i f f e r  advocated t h e  p roc lam at ion  of 
new t a x e s  in  a speech t o  t h e  B e r l in  Chamber of Commerce, V .V • 
Badu lesco ,  Le Frelevement E x t r a o r d i n a i r e  sur  l e  C a p i t a l  dans 
1 ’Empire Al1emand. p .  277•
2. Stresemann t o  Bund der  I n d u s t r i e l l e n ,  30. January  1919»
N a c h l a s s , 6818/122927-31.
3.  K e i l  (SPD), 8 J u l y  1919» N a t iona lversammlung, V o l ,  327»p.l3&7.
4.  Posadowsky-lTehner (DNVFj, i b i d . ,  V o l .  328» p.  8 3 .
5 .  i b i d . ,  27 March 1919,  V o l .  327, PP* 836- 7 .
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government p r o p o s a l s ,  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  l e s s  extreme 
"bourgeois p a r t i e s  r e f r a i n e d  from making any o u t r i g h t  p r o t e s t .  
Becker of  t h e  F e o p le ’ s P a r ty  contented  h im s e l f  w i th  a demand 
t h a t  t h e  government’ s budget  p ro p o sa l s  should be r e f e r r e d  t o  
a committee;"1 2345'* and t h e  Democrat Fachnicke  r e s e rv e d  f i n a l  
judgment on t h e  government’ s p o l i c y  u n t i l  d e t a i l e d  t a x  p ro p o s a l s  
were made. * The p a r t i c u l a r i s t s , moreover,  do not  appear t o  
have  been alarmed unduly  by t h e  p ro v i s io n s  of t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  
( A r t i c l e s  8 and 80-5) Tor t h e  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  of t a x i n g  power 
in t h e  hands of t h e  f e d e r a l  government.  During t h e  second 
r e a d i n g  of t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  in J u ly  a member of t h e  Bavarian 
P e o p l e ’ s P a r ty  did complain a t  t h e  f i s c a l  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  
envisaged in A r t i c l e  8 . J * However, no excep t ion  3eems to  have 
been t a k e n  t o  t h e  i n s i s t e n c e  of Preuss  t h a t ,  in t h e  e x i s t i n g
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e  of Germany, r e c o g n i t i o n  of t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of
4.
f i s c a l  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  was i n e v i t a b l e .  Th is  acqu ie scence  was 
no doubt due t o  t h e  e x p l i c i t  a s s u ra n c e  of A r t i c l e  8 t h a t  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  v i a b i l i t y  of t h e  s t a t e s  would be p rese rved  by t h e  
f e d e r a l  government. '  *
I t  cannot  be denied t h a t  t h e  German government was 
s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  views of t h e  v a r io u s  groups which opposed 
r a d i c a l  f i s c a l  r e fo rm .  On 15 February  S c h i f f e r  had as su red  t h e
N a t i o n a l  Assembly t h a t  f u t u r e  t a x  l e g i s l a t i o n  would t a k e  account
1 . i b i d . ,  p .  855«
2. i b i d . ,  p.  840.
3 . Heim (Bay.  VP) ,  3 J u l y  1919, i b i d . ,  V ol .  327,  p. 1241.
4.  i b i d . ,  p.  1244.
5 .  Of. F r e u s s ’ a s s u ra n c e  on t h i s  s u b j e c t :  i b i d . ,  24 February  
1919, V o l .  326, p .  287.
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of t h e  needs  both of t h e  s t a t e s  and of German i n d u s t r y .  He 
added t h a t  Germany’ s a b i l i t y  t o  reform h e r  f i n a n c e s  depended 
upon t h e  modera t ion  of  t h e  A l l i e s  as w e l l  a s  upon he r  own 
e f f o r t s . ^ *  But in h i s  budget  speech of 9 A p r i l ,  S c h i f f e r  
i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  i t  wa3 not  concern  f o r  t h e  s t a t e s  or f o r  
i n d u s t r y  or f e a r  of A l l i e d  p o l i c y  which had caused t h e  f i s c a l  
i n a c t i v i t y  of t h e  government .  He f o r e c a s t  b l u n t l y  t h a t  both  
d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  t a x e s  would have t o  be e x p l o i t e d  and t h a t  
t h e  f e d e r a l  government would be obliged  t o  t a k e  f i s c a l  
p recedence  over t h e  s t a t e s ,  Moreover,  a l though  he emphasised 
aga in  t h e  need fo r  t h e  A l l i e s  t o  r e s t r a i n  t h e i r  demands upon 
Germany, he did not  express  d i s t r u s t  f o r  t h e  E n te n te  in t h e  
same way as Stresemann had done in  J a n u a r y , 1"* This  i n d i c a t e s  
t h a t ,  a l though  t h e  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  of t h e  German government in 
t h e  f i r s t  e igh t  months of  peace  was a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  
p r o p e r t i e d  c l a s s e s ,  t o  p a r t i c u l a r i s t s and t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  who 
d i s t r u s t e d  t h e  i n t e n t i o n s  of t h e  A l l i e s , t h i s  was l a r g e l y  
because  of l e g i s l a t i v e  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  which 
a r o s e  out of t h e  d i s o r d e r e d  and t r a n s i t i o n a l  s t a t e  of German 
s o c i e t y .
The f a i l u r e  of t h e  German government t o  f l o a t  domestic  
loans  in  t h e  f i r s t  e ig h t  months of peace must a l s o  be expla ined  
in t e rm s  of  t h e  g e n e r a l  pos t-war  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  upheava l  
in  Germany, Obvious f a c t o r s  which d es t royed  t h e  domestic  
c r e d i t  of t h e  government were d e f e a t ,  which removed t h e  p a t r i o t i c
1.  i b i d . ,  V o l .  326,  p.  97.
2.  i b i d . ,  V o l .  327,  p p . 910-11
232
motive fo r  subscr ib ing  t o  public loans; s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  
u n r e s t ,  which made th e  propertied  c la s s e s  u n w ill in g  to  part 
with t h e ir  w ealth; and th e  f a l l i n g  va lu e  of th e  mark, which 
made investment in f ixed  in t e r e s t  s e c u r i t i e s  a f in a n c ia l  r i s k .
The e x i s t e n c e  of powerful m otives such as th ese  and th e  
prevalence of in f la t io n a r y  c r e d i t  th e o r ie s  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to
exjjlain  th e  complete c e s s a t io n  of long-term lend ing t o  th e
1.
government by th e  German people in t h i s  per iod . The threat  
of reparation  payments cou ld , at th e  most, have been only a 
supplementary reason for  th e  evaporation of th e  government’ s 
c r e d i t ,
The e f f o r t s  of th e  German government t o  dea l with i t s  
ex ter n a l  f in a n c ia l  problems were as in e f f e c t u a l  as i t s  in te r n a l  
f in a n c ia l  p o l ic y  in th e  f i r s t  eight months of peace. L i t t l e  
could be done to  remedy immediately the  b asic  economic and 
p sy ch o lo g ica l  fa c to r s  which were resp o n s ib le  for the trade  
d e f i c i t  and th e  export of c a p i t a l .  But, t o  make matters worse,  
attempts at imposing c o n tr o ls  were h a lf-hearted  and u n su c c e ss fu l .
It i s  t r u e  th a t  a system of import l i c e n s in g  had been in
2,
operation s in c e  January 1917* There were, moreover, sev era l  
attempts t o  improve th e  e f f i c i e n c y  of exchange c o n tr o ls .  An
Order of 21 November 1918 prohibited  th e  consignment of
1 , The only a c t io n  taken by mid-1919  t o  r e s to r e  th e  government’ s
cre d it  was th e  formation in June of th e  R eichsan le ihe-A ktien -  
G e s e l l s c h a f t , a banking combination designed to  support th e  
p rice  of government bonds through buying operations: See
C, R is t ,  Les Finances de Geurre de 1 ’Allemagne. p, 252*
2, J.W.F, T h e lw a ll ,  "General Report o n . . . .Germany in December, 
1920", l o c .  c i t . ,  p. 8 , No attempt was made t o  con tro l  
e i th e r  th e  p r ic e  or th e  volume of exports u n t i l  December 1919*
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s e c u r i t i e s  abroad except  th rough  t h e  medium of banks and in
accordance  w i th  f ix e d  p r o c e d u r e s ; w h i l e  a P roc lam at ion  of
15 January  1919 and an Order of 1 March 1919 in c re a s e d  th e
w ar - t im e  powers of t h e  German government t o  a p p r o p r i a t e
f o r e i g n  s e c u r i t i e s  held by German c i t i z e n s  and t o  prevent
t h e  s a l e  of  German s e c u r i t i e s  ab road .  * However, from t h e
end of 1918 i n d i v i d u a l s  who wished t o  expor t  c a p i t a l  or t o
r e t a i n  f o r e i g n  b i l l s  which t h e y  had earned were,  in  p r a c t i c e ,
■3 #
a b l e  t o  f in d  ways and means of doing so .  * The government ' s  
d i s t a s t e  f o r  c o n t r o l s  and i t s  r e c o g n i t i o n  of t h e  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  
of e n fo rc in g  them were r e f l e c t e d  in t h e  temporary removal 
of a l l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  upon impor ts  and upon t h e  expor t  of
4 .c a p i t a l  when t h e  A l l i e d  b lockade  was l i f t e d  in J u l y  1919*
In view of h e r  payments and t r a d e  d e f i c i t ,  which 
were l i k e l y  t o  co n t in u e  f o r  some t im e  and which could not be 
remedied by c o n t r o l s ,  Germany's only means of eas ing  h e r  
e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  was t o  ob ta in  f o r e i g n  a s s i s t a n c e .  
Here a g a i n ,  however,  t h e  German government was a t  t h e  mercy 
of f o r c e s  which i t  could not  i n f l u e n c e .  The A l l i e s  had been 
u n w i l l i n g  t o  f i n a n c e  German food imports  du r ing  t h e  A rm is t i ce  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  in February  and March 1919» *and a l l  hope of an
1. R e i c h s g e s e t z b l a t t « 1918, p .  1325*
2. For an account  of t h e s e  measures a g a i n s t  c a p i t a l  f l i g h t :  
Hampe (DNVP), 16 August 1919» Na t iona lve rsa m m lung . V ol .  
329, P. 2507.
3 . F.  U rb ig ,  "The P r a c t i c a b i l i t y  of Exchange C o n t r o l " ,  MGCRE. 
20 A p r i l  1922, p.  30 . See a l s o  S c h i f f e r ,  8 J u l y  1919» 
N at iona lversam mlung . V o l .  327» PP« 1395-6.
4. Hampe (DNVP), 16 August 1919» i b i d . ,  V ol .  329,  p . 2507.
5 .  See above,  pp.  84 -5 .
2 3 4 .
American-backed lo n g - te rm  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  loan had d i sappea red  
a f t e r  Wilson had r e j e c t e d  Keynes’ "Scheme f o r  t h e  R e h a b i l i t a t i o n
of European C red i t  and f o r  F inanc ing  R e l i e f  and R e c o n s t ru c t io n "
1.
e a r l y  in  May. Although t h e  d e s i r e  f o r  r e p a r a t i o n  determined 
t h e  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  A l l i e s  on t h e  former o c c a s i o n ,  i t  has  been 
seen t h a t  p re o c c u p a t io n s  of a p u re ly  domes t ic  n a t u r e  were,  t o  a 
l a r g e  e x t e n t ,  t o  blame f o r  W i lson ’ s f a t a l  d e c i s i o n  t o  d i v e s t  t h e  
United  S t a t e s  of any o f f i c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  German and 
European f i n a n c e s .
From t h e  middle of 1919 u n t i l  t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n  of t h e  
N a t i o n a l  Assembly in May 1920,  t h e  German government made a 
conce r ted  e f f o r t  t o  i n c r e a s e  pub l ic  revenue  th ro u g h  t h e  
im p o s i t io n  of  new t a x e s ,  th rough  measures t o  p reven t  t a x  
evas ion  and th ro u g h  a fundamenta l  r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  of t h e  German 
f i s c a l  sys tem.  I t  a l s o  endeavoured t o  resume lo n g - t e rm  
borrowing from t h e  German p u b l i c  by f l o a t i n g  a Premium Loan.
At t h e  same t ime s e r io u s  a t t e n t i o n  was g iven  t o  Germany’s 
e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  problems.  In an e f f o r t  t o  improve t h e  
b a lan ce  of t r a d e ,  a system of expor t  l i c e n s i n g  was in t roduced  
and an a d j u s t a b l e  expor t  levy  was imposed t o  p rev en t  German 
goods from being  sold abroad a t  unnecessar i ly  low p r i c e s .
Measures were a l s o  dev i sed  in  o rder  t o  c oun te r  t h e  f l i g h t  of  
c a p i t a l ,  and f o r e i g n  c r e d i t s  and loans  con t inued  t o  be sough t .
The v i s i b l e  r e s u l t s  of t h i s  in c re a s e d  a c t i v i t y  were 
d i s a p p o i n t i n g .  In b r i e f ,  w h i le  e x p e n d i tu r e s  remained h igh ,
1. See above ,  pp.  97-101
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p u b l ic  revenue  d e c l in e d  r a t h e r  th a n  in c re a sed  and , as a 
r e s u l t  of t h e  com para tive  f a i l u r e  of th e  Fremium Loan, t h e
f l o a t i n g  deb t  of  t h e  f e d e r a l  government con t inued  t o  r i s e
1.
r a p i d l y ,  v i z ,
Ipcome E x p en d itu re In c re a s e  in T o ta l
F lo a t in g  Debt F lo a t in g  Debt
( m i l l i o n ( m i l l io n ( m i l l io n ( b i l l i o n
gold marks) gold m arks) gold m arks) paper marks)
1212
June 299-7 1 ,2 1 2 ,6 914.0 73.4
J u ly 3 2 0 .2 1 ,063-7 7 4 3 .5 7 6 ,1
Aug 2 5 6 .5 947.8 691.4 78.2
Sep 2 0 7 .8 635.3 426.0 8 0 ,6
Oct 242.6 66O .5 417.9 8 3 .3
Nov 140.3 418.8 2 7 8 .5 85.2
Dec 136-5 232.4 95.2 86.4
1220
Jan 116.4 239.2 122.5 8 8 .3
Feb 73-8 1 0 5 .9 31 .8 8 9 .0
Mar 1 2 8 .8 2 5 7 .8 129.2 9 1 .6
Apr 5 2 .0 307.9 247.8 9 5 .1
May 102.2 6 9 4 .8 584.5 1 0 1 .6
June 193-5 1 ,4 4 1 .6 1 ,2 4 0 .0 113.2
F u r th e rm o re ,  t h e  new f e d e r a l  f i s c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  took a 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  t im e  t o  become e f f i c i e n t  and f i s c a l  m o r a l i t y  
became, i f  a n y t h i n g ,  more l a x .
The i n e f f i c a c y  of t h e  government ' s  i n t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  
reforms was p a r a l l e l e d  by t h e  f a i l u r e  of i t s  a t t e m p t s  t o  
r e g u l a t e  Germany's e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c e s .  The p h y s i c a l  c o n t r o l  
of impor ts  and expo r t s  was not  at tempted  a t  a l l  f o r  s e v e r a l  
months a f t e r  t h e  l i f t i n g  of t h e  A l l i e d  b lockade  in  J u ly  1919; 
and when e f f o r t s  were made t o  impose con t ro l s  t h e s e  were u n d e r ­
mined by a c o n s i d e r a b l e  amount of smuggling,  e s p e c i a l l y  th ro u g h  
t h e  "Hole in t h e  West” which was c r ea ted  by A l l i e d  Occupied
1. Source of f i g u r e s :  C, B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op, c i t . ,  pp .437 ,
439.
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Territory, Meanwhile price control of exports, which was 
instituted late in 1919» was made difficult by the fluctuation 
of the mark exchange rate. Thus the balance of trade 
continued to deteriorate in response to prevailing economic 
pressures. The payments problem thus created was not eased 
by any effective check on capital flight; nor was Germany 
able to obtain any foreign financial assistance except for a 
few limited Dutch, Scandinavian and American credits.
Germany’s domestic financial history in this period 
can, like that of the first half of 1919» be explained largely 
in terms of factors which were either beyond the control of 
the German government or were administrative rather than 
political in character. The most obvious of these factors 
was the rapid depreciation of the mark in the autumn and winter 
of 1919-20 which caused a spectacular reduction of real public 
revenue. This depreciation was not due to any important 
extent to the reparation question. It was caused primarily
by the huge excess of German imports over exports in the second
1.
half of 1919 after the lifting of the Allied blockade. A 
further cause was the export from Germany of substantial amounts 
of capital. This was made possible at first by the complete 
absence - and later by the comparative laxity - of exchange 
controls and it was provoked by a complex of psychological
2 .
influences, of which the reparation question was only one.
In any case, the importance of the depreciation as an influence
1. See above, pp. 37-8.
2. See below,pp.266-9.
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on t h e  s i z e  of  p u b l i c  revenues  was d iminished  by t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  between December 1919 and March 1920 r e a l  e x p e n d i tu r e s  
d e c l in e d  commensura te ly , and a l s o  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  d o l l a r  
r a t e ,  which had r i s e n  from 23 a t  t h e  end of September 1919 t o
over 100 a t  t h e  b e g inn ing  of February  1920, had d e c l in ed  t o
1.
37 hy t h e  end of May 1920.
More s e r i o u s  th a n  t h e  r e d u c t io n  of r e a l  revenues  in
t h e  months of v i o l e n t  d e p r e c i a t i o n  was t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e s e
revenues  t o  r i s e  when t h e  mark recovered in A p r i l  and May. One
obvious r ea son  f o r  t h i s  was t h e  d i s r u p t i o n  caused by t h e  Kapp
p
Putsch  and i t s  a f t e rm a t h  in March and A p r i l . " *  A more 
fundamenta l  ex p la n a t io n  i s  t o  be found in t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  which were encountered  both in s e t t i n g  up t h e  
new f e d e r a l  f i s c a l  machinery and a l s o  in t h e  assessmen t and 
c o l l e c t i o n  of new f e d e r a l  t a x e s  on p ro p e r ty  and income.
R efe re nce  had been made t o  t h e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in t h e  N a t i o n a l  
Assembly by bo th  government and non-government s p e a k e r s . T h e i r  
im por tance  was l a t e r  d e s c r ib e d  by Wirth  in  a s p e c i a l  memorandum 
which he drew up in October 1920.  The work of a s s e s s i n g  and 
l e v y in g  t a x e s  on b u s in e s s  and p ro p e r ty  had ,  he conc luded ,  been 
hampered by t h e  d i s t u r b a n c e  t o  e x i s t i n g  s t a t e  f i n a n c e  o f f i c e s  
caused by a b s o r p t i o n  in t h e  new f e d e r a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  There 
had ,  f u r t h e r m o r e ,  been c o n s id e r a b l e  t i m e - l a g s  between d e c l a r a t i o n ,  
assessment and c o l l e c t i o n  in t h e  ca se  of  newly-imposed d i r e c t
1. Die Entwicklung de r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p p . 12-13*
2.  K e i l  (SPD), 26 A p r i l  1920,  Nationalversammlung. V o l .  333 j
p.  5 ^6 0 .
3* Becker (DVP), 6 December 1919» i b i d . ,  Vol.  331,  P* 3987;
K e i l  (SPD), 26 A p r i l  1920,  i b i d . ,  V o l ,  333, p. 5459* •
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t a x e s .  As a r e s u l t ,  t h e  r e c e i p t s  from t h e s e  t a x e s  in t h e
months,  A p r i l - J u n e  1920,  had been only a t i n y  f r a c t i o n  of
J 1.
t h e  annua l  e s t im a te d  y i e l d ,  v i z ,
T a x Es t .A nnua l A c t u a 1 Y i e l d
Yie ld (pape r  marks)
( m i l l i o n A p r i l May, Sept  ember
paper mks)
Income Tax 12,000 31,994 540,914 44 ,440,763
C orpo ra t ion  Tax 900 - - -
Dividend Tax 1,300 3 , 031,578 12,501,146 12, 970,603
Reichsnot  opf er 3 ,500 719,420 4 ,308 ,242 176, 615,307
P r o p e r ty  Tax 100 683,124 692,165 1,417 ,587
I n h e r i t a n c e  Tax 620 4 , 696,797 7 , 420,969 8 ,462 ,833
S a le s  Tax 3,700 111 , 479,367 68 ,543 ,428 95,801,438
War Tax on
C a p i t a l  Gains 4 ,300 5 , 265,709 3 , 089,391 14,002 ,421
E x t r a o r d i n a r y
War Levy 1917 2,000 2 5 , 562,101 45,683 ,884 132 , 998,701
E x t r a o r d i n a r y
War Levy 1918 1,800
These f i g u r e s  make i t  c l e a r t h a t  t h e  imbalance of  t h e German
budget  in t h e  middle  of 1920 was due in l a r g e  p a r t  t o  t h e  
inadequacy of  German f i s c a l  machinery .
Although " e x t e r n a l 1’ and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  f a c t o r s  were 
such an im por tan t  cause  of t h e  low l e v e l  of  German pub l i c  
revenue b e f o r e  t h e  middle  of  1920,  t h e r e  were a l s o  p o l i t i c a l  
r ea s o n s  f o r  t h e  l i m i t e d  s uccess  of t h e  German g o v e r n m e n t s  
f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y .  P o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e s  may have been r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  r educ ing  t h e  s e v e r i t y  of  t h e  new t a x e s  which were imposed in
1. "D e n k sc h r i f t  über  den Stand de r  Veran lagung  und Erhebung 
d e r  R e ic h s s t e u e r n  ( u n t e r  Beschränkung auf  das  Gebiet  der  
B es i t z -und  V erk ehr s s t  e u e r n )" , 2 5 October 1920,  R e ichs tag ,« 
V o l ,  364,  Anl.  720 , For a case  h i s t o r y  of t h e  as sessment 
and c o l l e c t i o n  of one im por tan t  new t a x ,  t h e  R e i c h s n o t o p f e r , 
see V.V. Badulesco ,  Le Fr&L^vement E x t r a o r d i n a i r e  s u r  l e  
C a p i t a l  dans 1 ’Empire Allemand. pp.  451-8 ,
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t h i s  p e r io d ;  and t h e y  c e r t a i n l y  produced a p opu la r  r e a c t i o n  
a g a i n s t  t h e  t a x e s  v/hich hampered t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  e f f o r t s  t o  
c o u n t e r a c t  t a x  e v a s io n ,  t o  p reven t  th e  f l i g h t  of c a p i t a l ,  and 
t o  f l o a t  domest ic  l o a n s .
The r e p a r a t i o n  problem was p o t e n t i a l l y  a f a c t o r  which 
could e x e r c i s e  an im por tan t  i n f l u e n c e  upon t h e  German 
governm en t ' s  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  and upon t h e  r e a c t i o n  of t h e  
German p u b l i c  t o  t h a t  p o l i c y .  But b e f o r e  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly 
was d i s s o l v e d  in May 1920,  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  problem in  f a c t  
aroused  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  p o l i t i c a l  comment. The a t t e n t i o n  
of t h e  Assembly was absorbed in  r e s o l v i n g  t h e  domestic  
economic d i s l o c a t i o n ,  s o c i a l  t u r m o i l  and p o l i t i c a l  upheaval  
which had been caused by t h e  war and i t s  a f t e r m a t h .  I t  was 
t h e r e f o r e  t o  be expected t h a t  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  should be 
a f f e c t e d  l e s s  by d i f f e r e n c e s  of opin ion over t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  
q u e s t i o n  t h a n  by d i s p u t e s  over the  economic,  s o c i a l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  s e t t l e m e n t  which was t o  p r e v a i l  in pos t -w ar  Germany,
The p r e o c c u p a t io n s  of t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly were c l e a r  
when E rz b e rg e r  in t roduced  t h e  f i r s t  p a r t  of h i s  f i n a n c i a l  
re form programme e a r l y  in  J u l y  1919» The most im por tan t  of 
t h e  measures submit ted  t o  t h e  Assembly a t  t h i s  t im e  were an 
e x t r a o r d i n a r y  War Levy (K riegsabgabe)  and an e x t r a o r d i n a r y  
Levy on War-Time C a p i t a l  Gains (Kriegsabgabe vom Vermögens­
zuwachse) t h e  y i e ld  from which was o r i g i n a l l y  expec ted t o  
reduce  t h e  n a t i o n a l  debt  by 12 b i l l i o n  marks.  D r a f t s  of new 
permanent t a x e s  on i n h e r i t a n c e  and on land t r a n s f e r  were
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a l s o  in t ro d u ced  as  w e l l  as  r e v i s i o n s  of e x i s t i n g  im p o s i t io n s  
on e n t e r t a i n m e n t ,  s u g a r ,  f u e l  and o t h e r  commodit ie s .  I t  was 
hoped t h a t  t h e s e  and o t h e r  measures  would h e l p  t o  i n c r e a s e  
r e g u l a r  f e d e r a l  revenues  from t h e i r  1918 l e v e l  of about  9 
b i l l i o n s  t o  approx im ate ly  17^ b i l l i o n  marks a y e a r .  In 
j u s t i f y i n g  t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s ,  E rz b e rg e r  emphasised t h e  n e c e s s i t y  
of av o id in g  s t a t e  bank rup tcy ,  t h e  s o c i a l  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of an 
e q u i t a b l e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of Germany’ s f i n a n c i a l  b u rd e n ‘d* and 
t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  advan tages  t o  be d e r iv e d  from a c e n t r a l i s e d
O
f i s c a l  system.  He r e f e r r e d  t o  Germany's o b l i g a t i o n s  under  
t h e  t r e a t y  merely as an added i n c e n t i v e  f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  f e d e r a l  
f i n a n c i a l  s t r e n g t h .  * Although E rz b e rg e r  was c r i t i c i s e d  in t h e
ensuing d e b a t e  by h i s  C e n t r i s t  c o l l e a g u e ,  F arw ick ,  fo r  h i s
4.
lack  of s t r e s s  upon t h e  t r e a t y ,  t h e  concern  both  of t h e  
m a j o r i t y  who suppor ted  E r z b e r g e r ' s  p ro p o s a l s  and of  t h e  
m i n o r i t y  who opposed them was w i th  t h e i r  domest ic  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  
S i g n i f i c a n t  groups such as  t h e  DVP, which suppor ted  t h e  
governm en t ' s  programme only w i th  r e s e r v a t i o n s ,  and t h e  DNVP, 
which f l a t l y  opposed i t ,  were i n f lu e n c e d  almost  e x c l u s i v e l y  
by f e a r  fo r  t h e  working c a p i t a l  of i n d u s t r y ,  by a d e s i r e  t o  
p r o t e c t  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y ,  and by qualms about  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
v i a b i l i t y  of t h e  s t a t e s . ^ *  I t  was only in  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  of
1. "Gerech te  S teue rn  s t e l l e n  e ine  r a s c h e  w i rk en d e ,  
v o r z ü g l i c h e  S o z i a l i s i e r u n g  d a r . "
2. Nationalversammlung , 8 J u l y  1919» V o l .  327» PP* 1376, 1378,
1383.
3 .  i b i d . ,  p.  1378.
4.  Farwick (Zent rum),  8 J u l y  1919» i b i d . ,  p.  1391*
5 .  Posadowsky-Wehner (DNVP), 9 J u l y  1919» i b i d . ,  p p . 1426-33; 
Becker (DVP), i b i d . ,  p.  1458.
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a p r o j e c t e d  N a t io n a l  Emergency Levy t h a t  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  
demands of t h e  A l l i e s  were advanced as  a reason  f o r  opposing 
f i s c a l  r e fo rm .  On 9 J u l y  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t  spokesman,  Posadowsky- 
Wehner, warned t h e  Assembly t h a t  t h e  expec ted  80 t o  90 b i l l i o n
2 .
mark y i e l d  of t h e  R e ic h s n o to p fe r  could be se ized  by t h e  E n t e n t e ,
But t h i s  view was not  advanced by any o th e r  speaker  and i t s  
impact was d im in ished  by E r z b e r g e r ’s prompt a s s u ra n c e  t h a t ,  
b eca use  t h e  levy  would be c o l l e c t e d  over a per iod  of  between t h i r t y  
and f i f t y  y e a r s ,  i t  would be beyond t h e  g r a s p  of t h e  E n te n te . ^ *  
T he re  were f u r t h e r  d e b a t e s  in August when t h e  f i r s t  
ba tch  of t a x  p roposa l s  had emerged from committee.  Most of  t h e  
d i s c u s s i o n  cen t red  on a new group  of measures f o r  t h e  im pos i t ion  
of t h e  N a t i o n a l  Emergency Levy (R e ich sn o to p fe r ) and a S a l e s  Tax 
( U m s t a z s t e u e r ) , fo r  f l o a t i n g  a Premium Loan, and f o r  d e f i n i n g  
t h e  l e g a l  powers and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  f e d e r a l  
f i s c a l  a u t h o r i t y  (Reichsabgabenordnung) ,  The p re o c c u p a t io n s  of 
t h e  government and t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  cont inued  t o  be much t h e  same 
as in  J u l y .  In a f i n a n c i a l  memorandum which he p re s e n te d  t o  
t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly on 5 August ,  E rz b e rg e r  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  
budget  would remain p r o v i s i o n a l  u n t i l  t h e  re q u i re m e n t s  of t h e  
V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y  were more e x a c t l y  known. But d e s p i t e  t h i s  
u n c e r t a i n t y ,  a l l  p a r t i e s  from t h e  SPD t o  t h e  DVP con t inued  t o  
g iv e  t h e i r  g e n e r a l  suppor t  t o  t h e  government ' s  f i n a n c i a l  
programme and t h e  bou rgeo is  p a r t i e s  cont inued  t o  b ase  t h e i r
1, R e i c h s n o to p fe r . Th i s  measure was not  a c t u a l l y  in t roduced  
u n t i l  August 1919*
2 ,  i b i d . ,  pp .1431-2 .
3 ,  i b i d . ,  p.  1439.
1 .
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r e s e r v a t i o n s  on economic,  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
of a domes t ic  c h a r a c t e r .  In t h e  d eb a te  on t h e  second 
r e a d i n g  of t h e  v a r io u s  war l e v i e s  t h e r e  was a symptomatic 
c l a s h  between Lef t  and Right  over th e  q u e s t i o n  of  t a r i f f s  
and over p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  d e l a y s  in payment and exemptions ,
A M a jo r i ty  S o c i a l i s t  charge  t h a t  th e  p r o p e r t i e d  c l a s s e s  had 
been p r o t e c t i n g  t h e i r  v e s te d  i n t e r e s t s  by means of 
o b s t r u c t i o n  in committee was denied by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of 
bo th  t h e  Democra t ic  and P e o p l e ’s P a r t i e s ,  The spokesman of 
t h e  l a t t e r  g roup ,  R i e s s e r ,  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s ’ only
concern was t h a t  t h e  l e v i e s  w'ould not  p reven t  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n
1 .
and t h e  main tenance  of a h e a l t h y  Germany economy.
As in J u l y ,  i t  was mainly in d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  
R e i c h s n o to p f e r  t h a t  t h e r e  was any r e f e r e n c e  t o  A l l i e d  
r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y .  On 12 August ,  a f t e r  e x p r e s s in g  r e l u c t a n c e  
t o  d i s c u s s  such a t o p i c ,  E rzb e rg e r  gave a c a r e f u l  answer t o  
N a t i o n a l i s t  a l l e g a t i o n s  on t h i s  s u b j e c t .  I t  would n o t ,  he 
a s s e r t e d ,  be in  t h e  i n t e r e s t  of t h e  E n t e n t e  t o  s e i z e  t h e  
proceeds  of  t h e  Re ichsno t  opf e r  • Apart from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  
would o b ta in  n o th i n g  but  w o r th l e s s  p a p e r ,  such an a c t i o n  
would h i n d e r  Germany’s f i n a n c i a l  r e c o v e ry ,  in which t h e  A l l i e s  
had a s t a k e .  F u r the rm ore ,  such a s e i z u r e  would v i o l a t e  
German s o v e r e ig n t y  in a way which was i n c o n s i s t e n t  with  t h e
V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y  as i n t e r p r e t e d  by t h e  A l l i e s  in  t h e i r  Note
2 #
of 16 June  1919« * F i n a l l y ,  E rz b e rg e r  ob se rv ed ,  i f  f e a r  of
77 i b i d . ,  7 August 1919,  V o l .  329,  p .2246 .  Cf.  Fohlmar.n (DDF), 
pp. 2243-4 .
2 .  See above ,pp .  103-4,
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A l l i e d  p o l i c y  was a good reason  f o r  opposing t h e  Re ichs -
1.
n o t o p f e r ,  i t  was a good rea son  f o r  opposing a l l  t a x a t i o n .
E rz b e rg e r* s  a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  t h e  E n t e n t e  would be 
n e i t h e r  i n t e r e s t e d  nor  j u s t i f i e d  in  s e i z i n g  t h e  proceeds  of
t h e  R e i c h s n o to p f e r  was suppor ted  in  t h e  ensuing deba te  by
2 .
t h e  C e n t r i s t  Farwick .  Although Becker of  t h e  DVP conf ined  
h i m s e l f  t o  denying t h e  l e g a l  r i g h t  of t h e  A l l i e s  t o  t a k e  such 
a c t i o n ,  t h e r e  is  no i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  pessimism of t h e  
N a t i o n a l i s t s  a f f e c t e d  e i t h e r  t h e  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  Assembly 
t o  t h e  R e i c h s n o to p f e r  or  t h e  form of t h e  measure i t s e l f .  In 
any c a s e ,  bo th  on t h i s  and on l a t e r  o c c a s io n s ,  t h e  c r i t i c i s m s  
d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  Re ichsno t  opf er  by t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t s  l a i d  
as much emphasis upon t h e  u n d e s i r a b i l i t y  of s o c i a l i s m  and of  
f i n a n c i a l  b l o o d - l e t t i n g  as  t h e y  did  upon t h e  i n t e n t i o n s  of 
t h e  A l l i e s .
O ppos i t ion  t o  t h e  idea of paying r e p a r a t i o n  may have 
in c re a s e d  t h e  u n w i l l i n g n e s s  of t h e  German p u b l i c  t o  lend money 
t o  t h e  government a t  t h i s  t i m e .  On 18 August t h e  Assembly was 
asked t o  approve a c r e d i t  of 9 b i l l i o n  marks,  of which 2 
b i l l i o n s  were t o  meet e x p e n d i tu r e  occasioned by t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  
T r e a ty  and t h e  r e s t  t o  cover domestic  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  With a 
view t o  p r e v e n t in g  an i n c r e a s e  in t h e  f l o a t i n g  d e b t ,  i t  was
1. Nat iona lversam m lung . 12 August 1919, V o l .  329» p p . 2371-2.  
Cf. 13 August 1919> i b i d . ,  p,  2413. For N a t i o n a l i s t  v iews :  
Kraut  (DNVF), 13 August 1919, i b i d . ,  p .  2394; MUmm(DNVP),
14 August 1919> i b i d . ,  p.  2428.
2.  13 August 1919,  i b i d . ,  p .  2387.
3 .  Kraut (DNVP), i b i d . ,  p.  2394; Mumm (DNVP), 14 August 1919,  
i b i d . ,  p .  2428.
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proposed t o  i s s u e  a Fremium Loan t o  t h e  v a lu e  of t h e  c r e d i t .
In opposing t h e  c r e d i t  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t s  made much of t h e  f a c t
t h a t  i t  had been made n e c e s s a r y  by t h e  demands of  t h e  A l l i e s
which ,  t h e y  c la im e d ,  would prove t o  be l i m i t l e s s . ^ *  Although
E r z b e r g e r  was quick t o  po in t  out t h a t  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t s  had
d i s t o r t e d  t h e  te rms of t h e  t r e a t y  and t h a t  t h e  government’s
r e q u e s t  f o r  c r e d i t  had a r i s e n  l a r g e l y  because  of domestic  
2
e x p e n d i t u r e ,  £hese  a l l e g a t i o n s  could w e l l  have c o n t r i b u t e d
3.
t o  t h e  subsequen t  f a i l u r e  of t h e  Fremium Loan.
But t h e  main arguments which were used by t h e  Right  
a g a i n s t  bo th  th e  c r e d i t  and t h e  Premium Loan were of  a 
d i f f e r e n t  t y p e .  Hugenberg had advocated t h a t  t h e  c r e d i t  should 
be reduced from 9 ^ 0 8  b i l l i o n  marks,  not because  he opposed 
t h e  compensation of shipowners  and overseas  Germans who had 
been dep r ived  of t h e i r  p r o p e r ty  by t h e  E n t e n t e ,  bu t  as  a mark 
of h i s  g e n e r a l  d i s a p p r o v a l  of E r z b e r g e r ’s f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y .
He foresaw t h e  danger  t h a t  E rz b e rg e r  "who had l o s t  them t h e
war and bungled t h e  A rm is t i c e  would now d e s t r o y  t h e  n a t i o n ’s
4.
economy th rough  h i s  p o l i c y " .  The arguments of t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t s  
a g a i n s t  t h e  Fremium Loan w'ere mos t ly  in t h e  same g e n e r a l i s e d  
p e r s o n a l  and p a r t i s a n  v e i n .  Apart from e x p re s s in g  a p r e f e r e n c e  
on f i n a n c i a l  g rounds ,  f o r  a fo rced  loan  (Zwangsanleihe)  
c a r r y i n g  a low r a t e  of in te re s t , "^ *  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t s  a t t a c k e d
1. Hugenberg (DNVP), 29 August 1919» i b i d . ,  V o l .  329 9 p .2677 .
2.  i b i d . ,p p .  2679-81.
3 .  Cf. Haas (DDF), i b i d . ,  p.  2684; Wurm (USFD), i b i d . ,  p .2686,  
who s t r e s s e d  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of  c a r r y i n g  out l e v i e s ,  t h e  
proceeds  of which would go t o  t h e  E n t e n t e .
4.  i b i d , ,  p .  2675.
5.  i b i d . ,  p .  2676.
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th e  Premium Loan on th e  m ora l grounds th a t  i t  would 
s t im u la te  th e  gam bling  in s t in c t s  o f th e  German p e o p le . The 
e f f e c t  o f t h i s  s o r t  o f charge upon th e  success o f th e  loan  
was d e p lo re d  by E rz b e rg e r s e v e ra l months l a t e r . N o r  d id  
th e  N a t io n a l is t s  h e s i ta te  t o  l i n k  t h e i r  c r i t i c i s m  o f th e
Premium Loan w ith  th e  campaign o f p e rso n a l v i l i f i c a t i o n  w h ich
2.
th e y  were w aging a g a in s t E rz b e rg e r a t t h is  t im e .  ’ E a r ly  in  
December th e  Dem ocrat, D e rnbu rg , p ro te s te d  a t th e  e f f o r t s  
o f th e  R ig h t t o  sabotage th e  Premium Loan by dubb ing  i t  th e  
’’E rz b e rg e r L o a n ".- '*  I t  is  c le a r  th a t  th e  q u e s tio n  o f gove rn ­
ment b o rro w in g  had become en tang led  in  dom estic  p a r ty  p o l i t i c s .
The rem a in ing  measure o f im portance  d iscu ssed  in  
August was th e  F e d e ra l A d m in is t ra t iv e  O rd inance (R e ich s ­
abgabenordnung), w h ich  d e fin e d  th e  a d m in is t r a t iv e  and le g a l 
s t r u c tu re  o f th e  new fe d e ra l f i s c a l  o rg a n is a t io n .  Because o f 
th e  b u lk  o f t h is  measure -  i t  co n s is te d  o f 451 paragraphs -  
th e  s e c tio n  concerned, w ith  th e  e s ta b lis h m e n t o f new fe d e ra l 
ta x  o f f ic e s  was embodied in  a s e p a ra te  measure w h ich  became 
law on 10 Septem ber. * N e ith e r  in  th e  debate  ove r t h i s  
p re l im in a ry  b i l l  no r in  th e  d is c u s s io n  o f th e  re m a in in g  
paragraphs a t th e  end o f November 1919 was th e  s u b je c t o f 
A l l ie d  re p a ra t io n  p o l ic y  m e n tioned . The u nd e rs ta n d a b le
1. i b i d . ,  27 November 1919» V o l .  331» P» 3807*
2 . For H e l f f e r ic h 's  p ress  ons lau g h t on E rz b e rg e r from  J u ly  1919: 
K . E p s te in ,  M a tth ia s  E rz b e rg e r and th e  Dilemma o f German 
Democracy, p . 352.
3 . N a t io n a lv erSammlung. 5 December 1919» V o l.  331» P* 3882.
4 . Gesetz übe r d ie  R e ic h s fin a n z v e rw a ltu n g , R e ic h s te s e tz b la t t . 
1919, PP. 1591-1601.
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p re o c c u p a tio n  o f th e  N a t io n a l Assembly was w ith  such 
q u e s tio n s  as th e  r e la t iv e  advantages o f c e n t r a l is a t io n  and 
d e c e n t r a l is a t io n ,  th e  p ro pe r d is t r ib u t io n  o f f in a n c ia l  powers
between th e  fe d e ra l and s ta te  governm ents, and th e  c o m p a t ib i l i t y
1 .
o f v a r io u s  p ro v is io n s  w ith  th e  new ly-adop ted  c o n s t i t u t io n .  The 
November debates p ro v id e  f u r t h e r  evidence o f deep -sea ted  
o p p o s it io n  in  German s o c ie ty  to  th e  e f f o r t s  o f th e  governm ent 
t o  make i t s  f in a n c ia l  p o l ic y  r e a l ly  e f f e c t iv e .  There  was, in  
th e  f i r s t  p la c e , p re d ic ta b le  r ig h t -w in g  o p p o s it io n  t o  a 
p ro v is io n  w h ich  re q u ire d  n e x t - o f - k in  t o  d iv u lg e  d e t a i ls  o f th e  
e s ta te s  o f deceased persons (Paragraph 97)» and t o  a d i r e c t io n  
th a t  banks shou ld  be o b lig e d  to  re v e a l t h e i r  c l i e n t s ’ ba lances 
(P aragraph  1 8 9 ) .*  More s ig n i f ic a n t  s t i l l  was th e  deba te  over 
Paragraph 5» w hich sought t o  curb ta x  evasion  by p la c in g  le g a l 
r e s t r i c t io n s  on th e  manner o f co n d u c tin g  b us ine ss  t r a n s a c t io n s ,
■What was re v e a lin g  was n o t th e  s tro n g  o p p o s it io n  t o  t h i s
3 .
p ro v is io n  by a l l  p a r t ie s  w ith  b us iness  c o n n e c tio n s , b u t E rz b e rg e r ’ s 
de fence  o f i t  on th e  grounds th a t  in  th e  absence o f d e ta i le d  
le g is la t io n  th e  c o u r ts  tended t o  fa v o u r ta x  e va d e rs , * T h is  
suggests th a t  f in a n c ia l  re fo rm  was b e in g  hampered n o t o n ly  by 
entrenched l i b e r a l  com m ercia l e t h ic 9 but a ls o  by th e  a t t i t u d e  o f 
th e  ju d ic ia r y ,
1 . E rz b e rg e r ,  12 August 1919» N a tio n a lv  erSammlung, V o l ,  329»
pp. 2376-7 ; 19 August 1919, i b i d . ,  V o l .  329 , p p .2611-42;
22 November 1919» i b i d . ,  V o l .  331» PP* 3670-3700 .
2 . Kempkes(DVP), 22 November 1919» i b i d . ,  V o l .  331» p p .3681 -2 .
3 . E .g .  Ludewig (DDF), p . 3684; Hugenberg (DNVP), p p ,3688- 9 .
4 . i b i d . ,  pp . 3690-1 .
247
In October ,  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly became absorbed 
in t h e  long-overdue  d e b a t e s  over t h e  budget  f o r  1919- 20.
The government es t im a ted  o rd in a ry  e x p e n d i tu r e  f o r  t h e  y e a r  
a t  15 ,3  b i l l i o n  marks and e x t r a o r d in a r y  d i sbu rsem en ts  a t  
41 .3  b i l l i o n s .  Th is  was an improvement on t h e  budget  f o r  
1918 in which t h e  f i g u r e s  were 9 and 70 b i l l i o n s  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
O rd inary  revenue  f o r  1919-20 was es t imated  a t  13.2  b i l l i o n s  
(of  which 9 b i l l i o n s  were t o  be d e r iv e d  from new t a x e s )  as
o 1.compared w i th  a 1918 f i g u r e  of about 9 b i l l i o n s .  In view
of t h e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  gap which s t i l l  remained between c u r r e n t
revenue  and t o t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  i t  was p r e d i c t e d  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c
d e b t ,  which had stood  a t  156 b i l l i o n  marks on 31 March 1919
2
would be 212 b i l l i o n  marks on 31 March 1920.
S in ce  17 of  t h e  41 .3  b i l l i o n s  of expected e x t r a o r d i n ­
a ry  e x p e n d i tu r e  were a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y ,  i t  
might have been expected  t h a t  a l i v e l y  deba te  would be 
provoked about  t h e  impact of t h e  t r e a t y  on Germany^ domest ic  
f i n a n c e s .  But t h i s  did  not  in f a c t  occur .  During t h e  d e b a te  
on t h e  f i r s t  r e a d i n g  of t h e  bu d g e t ,  speakers  as f a r  ap a r t  
p o l i t i c a l l y  as  Scheidemann (SFD) and Stresemann (DVP) 
expressed  t h e  g e n e r a l  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  Germany could f u l f i l  
h e r  t r e a t y  o b l i g a t i o n s  only i f  t h e y  were s u b s t a n t i a l l y  r e v i s e d .  
But S c h e i d emann was co n ten t  t o  v o ic e  t h e  hope t h a t  t h i s  
r e v i s i o n  would be ach ieved  th rough  t h e  o f f i c e s  of t h e  League of 
N a t i o n s , ^  w h i l e  Stresemann r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  r e c e n t l y  completed
1 . E r z b e r g e r ,  30 October 1919,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  331,  p p . 3607-9»
2 . i b i d . ,  p.  36IO.
3 .  i b i d . ,  7 October  1919,  V o l .  320,  p.  2891.
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n e g o t i a t i o n s  over r e p a r a t i o n  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  as an example 
of how m o d i f i c a t i o n s  would in p r a c t i c e  be introduced."^* A 
f o r t n i g h t  l a t e r ,  d u r in g  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  e s t i m a t e s  fo r  t h e  
Fore ign  O f f i c e ,  M ö l le r ,  t h e  S o c i a l i s t  M i n i s t e r  f o r  Fore ign
A f f a i r s ,  expressed  r e g r e t  t h a t  t h e  E n te n te  had as y e t  shown
2 .
no s igns  of r e l a x i n g  t h e  t r e a t y ,  and Heinze (DVP) s t r e s s e d  
t h a t  Germany's economic r e c o v e ry  could not  proceed wi thou t  
r e v i s i o n , ' ' *  But t h e  government was a b l e  t o  avoid  any f u l l -  
s c a l e  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  problem, l a r g e l y  because  
no d e t a i l e d  r e p a r a t i o n  scheme yet  e x i s t e d .  E rz b e rg e r  a rgued ,  
t o  good e f f e c t ,  t h a t  i t  would be a t a c t i c a l  b lu n d e r  t o  g iv e  
d e t a i l e d  e s t i m a t e s  of e x p e n d i tu r e  occas ioned by t h e  t r e a t y  
u n t i l  t h e  E n t e n t e  had p r e s e n te d  i t s  demands; and he was a b l e  
t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  Assembly w i th  a g e n e r a l  d e c l a r a t i o n  t h a t ,
a l though  Germany wished s i n c e r e l y  t o  f u l f i l  t h e  t r e a t y ,  she
4.
could no t  do so beyond t h e  l i m i t  of h e r  c a p a c i t y .
I t  was in  December 1919 t h a t  t h e  d eb a te  over t h e  
government ' s  f i n a n c i a l  re form programme became most h e a t e d .
This  month saw t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  im por tan t  measures such as 
t h e  States Tax B i l l  ( L a n d e s s t e u e r g e s e t z ) ,  which s e t t l e d  t h e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  t a x  r e c e i p t s  between t h e  Reich and t h e  Länder ,  
and t h e  Income and C a p i t a l  Gains Taxes,  which were expec ted  
t o  y i e l d  about  t e n  b i l l i o n  marks of new revenue .  I t  was a l s o  
in December t h a t  t h e  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  p roposa l s  f o r  t h e  N a t i o n a l
77 i b i d . ,  8 October I 919 , V o l .  330,  p .  2917. ""For t h e  p o l i t i c a l
impact of t h e s e  n e g o t i a t i o n s :  see  above ,pp .  136- 8 .
2. i b i d . ,  23 October  1919, V o l .  330,  p.  3357.
3.  i b i d , ,  24 October  1919, V o l .  330,  p.  3393*
4.  i b i d . ,  30 October  1919» V o l ,  331» p p . 3^10-1 .
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Emergency Levy and t h e  S a l e s  Tax were f i n a l l y  adopted a f t e r  
s tormy d i s c u s s i o n .
The r e p a r a t i o n  problem had no v i s i b l e  e f f e c t  on t h e  
d e t a i l s  of t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  which was debated in December.
As on p rev io u s  o c c a s i o n s ,  t h e  only measure which was opposed 
e x p l i c i t l y  on account  of A l l i e d  r e p a r a t i o n  demands was t h e  
R e i c h s n o t o p f e r , t h e  y i e l d  of which was a l l e g e d  t o  be s u s c e p t ­
i b l e  t o  s e i z u r e  by t h e  E n t e n t e .  D iscuss ion  of t h e  s u b je c t  
appea rs  t o  have been occasioned  by a s ta tement in t h e  French 
p r e s s  which probab ly  a r o s e  out of t h e  c u r r e n t  acr imonious  
exchange of n o te s  over t h e  f u l f i l m e n t  of t h e  A rm is t i ce .^*
On 5 December,  E rz b e rg e r  f e l t  ob liged  t o  quote a l e g a l  op in io n ,  
which he had o r i g i n a l l y  c i t e d  c o n f i d e n t i a l l y  in committee on 
18 O ctober ,  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e  E n te n te  had no r i g h t  under
t h e  terms of t h e  t r e a t y  t o  i n t e r f e r e  w i th  Germany*s domestic
2 .
f i n a n c e s  so long as  t h e  l a t t e r  f u l f i l l e d  h e r  o b l i g a t i o n s .
But t h i s  a s s u ra n c e  did not  s a t i s f y  t h e  r i g h t - w i n g  p a r t i e s .  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  DVP c o n s id e re d  t h e  t h r e a t  of A l l i e d  
s e i z u r e  a good reason  f o r  opposing t h e  R e i c h s n o to p fer  and f o r  
p r e f e r r i n g  a measure i n v o lv in g  an a l l e g e d l y  more secure  
fo rced  loan (Zwangsanle ihe)  * The r e a c t i o n  of t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t s  
was more v i o l e n t .  Bes ides  e x p re s s in g  a p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  a
1.  See above,  pp.  2 1 0 -4 .  C f .  Dernburg,  N at ionalversammlung.
5 December 1919» V o l .  331» p.  3878«
2. i b i d . ,  pp .  3876-7.
3. Becker (DVP), i b i d . ,  p.  3901? R i e s s e r  (DVP), 9 December 1919»
i b i d . ,  V o l .  331» P. 3931. For t h e  B e c k e r -R ie s s e r  p ro p o s a l :  
i b i d . ,  V o l .  340, Anl.  1682,  1799» For o th e r  r i g h t - w i n g  
p r o p o s a l :  V,V. Badulesco ,  op. c i t . ,  pp.  284-5 .
250
fo rc e d  loa n  t h e y  demanded an as su rance  from t h e  A l l i e s  as  t o  
t h e i r  i n t e n t i o n s , ^ *  Hugenberg even went so f a r  as  t o  s t a t e  
t h a t ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  r i s k  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  German peop le  by
a c c e p t i n g  t h e  R e i c h s n o t o p f e r , he would p r e f e r  t h e  A l l i e s  t o
2 .
occupy t h e  Ruhr,
The r i g h t - w i n g  arguments f o r  amendment of t h e  Re ichs -  
n o t o p f e r  because  of t h e  p robab le  p o l i c y  of  t h e  E n t e n t e  appear  
t o  have c a r r i e d  l i t t l e  weight  w i th  t h e  government p a r t i e s ,
E rz b e rg e r  prompt ly po in ted  out  t h a t  t h e  y i e l d  of  t h e  R e i c h s n o to p f er  
was no more v u l n e r a b l e  t o  s e i z u r e  by t h e  E n t e n t e  tha n  t h e  proceeds  
of a f o rc e d  loan  or  any o th e r  government r e v e n u e .  In any c a s e ,
t o  al low f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  t o  be a f f e c t e d  by such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
o #
was t o  cour t  r u in  f o r  Germany, Kugenberg 's  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  an 
A l l i e d  occupa t ion  of t h e  Ruhr would be p r e f e r a b l e  t o  t h e  adop t ion  
of t h e  R e i c h s n o t o p fer provoked angry  r e p l i e s  from t h e  government
p a r t i e s ,  Hugenberg was accused of  w ish ing  t o  s a c r i f i c e  Germany’ s
4.
freedom mere ly  in o rde r  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of p r o p e r t y .
The Democrat ,  F e t e r s e n ,  cons ide red  Hugenberg’ s a t t i t u d e  
com ple te ly  i r r e s p o n s i b l e  because  t h e  R igh t  would have found i t  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  impose p r o p e r t y  t a x e s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  Reichsno t  opf e r  
i f  i t  had been in power
1.  D ür inger  (DNVP), 6 December 1919» Na t io n a lv e r sa m m lu n g ,
V o l .  331,  P.  3887.
2. i b i d , ,  9 December 1919, V o l .  331, PP-393&-7* For t h e  DNVP
forced  loan  p ro p o s a l :  i b i d . ,  V o l .  340, Anl.  l 6 l 2 ,  l 8 l 2 .
3 . i b i d . ,  6 December 1919, V o l .  331, p.  3897i c f .  W a lds te in  
(DDP), 17 December 1919, i b i d , ,  V o l .  331, PP* 4121-2.
4.  E r z b e r g e r ,  9 December 1919,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  331 ,  p.  3941?
Braun (SPD), 10 December 1919,  i b i d , ,  V o l .  331,  P* 3949; 
Farwick (Zentrum),  i b i d . ,  p.  3958.
5 .  i b i d . ,  p .  3959.
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Arguments which had a b e t t e r  chance of a f f e c t i n g  
t h e  shape of t h e  R e ic h s n o to p fe r  were t h o s e  t o  do w i th  i t s  
p o s s i b l e  f i n a n c i a l  and economic r e p e r c u s s i o n s .  R e p re s e n t ­
a t i v e s  of  t h e  r i g h t - w i n g  o p p o s i t i o n  groups expressed  f e a r s ,  
which were shared by a l a r g e  s e c t i o n  of t h e  b u s in e s s  
community, t h a t  u n l e s s  t h e  R e i c h s n o to p fer  were amended i t  
would d r a i n  t h e  l i f e - b l o o d  from t h e  German economy. By t h i s  
t h e y  meant t h a t  i t  would d e p r iv e  e n t e r p r i s e s  of  n e c e s s a r y  
working c a p i t a l ,  t h a t  i t  would d im in ish  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  
o b ta in  domestic  and f o r e ig n  c r e d i t s ,  t h a t  i t  would encourage 
high p r i c e s  and c a p i t a l  f l i g h t ,  and ,  i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  t h a t  i t  
would r educe  t h e  y i e ld  from o th e r  t a x e s .  I t  was,  in f a c t ,  
more w i th  a view t o  avo id ing  t h e s e  d i s a d v a n ta g e s  than  because  
of  t h e i r  f e a r  of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y  of t h e  E n te n te  t h a t  t h e  
o p p o s i t i o n  g r o u p s .p u t  forward  t h e i r  v a r io u s  schemes in v o lv in g  
a fo rced  l o a n .  The advan tages  of t h e  forced  loan  were t h a t  
i t  was r e p a y a b l e ,  t h a t  i t  b o re  i n t e r e s t  a t  a low r a t e ,  and
t h e  t h e  bonds i s sued  t o  s u b s c r i b e r s  could be used as s e c u r i t y
1.f o r  c r e d i t s .
But even t h i s  f i n a n c i a l l y - s l a n t e d  c r i t i c i s m  of t h e  
Reichsnot  opf e r  did  not  cause  i t  t o  be amended. One of t h e  
main r easons  f o r  t h i s  w'as t h a t  t h e  government r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
1. Becker (DVF), 6 December 1919» V o l .  331» P* 3901» 10
December 1919» i b i d , ,  p .  39&1; R i e s s e r  (DVP), 9 December 
1919, i b i d . ,  p. 3929* P e t i t i o n s  from t h e  German b u s in e s s  
community conce rn ing  t h e  R e i c h s n o topfe r : i b i d . ,  V o l .  337» 
Anl.  647“, V o l .  338, Anl.  753» 863; V ol .  339, Anl .  1171, 
1287, 1429; V o l .  340, Anl.  1762; V ol ,  34-1, Anl.  2112. 
Cf.  R i e s s e r ,  17 December 1919» i b i d . ,  V o l .  331» p*4117; 
and V.V. Badulesco ,  op, c i t . ,  pp. 296-7»
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could po in t  t o  t h e  p r o v i s io n s  in t h e  measure f o r  exemptions 
in cases  of h a rd s h ip  and f o r  payment by in s t a lm e n t s  over 
p e r io d s  of up t o  50 y e a r s . I t  could even be a s s e r t e d  
c o n f i d e n t l y  t h a t  an emergency levy  w i th  t h e s e  s a feg u a rd s
would be l e s s  damaging t o  t h e  b u s in e s s  community t h a n  a fo rced
2 .
l o a n ,  which would have t o  be l e v ie d  w i th i n  a few months.  ’ That  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  government p ro p o s a l  con ta ined  t h e s e  m i t i g a t i n g  p r o v i s i o n s ,  
which were s u b se q u en t ly  e x p l o i t e d  so as  t o  reduce  t h e  y i e l d  of 
t h e  Reichsno t  opf er  in a d i s a s t r o u s  manner, i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  
p r e s s u r e s  exer ted  du r ing  t h e  d eb a te s  in t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly 
had no im por tan t  a f f e c t .  There i s ,  moreover,  no reason  f o r  
conc lud ing  t h a t  t h e  government was in f a c t  bowing t o  hidden 
p r e s s u r e s  or t h a t  i t  was d e l i b e r a t e l y  i n s i n c e r e  in p u t t i n g  
forward i t s  p ro p o sa l  fo r  t h e  R e i c h s n o to p fer  qua a seve re  
and prompt levy  on p r o p e r t y . ^ ’ Both t h e  i n s e r t i o n  of t h e s e  
m i t i g a t i n g  p r o v i s io n s  and t h e  arguments used by t h e  government 
in  d e b a t e  c e r t a i n l y  r e v e a l  c o n s i d e r a b l e  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  needs  of t h e  community. But t h e  dismay expressed  by 
W ir th  in  A p r i l  1920 a t  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  p r o v i s io n s  f o r  
delayed  payment had been e x p lo i t e d  r e v e a l s  t h a t  t h e s e  p r o v i s io n s
4
had been in tended by t h e  government f o r  cases  of genu ine  h a r d s h i p .
1. 9 December 1919» N ationalversam mlung , V ol .  331» P* 3946;
Farwick (Zentrum), 10 December 1919» i b i d . ,  V o l .  331» P« 3956.
2.  E r z b e r g e r ,  10 December 1919» i b i d . ,  Vol.  331» P* 3966;
W alds te in  (DDP), 17 December 1919, i b i d . ,  V o l .  331,  p.  4119.
3 .  V.V, Badulesco ,  op.  c i t . ,  pp.  440-1.
4 .  For r e f e r e n c e  t o  W i r t h ’ s s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  t h e  payment p r o v i s i o n s  
of t h e  R e i c h s n o to p fer  should be "compressed":  Posadowsky- 
Wrehner (DNVP), 26 A p r i l  1920,  Na t iona lve r sa m m lung , Vol.  333» 
p,  5473-4,  On t h e  Fehrenbach government’ s l a t e r  e f f o r t s  t o  
ach ieve  t h i s  "compress ion" :  see below, pp.  281- 2 .
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Whatever may have  been t h e  exact  reasons  f o r  t h e  
t e c h n i c a l  lo opho les  in  t h e  R e ic h s n o to p fe r  t h e y  only became 
im por tan t  because  of t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of t h e  p s y c h o lo g i c a l  and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  f a c t o r s  which decreased  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of  
most German f i s c a l  measures in t h i s  p e r i o d .  These f a c t o r s  
inc lu d ed  t h e  de lay  in assessm ent  and c o l l e c t i o n ,  t h e  
i n f l e x i b i l i t y  of t h e  le v y  in  a pe r iod  of r ap id  f l u c t u a t i o n s  
in  t h e  v a l u e  of money and ,  above a l l ,  t h e  d e c l i n e  in  t h e  
g e n e r a l  w i l l i n g n e s s  of t h e  German people t o  pay t a x e s ,  I t  
i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  problem a c c e l e r a t e d  t h e  l a s t  
development through i t s  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  to n e  of t h e  f i s c a l  
d e b a t e s  in  December,
There  was in c re a s e d  g e n e r a l  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
p r o v i s io n s  of  t h e  t r e a t y  in t h e  December d e b a t e s .  R e p re s e n t ­
a t i v e s  of t h e  t h r e e  government p a r t i e s  a l l  s t a t e d  c l e a r l y  t h a t  
Germany's f i n a n c i a l  f u t u r e  depended on t r e a t y  r e v i s i o n ,  and 
t h e  Democrat ic  spokesman was f a r  l e s s  o p t i m i s t i c  about  t h e
l i k e l i h o o d  of such r e v i s i o n  th a n  h i s  S o c i a l  Democrat ic  and
1.
C e n t r i s t  c o l l e a g u e s .  All  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  groups  were f r a n k l y
p e s s i m i s t i c .  The Independent  S o c i a l i s t ,  Wurm, a t t r i b u t e d
Germany's f i n a n c i a l  d i s t r e s s  e n t i r e l y  t o  t h e  malevolence  of
2
her c a p i t a l i s t i c  r i v a l s ,  * Becker of th e  DVP was extremely  
c r i t i c a l  of th e  optimism of th e  government p a r t ie sV ’ and th e
1 . K e i l  (SPD), 5 December 1919» N at ionalversammlung« Vol.331» 
pp,  3859-60.  Zehn te r  (Zent rum),  p.  3868; Dernburg (DDP),
p .  3878.
2 .  i b i d . ,  6 December 1919» V o l .  33^-j P* 39H*
3. i b i d . ,  p . 3904.
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N a t i o n a l i s t ,  Hugenberg,  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  i t  was t h e  c l e a r
1.
i n t e n t i o n  of t h e  A l l i e s  t o  r u i n  Germany.
But in  s p i t e  of t h i s  inc reased  emphasis upon t h e  
t r e a t y ,  domest ic  p a r t i s a n ,  p o l i t i c a l  and s o c i a l  arguments of 
t h e  t y p e  t h a t  have a l r e a d y  been n o t i c e d  s e t  t h e  to n e  of t h e  
d e b a t e s .  The p e r s o n a l  abuse which had c h a r a c t e r i s e d  t h e  
d e b a t e  on t h e  Premium Loan was i n t e n s i f i e d .  On t h e  one hand
government speakers  r e p e a t e d l y  a t t r i b u t e d  Germany’s e x i s t i n g
2 #
d i s t r e s s  t o  t h e  f i s c a l  i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of t h e  old regime.
On t h e  o t h e r  hand t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t s  l e v e l l e d  e q u a l ly  i r r e l e v a n t  
p a r t i s a n  a t t a c k s  at  t h e  government and,  above a l l ,  a t  E r z b e r g e r .  
The l a t t e r ' s  domestic  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  was r i d i c u l e d  on t h e  
grounds of  u n j u s t i f i e d  optimism which he was a l l e g e d  t o  have  
d i s p la y e d  in  h i s  w ar - t im e  m iss ions  t o  I t a l y  and Vienna and in 
h i s  conduct  of t h e  a r m i s t i c e  and peace  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  The 
F inance  M i n i s t e r ’ s e a r l i e r  f a i l u r e s  in fo r e ig n  p o l i c y  were,  
in  t h e  op in ion  of  N a t i o n a l i s t s  such as Dör inger  and Hugenberg,  
s u f f i c i e n t  reason  f o r  assuming t h a t  h i s  c u r r e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
p o l i c y  would ru in  Germany."
The s o c i a l  emphasis of t h e  deba te  was a l s o  very  s t r o n g .  
The S o c i a l  Democrats  had con t inued  t o  s t r e s s ,  l a r g e l y  no doubt  
in  answer t o  t h e  c r i t i c i s m  of t h e  Lef t  o p p o s i t i o n  g roups ,  
t h a t  t h e  b e s t  way of app roach ing  s o c i a l i s m  was th ro u g h  t a x
1. i b i d . ,  9 December 1919» V o l .  331» P» 393&.
2.  K e i l  (SPD), 5 December 1919» i b i d . ,  V o l .  331» p p . 3860-1;  
E r z b e r g e r ,  6 December 1919» i b i d . ,  V o l .  331» P* 3898»
Braun (3FD),  10 December 1919» i b i d . ,  V o l .  331» p. 3950*
3 . Döring er  (DNVP), 6 December 1919» i b i d . ,  V o l .  331» p.  3886; 
Hugenberg (DNVP), 9 December 1919» i b i d . ,  V o l .  331» P» 3938*
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re fo rm .^*  And on 9 December E rzb e rg e r  had i n s i s t e d ,  j u s t  as  
he had in J u l y ,  on t h e  deep s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
of a measure such as  t h e  R e i c h s n o t o p f e r • The broad masses of 
German p e o p l e ,  he d e c l a r e d ,  had t h e  r i g h t  t o  demand t h a t  
p r o p e r t y  should make a s u b s t a n t i a l  s a c r i f i c e  b e fo re  f u r t h e r  
i n d i r e c t  t a x e s  were imposed,  * The r e a c t i o n  of t h e  Right  t o  
t h e s e  a s s e r t i o n s  was ex t remely  u n fa v o u ra b le .  The v en e ra b le  
Jakob R i e s s e r  remarked w i th  d i s t a s t e  t h a t  t h e  idea  of s o c i a l i s m  
"ran  l i k e  a red t h r e a d "  th ro u g h  t h e  Reichsnot  opf e r , t h e  Income 
Tax and t h e  C a p i t a l  Gains Tax ,  He endorsed ex-F inance  M in i s t e r  
G o th e i n ’s d e s c r i p t i o n  of  t h e s e  measures as "a c a p i t u l a t i o n  t o  
t h e  mob" ( e in e  Verbeugung vor  de r  S t r a s s e )  which could ru in  
t h e  German economy,“ The impact of t h i s  a s p e c t  of t h e  f i s c a l  
d e b a t e  was h e a r t i l y  dep lo red  by moderates such as t h e  Democrat ,  
Dernburg .  They conceded t h a t  t h e  government’s an t  i - c a p i t a  l i s t  
s l o g a n s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i th  t h e  s t e e p  t a r i f f s  embodied in i t s  f i s c a l  
m easu re s ,  expressed  an u n d e r s t a n d a b le  r e v u l s i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  
c o r r u p t i o n  and p r o f i t e e r i n g  of t h e  war and r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
p e r i o d s .  But t h e y  were c r i t i c a l  of t h e  encouragement which 
had a t  t h e  same t im e  been g iven  t o  t h e  p r o p e r t i e d  c l a s s e s  t o  
evade t a x e s  and t o  expor t  c a p i t a l ,  "Anyone," Dernburg sa id  
r u e f u l l y ,  "who has t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y . . .  of l i s t e n i n g  t o  t h e  
c o n v e r s a t i o n s  of o th e rw is e  o rd in a ry  p e o p l e , , , i n  which p r o t e c t i o n
1, E . g ,  Noske on 7 November 1919 at  Chemnitz: quoted by Kugenberg 
9 December 1919,  i b i d . ,  V o l ,  331,  p. 3938.
2,  i b i d , ,  p ,  391 2347j a l s o  Farwick (Zent rum) ,  p,  3955.
3 ,  i b i d , ,  9 December 1919,  V o l .  331,  P. 3929.  Cf.  Dür inger  (DNVP), 
i b i d . ,  6 December 1919,  V o l .  331,  P* 3889; Becker (DVP), i b i d , ,
p.  3900; Hugenberg (DNVF), 9 December 1919,  i b i d . ,  p,  3938*
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of one*s p r o p e r t y  a g a i n s t  c o n f i s c a t i o n  i s  advocated in t h e
most c y n i c a l  way, w i l l  have s e r i o u s  doubts  as  t o  whether  we
1 .
have not  made a m i s t a k e . "
The predominance of s o c i a l  and p a r t i s a n  p reo cc u p a t io n s  
in  t h e  December d e b a t e s  was confirmed in a n e g a t i v e  way by 
t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  S a l e s  Tax (U m s a tz s te u e r ) ,  
Although i t  was expected t o  y i e ld  about  4 b i l l i o n  marks,  t h i s  
im por tan t  measure aroused  l i t t l e  de te rmined  o p p o s i t i o n .  The 
r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  was l a r g e l y  t h a t ,  as  an i n d i r e c t  t a x ,  i t  was 
in  most r e s p e c t s  s o c i a l l y  and p o l i t i c a l l y  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  
R i g h t , A  f u r t h e r  reason  f o r  t h e  absence  of o p p o s i t i o n  was 
t h a t  t h e  5PD, t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  opponent of i n d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n ,  
was a member of t h e  government c o a l i t i o n .  The f i n a n c i a l  s t r a i t s  
of t h e  government and t h e  p o l i t i c a l  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  some c o u n t e r ­
p o i s e  t o  t h e  s p a t e  of new d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n  o b l ig e d  t h e  S o c i a l
Democrats t o  g iv e  t h e i r  somewhat shamefaced suppor t  t o  t h e
r>
measure ,^*  The only f o r t h r i g h t  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  S a les  Tax came 
from t h e  Independent  S o c i a l i s t  E ichho rn ,  who p r o t e s t e d  a g a i n s t  
t h e  h a r d s h ip  which would be caused t o  t h e  p o o re r  c l a s s e s  by 
any i n c re a s e d  t a x a t i o n  of  t h e  n e c e s s a r i e s  of l i f e .
Befo re  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly was f i n a l l y  d i s s o lv e d  
t h e r e  were impor tan t  f i n a n c i a l  d i s c u s s i o n s  b o th  a t  t h e  end of 
F ebrua ry  1920,  when t h e  Income Tax and C a p i t a l  Gains Tax
1. i b i d . ,  5 December 1919» V o l .  331» P* 3^79*
2. Wetz l ich  (DNVP), 16 December 1919» i b i d , ,  V o l .  331» p.4078;  
Kempkes (DVP), i b i d . ,  p. 4003«
3 .  Stock (SPD), i b i d . ,  p.  4074.
4.  i b i d . ,  17 December 1919, V o l .  331,  P» 4092.
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p r o p o s a l s  emerged from commit tee,  and l a t e r  in  A p r i l ,  du r ing
t h e  d e b a t e  on t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  budget  fo r  1920,  Both in  t h e
d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n  of i n d i v i d u a l  laws and in  t h e  g e n e r a l
d e b a t e  t h e r e  was, i f  a n y t h in g ,  l e s s  s t r e s s  on t h e  r e p a r a t i o n
q u e s t i o n  and more upon p a r t i s a n  and economic i s s u e s  tha n  t h e r e
had been in  December 1919*
The main f e a t u r e  of  t h e  d e t a i l e d  d e b a t e  over t h e
Income Tax Law was a s o c i a l l y  o r i e n t a t e d  d i s p u t e  over p a r a s ,
44-52 which provided  f o r  a 10^. wage deduc t ion  (Lohnabzug).
The r i g h t - w i n g  p a r t i e s  argued t h a t ,  ap a r t  from being  of d o u b t fu l
v a l u e  as a means of s im p l i f y i n g  t a x  c o l l e c t i o n ,  t h i s  measure
b e t r a y e d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  lack  of conf idence  in  t h e  working
c l a s s  and would cause p r e s s u r e  on employers t o  g r a n t  wage
i n c r e a s e s .  * The Lef t  o p p o s i t i o n  ob jec ted  t o  t h e  h a rd s h ip s
which would be caused by a f l a t  10^ d educ t ion  i f  r e funds  were
t o  be made only every q u a r t e r .  I t  a l s o  p r o t e s t e d  - presumably
on t h e  assumption t h a t  t h e r e  should be an equa l  o p p o r tu n i ty
f o r  a l l  t o  evade t a x e s  -  a t  what i t  co n s id e re d  t o  be
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  in favour  of t h o s e  who paid t h e i r  ta xes  in  a
2
s i n g l e  lump sum a f t e r  t h e i r  incomes had been a s s e s s e d .  The
government p a r t i e s  were a b l e  t o  answer t h e s e  s o c i a l l y  s l a n t e d
c r i t i c i s m s  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y , " 1* and r i g h t  and l e f t - w i n g  p ro p o s a l s
t h a t  p a r a s ,  44-52 should be omi tted were e a s i l y  d e f e a t e d .  * But
t h e  prominence of t h e  d i s p u t e  in  t h e s e  and l a t e r  d e b a t e s  over t h e
77 W etz l i ch  (DNVP), 2 March 1920,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  332,  p .  46l7 ;~ '  
Becker (DVP), i b i d . ,  pp.  4620-1.
2 .  E ichhorn  (USPD), i b i d . ,  p ,  4618.
3 .  Braun (SPD), i b i d . ,  p .  4619.
4.  i b i d . ,  p,  4623*
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Income Tax i s  a c l e a r  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  s o c i a l  a s p e c t s  of 
t a x a t i o n  were  t h o s e  w i th  which t h e  N a t io n a l  Assembly was 
p r e o c c u p ie d .
The main f e a t u r e  of t h e  g e n e r a l  d e b a t e  on t h e  Income 
Tax was i n c r e a s i n g  pessimism, not  only as t o  th e  s i z e  of t h e  
f i s c a l  burden which t h e  German economy could b e a r ,  but  a l s o  
as t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a prompt r e d u c t io n  of swol len  govern­
ment e x p e n d i t u r e s .  This  pessimism was voiced not  only by 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  DVP and DNVP,^*but a l s o  by t h e  Democrat,  
Pohlmann, who s t r e s s e d  on t h e  one hand in d u s t r y * s  need f o r  
working c a p i t a l ,  and on t h e  o th e r  hand t h e  p o s t a l  and ra i lway  
d e f i c i t s  and t h e  cos t  of import s u b s i d i e s .  ’ Only S o c ia l  
Democrats and C e n t r i s t s  expressed  any p o s i t i v e  optimism about 
Germany's f i n a n c i a l  f u tu re . ' "*  S ince  only Pohlmann l a i d  any
emphasis upon r e v i s i o n  of t h e  t r e a t y  as a p r e r e q u i s i t e  fo r
4.
f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i s a t i o n ,  i t  seems t h a t  t h i s  mounting d e s p a i r  
was induced l a r g e l y  by consc iousness  of Germany*s domestic  
f i n a n c i a l  problems.
As hopes of e f f e c t i v e  f i n a n c i a l  reform sank ,  p a r t i s a n  
r e c r i m i n a t i o n s  over Germany's f i n a n c i a l  c o n d i t i o n  i n c r e a s e d .
One of t h e  immediate reasons  f o r  t h i s  was t h e  E r z b e r g e r -  
H e l f f e r i c h  la w su i t  which ran  from 19 January  t o  12 March 1920.
1. Becker (DVP), 27 February  1920,  i b i d . ,  Vol.  332» p.  4559» 
Düringer (DNVP), p .  4555.
2. i b i d . ,  pp.  4550-3*
3 .  K e i l  (SPD), i b i d , ,  p.  4549; Herold (Zentrum),  i b i d . ,  p.  4563*
The Independent  S o c i a l i s t ,  Düwell ,  advanced t h e  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  
of b a l a n c in g  t h e  budget by t r a d i t i o n a l  methods as an argument 
f o r  s o c i a l i s a t i o n :  i b i d . ,  p.  4567*
4.  i b i d . ,  p.  4553.
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E r z b e r g e r  had been provoked i n t o  b r in g in g  a l i b e l  a c t i o n  
a g a i n s t  H e l f f e r i c h ,  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t  w ar - t im e  S e c r e t a r y  of 
S t a t e  t o  t h e  T r e a s u r y ,  by a p e r s o n a l  p r e s s  campaign which t h e  
l a t t e r  had waged a g a i n s t  him i n  t h e  course  of 1919* E rzb e rg e r  
r a t h e r  i n a d v i s e d l y  wished t o  c h a l l e n g e  H e l f f e r i c h ' s  vague 
a l l e g a t i o n s  of o f fences  a g a i n s t  p r o p r i e t y ,  of h a b i t u a l  
u n t r u t h f u l n e s s  and of mixing p o l i t i c s  w i th  b u s in e s s  a f f a i r s  
The t r i a l  i n e v i t a b l y  developed  i n t o  l i t t l e  more than  a s lo g g in g  
match between t h e  old and t h e  new reg im es .  The c o n s e r v a t iv e  
a n t i - E r z b e r g e r  groups scored  a n o t a b l e  popu la r  t r iu m p h ,  f o r  
a l though  E rz b e rg e r  t e c h n i c a l l y  won t h e  c a s e  t h e  v e r d i c t  of 
t h e  c o u r t  was damaging enough t o  f o r c e  h i s  r e s i g n a t i o n  from 
o f f i c e .  The u n d e s i r a b l e  impact of t h e  t r i a l  upon German f i s c a l  
m o r a l i t y  had been he igh tened  by t h e  s e i z u r e  and p u b l i c a t i o n  in 
t h e  p r e s s  of E rzb e rg e r* s  t a x  r e t u r n s ,  which appeared  a t  f i r s t  
g l a n c e  t o  p ro v id e  ev idence  of t a x  evas ion .  Although th e  
r e t u r n s  were sub se q u en t ly  proved t o  be in o r d e r ,  t h e  immediate 
im press ion  c r e a t e d  was t h a t  t h e  man who had been t h e  champion 
of  pos t -w ar  f i s c a l  re fo rm was h im se l f  a t a x  evade r .  The 
s e n s a t i o n  c r e a t e d  caused E rz b e rg e r  t o  r e s i g n  on 24 F eb rua ry ,  
pending t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of t h e  charges  made a g a i n s t  him; 
and h i s  s u sp e n s io n  from o f f i c e  l a s t e d  u n t i l  h i s  formal 
r e s i g n a t i o n  fo l low ing  t h e  judgment in  t h e  l i b e l  s u i t  a few 
weeks l a t e r .
The E r z b e r g e r - H e l f f e r i c h  ca se  had an obvious e f f e c t  in
1.  K. E p s t e i n ,  op.  c i t . ,  p. 354.
2 .  i b i d . ,  p .  3 6 6 .
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r a i s i n g  t h e  p a r t i s a n  p i t c h  of  t h e  d e b a te  in t h e  Assembly.
In r e p l y  t o  a complaint  from t h e  German b u s in e s s  community 
t h a t  t h e  Income Tax Law was be ing  rushed th rough  t h e  Assembly 
a f t e r  i n s u f f i c i e n t  d i s c u s s i o n ,  t h e  S o c i a l  Democrat ,  K e i l ,  
r e t o r t e d  t h a t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  back - log  of f i s c a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  was 
due t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  pursued by H e l f f e r i c h  d u r in g  t h e  
war.  K e i l  went on t o  express  i n d i g n a t i o n  t h a t  H e l f f e r i c h ,
"who had every  reason f o r  remain ing  s i l e n t " ,  should have
1.
assumed t h e  r o l e  of a g u a rd ia n  of p o l i t i c a l  m o r a l i t y .  The 
Right  p a r r i e d  w i th  an a p o lo g ia  f o r  H e l f f e r i c h ’ s w ar - t im e  
f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y ; 1 23'* and c o u n t e r - a t t a c k e d  wi th  c r i t i c i s m  of t h e  
s p i r i t  of  pos t -w ar  f i s c a l  re forms which,  i t  a l l e g e d ,  had 
harmed t h e  economy, damaged i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l
ß I
c o n f id e n c e  and depressed  f i s c a l  m o r a l i t y .  * I r r e s p e c t i v e  of  
t h e  amount of t r u t h  t h e y  c o n t a in e d ,  t h e s e  a l l e g a t i o n s  and 
c o u n t e r - a l l e g a t i o n s  could not  have in c re as ed  t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  
of t h e  German pub l i c  t o  pay t a x e s .
The d e b a t e  on t h e  p r o v i s i o n a l  budget f o r  1920 y i e ld e d  
l e s s  p a r t i s a n  r e c r i m i n a t i o n  -  l a r g e l y  because  t h e  f a l l  of 
E rz b e rg e r  had removed t h e  R i g h t ’ s blfte n o i r  from t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
a rena  -  bu t  i t  was t h e  occas ion  f o r  inc re ased  f i n a n c i a l  
pess imism. Otto  W i r t h , E r z b e r g e r ’s s u c c e s s o r  as F inance  
M i n i s t e r ,  e s t im a ted  t h a t  o r d in a r y  e x p en d i tu re s  f o r  t h e  coming 
y ea r  would be 27.9 b i l l i o n  marks and t h a t  o r d in a r y  revenues
1. N at iona lversam mlung . 28 F ebruary  1920,  V o l .  332» p .4546 ,
2. Becker (DVP), i b i d . ,  pp.  4558-9.
3 .  D ör inger  (DNVP), i b i d . ,  pp.  4554-6; Becker (DVP), i b i d . ,  
PP. 4559» 4661.
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would be 25 b i l l i o n s . 1  23* Th is  l e f t  a d e f i c i t  of  2 .9  b i l l i o n s  
which was t o  be covered by t a x e s  which would be vo ted  in t h e  
cou rse  of t h e  y e a r .  E x t r a o r d i n a r y  e x p e n d i tu r e ,  which would 
no t  be covered by r e g u l a r  r e v e n u e ,  was expec ted t o  be 11,6 
b i l l i o n s .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  budgets  of t h e  r a i l w a y s  and t h e  pos t  
o f f i c e  were  expected  t o  show d e f i c i t s  of 12 b i l l i o n  and 1 
b i l l i o n  marks r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The most s t r i k i n g  f e a t u r e s  of 
t h e s e  e s t i m a t e s  were t h e  con t inued  imbalance of t h e  o rd in a ry  
budget  d e s p i t e  t h e  expected i n c r e a s e  in revenue ,  and t h e  
s p e c t a c u l a r  d e f i c i t s  of t h e  p u b l i c  u t i l i t i e s .  These i t e m s ,  
t o g e t h e r  w i th  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  ex p e n d i tu r e ,  were r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  
an e s t im a te d  t o t a l  d e f i c i t  of about 25 b i l l i o n  marks.  In 
view of t h e  s i z e  of  t h e s e  f i g u r e s  i t  i s  perhaps  s u r p r i s i n g  
t h a t  t h e  government s p eak e r s  s t i l l  d i s p l a y e d  r e a s o n a b l e  
optimism. Wirth emphasised how much t h e  l e v e l  of  government
e x p e n d i tu r e  was due t o  abnormal economic c o n d i t i o n s  and high
2 .
p r i c e s  caused by t h e  w ar .  He went on t o  e x p re s s  hopes of  a 
domest ic  loan  and a l s o  r e f e r r e d  t o  p la ns  f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  p u b l i c  
revenues  by means of s t a t e  monopolies.-^* His S o c i a l  Democratic 
c o l l e a g u e ,  K e i l ,  a l s o  a t t r i b u t e d  t h e  s i z e  of government 
e x p e n d i tu r e  t o  temporary  f a c t o r s  such as t h e  Kapp P u t s c h ,  t h e  
w ind ing-up  of  t h e  old army and t h e  swol len  numbers of  govern­
ment employees.  Moreover,  w h i l e  he d isapproved  of s t a t e  
monopolies i f  t h e y  merely r a i s e d  p r i c e s ,  he co n s id e re d  t h a t
77 i b i d . ,  26 A p r i l  1920,  V o l .  333,  PP. 5442-5 •
2. i b i d . ,  p .  5442; c f ,  Nacken (Zentrum),  i b i d . ,  p.  5469»
3 .  W i r t h ,  i b i d . ,  p.  5449.
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revenues  could be inc re ased  by im p o s i t io n  of f u r t h e r  t a x e s
1 .
on lu xury  goods .  The s p eak e r  for  t h e  o th e r  c o a l i t i o n  p a r ty ,  
Dernburg (DDF), a l s o  po in ted  out t h a t  t h e  d e f i c i t  was caused 
by t r a n s i t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  a r i s i n g  out of t h e  war and t h e  a f t e r -  
math.  But he adm it ted  t h a t  t h e  d e f i c i t  of  t h e  r a i lw a y s  and
t h e  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  e x p e n d i tu r e  occasioned by t h e  V e r s a i l l e s
2,
T r e a t y  would not d im in ish  r a p i d l y ,  and he was l e s s  hopefu l  
t h a n  W ir th  about  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a s u b s t a n t i a l  domestic  
loan  or about an i n c re a s e d  y i e l d  from t a x e s , *  The r i g h t - w i n g  
o p p o s i t i o n  groups  were openly p e s s i m i s t i c ,  R i e s s e r  p r e d i c t e d  
t h a t  i t  would be im poss ib le  t o  i n c r e a s e  pub l i c  revenues  
except  by forming s e l f - a d m i n i s t e r i n g  f i s c a l  t r u s t s  in i n d u s t r y ,  
t r a d e ,  a g r i c u l t u r e  and t h e  p r o f e s s i o n s .  Short  of  t h i s  t h e  
only way of cover ing  c u r r e n t  government e x p e n d i tu r e s ,  l e t  a lone
4
of fund ing  t h e  f l o a t i n g  d e b t ,  was t o  impose a fo rced  lo a n .  *
The N a t i o n a l i s t ,  Fosadowsky-Vehner, d e s p a i r e d  of any f u r t h e r  
i n c r e a s e  in government revenue  and could advoca te  no th ing  but  
s t e r n  r e t r e n c h m e n t .  * On t h e  extreme Left  t h e  Independent  
S o c i a l i s t ,  Henke, a s s e r t e d  t h a t  Germany’s p l i g h t  could only
be cured by s o c i a l i s m ,  but  he r e f r a i n e d  from making any
6 •
p r a c t i c a l  s u g g e s t i o n s .
Germany’s t r e a t y  o b l i g a t i o n s  do not ap p ea r  t o  have 
exer ted  any g r e a t  e f f e c t  on a t t i t u d e s  t o  t h e  budge t .  W i r t h ,
1. i b i d . ,  p. 5460.
2.  ib id  . ,  p .  54-62.
3 . i b i d . ,  p. 5466.
4. i b i d . ,  27 A p r i l  1920,  p.  5495.
5 .  i b i d . ,  26 A p r i l  1920,  p.  5474.
6 .  i b i d . ,  27 A p r i l  1920,  pp.  5497-5506.
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a f t e r  making a p r o v i s i o n a l  e s t i m a t e  t h a t  e x p e n d i tu r e s  a r i s i n g  
out of t h e  t r e a t y  would account  f o r  5 b i l l i o n s  of t h e  11.6 
b i l l i o n s  of  t h e  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  budge t ,  s t r e s s e d  t h e  importance
of f i x i n g  Germany's f u t u r e  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s  a t  a
1.
r e a s o n a b l e  l e v e l .  However, t h e  absence  of any f i n a l  
r e p a r a t i o n  s e t t l e m e n t  enabled h i m , l i k e  E rz b e rg e r  on prev ious  
occas ion^  t o  evade any e s t i m a t e  of t h e  r e g u l a r  cos t  of t h e  
t r e a t y  t o  Germany in t h e  f u t u r e .  He even r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  
imminence of n e g o t i a t i o n s  on t h i s  s u b j e c t  w i thou t  undue 
pess imism. * The S o c i a l  Democrat,  K e i l ,  p r e d i c t e d  t h a t  f u l f i l ­
ment of t h e  t r e a t y  would c o s t  Germany 3 b i l l i o n  gold marks a 
y e a r ;  but  advanced t h i s  as an added i n c e n t i v e  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  
r e fo rm .  * The Democrat ,  Dernburg,  s t r e s s e d  t h e  harm t h a t  had 
a l r e a d y  been done t o  Germany's pub l ic  f in a n c e s  by t h e  a r m i s t i c e  
and t r e a t y  t e r m s ,  but quoted h o p e f u l l y  t h e  op in ion  of t h e  
I t a l i a n  F o re ig n  M in i s t e r  N i t t i  t h a t  t h e  t r e a t y  ought t o  be 
r e v i s e d . 1 234. Even t h e  r i g h t - w i n g  o p p o s i t i o n  groups did  not p la c e  
overmuch emphasis upon t h e  t r e a t y  as a r ea son  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  
pessimism. R i e s s e r  demanded t h a t  t h e  c o s t s  of t h e  armies  of 
occupa t ion  (3 b i l l i o n  marks a y e a r )  should be reduced;  and 
p r o t e s t e d  a t  t h e  f i g u r e  of 90 b i l l i o n  gold marks which had 
been sugges ted  in  t h e  French  p r e s s  as Germany's t o t a l  r e p a r a t i o n  
l i a b i l i t y .  But i t  was s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  R i e s s e r  f e l t  a b l e  t o  
d i s m i s s  t h i s  sum as r i d i c u l o u s  because  of an i n c r e a s in g
1. i b i d . ,  26 A p r i l ,  1920,  p.  5^51«
2 . i b i d . ,  p .  5445.
3 . i b i d . ,  p .  5462.
4 .  i b i d . ,  p.  5464.
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awareness in Entente cou n tr ies  th a t  such notions were 
" in to le r a b le  and c o n s is te n t  only with unbridled im perialism  
and revanchism".^* It was even more s ig n i f ic a n t  that th e
speech of t h e  N a t io n a l i s t ,  Posad owsky-V/ehner, contained no
2,
re fe ren ce  of any sort t o  Germany’s t r e a ty  o b l ig a t io n s .
The la r g e ly  dom estica lly -induced  f in a n c ia l  pessimism  
of th e  Assembly was accompanied by the  growth of f in a n c ia l  
apathy and f i s c a l  »m orality  in th e  German n a t io n ,  Ihen  
introducing th e  budget, Wirth had deplored the f in a n c ia l  
ignorance of th e  broad masses of th e  German people and th e
3.
apathy r e f le c t e d  in th e  poor attendance in th e  Assembly.
The Democrat, Dernburg, a ttr ib u ted  t h i s  apathy to  th e  
prevalence of 10 and 12 f ig u r e  numbers which had caused both
th e  Assembly and th e  German public  t o  lo s e  contact with th e
4.r e a l i t i e s  of the  n a t io n 's  f in a n c e s .
Wirth a l s o  expressed concern at th e  growth of p o s i t iv e  
opposit ion  t o  paying t a x e s .  His genera l explanation for t h i s  
was that th e  German people were not accustomed to  paying large  
d ir e c t  ta x e s  But he a ttr ib u ted  i t  more irrmed ia t  ely  t o  a 
recent p artisan  press campaign, conducted with an eye to  th e  
coming e le c t io n s  for  th e  new R eich stag , which sought t o  arouse  
th e  f e e l in g s  of th e  m id d le -c la s s  property owners hardest h i t  
by th e  new t a x e s .  In order t o  combat t h i s  development, Wirth
U  i b i d , ,  27 A pril 1920, p. 5494.
2. i b i d . ,  26 A pril 1920, p. 5471.
3 . i b i d . ,  p. 5439*
4. i b i d . ,  p. 5464.
5 .  i b i d . ,  p. 5447.
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s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e  m i d d l e - c l a s s e s  would not be unduly harmed 
by f e d e r a l  t a x a t i o n  and appealed  f o r  a r e v i v a l  of  t h e  s p i r i t
undoubted ly  w i tnessed  a growth of f i n a n c i a l  pessimism. But 
t h i s  had been due a lmos t  e n t i r e l y  t o  domestic  f i n a n c i a l  
developments ;  and t h e r e  was c e r t a i n l y  no n o t i c e a b l e  
p reo c c u p a t io n  w i th  Germany’ s o b l i g a t i o n s  under t h e  t r e a t y  in 
t h e  f i s c a l  and budge ta ry  d e b a t e s  at  t h i s  t i m e .  A p a r a l l e l  
o b s e r v a t i o n  may be made in e x p l a in in g  any d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of 
f i s c a l  m o r a l i t y .  Here aga in  t h e  im por tan t  i n f l u e n c e s  at 
work were t h e  d o m e s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  E r z b e r g e r - H e l f f e r i c h  
t r i a l  and t h e  p a r t i s a n  p r e s s  campaign which preceded t h e  
e l e c t i o n s  of June 1920.  The d e b a t e s  of t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly 
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  Germany’ s r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s  had r e l a t i v e l y  
l e s s  impact on t h e  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  German t a x p a y e r  than in 
December 1919*
P o l i t i c a l  o p p o s i t i o n  c e r t a i n l y  c o n t r i b u t e d  psycho log ic ­
a l l y ,  i f  no t  in a p r a c t i c a l  l e g i s l a t i v e  way, t o  t h e  German 
government’ s con t inued  f i s c a l  weakness and t o  i t s  almost  
complete i n a b i l i t y  t o  borrow d o m e s t i c a l l y  b e f o r e  mid-1920.
The r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  was,  however,  never  more t h a n  one 
among s e v e r a l  grounds  f o r  t h i s  o p p o s i t i o n .  In any c a s e ,  t h e  
d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  mark,  p o l i t i c a l  u n r e s t  and t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t  
ive  d i f f i c u l t i e s  involved  in  s im u l ta n e o u s ly  s e t t i n g  up new 
f i s c a l  machinery and imposing an e n t i r e l y  new system of t a x e s
The c l o s i n g  months of t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly had
1.  i b i d . ,  p p . 54-49-1, 5476
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a r e  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  exp la in  t h e  p e r s i s t e n t  lowness of t h e  
government’ s revenues  and t h e  f a i l u r e  of  t h e  s i n g l e  a t tempt  
which was made t o  f l o a t  a domest ic  loan in t h i s  p e r i o d .
In i t s  e f f o r t s  t o  improve Germany’s e x t e r n a l  
f i n a n c e s ,  t h e  German government was even more a t  t h e  mercy 
of f a c t o r s  which were beyond i t s  c o n t r o l .  The most 
im por tan t  of t h e s e  was t h e  pos t -w ar  demand of t h e  German 
p u b l i c  f o r  goods .  A f t e r  t h e  A l l i e d  b lockade  has  been l i f t e d  
in J u l y  1919 t h i s  demand caused a f lood  of  impor ts  which had 
a d i s a s t r o u s  e f f e c t  on t h e  German b a lance  of t r a d e . ^ ’Germany's 
f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  was f u r t h e r  weakened by t h e  s t r o n g  d e s i r e  
of German c i t i z e n s  t o  export  c a p i t a l .  This  d e s i r e  which ,  in  
t h e  words of one o b s e r v e r ,  caused t h e  German mark t o  pour 
abroad " in  i n e x h a u s t i b l e  s t r eam s" 'w as  caused by a d e e p - s e a t e d  
lack  of c o n f id e n c e  in Germany’ s f i n a n c i a l  f u t u r e  which t h e  
government could do l i t t l e  t o  remedy.
The e f f e c t  o f  t h e s e  powerful  economic and p s y c h o lo g i c a l  
f a c t o r s  on t h e  German b a l a n c e  of  payments was aggrava ted  t o  a 
c e r t a i n  e x ten t  by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  such as A l l i e d  
d e l a y  in s a n c t i o n in g  t h e  enforcement of German import and 
expor t  c o n t r o l s  in Occupied T e r r i t o r y .  In unoccupied Germany
3.
customs were paid in  gold from 21 J u l y  1919» expo r t s  were 
s u b je c t  t o  l i c e n s e  from 27 November 1919» and imports  w'ere
1. For import  f i g u r e s  in t h e s e  months: see above,  p .3 7  •
Cf.  The Econom is t . 29 November 1919> pp* 9^ 3 -^ .  ( B e r l i n  
C or responden t ,  15 November 1919)*
2. i b i d .  See a l s o :  E r z b e r g e r ,  16 August 1919> N a t i o n a l v e r Samm­
lung , V o l .  329, pp.  2512-4; F.  U rb ig ,  "The P r a c t i c a b i l i t y  
of Exchange C o n t r o l " ,  NGCRE, 20 A p r i l  1922,  p .  30»
3» Di e  Entwicklung d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p.  11*
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v a r i o u s l y  r e s t r i c t e d  in t h e  cou r se  of 1919. However, in 
t h e  Occupied T e r r i t o r i e s  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  of customs in  gold 
was not  al lowed by t h e  A l l i e s  u n t i l  6 December 1919, 1  2345* t h e
l i c e n s i n g  of expor ts  did not  beg in  u n t i l  6 March 1920, and
„ . 2 .
German import c o n t r o l s  came i n t o  f o r c e  only on 31 March 1920.
The u n d e s i r a b l e  impact exe r t ed  upon t h e  ba lance  of t r a d e  and
a l s o  upon p u b l i c  revenue by t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of t h i s  "Hole in  t h e
3West" was t h e  s u b je c t  of r e p e a te d  German p r o t e s t s ;  * and i t  was
4
dep lo red  by B r i t i s h  obse rve rs  in  Germany e a r l y  in  1920.
A d m in i s t r a t i v e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  were a l s o  encountered  in 
o p e ra t in g  t h e  F ore ign  Trade  O f f ice s  ( A u ss e n h a n d e l s s t e i l e n ) 
which had been s e t  up in  December 1919 t o  c o n t r o l  th e  volume 
and t h e  p r i c e  of e x p o r t s .  A f t e r  t h e  improvement of t h e  mark 
in t h e  s p r in g  of 1920 much of t h e  o r i g i n a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
t h e  complica ted  c o n t r o l  system,  which had been des igned  t o  
p reven t  German goods from being sold abroad a t  unduly  low 
p r i c e s ,  was removed.  * T h e r e a f t e r  t h e  slowness of t h e  c o n t r o l  
o r g a n i s a t i o n  in a d j u s t i n g  i t s  l e v i e s  in harmony with  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  of t h e  mark was a f r e q u e n t  s u b j e c t  of compla int
1. DBFP, V ol .  I I ,  p .  523.
2. J .W.F .  T h e l w a l l ,  "General  Report  on . . .  Germany in December, 
1920",  l o c .  c i t . ,  pp.  8-9 ;  S t u a r t  t o  Curzon,  17 A p r i l  1920, 
DBFP. V ol .  IX, pp.  416-8.
3.  Gothein  (DDP), 1 October 1919» N a t i o n a l v erSammlung. V o l .  329» 
pp. 2797-8; E r z b e r g e r ,  i b i d . ,  p p . 2800-3; Pohlmann (DDP),
27 February  1920, i b i d . ,  V o l .  332 , p. 4550.
4. Kilmarnock t o  Curzon,  31 «January 1920, DBFP. V o l .  IX, p. 27; 
S t u a r t  t o  Wat e r low, 4 February  1920, i b i d . ,  pp .  36- 8 .
5.  Enc . in  Kilmarnock t o  Curzon,  22 May 1920,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  IX,
P. 491.
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amongst German e x p o r t e r s ,
F o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s ,  among them t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n ,  
a l s o  h e l p  t o  e x p la in  t h e  i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h e  German 
governm en t ' s  e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i cy  a t  t h i s  t i m e .  The 
d e b a t e s  in  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly in August 1919 on t h e  s u b j e c t  
of cu rb ing  c a p i t a l  f l i g h t  r e v e a l  t h a t  an im por tan t  impetus t o
t h e  expor t  of c a p i t a l  was t h e  d e s i r e  t o  evade t h e  new t a x e s
2 ,which were be ing  imposed by t h e  f e d e r a l  government,  * The 
p ro s p e c t  t h a t  t h e  proceeds  of t h e s e  t a x e s  might be absorbed 
in r e p a r a t i o n  payments t o  t h e  A l l i e s  could e a s i l y  have  been 
an added inducement t o  t h i s  form of t a x  e v a s io n .  However, 
t h e  sp eak e r s  in t h e  d e b a t e  always r e f e r r e d  in g e n e r a l  te rms  
t o  c a p i t a l  f l i g h t  as  a product  of t h e  l o s t  war and t h e  a f t e r m a t h !  
The only d isagreement appea rs  t o  have been over t h e  qu es t io n  of 
whether  t h e  old or t h e  new regime was more t o  blame f o r  c r e a t i n g
4#
t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  which gave r i s e  t o  t h e  exodus of f u n d s .
The in f l u e n c e  of l i b e r a l  economic i d e a s ,  which had 
c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  p remature  su spens ion  of exchange c o n t r o l s  
in J u l y ,  was a l s o  ev iden t  in t h i s  d e b a t e .  The governm en t ' s  
p ro p o s a l  sought t o  check c a p i t a l  f l i g h t  by s t i p u l a t i n g  t h a t  
n o te s  and s e c u r i t i e s  should be consigned overseas  only through 
banks ( p a r a .  l ) .  I t  f u r t h e r  empowered t h e  F inance  M in i s t e r  t o  
f l u s h  c a p i t a l  hoarded by tax  evaders  w i th i n  Germany by c a l l i n g
1. For a p r o t e s t  a g a i n s t  t h e  expor t  l e v i e s :  Iron Age. 15 J u l y  
1920,  p .1 4 2 .  On t h e  i n e f f i c i e n c y  of t h e  F ore ign  Trade 
O f f i c e s ;  The E conom is t . 4 December 1920, p . 987.
2 .  E r z b e r g e r ,  l6 August 1919» Nationalversammlung;. V o l ,  329»
pp.  2512-4.  ..................... ............ ..
3 .  E . g .  Raschig  (DDF), i b i d , ,  p ,  2508.
4.  Braun (SPD), i b i d . ,  p.  2512.
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i n ,  en d o rs in g  and c o n v e r t in g  no te s  and s e c u r i t i e s  ( p a r a .  7)«^* 
Although t h e  s t i p u l a t i o n  t h a t  c a p i t a l  expo r ts  should he made 
only th ro u g h  hanks was f a r  l e s s  seve re  th a n  t h e  p r o v i s io n  of 
t h e  w ar - t im e  Fore ign  Exchange R egu la t ions  t h a t  t h e y  should he 
approved hy t h e  Reichshank ,  t h e r e  was c o n s id e r a b l e  o p p o s i t i o n
p
t o  t h e  h i l l  in committee from l i b e r a l  f r e e  t r a d e r s .  The 
u n f a v o u ra b le  a t t i t u d e  of f i n a n c i a l l y  i n f l u e n t i a l  groups w i th i n  
t h e  Assembly was g iven  f u l l  e x p re s s ion  hy R i e s s e r  (DVP) who, 
a f t e r  p r e d i c t i n g  t h a t  i t  would he im poss ib le  t o  s to p  t h e  
f l i g h t  of c a p i t a l ,  c r i t i c i s e d  t h e  law on t h e  grounds t h a t  i t  
v i o l a t e d  commercial  p r iv ac y  and t h a t  i t s  p ro v i s io n s  f o r  t h e  
endorsement of n o te s  would cause a s h o r t a g e  of c i r c u l a t i n g  
media."''* The widespread  acc ep tan c e  of such views could e a s i l y  
have had a s e r i o u s  e f f e c t  on Germany’s i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  
f in an e  e s •
But,  d e s p i t e  t h e s e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s ,  
Germany’s e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  problems were due b a s i c a l l y  to  
economic d i s l o c a t i o n  and f i n a n c i a l  apprehens ions  which had 
been induced by t h e  war and by t h e  a f t e rm a th  and which could 
no t  be  cured by t h e .u n a i d e d  e f f o r t s  of t h e  German government.
I t  was perhaps a symptom of t h i s  t h a t  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n s  of 
Germany’ s f o r e i g n  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  in t h e  N a t i o n a l  Assembly 
were e i t h e r  p redom inan t ly  p a r t i s a n  in c h a r a c t e r  or  were 
n o t i c e a b l y  a p a t h e t i c .  In October 1919 members of t h e  DVP and
1. Gesetz gegen d i e  K a p i t a l f l u c h t ,  vom 8,  September 1919 » 
R e i c h s g e s e t z b l a t t ,  1919» pp.  1540-2.
2.  Hampe (DNVP), 16 August 1919» Nationalversammlung , Vol.329» 
P. 2507.
3. Becker (DVP), i b i d . ,  pp.  2510-11.
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DNVP a t t r i b u t e d  Germany’s e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  p l i g h t  and t h e  
f a l l  of t h e  mark t o  t h e  r a d i c a l  domestic f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  
which was be ing  pursued by t h e  government,  and i n s i s t e d  t h a t  
only a more l i b e r a l  programme would r e s t o r e  bad ly  needed 
domest ic  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  conf idence  in Germany,^* In r e p l y ,  
t h e  government blamed t h e  s t a t e  of t h e  mark exchange on 
i n s u p e r a b l e  economic f o r c e s ,  above a l l  t h e  u n fav o u rab le  t r a d e  
b a l a n c e ,  and a s s e r t e d  t h a t  any German reco v e ry  would not  be
2 .l a s t i n g  u n l e s s  i t  were based on a re form of domestic  f i n a n c e s , " ’ 
I t  was in keep ing  w i th  t h i s  emphasis of p u re ly  domestic 
f i n a n c i a l  p o l i t i c s  t h a t  t h e r e  was h a rd ly  any r e f e r e n c e  in t h e  
d e b a t e  t o  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n .  The N a t i o n a l i s t ,  S c h i e l e ,  
d id  a t  one s t a g e  argue a g a i n s t  any a t tempt at  f i n a n c i a l  reform 
u n t i l  Germany’s r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s  were f i x e d ,  on t h e  
grounds  t h a t  t h e  E n t e n t e  would i n c r e a s e  i t s  demands once t h e  
German budget  was b a l a n c e d ,  ^  * Hov/ever, S c h i e l e  was round ly  
rebuked by t h e  C e n t r i s t ,  Bolz ,  who i n s i s t e d  t h a t  in t h e  p r e s e n t
s t a t e  of German f i n a n c e s  n o th in g  could j u s t i f y  any de lay  in
4.
implementing r e fo rm s .
The cont inued  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of Germany's e x t e r n a l  
f i n a n c e s  caused a h e i g h te n in g  of t h e  p a r t i s a n  p i t c h  of d e b a t e  
in t h e  Assembly.  In December 1919 a r ig h t - w i n g  a t t a c k  on t h e
1. I n t e r p e l l a t i o n  de r  Abgeordneten Heinze und Genossen 
b e t r e f f e n d  d i e  d e u t s c h e  V a l u t a ,  24 September 1919, i b i d , ,  
V o l .  539 ,  Anl,  106 l;  Hugo (DVP), 1 October 1919,  i b i d . ,
V o l .  329,  PP. 2784-9.
2. E r z b e r g e r ,  D e n k s c h r i f t  "Zur V a l u t a f r a g e " ,  27 September 1919, 
i b i d . ,  V o l ,  339,  Anl.  1067; E r z b e r g e r ,  10 October 1919,  
i b i d . ,  V o l .  329,  pp.  2793-4.
3.  S c h i e l e  (DNVP), i b i d . ,  p.  2807.
4.  Bolz (Zent rum),  i b i d . ,  p .  28o8,
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government’ s domestic  and f o r e i g n  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c i e s  f e a t u r e d  
a f a m i l i a r  d i a t r i b e  a g a i n s t  c o n t r o l s  which ,  i t  was c la imed ,  
d e s t ro y ed  t h e  economy’s n a t u r a l  b a l a n c e ,  and a g a i n s t  t a x a t i o n ,  
which was a l l e g e d  t o  r a i s e  p r i c e s  and absorb  v i t a l l y - n e e d e d  
working c a p i t a l , 1 * For t h e  r e s t  i t  c o n s i s t e d  mainly of p a r t i s a n
r e c r i m i n a t i o n  about  t h e  c o n t r a s t  between t h e  p r e s e n t  p l i g h t
2,
of Germany and e a r l i e r  more prosperous  t i m e s ,  E rz b e rg e r  had 
l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t y  in r e v e a l i n g  t h e  f laws  in t h e  f i n a n c i a l  and 
economic arguments of t h e  government’s c r i t i c s ;  and he was 
quick t o  blame Germany's d i f f i c u l t i e s  on t h e  w ar - t im e  economic 
p o l i c i e s  of t h e  old regime.- '*  I t  was symbolic of t h e  f u t i l i t y  
of t h e  d e b a t e  and of t h e  pow er le ssness  of t h e  government t o  
remedy t h e  e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  m a la i s e  t h a t ,  a f t e r  t h e  government 
speakers  had made t h e i r  r e p l i e s ,  t h e  Assembly ad journed f o r  want 
of a quorum.
The fundamenta l  r eason  f o r  t h e  e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  
h e l p l e s s n e s s  of t h e  German government was i t s  i n a b i l i t y  t o  
l i m i t  or t o  c o n s o l i d a t e  Germany’ s e x t e r n a l  f l o a t i n g  d e b t .  In 
t h e  per iod  b e f o r e  mid-1920 s e v e r a l  c r e d i t s  were ob ta ined  t o  
f a c i l i t a t e  imports  of food and raw m a t e r i a l s ;  and ar rangements 
were made f o r  t h e  supp ly  of raw m a t e r i a l s  by f o r e ig n  f i n a n c i e r s  
in  r e t u r n  f o r  e i t h e r  an i n t e r e s t  in t h e  b u s in e s s  of t h e  German
1. I n t e r p e l l a t i o n . . . b e t r e f f end W i r t s c h a f t s -u n d  S t e u e r p o l i t i k  
sowie das  u n a b l ä s s i g e  und ungeheuer S te ig e ru n g  a l l e r  F r e i s e ,  
i b i d . ,  V o l .  340, Anl.  1792; In t  e r p e l l a t i o n . . . b e t r e f f end d i e  
Ein-und Ausfuhr ,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  3^0,  Anl ,  1795» Hugo (DVP), 19 
December 1919» i b i d , ,  V o l .  331? PP« 4166-74.
2.  Mumm (DNVP), i b i d . ,  p.  4175.
3 .  E r z b e r g e r ,  i b i d . ,  p p .4185-90»
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r e c ip ie n t  or a r ight to  the  f in ish e d  goods produced by him*
But t h e s e  were stop-gap  measures which would, at b e s t ,  only  
d elay  th e  growth of the ex ter n a l  f lo a t in g  d eb t .  So long as 
a huge amount of German paper money and sh ort-term  s e c u r i t i e s  
remained unabsorbed or uncovered by any la r g e  s c a le  long-term  
in te r n a t io n a l  loan , th e  s t a b i l i t y  of th e  mark was never 
assu red .
This in a b i l i t y  t o  obtain s u b s ta n t ia l  fore ign  
a s s i s ta n c e  was in part due to  th e  reparation  q u es t io n . U n t i l  
th e  con clus ion  of th e  Spa Agreement in Ju ly  1920, Germany had 
even been unable to  obtain  c r e d i t s  from th e  A l l i e s  under
A r t ic l e  235 of th e  t r e a t y  in order to  meet her immediate needs
2.
for  food and raw m ater ia ls ." -* Moreover, although th e
f lo t a t i o n  of a la r g e - s c a le  loan on the  s e c u r i t y  of Germany's
fu ture  reparation payments was envisaged by th e  A l l i e s  in t h e i r
d is c u s s io n  of the  gen era l reparation  q u es t io n ,  progress in
t h i s  d ir e c t io n  was prevented by the absence of any agreement
•3 #
on Germany's t o t a l  reparation  o b lig a t io n .^ *
However, n e ith e r  th e  s a t i s f a c t o r y  sett lem en t of the  
reparation  question  nor th e  gen era l f in a n c ia l  reconstru ction
1. For d e t a i l s  of c r e d it s  obtained by Germany: Stuart to  
Curzon, 25 February 1920, DBFF. V o l .  IX, p. 96• C. R is t ,  
op. c i t . ,  p. 205* On fo re ig n  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in German 
firm s; J.W.F. T h e lw a ll ,  "General Report on. .  . .Germany in 
December 1920", l o c . c i t ,  p. 6 .
2 . See above, pp .138-42 .
3 . The g en era l reparation  scheme drawn up by th e  A llied  
f in a n c ia l  experts on 21-2 June 1920 at th e  Boulogne 
Conference recommended that Germany should is su e  a s e r ie s  
of loans with th e  support of th e  Reparation Commission, 
DBFF, V o l.  V III ,  p. 338.
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of Europe were p o s s i b l e  w i thou t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
of t h e  United  S t a t e s  government.  Hopes of such an i n t e r v e n t i o n  
receded r a t h e r  than  grew in  t h e  per iod  b e fo re  June 1920 
because  of t h e  r e f u s a l  of t h e  Sena te  t o  r a t i f y  t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  
T r e a t y .  W i l s o n ' s  t r a g i c  f a i l u r e  t o  o b ta in  r a t i f i c a t i o n  on both  
19 November 1919 and 19 March 1920 was, in t h e  f i r s t  i n s t a n c e ,  
t h e  r e s u l t  of a pu re ly  domest ic  p a r ty  p o l i t i c a l  s t r u g g l e  and of 
h i s  own t a c t i c s  r a t h e r  than  of any i r r e v o c a b l e  d i s l i k e  of t h e  
American people  f o r  t h e  treaty."*"* But t h e  f i n a n c i a l  im p l i c a t i o n s  
of t h i s  f a i l u r e  f o r  Germany were d i s a s t r o u s .  On 31 Jan u a ry  1920, 
Kilmarnock r e p o r te d  t h e  s u b s t a n c e  of an in t e rv ie w  which had t a k e n  
p l a c e  between E rzb e rg e r  and D r e s e l ,  t h e  American Commissioner in 
B e r l i n .  E r z b e r g e r ,  a f t e r  e x p re s s in g  hopes of loans  from H o l land ,  
Denmark, Sweden, Sw i tze r l and  and Spain ,  had s t r e s s e d  t h a t  Germany 
was " c h i e f l y  anxious  t o  o b ta in  l a r g e  c r e d i t s  in t h e  United
S t a t e s " .  D re s e l  had ,  however,  d iscounted  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of an
2 .
American loan  u n t i l  t h e  t r e a t y  had been r a t i f i e d  by Congress .
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  n o n - r a t i f i c a t i o n  was r e i n f o r c i n g  a t r end  
towards  f i n a n c i a l  i s o l a t i o n i s m  which was t o  become s t r o n g e r  and 
s t r o n g e r  in  succeeding  months.
The per iod  between June  1920 and t h e  end of A p r i l  1921 
w i tne ssed  a d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of t h e  German governm en t ' s  f inanc es  
which was checked only momentar i ly and s l i g h t l y  in t h e  l a s t
1. For an i n c i s i v e  account  of t h e  reasons  fo r  t h e  non­
r a t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  t r e a t y :  W.S. H o l t ,  T r e a t i e s  Defea ted
by t h e  S e n a t e , pp.  249-307* See a l s o  T.A. B a i l e y ,  Woodrow 
Wilson and t h e  Great  B e t r a y a l , passim.
2.  Kilmarnock t o  Curzon,  31 Jan u a ry  1920, DBFP, Vol.  IX, p .2 6 .
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q u a r t e r  of 1920, v i z 1.
Income E x p e n d i tu re
( m i l l i o n ( m i l l i o n
1920
gold marks) gold marks)
June 193.5 1 ,4 4 1 .6












I n c r e a s e  in T o t a l
F l o a t i n g  Debt F lo a t in g  Debt
( m i l l i o n ( b i l l i o n
gold m a rk s ) paper marks)
1 ,2 4 0 .0 113.2
1 ,0 1 5 .1 122.7
591 .9 129.4








The major cause  of t h e  budge ta ry  imbalance was c l e a r l y  t h a t ,  
w h i l e  ex p e n d i tu r e s  remained h ig h ,  income in  te rm s  of gold 
lagged behind a t  about i t s  1913 l e v e l  of 3*5 b i l l i o n  marks.
The f a i l u r e  of revenue t o  i n c r e a s e  r a p i d l y  was due,  
as  in t h e  p reced ing  p e r i o d ,  l a r g e l y  t o  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  of t h e  
new f i s c a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t o  cope a d e q u a te ly  w ith  t h e  burdens  
which had been placed upon i t .  Although t h e  y i e l d s  from 
r e l a t i v e l y  un im por tan t  s e l f - c o l l e c t i n g  stamp d u t i e s  exceeded 
e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  t h e  r e t u r n  from a l l  o th e r  major t a x e s  except 
t h e  income t a x  -  much of which came from au tom at ic  wage d e d u c t io n s  
d id  n o t ,  in t h e  months Ju ly -S ep tem ber  1920,  show any s u b s t a n t i a l
2 .
or s u s t a in e d  improvement over t h a t  of t h e  p r e v io u s  q u a r t e r ,  v i z ,
1 . F ig u re s  from C, B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op.  c i t , ,  pp,  437-9*
2.  D e n k s c h r i f t  ü b e r . . . . R e i c h s s t e u e r n , 25 October 1920. 
R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  364,  Anl.  720. For f i g u r e s  fo r  months 
A p r i l  t o  June 1920,  see above,  p .  238.
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T a x  Es t . Annua l A c t u a 1 Y i e l d
Yield (pape r  marks)
( m i l l i o n  
paper mks)
J  U  1 V Autfu s t Sept ember
Income Tax 12,000 396, 375,254 555, 513,814 749,022,480
C orpo ra t ion  Tax 900 - - -
Dividend Tax 1,300 22, 380,615 16 ,001 ,387 22, 380,530
Reichsno t  o p fer 3,500 135, 998,597 61 ,929 ,428 110,139,437
P r o p e r ty  Tax 100 1,102,441
15,320,182
438,143 173,207
I n h e r i t a n c e  Tax 620 15, 510,629 15,524,785
S a le s  Tax 
War Levy on
3,700 70, 797,843 87, 631,894 107,090,149
C a p i t a l  Gains 
E x t r a o r d i n a r y
4,300 l 6 , 966,057 37 , 175,366 67, 68l ,636
War Levy 1917 




162 ,958,620 207, 175,562 215,103,953
I t  w i l l  be n o t i c e d  t h a t  in t h e  case  of t h e  C o rpo ra t ion  Tax 
no r e t u r n s  had been r e c e iv e d  a t  a l l .  The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  hampering t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  of t h e  R e ic h s n o to p fe r  
were t y p i c a l .  The d e a d l i n e  f o r  t h e  submiss ion  of d e c l a r a t i o n s
was extended s e v e r a l  t im e s  u n t i l  i t  was f i n a l l y  f ix e d  a t  30
1,
September 1920, I t  was not  u n t i l  November 1920 t h a t  t h e  
y i e l d  of t h e  Reichsnot  opf er  in c re as ed  t o  a r e a s o n a b le  l e v e l ,  
and even th e n  t h i s  was due t o  p r i v i l e g e s  g r a n t e d  f o r  payments 
made b e f o r e  1 January  1921.  * R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of  both  t h e  
Right  and t h e  Left  con t inued  th ro u g h o u t  t h e  p e r io d  t o  blame
3 .
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  f a c t o r s  f o r  t h e  lowness of t a x  r e t u r n s *
The e f f e c t  of d e l a y s  in assessment and c o l l e c t i o n  was
1. V «V. Badulesco ,  op. c i t , ,  p .  4 5 l .
2. i b i d , ,  p .  453«
3. Becker (DVP), 18 December 1920. R e i c h s t a g .  V o l .  346, p . l 8 6 6 ;  
K e i l  (3RD), 22 Jan u a ry  1921,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  3*7 ,  p.  2012.  Cf. 
D'Abernon t o  Curzon, 30 J u ly  1920, DBFP. V o l .  X, p, 501.  
D’Abernon p e r c e p t i v e l y  emphasised t h e  p s y c h o lo g i c a l  d i f f i c u l t y  
of suddenly  i n t r o d u c in g  i n t e n s i v e  t a x a t i o n  in a n a t io n  which 
was unaccustomed t o  a heavy t a x  bu rden .
s e r i o u s l y  aggrava ted  by t h e  d e c l i n i n g  va lue  of t h e  mark* For
most of t h e  second h a l f  of 1920, t h e  d o l l a r  r a t e  r o s e  sudden ly ,
1.
V 1 Z j
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30 June 1920 3 3 . 5
31 J u l y  1920 42.5
31 August 1920 49.8
30 3 ept emb er  1920 62.2
31 October  1920 7 6 . 5
30 November 1920 7 0 .7
31 December 1920 73*3
The peak of t h i s  r i s e  a c t u a l l y  occurred on 12 November, when 
t h e  d o l l a r  was quoted a t  87.6  paper marks.  A f t e r  t h i s  t h e r e
was something of a r e c o v e ry ,  which was fo l lowed  in  t h e  e a r l y
2 .
months of 1921 by a per iod  of r e l a t i v e  s t a b i l i t y ,  v i z ,
31 Jan u a ry  1921 60 .5
28 February  1921 63*0
31 March 1921 62 .5
30 A p r i l  1921 66.0
The v a l u e  of t h e  mark had t h e r e f o r e  f a l l e n  n o t i c e a b l y  over 
t h e  pe r iod  as  a whole .  Th is  reduced d i s a s t r o u s l y  t h e  r e a l  
v a l u e  of  t h e  y i e ld  from d i r e c t  t a x e s ,  above a l l  t h o s e  which ,  
l i k e  t h e  War-Time C a p i t a l  Gains Levy and t h e  R e i c h s n o t o p f e r , 
were a s s e s s e d  on t h e  v a lu e  of p ro p e r ty  he ld  on f ix ed  d a t e s  - 
30 June 1919 and 31 December 1919 r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Given a d e l a y  
in assessm ent  and c o l l e c t i o n ,  any r i s e  in t h e  paper  v a lu e  of 
p r o p e r ty  a f t e r  t h e s e  d a t e s  c o r re s p o n d in g ly  reduced t h e  s e v e r i t y  
of t h e  t a x e s  a c t u a l l y  p a i d .  The i n f l a t i o n  of v a lu e s  was in 
f a c t  so g r e a t  in  t h i s  pe r iod  t h a t ,  acco rd ing  t o  one a u t h o r i t y ,  
payments due under  t h e  War-Time C a p i t a l  Gains Levy which had 
a t  t h e i r  o r i g i n a l  assessment in  June 1919 amounted t o  80^ of
1 . Die Entwicklunp; d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p p . 13-15*
2 . i b i d , ,  pp.  l 6- l 8 .
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of i n c r e a s e s  in wea lth  were reduced by t h e  end of 1920 t o  2 0 / . 1.
This  meant no t  only t h a t  p ro p e r ty  owners escaped l i g h t l y ,  bu t  
a l s o  t h a t  e x p e n d i tu r e s ,  many of  which were s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  
g e n e r a l  i n f l a t i o n  of v a l u e s ,  tended t o  o u t s t r i p  r ev en u e s .  The 
r e l a t i v e  i n f l e x i b i l i t y  of paper  revenues  a t  a t im e  when paper
e x p e n d i tu r e  was i n c r e a s i n g  r a p i d l y  was r e f l e c t e d  in t h e  s u c c e s s -
2 ,ive  e s t i m a t e s  and f i n a l  f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  budget  of 1920/ 2 1 , v iz  , *
( b i l l i o n  paper marks)
TOTAL E X P E N D  I  T U R E
Ordinary Ext r a o r d i n a r v  P ub l ic  T o t a l
■T;; T r e a t y  Other Ut i l i t  i e s  E x p en d i tu re
2320,
A p r i l 27.9 27.9 5 . 0 6,6 13.0 5 2 .5
J u ly 27.7 27.7 5 . 0 6,6 l 6 . 0 5 5 .3
Oct ober 39.9 39.9 41.4 11.2 1 9 .2 111.7
1921
January 39.9 39.9 41.4 22,0 1 9 .2 1 2 2 .5
F i n a l
Budget 4 4 .5 4 4 .5 42.8 48.0 21.2 156 .5
A ctua l
Budget 50 .9 51 .9 25.6 67.7 21.2 166.4
The in c r e a s e  in es t im a ted  and a c t u a l  ex p e n d i tu re s  was 
due p a r t l y  t o  t h e  a d d i t i o n  of e n t i r e l y  new i tems in  t h e  l a t e r  
b u d g e t s .  In t h e  October e s t i m a t e ,  9*4 of t h e  12 b i l l i o n  
i n c r e a s e  in o rd in a ry  ex p e n d i tu re  was caused by t h e  i n c l u s i o n  fo r
1, 
2 .
Hertz (U3PD), 22 January  1921,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  347, p.  2028.
Cf,  The Econom is t , 15 Janua ry  1921, pp.88-9*
Sources :  ( l )  A p r i l  1920: W i r th ,  Nat i o n a l v erSammlung.
26 A p r i l  1920,  V ol .  333,  p .  5439.
(2) J u ly  1920: R e i c h s t a g , V ol .  364,  Anl.  254.
(3) October 1920: i b i d . ,  W i r t h , 21 October 1920,  
V ol .  345, pp.  794-7.
(4) January  1921: V,V. Badulesco ,  op. c i t , , p . 2 4 7 .
(5)  A ctua l  Budget: R e i c h s h a u s h a l t rechnung 1920. 
R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  375,  Anl.  4883.
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t h e  f i r s t  t im e  of d i sbu r sem en ts  which were t o  be made by t h e  
f e d e r a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  t h e  s t a t e  governments.  S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  
i n c r e a s e  of p r o j e c t e d  e x p e n d i tu r e s  a r i s i n g  out of t h e  t r e a t y  
from 5 b i l l i o n s  t o  41 b i l l i o n s  r e p r e s e n t e d  an upward r e v i s i o n  
of  t h e  e s t im a ted  r e a l  cos t  of t h e  t r e a t y  t o  Germany, However, 
t h e  f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  d e f i c i t s  of t h e  p u b l i c  u t i l i t i e s  and f o r  
g e n e r a l  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  e x p e n d i tu r e  almost  c e r t a i n l y  r e f l e c t e d  
t h e  d e c l i n i n g  v a l u e  of t h e  mark.  I t  was,  moreover,  t h e  r ap id  
i n c r e a s e  of t h e  l a t t e r  c a t e g o r i e s  of expend i tu re  r a t h e r  t h a n  
t h e  s i z e  of t r e a t y  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  which was in t h e  end 
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  most of t h e  d e f i c i t .
I t  i s  h ig h ly  l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  s h o r t - t e r m  i n s t a b i l i t y  of 
t h e  mark in t h i s  per iod  was in f lu en ced  by t h e  development of 
t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n .  The f a i l u r e  t o  r e a c h  any f i n a l  
r e p a r a t i o n  s e t t l e m e n t  a t  Spa in J u l y  1920 does not  appea r  t o  
have had any dramatic  e f f e c t .  However, t h e  r i s i n g  t i d e  of 
compla in t  which was voiced  in Germany in ensuing months on t h e  
s u b je c t  of t h e  Spa co a l  d e l i v e r i e s  was p robab ly  p a r t l y  t o  blame 
f o r  t h e  f a l l  of t h e  mark in September and O ctober .  The i n f l u e n c e  
of  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  seems t o  be most obvious du r ing  t h e  
v i o l e n t  d e p r e c i a t i o n  which occurred  between 25 October 1920,  
when t h e  d o l l a r  r a t e  s tood a t  69. 6 , and 12 November when i t  had 
reached 87« 5 *  S p e c u l a t io n  a g a i n s t  t h e  mark was almost 
c e r t a i n l y  encouraged du r ing  t h i s  per iod  by b i r t h ’s budget  
speech of 27 October and t h e  ensuing  budget  d e b a t e  in which 
1. Die Entwicklung d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p.  15.
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Germany’s r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s  were g iven  a g r e a t  d e a l  of 
p rom inence ,“ * However, the  subsequent  r e c o v e ry  of t h e  mark, 
and i t s  r e l a t i v e  s t a b i l i t y  in t h e  e a r l y  months of 1921,when 
r e p a r a t i o n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  were g e n e r a t i n g  a c o n s id e r a b l e  amount 
of i l l - f e e l i n g  w i th i n  Germany, reduce t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h e  
r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  as a s h o r t - t e r m  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  e x t e r n a l  
v a lu e  of German c u r re n c y .
In f a c t ,  t h e  v a l u e  of t h e  mark over any c o n s id e r a b l e  
per iod  depended not on s h o r t - t e r m  s p e c u l a t i o n  but  on such 
f a c t o r s  a s  t h e  b a lan ce  of payments and t h e  s i z e  of  Germany’s 
e x t e r n a l  f l o a t i n g  d e b t .  The r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  d id  a f f e c t  
bo th  of t h e s e  f a c t o r s  by i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  German t r a d e  d e f i c i t
and by damaging Germany’ s c r e d i t .  But i t s  i n f l u e n c e  in  both
2 .
t h e s e  a r e a s  was com para t ive ly  s l i g h t .  Hence i t  cannot  be 
blamed t o  any l a r g e  e x t e n t  f o r  c r e a t i n g  t h e  u n d e r ly i n g  
c o n d i t i o n s  which made t h e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  mark p o s s i b l e  
and which undermined t h e  e f f o r t s  of t h e  German government t o  
i n c r e a s e  p u b l i c  r evenue s .
The imbalance of t h e  German budget  cannot  be exp la ined  
e n t i r e l y  in terms of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and t h e  
d e c l i n i n g  v a l u e  of t h e  mark.  The f a i l u r e  of paper  revenues  t o  
i n c r e a s e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  was a l s o  due t o  a p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  and 
p o l i t i c a l l y  induced i n f l e x i b i l i t y  in t h e  German f i s c a l  a p p a r a t u s .  
In t h i s  connec t ion  t h e  f l u c t u a t i n g  and u n c e r t a i n  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  
and p o l i t i c a l  impact of n e g o t i a t i o n s  over t h e  r e p a r a t i o n
1. See a b o v e ,  p p , 183-6.
2 .  See be low,  p p . 289-92.
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q u e s t i o n  has been examined. However, t h e  f i s c a l  d e b a t e s  of 
t h e s e  months seem t o  r e v e a l  t h a t  a more c o n s i s t e n t  and powerful  
i n f l u e n c e  was exer ted  upon t h e  l e v e l  of German p u b l i c  revenue 
by p u re ly  domestic  p o l i t i c a l  p r e o c c u p a t io n s .  A f t e r  t h e  swing 
t o  t h e  r i g h t  a t  t h e  e l e c t i o n s  of June 1920, t h e  Weimar 
c o a l i t i o n  of 3FD, DDF, and Zentrum was succeeded by a more 
c o n s e r v a t i v e  DDF-Zentrum-DVP c a b i n e t .  The SPD, which had 
e x e r t e d  p r e s s u r e  in t h e  Bauer Cabinet  in favour  of s t e r n  
p r o p e r t y  t a x a t i o n ,  was now rep la ced  by t h e  DVP, a f i rm  
opponent of many of E rz b e rg e r* s  f i n a n c i a l  r e f o r m s .  This  did  
no t  cause  any n o t i c e a b l e  r e v e r s a l  of t h e  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  
i n a u g u ra te d  by Er zb erg  e r ;  but i t  inc re ased  t h e  s t r e n g t h  of 
t h e  o p p o s i t i o n ,  both  i n s i d e  and o u t s id e  t h e  government,  t o  
e f f o r t s  t o  adapt  E r z b e r g e r ’s d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  t a x e s  t o  
f l u c t u a t i n g  f i n a n c i a l  and economic c o n d i t i o n s .
The g e n e r a l  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  new German government 
t o  t h e  f i s c a l  q u e s t i o n  was r e v ea led  when Bergmann, a German 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  a t  t h e  B ru s s e l s  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  
Conference of  September 1920, claimed t h a t  Germany had gone t o  
t h e  l i m i t  of r e a s o n a b l e  t a x a t i o n ,  " c o n s id e r in g  t h a t  any 
d im in u t io n  of p ro d u c t io n  should be avoided l e s t  t h e  a t tempt
t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  revenue  of t h e  Reich should  lead  t o  t h e
2 .
c o n t r a r y  e f f e c t " .  T h i s  op in ion  was r e p e a t e d  two months l a t e r  
by S c h ro ed e r ,  a German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  a t  t h e  B ru s se l s  r e p a r a t i o n  
co n fe ren c e  of December 1920, who emphasised in p a r t i c u l a r  t h e
1. See above ,  Par t  I I ,  S e c t io n  IV, passim
2.  League of N a t i o n s ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  .Conf e r e n c e  192C, 
V o l .  I l l ,  p .  23.
1.
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i m p o s s i b i l i t y  of i n c r e a s i n g  German d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n .
The f i r s t  domestic  s ig n  of  t h e  changed f i s c a l  s t a t u s  
quo was t h e  u n fa v o u ra b le  r e a c t i o n  of t h e  5FD t o  p ro p o sa l s  f o r  
t h e  amendment of i n d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n .  When, in J u l y  1920,  t h e  
government proposed a y e a r ' s  ex ten s io n  of t h e  l u c r a t i v e  20/£ 
ad va lorem Coal Tax,  t h e  3FD vo iced s t r o n g  o p p o s i t i o n .  In 
committee i t  proposed s u c c e s s i v e l y  t h a t  t h e  ta x  should be 
extended only u n t i l  1 October 1920,  t h a t  t h e  government should 
b e f o r e  t h a t  d a t e  submit p ro p o s a l s  fo r  t h e  s o c i a l i s a t i o n  of t h e
c o a l  i n d u s t r y ,  and t h a t  t h e  t a x  should not  r i s e  above t h e  r a t e
2,
a p p l i c a b l e  on 31 J u ly  1920,  D e s p i t e  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  of a l l  
t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s ,  t h e  government was ob l iged  t o  p l a c a t e  t h e
l e f t  o p p o s i t i o n  by u n d e r t a k in g  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  and t o  p r e p a r e  a
3.
prompt r e p o r t  on t h e  s u b j e c t  of coa l  n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n .  In 
March 1921,  when t h e  q u e s t i o n  of f u r t h e r  renewal  was r a i s e d ,  
j o i n t  SFD-USFD o p p o s i t i o n  made t h e  a d o p t io n  of t h e  p ro p o sa l
4 #
dependent  on t h e  DNVF v o t e .  Thus t h e  3FD which had ,  as  a 
member of t h e  government c o a l i t i o n ,  vo ted  f o r  t h e  S a le s  Tax 
in December 1919, f e l t  f r e e  once i t  had been d iv e s t e d  of 
c a b in e t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  oppose t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  of a v i t a l  
p i e c e  of i n d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n .
P o s s i b l y  more im por tan t  in i t s  e f f e c t  on t h e  l e v e l  of 
government revenue  was t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  Cabinet  t o  
p ro p o s a l s  f o r  r a i s i n g  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  of e x i s t i n g  d i r e c t  t a x e s ,
1. See ab o v e ,  pp.  201-2.
2.  K e i l  (SPD), 30 J u ly  1920,  R e i c h s t a g , V o l .  344,  p .  447.
3.  i b i d . ,  p.  454,
4.  l 8  March 1921, i b i d . ,  V o l .  348,  p p . 3227-8 .  Cf.  H.Jonuschat, 
Die S te u e r p o l i t ik  der Parte ien  im R eichs tag ,  pp.  167-8 .
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This  v/as n o t i c e a b l e  at  t h e  end of 1920 d u r in g  d i s c u s s i o n s  of
l Ti r t h * s  p ro p o s a l  f o r  t h e  quick assessment and c o l l e c t i o n  of
1.
t h e  R e i c h s n o t op fe r . Late  in  November 1920 t h e  p roposa l  '»as
a t t a c k e d  in t h e  tax  committee by members of t h e  DDP and DVP 
as  w e l l  a s  by t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t  H e l f f e r i c h .  * Although t h e  DDP 
was won round t o  suppor t  t h e  measure ,  t h e  DVP remained adamant 
and a Cabinet  c r i s i s  developed  when t h e  Zentrum and DDP 
demanded t h a t  t h e  DVP should e i t h e r  acc ep t  p a r t  of t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  law or l e av e  t h e  c o a l i t i o n .  The DVP 
e v e n t u a l l y  gave i t s  suppor t  t o  t h e  measure ,  l a r g e l y  because  
of t h e  u n d e s i r a b i l i t y  of  l e a v in g  t h e  Cabinet  on t h e  eve of t h e  
e l e c t i o n s  f o r  t h e  P r u s s i a n  Landtag .  Eut t h e  DVF was,  in 
p r a c t i c e ,  ob l iged  t o  v o t e  immediate ly  only f o r  a p r i v a t e  b i l l  
in t roduced  on 15 December which was concerned s o l e l y  w i th  t h e  
f i r s t  p a r t  of W i r t h ' s  o r i g i n a l  p ro p o s a l  d e a l i n g  w i th  quick 
assessment
A s e p a r a t e  b i l l ,  in t roduced  by t h e  government on 17
December, which con ta ined  p r o v i s io n s  f o r  quick payment did  not
4 #
become law u n t i l  6 J u l y  1921.  * The o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  measure ,  
bo th  in t h e  Committee and in t h e  R e ic h s ta g  p r o p e r ,  was based
e x c l u s i v e l y  upon f e a r s  of t h e  c o n f i s c a t i o n  of w e a l th  and of
5 #
f i n a n c i a l  d i s l o c a t i o n . "  * I t  was symptomatic t h a t  members of
1 . Entwurf  eines  G es tezes  zur b e s c h l e u n ig t e n  Erhebung d e 3 
R e ic h s n o to p fe r s  und der  K r iegsabgabe  von Vermögenszuwachse,  
13 November 1920,  R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  364,  Anl.  876.
2.  V.V, Badulesco ,  op.  c i t , ,  p .  2,1 1 *
3 . R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  3 6 5 j Anl.  1158
4.  H. J o n u s c h a t ,  op.  c i t . ,  p p . 4 - 9 .
5* V . V .  Badulesco ,  op.  c i t . ,  p .311 .  R e i c h s t a g , l 8 December 
1920,  V o l .  344,  pp.  1859-83.
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t h e  DVP and DNVP expressed  a p r e f e r e n c e ,  as  t h e y  had in 
December 1919» f o r  a fo rced  loan  on t h e  grounds  t h a t  t h e  bonds 
i s sued  t o  s u b s c r i b e r s  could be used by them t o  o b ta in  'working 
c a p i t a l *
The o p p o s i t i o n  groups  both  i n s i d e  and o u t s i d e  t h e  
Cabinet  were a l s o  s t r o n g  enough t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  manner in 
which t h e  R e i c h s n o to p fe r  was t o  be a s s e s s e d ,  A government 
o rde r  of 4 September 1920 had d i r e c t e d  t h a t  landed  p r o p e r ty  
was t o  be va lued  acc o rd ing  t o  i t s  average  y i e l d  in t h e  y e a r s  
1914-19* This  aroused  p r o t e s t s  from t h e  R i g h t ,  which claimed 
t h a t  w a r - t im e  land v a l u e s  were abnormal ly  h igh and demanded
2#
t h a t  the -va lua t ion  pe r iod  should be extended back t o  1908- 9 *
In p r a c t i c e ,  however, as  t h e  Democrat Fohlmann l a t e r  po in ted  
o u t ,  t h e  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  as t o  t h e  b a s i s  of  as sessment was l e f t
3.t o  t h e  l o c a l  t a x  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Th is  was c o n s i s t e n t  with  t h e  
promise which t h e  DVP had e x t r a c t e d  from t h e  government t h a t
t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  of t h e  R e i c h s n o t o p fer  would be a p p l i e d  in a
4.
broad s p i r i t .
The government seems in  p r a c t i c e  t o  have  been more 
concerned t o  remove h a rd s h ip s  imposed upon t a x p a y e r s  by t h e  
f l u c t u a t i o n  of  t h e  mark tha n  i t  was t o  remedy t h e  f a l l  in r e a l  
p u b l i c  revenue* The former  p reocc upa t ion  c e r t a i n l y  i n s p i r e d  t h e  
v a r i o u s  amendments t o  t h e  Income Tax Law which were mooted in 
t h i s  p e r i o d .  The system of wage d e d u c t i o n s ,  which had been a 
77 H e l f f e r i c h  (DNVP), i b i d . ,  p.  i860;  R i e s s e r  (DVP), i b i d . ,
p . l 880 .
2.  H e l f f e r i c h  (DNVF), i b i d . ,  p .  1862; Roes icke  (DNVP), i b i d . ,
P*l88l.
3. 22 J a n u a ry  1921,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  347,  p.  2038.
4 .  V.V, Badu lesco ,  op.  c i t . p*312.
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c e n t r a l  i s s u e  in t h e  o r i g i n a l  Income Tax d e b a t e s ,  aga in  became
I
t h e  s u b je c t  of d i s c u s s i o n  as soon as t h e  R e ic h s ta g  assembled 
in June 1920,  The committee appoin ted  t o  examine t h e  o p e ra t io n  
of wage d e d u c t io n s  almost  unanimously recommended t h e i r  
r e t e n t i o n ;  but  advised  t h a t  t h e  t a r i f f s  of t h e  t a x  should be 
a d j u s t e d  t o  t h e  d e p r e c i a t e d  v a l u e  of t h e  mark,  * Wirth*s 
Income Tax Amendment Law of 16 December 1920 was devised  
p r i m a r i l y  w i th  a view t o  making such an ad jus tm en t  and t o  
r i g h t i n g  o th e r  anomalies in t h e  e x i s t i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n .  I t  was 
s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  one of t h e  few r e v e n u e - r a i s i n g  p roposa ls  
con ta ined  in  th e  measure -  f o r  t h e  a b o l i t i o n  of t a x  exemptions 
f o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  c u l t u r a l ,  c h a r i t a b l e  and p o l i t i c a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  -  encountered  such f i rm  r e s i s t a n c e  from t h e  DDF,
DVF and DNVF t h a t  i t  had t o  be watered down,“"* P r o v i s io n s  were 
even added t o  t h e  law dur ing  i t s  passage  th rough  committee 
which c o n fe r re d  new t a x  exemptions on income d e r iv e d  from 
"normal1' ( i e ,  n o n - s p e c u l a t i v e )  s a l e s  of p r o p e r ty  and which
l i b e r a l i s e d  ar rangem ents  f o r  t a x  deduc t ions  in r e s p e c t  of
4 #
d e p r e c i a t i o n  a l lo w an ces ,  * The main p reocc upa t ion  of t h e  
m a j o r i t y  of t h e  R e ich s tag  was c e r t a i n l y  no t  t o  make t h e  income 
t a x  a source  of in c re as ed  rev en u e .
The n e g a t i v e  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  "bourgeo is"  p a r t i e s  t o  
d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n ,  and above a l l  t o  p ro p e r ty  t a x e s ,  provoked a
1. See a bove ,pp ,  257-8 .
2 .  Rei c h s t a g . V o l .  3^3» Anl.  125«
3 .  Fohlmann (DDP),22 January  1921,  i b i d . ,  V o l ,  347,  p.  2037;
Becker (DVP), i b i d . ,  p.  2031; H e l f f e r i c h  (DNVP), i b i d . ,  
p.  2019. For t h e  f i n a l  form of t h i s  p ro p o s a l :  R e ich s ­
ges e t z b l a t t  , 1921, p .  314,  para 3 ( c ) .
4 .  Bel t  in  (Zentrum),  19 March 1921,  i b i d . ,  V o l . 348,  p.  3246,
2 85
s t r o n g  p r o t e s t  from t h e  L e f t ,  Much of  t h e  d e b a t e  on t h e  f i r s t  
r e a d in g  of  t h e  Income Tax Amendment Law on 22 Janua ry  1921 
was in  f a c t  devoted t o  r e c r i m i n a t i o n  over t h e  a l l e g e d  sabo tage  
of p r o p e r ty  t a x a t i o n  by p a r t i e s  in t h e  government and by th e  
DNVF, The Independent  S o c i a l i s t ,  H e r tz ,  quoted e x t e n s i v e l y  
from an a r t i c l e  pub l i shed  by a r ig h t -w in g  p r o f e s s o r  of t h e  
U n i v e r s i t y  of  Munster  which demonst rated  t h a t  t h e  r e a l  v a l u e  of 
t h e  yield from p ro p e r ty  t a x e s  was f a r  below what had o r i g i n a l l y  
been e x p e c te d ,  " * The main l e f t - w i n g  a t t a c k  was mounted by t h e  
S o c i a l  Democrat ,  K e i l ,  who a l l e g e d  t h a t  s y s t em a t ic  sabotage 
( "p lan m äss ig e r  Abbau” ) of p r o p e r t y  t a x a t i o n  was t a k i n g  p l a c e .  
K e i l  emphasised how, in t h e  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  over t h e  amendment 
of t h e  R e ic h s n o to p fe r  a t  t h e  end of 1920,  Wirth  had been faced 
w i th  r e s i s t a n c e  not  only from t h e  DNVF but  a l s o  from t h e  DVP 
and DDF, and even from h i s  own Cen tre P a r t y ,  which ,  he c la imed ,  
had f a l l e n  under  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of i t s  a g r a r i a n  and i n d u s t r i a l  
s e c t i o n s .  The aim of W i r t h ' s  opponents was ,  in K e i l ' s  op in io n ,  
not  only t o  p revent  t h e  e f f i c i e n t  ex ac t io n  of p r o p e r ty  t a x es  
bu t  a l s o  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  burden of  i n d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n .  To t h e  
c la im  t h a t  d i r e c t  t a x e s  had been imposed t o  t h e  l i m i t  and t h a t  
only consumption t a x e s  could be i n c r e a s e d ,  K e i l  r e t o r t e d  by 
d e c l a r i n g  " b e fo re  t h e  whole world" t h a t  "German t a x  l e g i s l a t i o n  
was a d e c e p t i v e  p iece  of  window-dress ing  which would not  be 
c a r r i e d  o u t " . ^ ’ Although t h e  government p a r t i e s  denied t h e
77 22 J a n u a r y  1921,  i b i d . ,  V o l ,  347,  p,  2028.
2. " . . e i n e  b lendende  K u l i s s e ,  d i e  n i c h t  a u s g e f ä h r t  w i r d " ,  ib id
p.  2018 .
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e x i s t e n c e  of any p lan  t o  undermine E r z b e r g e r ’ s t a x e s ,  a l l  of 
them, i n c lu d in g  t h e  Cent re  P a r t y ,  i n s i s t e d  more or l e s s  
s t r o n g l y  on t h e i r  r i g h t  t o  work f o r  t h e  r e v i s i o n  of t h e s e  
t a x e s  i f  t h e y  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  harm t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of b u s in e s s  or 
a g r i c u l t u r e . ' * "  Th is  sugges ts  t h a t ,  a l though  t h e  Left  somewhat 
o v e r s t a t e d  i t s  c h a rg e s ,  t h e r e  was s u f f i c i e n t  s o c i a l l y  and 
f i n a n c i a l l y  based f e e l i n g  w i t h i n  t h e  R e ichs tag  t o  e x p la in  t h e  
r e l a t i v e  i n e r t i a  of t h e  government about  d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n ,  A 
c o n t r a r y  im press ion  was momentari ly conveyed by t h e  Democrat,  
Pohlmann, who advocated  t h a t  t h e  f i s c a l  committee of t h e  
R e ich s tag  should become a s t a n d i n g  committee w i th  t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of a d j u s t i n g  German t a x  law t o  changing 
f i n a n c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s .  However, t h e r e  i s  no s p e c i a l  i n d i c a t i o n
t h a t  Pohlmann envisaged t h e  t a x  committee as an organ f o r  t h e
2.
s t e r n  im plementa t ion  of  E r z b e r g e r ’s d i r e c t  t a x e s .
The f i s c a l  i n e r t i a  of t h e  government p a r t i e s  does not  
appear  t o  have been induced t o  any l a r g e  e x t e n t  by p r eo cc u p a t io n  
wi th  Germany’ s e x i s t i n g  or f u t u r e  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s .  I t  
i s  t r u e  t h a t  on 22 J anuary  1921 Wirth  mentioned t h e  u n c e r t a i n  
s t a t e  of  r e p a r a t i o n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  as  a reason  f o r  h i s  f a i l u r e  
t o  i n t r o d u c e  any l a r g e - s c a l e  f i s c a l  programme. But he went on 
t o  s t r e s s  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  and p a r t i s a n  f a c t o r s  -  presumably of 
a domest ic  n a t u r e  -  had ,  because  of t h e  imminence of t h e  
P ru s s i a n  e l e c t i o n s ,  e x e r t e d  an impor tan t  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e
1, Ten Hompel (Zent rum),  i b i d , ,  p,  2026; Pohlmann (DDF), i b i d , ,  
pp, 2037-8;  Becker (DVP), i b i d . ,  p,  2032; K e l f f e r i c h  (DNVF), 
i b i d . ,  p.  2023.
2.  i b i d . ,  p .  2036,
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b eh av io u r  of t h e  government p a r t i e s , ^ -* For t h e  r e s t ,  t h e  
r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  was h a rd ly  mentioned dur ing  t h e  course  
of t h e  f i s c a l  deba tes  in t h i s  p e r io d ,  except  when t h e  S o c i a l
Democrat ,  K e i l ,  p r e d i c t e d  t h a t  t h e  Right would u s e  A l l i e d
2 ,
demands as an excuse f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  i n d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n .
A l l i e d  r e p a r a t i o n  claims were c e r t a i n l y  neve r  r e f e r r e d  t o  
e x p l i c i t l y  in  d e b a t e  over  s p e c i f i c  t a x  p r o v i s i o n s .
The f a c t o r s  which were r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  R e i c h s t a g ’s 
lack  of  f i s c a l  dynamism a r e  a l s o  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  ex p la in  t h e  
con t inued  i n a b i l i t y  of t h e  government t o  r a i s e  domestic  l o a n s .  
The only move in t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  d u r in g  t h e s e  months was made 
in November 1920 by t h e  r i g h t - w i n g  groups which p r e f e r r e d  a 
fo rced  loan t o  t h e  governm en t ' s  p ro p o s a l  f o r  t h e  prompt 
c o l l e c t i o n  of  t h e  R e i c h s n o t o p f e r , On 1 December 1920 t h e  
t a x  committee of t h e  R e i c h s t a g ,  encouraged by t h e  f a v o u ra b l e  
t e s t im o n y  of H a v e n s te in ,  t h e  F r e s id e n t  of t h e  Reichsbank,  had 
swung t e m p o r a r i l y  in favou r  of  a scheme f o r  combining t h e  
R e i c h s n o to p f e r  w i th  a f o r c e d  lo a n , " ”  However, s i n c e  t h e  fo rced  
loan was seen by i t s  s u p p o r t e r s  as an a l t e r n a t i v e  r a t h e r  th a n  
as  a supplement t o  t h e  R e ic h s n o to p fe r , t h e  passage  of b i r t h ' s  
o r i g i n a l  p r o p o s a l  caused d i s c u s s i o n  of  t h e  former t o  l a p s e .
In t h e s e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  t h e  outlook f o r  any v o l u n t a r y  le n d in g  
t o  t h e  government by t h e  German p u b l i c  was,  n e e d l e s s  t o  s a y ,  
h o p e l e s s .
I t  was perhaps  t o  be expected t h a t  t h e  emphasis p laced
1,  i b i d . ,  p,  2025«
2.  i b i d . ,  p.  2018
3* V.V. Badulesco,- op, c i t . ,  p.  310.
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upon t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  d u r ing  t h e  budget d eb a te s  of 
October-November 1920  would l e a v e  i t s  mark on German f i s c a l  
m o r a l i t y .  But ,  whether  because  t h e  s t r a i n  on t h e  budget of  
Germany's c u r r e n t  t r e a t y  o b l i g a t i o n s  was l e s s  th a n  Wirth had 
p r e d i c t e d ,  or whe ther  because  of t h e  r e a l  u n c e r t a i n t y  which 
e x i s t e d  as t o  Germany's f u t u r e  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  t h e r e  was no 
r e f e r e n c e  t o  r e p a r a t i o n s  as e i t h e r  a cause or a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
f o r  i n c re a s e d  t a x  evas ion .  Comment in  t h e  R e ic h s ta g  u s u a l l y  
a t t r i b u t e d  t h e  s t a t e  of f i s c a l  m o r a l i t y  t o  t h e  im p e r fe c t io n s  
of t h e  t a x  sys tem.  On 19 March 1921 t h e  Democrat ,  Pohlmann, 
quoted e x t e n s i v e l y  from a s ta t em en t  by t h e  B e r l i n  Bar 
A s s o c i a t i o n  ( B e r l i n e r  A nwal tvere in )  about t h e  mora l  e f f e c t s  
of t h e  p r o v i s io n s  of t h e  Income Tax Law conce rn ing  t h e  t a x a t i o n  
of t h e  proceeds  from n o n - s p e c u l a t i v e  s a l e s  of p r o p e r t y .  I t  
was a l l e g e d  t h a t  under  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of t h i s  p r o v i s io n  much 
moral  con fus ion  had been c r e a t e d .  Law-abiding c i t i z e n s  had 
r e f r a i n e d  from t r a n s a c t i n g  u rg en t  b u s in e s s  d ea l s  and o th e rs  
had sought t o  evade t a x a t i o n  by f a l s e  d e c l a r a t i o n s ,  by s i d e  
payments,  and by t h e  conduct  of i l l e g a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  " I t  was 
u s e l e s s , "  t h e  r e p o r t  conc luded ,  " to  po in t  out t h e  n u l l i t y  of  
t h e s e  d e a l s  s i n c e  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  p r e f e r r e d  t o  t r u s t  in t h e  
f u l f i l m e n t  of a void c o n t r a c t  by t h e  o the r  p a r t y  and t o  l a y  
them se lves  open t o  t h e  danger  of p ro s e c u t io n  r a t h e r  than t o
al low t h e  income a c c ru in g  from t h e  s a l e  of t h e i r  p r o p e r ty  t o
1.
be ta xed  away." This  a c c o u n t ,  a l though  no doubt t o  some
s p e c i a l  p l e a d i n g ,  seems t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  seeming h a r s h n e s s  
1* R e i c h s t a g . Vol.  R48« p. ^2^>2.
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of t h e  t a x e s  and t h e  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  of  t h e  t a x p a y e r  were a 
s u f f i c i e n t  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  t h e  d e c l i n e  of f i s c a l  m o r a l i t y .
Germany's e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  problems in  t h e  months 
between June  1920 and A p r i l  1921 con t inued  t o  be b a s i c a l l y  
t h e  r e s u l t  of a l a r g e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  and an u n fa v o u ra b le  
b a l a n c e  of  payments which i t  was im p o ss ib le  f o r  t h e  German 
government t o  remedy.  D e s p i t e  t h e  incom ple teness  of t h e  
pub l i shed  f i g u r e s ,  i t  can be c a l c u l a t e d  t h a t  1 . 6  b i l l i o n  gold 
marks of  Germany's o f f i c i a l  v i s i b l e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  fo r  1920 
was i n c u r r e d  in t h e  seven months June t o  December; and t h a t  
about h a l f  of t h e  fo l low ing  y e a r ' s  d e f i c i t  of 1 .1  b i l l i o n  marks 
wag accumula ted between Jan u a ry  and A p r i l .  Th i s  i n d i c a t e s  
t h a t  t h e r e  was in t h e s e  months an o f f i c i a l  v i s i b l e  t r a d e  
d e f i c i t  approach ing  2 b i l l i o n  gold marks and,  a c c o r d in g ly ,  a 
c o n s i d e r a b l y  l a r g e r  a c t u a l  v i s i b l e  and i n v i s i b l e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t .  
The d i r e c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  of  r e p a r a t i o n  payments t o  t h i s  d e f i c i t  
could not  have been more t h a n  t h e  c o n s i d e r a b l e ,  but no t  
e x c e s s i v e ,  f i g u r e  of  600 m i l l i o n  gold marks."'  For t h e  r e s t ,  
t h e  d e f i c i t  w/as due t o  g e n e r a l  economic d i s l o c a t i o n ,  t o  which 
t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  problem c o n t r i b u t e d ,  bu t  which was mainly t h e  
product  of t h e  economic exhaus t ion  caused by t h e  war .  One of 
t h e  most n o t i c e a b l e  f e a t u r e s  of  t h i s  exhaus t ion  was t h e  
d i l a p i d a t i o n  of German a g r i c u l t u r e  which ,  by caus ing  l a r g e  
impor ts  of  f o o d s t u f f s ,  had a s e r i o u s  e f f e c t  on t h e  ba lance
1. See above ,  p.3»7.
2.  On t h e  r ea sons  f o r  o f f i c i a l  unde r - e s t i m a t i o n  of t h e  t r a d e  
d e f i c i t :  see above,  p.  3 8 ,
3 .  See above ,  p .  8 l .
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Germany’ s e x t e r n a l  payments d i f f i c u l t i e s  were almost 
c e r t a i n l y  aggrava ted  by p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s  in t h e  months which 
a r e  under  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  Although t h e  e n t r y  of t h e  f i s c a l l y  
c o n s e r v a t i v e  DVP in t o  t h e  Cabinet  p robab ly  reduced t h e  
impetus t o  c a p i t a l  f l i g h t  among t h e  p r o p e r t i e d  c l a s s e s ,  i t
a l s o  decreased  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  of any r e d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  e x t e r n a l
%
p r e s s u r e  on t h e  mark by t h e  means of c o n t r o l s .  At a meeting 
of a DVP e x e c u t iv e  g roup  in October 1920 t h e  l i f t i n g  of war­
t i m e  c o n t r o l s  (Zwang s w i r th s c h a  f t ) and t h e  a b o l i t i o n  of t h e  t a x
on expo r t s  were c i t e d  as two achievements which had r e s u l t e d
2from DVP membership of t h e  government, '"*
The r e s t o r a t i o n  of  Germany's e x t e r n a l  f in a n c e s  s t i l l  
depended u l t i m a t e l y  on h e r  a b i l i t y  t o  o b ta in  s u b s t a n t i a l  long­
te rm  fo r e ig n  a i d .  Germany’ s almost comple te  p o w er le s sness  in 
t h i s  r e s p e c t  was due p a r t l y  t o  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c i e s  of t h e  
European A l l i e s .  Lloyd George’ s p ro p o sa l  a t  Spa fo r  l a r g e -  
s c a l e  c r e d i t s  t o  Germany had foundered on M i l l e r a n d ’s r e f u s a l  
t o  supply  food and raw m a t e r i a l s  " fo r  t h e  whole of  German
3.
i n d u s t r y " .  The growth of t h e  e x t e r n a l  f l o a t i n g  debt  had ,  i t  
i s  t r u e ,  been s l i g h t l y  r e s t r a i n e d  by t h e  payment of 390 m i l l i o n
gold marks t o  Germany between J u l y  1920 and Ja n u a ry  1921 under
4.
t h e  terms of t h e  Spa Coal Agreement.  But t h e  A l l i e s  had 
re fu s ed  t o  renew t h i s  agreement ,  and 200 m i l l i o n s  of  t h e
1 . The E conom is t , 4,  11 December 1920, p p . 1038, 108l .
2. N a c h la s s . 6933/139791.
3* See above ,  p , l 6 0 .
4,  See above ,  p .7 8 .
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f o r e i g n  exchange earned had been absorbed immediate ly  by 
payments t o  f o r e ig n  i n v e s t o r s  in pre-war  Germany under t h e
c l e a r i n g  agreements p r e s c r i b e d  by A r t i c l e  296 of t h e  V e r s a i l l e s
1.
T r e a t y .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  s p e c t a c u l a r  f a i l u r e  of  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
over Germany’s t o t a l  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n  in t h e  e a r l y  months 
of 1921 had t e m p o r a r i l y  d e s t ro y e d  any hope of t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n  
of a lo n g - t e rm  lo a n .
There  were,  however,  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  a long- te rm  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  loan would have been im poss ib le  t o  ob ta in  even 
i f  t h e r e  had been no r e p a r a t i o n  problem; o r ,  in o th e r  words,  
t h a t  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  problem was a symptom r a t h e r  t h a n  a cause  
of a g e n e r a l  breakdown of t h e  pre-war system of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c r e d i t .  Hopes t h a t  t h i s  breakdown would be remedied by means 
of l a r g e - s c a l e  government f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  were s e v e r e l y  
shaken in  October 1920 by t h e  recommendation of  t h e  B ru sse l s  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  Conference t h a t  " a p a r t  from p a r t i c u l a r  
d e c i s i o n s  d i c t a t e d  by n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  or  by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
of humani ty ,  c r e d i t s  should  (n o t )  be accorded d i r e c t l y  by
2 .
governm en ts" .  A l l  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a loan  was f i n a l l y  removed 
by domest ic  developments  in t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  of America.
The l a n d s l i d e  Republ ican  v i c t o r y  in t h e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  e l e c t i o n  
of  November 1920 c r y s t a l l i s e d  a r e j e c t i o n  of  Europe and i t s  
problems by t h e  n a t io n  upon which t h e  success  of  any European 
lo n g - t e rm  loan u l t i m a t e l y  depended.  The American d e n i a l  of
1. Simons, 24 November 1920,  R e i c h s t a g ,  V o l .  3^5> P* 1221,
Cf.  The Econom is t . 11 December 1920, p,  IO38 .
2.  League of  N a t i o n s .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  Conference 1920.« 
V o l .  I ,  p .  27.
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p o l i t i c a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  Europe which occur red  when
F r e s id e n t  Harding f i n a l l y  disowned t h e  League of  Nat ions  on
1.
12 A p r i l  1921 was p a r a l l e l e d  by a f i n a n c i a l  w a sh ing -o f -hands  
t e n  days l a t e r  when t h e  American F*resident r e j e c t e d  t h e  
d e s p e r a t e  appea l  of t h e  German government f o r  h i s  med ia t ion
2
over t h e  q u e s t i o n  of Germany's t o t a l  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n .
The f o l l y  and i m p o s s i b i l i t y  of f i n a n c i a l  i s o l a t i o n i s m  were t o  
become obvious more q u ic k ly  t h a n  were t h e  t r a g i c  consequences 
of i t s  p o l i t i c a l  c o u n t e r p a r t .  I t  was not  long b e fo re  t h e  
head long  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of  t h e  mark comple te ly  des t ro y ed  t h e  
s a v ings  of  t h e  many Americans who, in s t e a d  of i n v e s t i n g  in a 
government-guaran teed  German lo a n ,  had indulged  in  the  
s p e c u l a t i v e  buying of mark n o t e s .
In t h e  f i r s t  t h i r t y  months of peac e ,  Germany’s domest ic  
f i n a n c i a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  had in c re a s e d  because  of t h e  f a i l u r e  of 
a l l  e f f o r t s  t o  i n c r e a s e  r e g u l a r  pub l ic  revenues  and t o  f l o a t  
p u b l i c  l o a n s .  At t h e  same t im e  e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  c o l l a p s e  had 
loomed l a r g e r  because  t h e  b a lan ce  of t r a d e ,  d e s p i t e  a s l i g h t  
improvement in  1920 and 1921,  had remained exceed ing ly  
u n f a v o u r a b l e ,  and because  Germany was power less  t o  c o n s o l i d a t e ,  
or even t o  check t h e  growth o f ,  h e r  e x t e r n a l  f l o a t i n g  d e b t .
The German government had been unab le  even t o  d ev o te  
i t s  f u l l  a t t e n t i o n  t o  domestic  f i n a n c i a l  reform u n t i l  t h e  
middle of  1919» T h e r e a f t e r ,  s e v e r a l  powerful  f a c t o r s ,  a p a r t  
from t h e  g e n e r a l  pos t -w ar  economic d i s l o c a t i o n  of  Germany, had
1, H, Hoover,  The Ordea l  of  Woodrow "Wilson, p .  29&.
2.  See a b o v e , p p . 208- 9 .
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hampered e f f o r t s  t o  r a i s e  revenue* In t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e  t h e r e  
were obvious a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in t h e  way of 
s im u l ta n e o u s ly  c r e a t i n g  an e n t i r e l y  new f i s c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
and imposing heavy t a x a t i o n  on a n a t io n  which was unused t o  
b e a r i n g  a l a r g e  f i s c a l  burden* These d i f f i c u l t i e s  were made 
almost in su rm oun tab le  by t h e  c o n t in u a l  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  
mark,  which d es t royed  t h e  r e a l  va lu e  of t h e  t a x e s  t h a t  were 
c o l l e c t e d  and made government borrowing im poss ib le*  P o l i t i c a l  
o p p o s i t i o n  a l s o  h inde red  f i n a n c i a l  r e fo rm ,  f i r s t l y  by 
i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  u n w i l l i n g n e s s  of t h e  German people  t o  pay t a x e s  
and t o  s u b s c r i b e  t o  p u b l i c  l o a n s ,  and s e c o n d ly ,  a f t e r  June 1920,  
by encouraging  t h e  r e l u c t a n c e  of  t h e  government t o  adapt  t h e  
t a x  system t o  t h e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  mark*
The r e p a r a t i o n  problem c o n t r i b u t e d  in a com para t ive ly  
minor way t o  t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  German government t o  in c r e a s e  
i t s  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  in  t h e  per iod  b e f o r e  May 1921. I t  was 
only one among many p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s  which in c re a s e d  t h e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of  t a x a t i o n  and which undermined 
t h e  c r e d i t  of t h e  government w i th  t h e  German p e o p le .  I t  was, 
moreover,  only one of s e v e r a l  causes  of t h e  lo n g - t e rm  f a l l  of  
t h e  v a l u e  of t h e  mark which had such a d i s a s t r o u s  e f f e c t  on r e a l  
p u b l i c  rev en u e .
Germany’s e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  im balance ,  of which t h e  
d e p r e c i a t i o n  of  t h e  mark was a symptom, was t h e  product  of 
t h e  i n a b i l i t y  of t h e  German government t o  reduce  t h e  t r a d e  
d e f i c i t ,  t o  check c a p i t a l  f l i g h t  and t o  f l o a t  l a r g e - s c a l e
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l o a n s .  The r e p a r a t i o n  problem caused p a r t  of  
t h e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t ,  gave Germans added i n c e n t i v e  t o  export  
c a p i t a l ,  and in ju r e d  Germany's i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c r e d i t .  However, 
in t h e  pe r iod  b e f o r e  May 1921 t h e  most impor tan t  causes  of  
t h e s e  developments were t h e  economic d i s l o c a t i o n  and f i n a n c i a l  
pessimism induced by t h e  war and t h e  a f t e r m a t h  w i th i n  Germany, 
and a jamming of t h e  mechanism of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c r e d i t  which 
p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  could n o t ,  and governments would n o t ,  remedy.
PART III
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SECTION I
THE GERMAN ECONOMY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
BETWEEN MAY 1921  AND JANUARY 1923
The p e r i o d  b e t w e e n  May 1921 and t h e  c l o s e  of  t h e  y e a r  
1922 w i t n e s s e d  a r e m a r k a b l e  g r o w t h  of  German i n d u s t r i a l  o u t p u t .  
Fo r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  s i n c e  t h e  w a r ,  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  v i t a l  s e c t o r s  
o f  German i n d u s t r y  r e c o v e r e d  a l m o s t  t o  i t s  p r e - w a r  l e v e l ,  v iz , '* '*
( m i l l i o n t  o n s )
B l a c k  C o a l L i g n i t  e P i g  I r o n Crude S t e e l
1913 190 87 1 2 . 9 1 5 .3
1913 ( p o s t - w a r  f r o n t i e r s )
173 87 1 0 . 9 1 1 . 9
1913 ( f r o n t i e r s  a f t e r  May 
140
1922)
87 1 0 . 3 10 .9
1918 160 101 9 . 2 12.9
1919 108 94 6 . 3 8 . 5
1920 131 112 6 . 4 8 . 5
1921 136 123 7 . 9 1 0 .1
1922 130 137 9 . 4 1 1 . 7
T h e s e  f i g u r e s ,  w h i c h  do n o t  i n c l u d e  t h e  p o s t - M a y  1922 o u t p u t  o f
t h e  p o r t i o n  o f  U p p e r  S i l e s i a  w h i c h  was ceded  t o  P o l a n d ,  r e v e a l  
t h a t  i n  1922 p r o d u c t i o n  o f  p i g  i r o n  and c r u d e  s t e e l  was e i t h e r  
a p p r o a c h i n g  o r  had s u r p a s s e d  i t s  l e v e l  i n  1913 i n  t h e  same 
a r e a .  T h e r e  was s t i l l  a l a g  o f  a b o u t  10 m i l l i o n  t o n s  i n  t h e  
p r o d u c t i o n  o f  b l a c k  c o a l :  b u t  t h i s  was b a l a n c e d  by an enormous
i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  y i e l d  o f  l i g n i t e ,  w h i c h  was u s e d  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
i n  t h i s  p e r i o d  a s  a s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  b l a c k  c o a l .
1 .  I r o n  and s t e e l  p r o d u c t i o n  f i g u r e s  f r om  C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  
o p .  c i t . ,  p .  193 N o t e :  c o a l  and l i g n i t e  p r o d u c t i o n  f i g u r e s
f r o m  J . S ,  D a v i s ,  ’’Economic  and F i n a n c i a l  P r o g r e s s  i n  E u r o p e " ,  
Rev iew o f  Economic  S t a t i s t i c s . 1923» V o l .  5» p .  1 0 5 .  F o r  t h e  
1913 o u t p u t  o f  P o l i s h  U ppe r  S i l e s i a :  R.  M a c h r a y ,  The P r o b l e m  
of  U p p e r  S i l e s i a , p .  118;  G. L ü b s e n ,  "The German Coa l  
S i t u a t i o n  and t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  D e l i v e r i e s " ,  MGCRE, 7 S e p t e m b e r  
1922 , p p .  4 2 7 - 9 .
These p ro d u c t io n  t r e n d s  were h ig h ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  as an 
index of t h e  g e n e r a l  l e v e l  of German i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t y  because  
t h e  i ro n  and s t e e l  t r a d e s  and c o a l  mining were Germany’s most 
im por tan t  b a s i c  i n d u s t r i e s  and were l i nked  v e ry  c l o s e l y  t o  t h e  
h ig h ly  developed eng in ee r in g  and s h i p - b u i l d i n g  i n d u s t r i e s .  In 
t h e  l a t t e r  sphe re  t h e r e  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e n s e  a c t i v i t y  in 
1922, when t h e  tonnage  of s h ip s  launched was w e l l  above t h e  
l e v e l  of 1913> v i z ,
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A f u r t h e r  i n d i c a t i o n  of in c re a s e d  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t y  was t h e  
almost con t inuous  f a l l  in t h e  number of persons r e c e i v i n g  unemploy 
ment r e l i e f .  The only i n t e r r u p t i o n  t o  t h e  downward t r e n d  of 
unemployment occurred  d u r ing  t h e  months January  t o  March 1922. 
T h e r e a f t e r  t h e  f a l l  con t inued  u n t i l ,  in t h e  summer of 1922,
2 .
unemployment in Germany was a t  an i n c r e d i b l y  low l e v e l ,  v i z ,
1921 1922
1 January 410,238 164,248
1 February 202,594
1 March 212,526
1 A p r i l 413,321 115,845
1 May 64,708
1 June 357,352 28,626
1 J u l y 31^,475 19,648
1 August 15,137
1 Sept  ember 232,057 11,671
1 October 185,806 16,681
1 November 24,738
1 December 149,126 42,593
1 . C, B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op. c i t . ,  p.  194- Note.
2.  J .W .F ,  T h e l w a l l ,  Report  on . . .  Germany t o  Mar ch.  1922. p • 9 2 5 
idem, Report  on . . .  Germany t o  March, 1921. p .  99»
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The c o n t r a s t  between t h e  s t a t e  of German in d u s t r y  and 
t h a t  of German a g r i c u l t u r e  was s t r i k i n g .  At t h e  end of 1921 
numbers of l i v e s t o c k  were s l i g h t l y  below t h e i r  1920 l e v e l ;  and
t h e r e  was a f u r t h e r  more n o t i c e a b l e  d e c l i n e  d u r ing  t h e  course






C a t t l e  Sheep P ies Goats
1/1 2/13 4,523 20 ,994 5,521 25,659 3,548
4/ 12/18 3,493 18,095 5,382 10,545 4,426
Pos t-war  
f r o n t i e r s  
4 /12/18 2,978 16,448 4,905 9,227 4,021
1/1 2/19 3,468 16,298 5,356 11,469 4,052
1 /12 /20 3,588 16,807 6,150 14,179 4,459
1 /12 /21 3,666 16,791 5,891 18,818 4,296
1/12/22 3,650 16,316 5,566 14,678 4,140
In 1921 most crop y i e l d s  cont inued  t h e i r  r ecove ry  from th e  low
l e v e l  t o  which th e y  had slumped in 1919» However in 1922 t h e r e
was, excep t  in t h e  case of p o t a t o e s ,  an ex t remely  s e r io u s  20^ t o
2






t  o n s )
P o ta t  oes Oats
1913 12,222 4,656 3,673 54,121 9,714
1918 8 ,035 2,527 2,038 29,941 4,769
Pos t-war  
f  r  ont i  er  s 
1918 6,676 2,337 1,850 24,744 4,381
1919 6,100 2,169 1,670 21,449 4,494
1920 4,970 2,250 1,800 28,250 4,870
1921 6,798 2,933 1,937 26,149 5,004
1922 5 ,234 1,958 1,607 40,661 4,015
(Germany’ s f o r e i g n  t r a d e  cont inued  t o  be s e v e r e l y  imbalanced 
over t h e  pe r iod  as a whole .  During t h e  months November 1921 t o  
January  1922 t h e  va lu e  of expo r ts  and imports  was t e m p o r a r i l y  almost  
e x a c t ly  e q u a l .  But t h e r e a f t e r  t h e  d e f i c i t  grew l a r g e r ;  so t h a t
1. For s o u rc e s :  see above,  p,  36 Note 2. See a l s o :  S t a t  i s t  ic hes
J ahrbuch  f ü r  das d e u t s c h e  R e i c h . 1926, pp. 50-1*
2.  i b i d . ,  pp.  44-5;  C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op. c i t . ,  p .192 Note .
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i n  t h e  second h a l f  o f 1922  t h e r e  was a v i s i b l e t r a d e  gap o f
o ve r  1400 m i l l i o n  g o ld m a rk s ,  v i z , ' 1'*
V A L U E VOLUME
( m i l l i o n  g o ld  m arks) ( thousand t  o n s )
Month Im p o r ts E x p o r t  s B a lance Im p o r ts E x p o r ts
1913 Average 896 842 -  55 6 ,0 6 8 6 ,1 4 3
1919 Ave rage 539 146 -393 827 1 ,0 5 4
1920 Ave rage 5 8 3 419 -1 6 4 1 ,5 7 2 1 ,8 9 9
1921 May 373 310 -  63 1 ,5 3 0 1 ,140
Jun 392 331 -  61 1 ,8 2 0 1 ,5 1 0
J u l 40? 334 -  73 1 ,9 2 0 1 ,560
Aug 463 328 -1 3 5 2,110 1 ,8 3 0
Sep 440 309 -1 3 1 2 ,5 3 0 1 ,870
Oct 396 276 -1 2 0 3 ,0 0 0 1 ,970
Nov 219 226 + 7 2 ,5 3 0 1 ,910
Dec 299 318 + 19 ? ro8o 1 .930
2 ,9 8 9 2 ,4 3 2 -5 5 7 1 7 ,5 2 0 13,720
1921 A verage 374 304 2 ,1 9 0 1 ,7 1 5
1922 Jan 330 325 -  5 2 ,309 2,027
Feb 360 298 -  62 1 ,4 7 5 1 ,747
Mar 563 324 -239 2 ,645 2 ,1 5 3
Apr 5o8 327 -1 8 1 2 ,8 8 9 2 ,1 7 6
May 565 416 -1 4 9 3 ,8 1 0 2 ,093
Jun 565 428 -1 3 7 4 ,0 2 9 1 ,879
J u l 684 336 -348 4 ,7 9 8 1 ,6 3 6
Aug 545 255 -2 9 0 4 ,6 7 6 1 ,407
Sep 422 291 -1 3 1 4 ,2 8 9 1 ,587
Oct 532 291 -241 5 ,5 5 2 1 ,539
Nov 536 255 - 28 I 4 ,5 5 1 1 ,551
Dec 970 423 -147 4,320 1 .760
6 .1 8 0 3 ,969 -2 .2 1 1 49 .349 2 1 .999
1922 A verage 515 331 -1 8 4 3,779 1 ,7 9 6
These f i g u r e s a ls o  r e v e a l  a r i s e  in th e  vo lum e o f  im p o r ts w h ic h
became p a r t i c u l a r l y  r a p id  in  t h e  second h a l f  o f  1922. T h is
■was accom panied by a s l i g h t  in c r e a s e  i n  t h e  vo lum e o f  e x p o r ts
w h ic h  was d is g u is e d  by t h e  e x c lu s io n  o f  r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s
f ro m  e x p o r t  f i g u r e s  a f t e r  May 1921 . H owever, d e s p i t e  th e s e
1* The E c o n o m is t . M o n th ly  S u p p le m e n t. 23 June 1923» P* 6;
J .W . F .  T h e l w a l l ,  R e p o r t  on . . .  Germany t o  M a rch . 1922 . p .  33 ; 
idem , R e p o r t  on . . .  Germany t o  M arch . 1 9 2 3 . p* 41,
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i n c r e a s e s ,  im por ts  in  1922 were s t i l l  only 62 per  c e n t ,  of t h e i r  
1913 l e v e l  and expor ts  remained at 29 per  c e n t ,  of  t h e i r  1913 
volume.
The c o n d i t i o n  of  German i n d u s t r y ,  a g r i c u l t u r e  and
f o r e i g n  t r a d e  can be a t t r i b u t e d  p a r t l y ,  as  in t h e  preceding
p e r i o d ,  e i t h e r  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  economic ex h au s t io n  caused by t h e
war and t h e  a f t e r m a t h  or e l s e  t o  co n t in g en t  f a c t o r s .  The
growing output  of i r o n ,  s t e e l ,  c o a l  and s h ip p in g  r e f l e c t e d  a
pos t -w ar  emphasis on t h e  p roduc t ion  of i n s t r u m e n t a l  goods which
had a r i s e n  from t h e  need t o  r e p l a c e  c a p i t a l  equipment worn out
2
or d e s t ro y e d  dur ing  t h e  war or d e l i v e r e d  as r e p a r a t i o n ,  * On 
t h e  o th e r  hand,  a l though  a s h o r t a g e  of c e r t a i n  f e r t i l i s e r s  was 
s t i l l  f e l t , ^ *  t h e  slump in  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p ro d u c t io n  in 1922 was
due t o  t h e  wet summer of t h a t  y e a r  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  t h e  e f f e c t s  of
4.
t h e  war .  The p e r s i s t e n t  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  was t h e  product  of 
both war- induced  and c o n t in g e n t  f a c t o r s .  The excess  of impor ts  
over expo r t s  was due p a r t l y  t o  t h e  l a r g e  impor ts  of i ron  and 
i ron  ore which were occasioned  by Germany's i n d u s t r i a l
5.
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  p a r t l y  t o  t h e  l a r g e  f o r e i g n  purchases  of food
fa
which were made n e c e s s a ry  by t h e  low h a rv e s t  y i e l d  of 1922, * and 
p a r t l y  t o  t h e  p a r t i t i o n  of Upper S i l e s i a  which,  from June 1922,  
caused Germany t o  become a n e t  im por te r  of c o n s id e r a b l e  q u a n t i t i e s  
of coal#^*
1. i b i d . ,  p,  3 8 .
2. C, B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op, c i t . ,  p, 196•
3.  J .W.F .  T h e l w a l l ,  Report  on . . .  Germany t o  March,  1921, p, 122.
4. i b i d , ,  p .  16 .
5.  i b i d . ,  pp.  44-5 .
6 . i b i d . ,  p .  16 .
7.  See below,  pp.308-9*
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The t r e n d s  which have been d e s c r ib e d  in  Germany’ s 
domest ic  economic a c t i v i t y  and e x t e r n a l  t r a d e  were a f f e c t e d  in 
an im p o r tan t  manner by f i n a n c i a l  developments .  The dominat ing 
f i n a n c i a l  f e a t u r e s  of t h i s  pe r iod  were t h e  con t inued  rap id  
expans ion  of both  t h e  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  f l o a t i n g  d e b t ,  and 
t h e  s im u l tane ous  r e d u c t i o n  of t h e  r e a l  v a lu e  of t h i s  inde b tedness  
because  of t h e  e x t e r n a l  d e p r e c i a t i o n  and i n t e r n a l  p r i c e  i n f l a t i o n  
which o c c u r r e d .  The expansion  of t h e  government’ s domestic  
in d e b te d n e s s  can be seen in t h e  monthly f i g u r e s  f o r  pub l ic
r e c e i p t  s and expend i tu r e in t h e  per iod between May 1921 and Dec-
ember 1 9 2 2 , v i z ,
Income E x p en d i tu re In cr ea s e in T o t a l
( m i l l i o n ( m i l l i o n
F l o a t i n g  Debt 
( m i l l i o n
F l o a t i n g  Debt 
( b i l l i o n
gold  marks) gold marks) gold marks) paper marks)
1920
May 411.8 686.0 270.2 176 .7
June 350 .3 862.3 508.0 185.1
Ju ly 304.8 617.8 3 0 9 .0 1 9 0 ,8  .
Aug 2 5 6 .3 8 6 3 .2 602.9 202.9
Sept 1 9 6 .5 506.0 3 0 5 .5 210.5
Oct 173.0 3 8 4 .5 2 0 7 .5 2 1 8 .0
Nov 112.5 254.6 138.1 226.7
Dec 175.3 626 • 5 447.2 247.1
T o t a l 1980.5 4800.9 2788.4
1922
Jan 1 9 2 .6 3 8 8 .2 1 9 1 .6 2 5 5 .9
Feb 194.2 342.4 144.2 2 6 3 .0
Mar 207.8 3 4 6 .5 134.7 272.1
Apr 190.3 3 2 1 .8 129 .8 2 8 1 .1
May 2 5 4 .9 3 7 6 .9 120.3 289.4
June 2 3 5 .1 3 1 3 .8 77.0 295 .3
J u l y 183.4 2 0 8 .5 23.4 3 0 8 .0
Aug 116.4 205.1 86.9 3 3 1 .5
Sep 9 0 .8 4 3 4 .9 3 4 2 .5 451.1
Oct 66.2 2 6 9 .5 201.6 6 0 3 .8
N0v 6 0 .6 199.8 1 3 7 .5 8 3 9 .1
Dec 73.4 438.0 362.9 1495.2
T o t a l 1865.7 3845 .4 1942.4
1. F ig u r e s  from C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i , op. c i t . ,  pp.,438- 9 .
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I t  w i l l  be n o t i c e d  t h a t  t h e  d e f i c i t  f o r  t h e  l a s t  e i g h t  months 
of 1921 was c o n s id e r a b ly  g r e a t e r  tha n  t h a t  f o r  t h e  whole of 1922. 
This  was due l a r g e l y  t o  th e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  l e v e l  of both r e a l  
income and r e a l  e x p e n d i tu r e  was reduced s e v e r e l y  by t h e  f a l l  in 
t h e  va lu e  of t h e  mark in t h e  l a t t e r  p e r io d .  The enormous in c r e a s e  
in t h e  t o t a l  f l o a t i n g  d e b t ,  which was expressed  in paper marks, 
was merely a r e f l e c t i o n  of t h e  d e c l i n e  in  t h e  va lu e  of German 
c u r r e n c y .  The f a l l  of  t h e  mark from 66 t o  t h e  d o l l a r  on 1 May 
1921 t o  7350 t o  t h e  d o l l a r  on t h e  l a s t  day of 1922 in f a c t  meant 
t h a t  t h e  r e a l  amount of t h e  German government’s f l o a t i n g  debt  
had been d r a s t i c a l l y  reduced in t h i s  period. '*"’
The months between May 1921 and December 1922 a l s o  
w i tne ssed  a paper  expansion and r e a l  r e d u c t io n  of Germany's 
e x t e r n a l  f l o a t i n g  d e b t .  A V i c e - P r e s id e n t  of t h e  Reichsbank 
es t im a ted  t h a t  a t  t h e  end of 1921 only 1 b i l l i o n  gold marks of 
a t o t a l  pos t -w ar  t r a d i n g  d e f i c i t  of 11 b i l l i o n  gold marks had 
been covered by ex p o r t s  of b u l l i o n .  The remainder  had been 
covered by ( l )  t h e  s a l e  of 25-30 b i l l i o n  paper  marks ab road ,
(2) an i n c r e a s e  of about  35 b i l l i o n  paper marks in t h e  c r e d i t  
b a l a n c e s  of f o r e i g n e r s  in  German banks ,  ( 3 ) t h e  s a l e  t o  f o r e i g n e r s  
of German s e c u r i t i e s  wor th approx im ate ly  35 b i l l i o n  paper marks,  
(4)  c r e d i t s  o f ,  p o s s i b l y ,  30 b i l l i o n  paper marks and (5) t h e  
s a l e  of l a n d ,  b u i l d i n g s ,  and s h a re  u n d e r ta k in g s  of an unknown 
v a l u e .  * In "the course  of 1922 t h e  nominal  v a l u e  of t h i s
1. For exchange r a t e s :  Die Entw ic k lung  de r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e .
pp.  1 8 , 37.
2. Dr.  von Glasenapp,  "Germany's Balance of  Payments w i th  o th e r
C o u n t r i e s " ,  MGCRE, 20 A p r i l ,  1922,  p.  28-9 .
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e x t e r n a l  in d e b te d n e s s  in c re a s e d  r a p i d l y ,  but  t h e  v i o l e n t  f a l l  
of t h e  mark s u b s t a n t i a l l y  reduced t h e  r e a l  s i z e  of Germany's 
f o r e i g n  o b l i g a t i o n s . 1 *
Such i n f l a t i o n  and d e p r e c i a t i o n  i n e v i t a b l y  had impor tan t  
economic r e p e r c u s s i o n s .  The v i o l e n t  slump of t h e  mark in t h e  
autumn of 1921 p r e c i p i t a t e d  a " c a t a s t r o p h e  boom", dur ing  which 
Germans, anxious  t o  conver t  marks i n t o  goods of any d e s c r i p t i o n ,  
and f o r e i g n e r s ,  who were favoured  by t h e  s u p e r i o r  purchas ing 
power of t h e i r  c u r r e n c i e s  in t h e  e a r ly  s t a g e s  of any d e p r e c i a t i o n ,  
v ied w i th  each o th e r  in a f r e n z y  of buy ing .  The improvement of 
t h e  mark in  t h e  w in t e r  of 1921-2 was s u f f i c i e n t  t o  cause 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  commercial  and i n d u s t r i a l  u n c e r t a i n t y  w i th in  Germany, 
a l though  a s e v e re  r e c e s s i o n  was preven ted  by t h e  back- log  of 
o rders  which had been b u i l t  up in  t h e  p revious  p e r i o d .  However, 
once t h e  mark resumed i t s  downward course  in  February  and March 
1922, i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t y  became more i n t e n s e ;  and i t  reached 
a f e v e r i s h  p i t c h  in t h e  months of headlong d e p r e c i a t i o n  a f t e r  
m id -1922 .2  3*
An importan t  b y -p roduc t  of t h e  f a l l  in t h e  va lue  of t h e  
mark in  1921 and 1922 was an i n c r e a s e  in t h e  v e l o c i t y  of n o te  
c i r c u l a t i o n .  A± t h e  end of December 1921 i s s u e s  of Reichsbank 
and War Loan O f f i c e  n o t e s ,  which had amounted t o  8 l  b i l l i o n  marks 
in May 1921, had r i s e n  t o  1 ,293 b i l l i o n  m a r k s . H o w e v e r ,  over
1. J .M.Keynes,  "S p e c u la t io n  in t h e  Mark and Germany's Balances  
Abroad",  i b i d . ,  28 September 1922, p. 48o.
2 . C, B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op. c i t . ,  pp.  190- 2 .
3. J . S .  Dav i s ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 90.
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t h e  same pe r iod  w h o le s a le  p r i c e s  of home-produced goods 
i n c r e a s e d ,  acc o rd in g  t o  t h e  index p u b l i she d  by t h e  S t a t i s t i c a l  
Bureau of t h e  R e ich ,  from 1,266 (1913=100) t o  1 2 7 ,5 0 4 .1# S ince  
t h e  volume of n o te s  had r i s e n  only s i x t e e n - f o l d  w h i le  p r i c e s  
had r i s e n  t o  one hundred t im e s  t h e i r  p rev ious  l e v e l ,  t h e r e  had
i n e v i t a b l y  been a sharp  r i s e  in t h e  v e l o c i t y  of  n o te  c i r c u l a t i o n
2 #
from O.96 in May 1921 (1913=1) t o  6 .85  in December 1922. Th is  
development,  which was most n o t i c e a b l e  in t h e  second h a l f  of 
1922,^ was a symptom of t h e  powerfu l  demand f o r  goods which 
was p r e c i p i t a t e d  by t h e  a c t u a l  and a n t i c i p a t e d  e v a p o ra t io n  of 
t h e  p u rc h a s in g  power of t h e  mark in  t h i s  p e r i o d .
The d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  mark i n e v i t a b l y  had an e f f e c t  on 
t h e  b a l a n c e  of t r a d e .  Th is  e f f e c t  was however of an unusua l  
k in d ,  s i n c e  any sharp  f a l l  in  t h e  exchange r a t e  not  only s t im u la t e d  
ex p o r t s  in t h e  accepted  manner but a l s o  in c re a s e d  im por ts .  The 
reason  fo r  t h i s  was t h a t ,  because  of t h e  heavy dependence of 
pos t -w ar  German i n d u s t r y  on f o r e i g n  raw m a t e r i a l s ,  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l
boom c o n d i t i o n s  c r e a t e d  by a f a l l  in t h e  mark p r e c i p i t a t e d  a
4.
c o n s id e r a b l e  demand f o r  im p o r t s .  Converse ly ,  any r a p id  r ecovery  
of t h e  mark,  such as occurred  in  t h e  w in t e r  of 1921- 2 , decreased  
impor ts  as  w e l l  as  expo r ts  because  of t h e  s l a c k e n in g  of t h e  
domest ic  and f o r e ig n  demand fo r  German goods.  * The sharp r i s e  
in t h e  volume of imports  which began in th e  s p r in g  of 1922 and
1 . F ig u re s  de r ived  from C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op.  c i t . ,  p p . 25-35> 
T ab le  I -V I .
2.  i b i d . ,  pp. 168-74.
3 .  i b i d . ,  p. 168, Tab le  XXII,
4 .  J .H .W i l l i a m s , "German F ore ign  Trade and t h e  R epa ra t ion  Payments",  
QJE. May 1922, V o l.  36 , pp. 482-90.
5 .  See above ,  p.  298.
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con t inued  u n t i l  l a t e  in 1922 was connected w i th  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
r a p i d  f a l l  of t h e  mark in  t h i s  p e r io d .  The i n f l u e n c e  of t h e  
p a r t i t i o n  of Upper S i l e s i a  and t h e  poor h a r v e s t  of 1922 on t h e
l e v e l  of im por ts  in t h e  second h a l f  of 1922 was, however, a l s o
1.
c o n s i d e r a b l e .
Bes ides  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  l e v e l  of economic a c t i v i t y  and t h e  
b a l a n c e  of t r a d e ,  t h e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  mark a l s o  s h i f t e d  t h e  
emphasis of German p ro d u c t io n  by i n c r e a s in g  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  power 
of c e r t a i n  s e c t i o n s  of t h e  German community a t  t h e  expense of 
o t h e r s .  The c l a s s e s  which s u f f e r e d  most as  a r e s u l t  of t h e  f a l l i n g  
v a l u e  of t h e  mark were t h o s e  whose incomes were e i t h e r  f i x e d  or 
slow in  a d a p t in g  the m se lves  t o  r ap id  changes in  t h e  v a lu e  of money. 
Smal l  bondho lde rs  and sav ings  bank d e p o s i t o r s  s u f f e r e d  se v e re ly  
b eca use  of t h e  r e d u c t io n  of t h e  r e a l  va lue  of t h e i r  income and 
t h e i r  s a v i n g s .  By t h e  end of 1922 t h e  i n t e r e s t  payments of t h e
German government on t h e  pub l i c  debt  were r a p i d l y  l o s in g  t h e i r
2 .
r e a l  v a l u e ;  and t h e  gold v a l u e  of sav ings  bank d e p o s i t s  was a
o
mere f r a c t i o n  of i t s  former l e v e l .  The r e a l  incomes of wage-
e a r n e r s  were a l s o  reduced a p p r e c i a b l y ,  above a l l  d u r ing  t h e  p e r io d s
of v i o l e n t  i n f l a t i o n  in  1921 and 1922, a l though  t h i s  r e d u c t i o n  was
somewhat o f f s e t  by t h e  s im ul taneous  i n c r e a s e  in employment which
o c c u r r e d .  * The r e l a t i v e  impoverishment of t h e s e  v u l n e ra b l e
groups in t h e  community was such t h a t  t h e r e  was a d e c l i n e  in t h e
£
demand f o r  consumption goods in Germany in 1921-2.
1 . See above ,  p .  299*
2.  C, B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op. c i t . ,  pp.  31^—19»
3 » J .W .F .  T h e l w a l l ,  Report  on. . .Germany t o  March, 1923? P» 9 *
4.  C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op. c i t . ,  pp.  305-0»
5 .  J .W .F .  T h e l w a l l ,  op. c i t . ,  s u p ra ,  pp. 119-20.  C . B re s c i a n i -  
T u r r o n i ,  op.  c i t . ,  p.  196.
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The f i n a n c i a l  power of which t h e  consuming c l a s s e s  had 
been depr ived  by t h e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  mark was f o r  t h e  most 
p a r t  t r a n s f e r r e d  e i t h e r  t o  t h e  government,  whose d eb t s  were 
almost  com ple te ly  wiped o u t ,  or e l s e  t o  l a r g e  i n d u s t r i a l  g ro u p s ,  
which were a b l e  t o  make i n f l a t i o n  p r o f i t s  and t o  ob ta in  l i b e r a l  
s u p p l i e s  of  c r e d i t .  The f a v o u ra b l e  p o s i t i o n  of t h e  l a t t e r  was 
r e f l e c t e d  in  t h e  d im in is h in g  impor tance  of t h e  normal c r e d i t -  
c r e a t i n g  a g e n c i e s .  Although t h e  paper  v a l u e  of advances made by 
t h e  War C red i t  O f f i c e s  r o s e  from 23 b i l l i o n  marks in May 1921 
t o  92 b i l l i o n  marks in  November 1922, * t h i s  was i n s u f f i c i e n t ,  
in view of t h e  r a p id  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  c u r r e n c y ,  t o  p reven t
them from becoming,  l i k e  t h e  c r e d i t  banks ,  r e l a t i v e l y  i n s i g n i f -
2 .
i c a n t  as  a so u rc e  of c r e d i t .  A f te r  t h e  middle  of 1922 t h e  
main c r e d i t - c r e a t i n g  a g e n c ie s  in Germany came t o  be t h e  Reichsbank 
and i n d u s t r y  i t s e l f .  The v a lu e  of advances made by t h e  Reichsbank 
on t h e  s e c u r i t y  of commercial  b i l l s  ro s e  from 1 b i l l i o n  marks a t
t h e  end of 1921 t o  5 b i l l i o n s  in  June 1922, and th e n c e  t o  422
3.
b i l l i o n s  a t  t h e  end of 1922.  Meanwhile,  l a r g e  i n d u s t r i a l  groups 
made such p r o f i t s  out of  t h e  i n f l a t i o n  t h a t  t h e y  were ab le  e i t h e r
t o  absorb  c r e d i t  banks i n t o  t h e i r  framework or t o  se t  up t h e i r
4 #
own banks .  * The d ry in g -u p  of t h e  normal sources  of c r e d i t  and 
t h e  s h i f t  of c r e d i t - c r  eat ing power t o  t h e  Reichsbank and t o  t h e  
l a r g e  i n d u s t r i a l  groups h e lp s  t o  exp la in  t h e  growing emphasis 
of German economic a c t i v i t y  in 1921 and 1922 on t h e  manufac tu re
1 . R. S tucken ,  op. c i t . ,  p.  35.
2. C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i , op. c i t . ,  pp.  212-4,
3 . H. S ch ach t ,  "The D iscount  P o l i c y  of t h e  Re ichsbank" ,  MGCRE 
7 December 1922,  pp.  689-70;  J  . S . D av is ,  l o c .  c i t .
4. C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op. c i t .  pp. 212-4.
of p ro d u c t io n  goods* Large f i rm s  w i th  command e i t h e r  of 
i n f l a t i o n  p r o f i t s  or of Reichsbank c r e d i t s ,  which could be 
repa id  in  d e p r e c i a t e d  paper  c u r r e n c y ,  were a b le  t o  v e n t u re  upon 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  and expans ion  of t h e i r  p ro d u c t iv e  
a p p a r a t u s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in  t h e  second h a l f  of 1 9 2 2 . Thi s  
i n e v i t a b l y  in c re a s e d  t h e  demand f o r  i n s t r u m e n t a l  goods in an 
e x t r a o r d i n a r y  manner.
The per iod  between May 1921 and December 1922 was, 
t h e r e f o r e ,  one of i n t e n s e  economic a c t i v i t y  in Germany. However, 
t h i s  a c t i v i t y ,  and t h e  h igh  l e v e l  of employment which went w i th  
i t ,  were achieved l a r g e l y  because  of t h e  a r t i f i c i a l  s t im ulus  
g iven  by t h e  domestic  p r i c e  i n f l a t i o n  and e x t e r n a l  d e p r e c i a t i o n  
r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  p e r s i s t e n t  imbalance  of Germany*s i n t e r n a l  
and e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c e s .  As a r e s u l t ,  Germany*s p r o d u c t iv e  energy 
and r e s o u r c e s  were channe l led  t o o  much towards  t h e  manufac tu re  
of p r o d u c e r s ’ goods and t o o  l i t t l e  towards  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  needs 
of consumers .  The s o c i a l  d i s t r e s s  and economic d i s o r g a n i s a t i o n  
caused by t h i s  d i s t o r t i o n  were a l r e a d y  becoming ev iden t  in 1922, 
and the y  were t o  become p a i n f u l l y  obvious when f i n a n c i a l  
s t a b i l i s a t i o n  removed t h e  s t im u lus  which had been provided by 
t h e  f a l l i n g  va lu e  of t h e  mark.
306.
1. i b i d . ,  pp.  201-3
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SECTION I I
THE ECONOMIC AND THE D IRECT FINANCIAL IMPACT OF REPARATIONS 
BETWEEN M Y  1 9 2 1  AND THE END 0 F ~ 1 9 2 2
( a ) T h e  E c o n o m ic  Im p act  o f  R e p a r a t i o n s
B e c a u s e  d e l i v e r i e s  i n  k i n d  w e r e  l e s s  i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  c a s h
payments a f t e r  May 1921, t h e  main impact of r e p a r a t i o n  was 
f i n a n c i a l  r a t h e r  than  economic in t h e  twenty  months which preceded 
t h e  F ranco -B e lg ian  occupa t ion  of th e  Ruhr in January  1923» The 
main i tems among d e l i v e r i e s  of goods,  which accounted  f o r  1.046 
b i l l i o n  gold marks of t o t a l  r e p a r a t i o n  payments of 2.749 b i l l i o n
gold marks ,  were
Coal ,  coke and l i g n i t e
(gold marks)
481,996,745
Proceeds  of R e p a ra t io n  Recovery Act 163, 160,182
Sundry d e l i v e r i e s  (Annex I I ) 157,978,339
Ships  (Annex I I I ) 46 ,774,665
In land  W a te r c r a f t 27,689,164
Animals 67 ,482,471
Sundry d e l i v e r i e s  (Annex IV) 55,325,329
D e r i v a t i v e s  of c o a l 21,518,814
D y e s tu f f s  (Annex VI) 23,683,736
P h a rm ac eu t i ca l  F roduc ts (Annex VI) 1 0 , 497, 667.
The r e l a t i v e l y  sm a l l  s i z e  of most of t h e s e d e l i v e r i e s  and t h e
p r e c a u t io n s  which were taken  t o  preven t  shipments of a g r i c u l t u r a l  
equipment,  r i v e r c r a f t ,  d y e s t u f f s  and coa l  d e r i v a t i v e s  from caus ing  
economic d i s l o c a t i o n 'm e a n t  t h a t  t h e  only economica lly  s i g n i f i c a n t  
d e l i v e r i e s  in t h i s  per iod  were t h o s e  of c o a l .  The economic as 
opposed t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  importance  of t h e s e  was,  moreover,  reduced 
by inc re ased  German c o a l  p ro d u c t io n  and,  from t h e  beg inn ing  of  
1922, by a c o n s id e r a b l e  r i s e  in c o a l  im por ts .
1.  R»C, , IV, Tab l e  IV, pp.  12-13.
2 .  See above ,  pp.  49-53*
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In a s s e s s i n g  t h e  economic impact of r e p a r a t i o n  co a l  
d e l i v e r i e s  a d i s t i n c t i o n  must be made between t h e  per iod from 
May 1921 t o  t h e  beg inning  of June 1922 and t h e  l a s t  seven months 
of 1922.  In th e  f i r s t  per iod  of t h i r t e e n  months,  t h e  amount of
coa l  p o t e n t i a l l y  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  in Germany was 153»7
1.
m i l l i o n  t o n s ,  v i z ,
Net Black Coal L i g n i t e  T o t a l  Net Remainder
Product  ion Product  ion Export  s
( i n  te rms of b la ck  coa])
129 30 .7  159.7 6 153.7
Since r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  in t h e s e  months came t o  19 m i l l i o n
2 .
t o n s ,  t h e  amount of c o a l  d i s t r i b u t e d  in Germany was in f a c t  134.7 
m i l l i o n  t o n s .  On t h e  assumption  t h a t  t h e  amount of  c o a l
d i s t r i b u t e d  in  1913 w i t h i n  pos t -w ar  German f r o n t i e r s  was 11
m i l l i o n  t o n s  a month"1 23 4* ( t h a t  i s ,  143 m i l l i o n  t o n s  fo r  13 months) ,
r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  were r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a lag of l e s s  th a n  7$
behind peac e - t im e  consumpt ion .
In t h e  l a s t  seven months of  1922 more c o a l  was d i s t r i b u t e d
w i th i n  Germany th a n  a t  any t im e  s i n c e  t h e  war .  Th is  was in s p i t e
of t h e  p a r t i t i o n  of Upper S i l e s i a  which depr ived  Germany of 2
4
m i l l i o n  t o n s  of he r  monthly c o a l  output  a f t e r  May 1922.  * The main 
reason  f o r  t h e  improvement of t h e  co a l  supply  was t h a t  Germany, which
had in t h e  f i r s t  f i v e  months of 1922 been a ne t  e x p o r t e r  of 2 .5
1. F ig u re s  f o r  g ross  b lack  c o a l  and l i g n i t e  p ro d u c t io n  in 1921 
and 1922 in :  J .W .F.  T h e l w a l l ,  Report: on . . .  Germany t o  March.
1922, p.  85; idem, Report  on . . .  Germany t o  March. 1923. p .6 0 .  
F ig u r e s  f o r  ne t  c o a l  e x p o r t s :  i b i d . ,  p. 44.  Net b lack  coa l  
p r o d u c t i o n : -  g ro s s  p ro d u c t io n  l e s s  13/£.
2. D e l i v e r y  f i g u r e s  t o  J anuary  1922: R . C , , V, p.  229. For t o t a l  
d e l i v e r i e s  between May 1921 and December 1922: i b i d . ,  IV, p .1 2 .
3 . See above ,  pp.  56-7 .
4. J . S .  D av is ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 105.
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m i l l i o n  t o n s  of c o a l ,  becarase between June and December 1922 
a ne t  im por te r  of 10.3 m i l l i o n  t o n s . 1 * The amount of c o a l  which
was p o t e n t i a l l y  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  in t h e s e  seven months
2 .
was t h e r e f o r e  8 9 .5  m i l l i o n  t o n s ,  v i z ,
Net  Black Coal  L i g n i t e  Net To t a l
Product  ion  Pro d u c t io n  Imports
( i n  te rm s  of b lack  coa l )
61 18 .2  10 .3  89 .5  
S ince  r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  in t h e s e  months amounted t o  10 .5  
m i l l i o n  t o n s ,  * t h e  amount of co a l  in f a c t  a v a i l a b l e  was 79 m i l l i o n  
t o n s .  This  was 2 m i l l i o n  to n s  above th e  1913 d i s t r i b u t i o n  l e v e l  
of 77 m i l l i o n  to n s  ( l l  m i l l i o n  t o n s  a month f o r  seven months) ,^*  
S ince  t h e  c e s s io n  of P o l i s h  Upper S i l e s i a  reduced t h e  t o t a l  coa l  
consumption of Germany by a c o n s id e r a b l e  amount,  c o a l  was in f a c t  
even more p l e n t i f u l  by 1913 s t a n d a r d s .  In 1913 ' the consumption 
of  t h e  ceded p o r t i o n  of Upper S i l e s i a  had been about  14 m i l l i o n  
t o n s  a y e a r ,  t h a t  i s ,  8 m i l l i o n  t o n s  fo r  seven months.^ Thus 
between June 1922 and December 1922 t h e r e  were about  t e n  m i l l i o n  
more tons  of c o a l  a v a i l a b l e  w i th i n  Germany th a n  t h e r e  had been 
f o r  a comparable a rea  and over t h e  same per iod in 1913»
The s t a t e  of t h e  German coa l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  in 1921 and 1922 
i s  r e f l e c t e d  in t h e  comments of two w e l l -p l a c e d  f o r e i g n  o b s e r v e r s .  
In t h e  s p r in g  of 1922 T h e l w a l l ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  Commercial S e c r e t a r y  
in B e r l in  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  "dur ing  1921 t h e  v i o l e n t  con t ro v e r sy
1. J .W.F .  T h e l w a l l ,  Report  on. . .Germany t o  March.  1923. pp.44-5$ 
idem, Repo r t  on . . .Germany t o  A p r i l .  1924, p . 6 9 .
2.  For s o u rc e s :  see above ,  p.  308 Note 1.
3 . For s o u r c e s ,  see above,  p.  3^8 Note 2.
4. On f i g u r e  f o r  1913 d i s t r i b u t i o n  l e v e l ,  see above,  pp.  56 -7 .
5 .  G. Lübsen, "The German Coal S i t u a t i o n  and t h e  R epara t ion  
D e l i v e r i e s " ,  MGCRE, 7 September 1922, pp.  427-8.
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c o n c e r n i n g  Germany' s  c o a l  s u p p ly  and c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  which raged  
t h r o u g h o u t  1920 d i e d  down a lm o s t  c o m p l e t e l y " .  T h e l w a l l  c o n s i d e r e d  
t h a t  any c o a l  s h o r t a g e  which was e x p e r i e n c e d  in  1921 had been 
"due f o r  t h e  most  p a r t  t o  d e f e c t s  in  t r a n s p o r t ,  l a b o u r  and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  and no t  t o  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s " .  Coal  
d e l i v e r i e s  w e r e ,  he  a d m i t t e d ,  a b u r d e n ,  bu t  t h e y  were  by no means 
an e x c e s s i v e  one ,  no r  was i t  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  remedy t h e i r  e f f e c t  "by 
j u d i c i o u s  p u r c h a s e s  on t h e  w o r l d ' s  c o a l  m a r k e t s  and improved 
e x p l o i t a t i o n " . J ’ The comment of  an American o b s e r v e r ,  w r i t i n g  
e a r l y  i n  1923» was somewhat d i f f e r e n t .  He remarked  t h a t  t h e r e  
had been c o m p l a i n t s  of a c o a l  s h o r t a g e ,  bu t  t h e s e  w e r e ,  he 
c o n s i d e r e d ,  a r e f l e c t i o n  of  " i n c r e a s e d  p r o d u c t i v e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
r a t h e r  t h a n  reduced  s u p p l i e s  or i n c r e a s e d  d e l i v e r i e s  on r e p a r a t i o n  
a c c o u n t " . ^ *
Any s h o r t a g e  of  c o a l  wh ich  was e x p e r i e n c e d  in  Germany was 
in  f a c t  due t o  t h e  t r e n d  away from t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  of consumer 
goods t o w a r d s  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  of  p r o d u c e r s '  goods which  has  been 
n o t i c e d  in  t h i s  p e r i o d , ^ *  I t  was above a l l  i n  t h e  second h a l f  
of 1922 t h a t  t h i s  t r e n d  h e i g h t e n e d  t h e  demand f o r  i r o n  and s t e e l  
and s o ,  u l t i m a t e l y ,  f o r  c o a l .  ’ T h u s ,  a l t h o u g h  more c o a l  was 
a v a i l a b l e  in  Germany in  t h e  second h a l f  of  1922 t h a n  t h e r e  had 
been  f o r  a com parab le  a r e a  i n  1 9 1 3 » ‘t h e  supp ly  was s t i l l  i n s u f f i c ­
i e n t .  However ,  s i n c e  t h e  u p s u r g e  of  economic a c t i v i t y  was 
a r t  i f  i c i a l l y - i n d u c e d  and d i s t o r t e d  in  emphasis  t h e  r e a l  economic
damage caused  by any s c a r c i t y  of  c o a l  was p r o b a b l y  s l i g h t .  I t  i s
1 . J  ,W,F . T h e l w a l l ,  R e po r t  on . . .  Germany t o  March ,  1922. p .  84.
2 .  J . 3 ,  D a v i s ,  "Economic  and F i n a n c i a l  P r o g r e s s  i n  E u r o p e " ,  
Review of  Economic S t a t i s t i c s . J a n u a r y  1923» V o l .  V,  p .  105.
3 .  See  a b o v e ,  pp .  295-30&«
4 .  C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op.  c i t . ,  pp .  197 -2 0 0 .
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even a rg u a b le  t h a t  any h in d r a n c e  t o  t h e  w a s t e f u l  o v e r - c a p i t a l i s a t i o n  
which occurred  in many s pheres  of economic a c t i v i t y  in t h i s  per iod  
was h igh ly  desirable."*"*
( b ) The D i r e c t  F i n a n c i a l  Impact of R epa ra t ions
The d i r e c t  f i n a n c i a l  impact of r e p a r a t i o n  payments was 
f a r  more d e c i s i v e  t h a n  t h e i r  economic e f f e c t  in t h e  per iod between 
May 1921 and t h e  end of 1922.  The t o t a l  amount of government 
e x p e n d i tu r e  occas ioned by t h e  e n t i r e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a ty  was 2.8 
b i l l i o n  gold  marks in t h e  budge ta ry  year  1921/2 and 1.2 b i l l i o n  
gold marks in 1922/3 .  I f  ded u c t io n s  a r e  made f o r  '’c l e a r i n g ” 
agreement payments under  A r t i c l e  296, compensation paid t o  German 
n a t io n a I s  l i v i n g  abroad and payments o th e r  th a n  r e p a r a t i o n ,  t h e  
remain ing  ex p e n d i tu r e s  -  t h o s e  occasioned e x c l u s i v e l y  by t h e  
R epara t ion  Chapter  -  amounted t o  2.0  b i l l i o n s  in  1921/2 and 1.1 
b i l l i o n s  in 1922/3* These  sums were a much h ig h e r  p ro p o r t i o n  of 
t o t a l  government e x p e n d i tu re  t h a n  th e y  had been in p reced ing  y e a r s ,
a l though  t h e y  were s t i l l  by no means t h e  s o l e  d i r e c t  cause of th e
2 .
d e f i c i t s  which were i n c u r r e d ,  v i z ,
( b i l l i o n  gold marks)
Year T o t a l T o t a l Reoara t  ion T o t a l T o t a l
E x p e n d i tu re D e f i c i t Expend i t u r  e E xpend i tu re  D e f i c i t
i  %
1919-20 8 .6 6 .0 0 .14 1 .6 2 .3
1920-21 9.3 6 .2 O.89 9 .6 14.4
1921-22 6.7 3.7 2 .0 30 .0 54 .1
1922-23 4 .0 2 .5 1 .1 27 .5 44.0
Thus in t h e  y ea r s  1921-2 and 1922-3  r e p a r a t i o n payments,  which had
account ed f o r  a r e l a t i v e l y  sm al l p ro p o r t i o n  of t h e  government '1 s
1. i b i d . ,  pp.  219-23.
2.  For government e x p e n d i tu r e  and d e f i c i t s :  i b i d . ,  pp.  437-8* 
f o r  d is b u r s em en ts  occasioned by t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a ty :  K .J .  
Moulton and C.E.  McGuire, Germany’ s Capac i ty  t o  Pay , p p . 170-1.
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o u t l a y  in  t h e  two p r e c e d i n g  b u d g e t a r y  y e a r s ,  were r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  a lm os t  o n e - t h i r d  of  t o t a l  government  e x p e n d i t u r e  and abou t  
o n e - h a l f  o f  t h e  d e f i c i t .
R e p a r a t i o n  payments  a l s o  e x e r t e d  a much g r e a t e r  d i r e c t  
e f f e c t  on t h e  German b a l a n c e  of payments i n  t h i s  p e r i o d .
C a l c u l a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  e f f e c t  v i a  t h e  b a l a n c e  of t r a d e  i s  s i m p l i f i e d  
by t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  v a l u e  of  d e l i v e r i e s  of  c a p i t a l  equipment  
such a s  s h i p s  and in l a n d  w a t e r c r a f t ,  which were  t o g e t h e r  w or th  
l e s s  t h a n  75 m i l l i o n  m a r k s . T h e  a n n u a l  l o s s  of i n v i s i b l e  
income o c c a s io n e d  by s h i p  d e l i v e r i e s  has  a l r e a d y  been  e s t i m a t e d  
a t  a maximum f i g u r e  of 300 m i l l i o n  go ld  m ark s .  * The a d d i t i o n a l  
l o s s  r e s u l t  fing from d e l i v e r i e s  be tween  May 1921 and December 1922 
would have  been  more t h a n  c a n c e l l e d  out  by t h e  e a r n i n g s  of  t h e  
new or  c h a r t e r e d  s h i p s  which t h e  German s h i p p i n g  l i n e s  had o b t a i n e d  
t o  r e p l a c e  t h e i r  fo rm e r  f l e e t s . ^ *  T h e r e f o r e  t h e  l o s s  of  i n v i s i b l e  
e a r n i n g s  c aused  by t h e  t r e a t y  in  t h i s  p e r i o d  cou ld  s t i l l  no t  have  
been more t h a n  300 m i l l i o n  g o ld  marks a y e a r .
The r e m a in d e r  of  t h e  d e l i v e r i e s  in  k i n d ,  w i t h  t h e  
e x c e p t i o n  of  c o a l ,  were r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  and can be c r u d e l y  
reckoned  a s  e i t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  e x p o r t s  or import  s u b s t i t u t e s ,  and
g i v e n  t h e  v a l u e  of abou t  500 m i l l i o n  gold marks a s c r i b e d  t o  them
4 .
by t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission.  On t h e  a s s u m p t io n  t h a t  t h e s e  
d e l i v e r i e s  a f f e c t e d  t h e  b a l a n c e  of  t r a d e  a t  a s t e a d y  r a t e ,  t h e  n e t  
u n f a v o u r a b l e  e f f e c t  of  a l l  d e l i v e r i e s  in  k i n d ,  excep t  c o a l ,  would
1 . See a b o v e ,  p .  3°7«
2.  See a b o v e ,  p .  79«
3 .  See a b o v e ,  pp .  49,  79»
4 .  R , C. . IV, pp .  12 -13 .  See a b o v e ,  p . 3 0 7 .
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have been 400 m i l l i o n  go ld  marks i n  t h e  l a s t  e i g h t  months of
1.
1921 and 600 m i l l i o n  go ld  marks in  1922,
The R e p a r a t i o n  Commission f i x e d  t h e  v a l u e  of  t h e  29*5 
m i l l i o n  t o n s  of c o a l  wh ich  were  d e l i v e r e d  in  t h i s  p e r io d  a t  482 
m i l l i o n  go ld  m ark s .  * In c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  b a l a n c e - o f - t r a d e  
e f f e c t  of t h e s e  d e l i v e r i e s  i t  w i l l  be assumed c r u d e l y  t h a t ,  i f  
no r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  had been  made,  c o a l  e x p o r t s  would b e f o r e  
J u n e  1922 have  e q u a l l e d  t h e  amount by which t o t a l  p r o d u c t i o n  
exceeded  t h e  1913 l e v e l  of  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  I t  w i l l  f u r t h e r  be 
assumed t h a t  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  of  heavy  demand f o r  c o a l  a f t e r  Ju n e
1922 a l l  r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  would o t h e r w i s e  have  been import  
s u b s t i t u t e s .  F i n a l l y ,  i t  w i l l  be  assumed t h a t  b o t h  t h e  p r i c e  
which  would have  been  o b t a i n e d  i f  r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  had been 
e x p o r t e d  and t h e  p r i c e  which  was in  f a c t  pa id  f o r  c o a l  impor ts  
were t h e  r u l i n g  E n g l i s h  e x p o r t  p r i c e  f o r  c o a l .  T h i s  a s sum pt ion  
i s  n e c e s s a r y  b e c a u s e  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commiss ion 's  v a l u a t i o n  o f  
most of  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  was based  upon t h e  • 
abn o rm a l ly  low German d om es t ic  c o a l  p r i c e s . * I t  i s  a l s o  n e c e s s ­
a r y  b e c a u s e  t h e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  of  t h e  mark make t h e  e f f e c t i v e  e x p o r t  
p r i c e  of  German c o a l  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  c a l c u l a t e .  I t  i s ,  m o re o v e r ,
t o  some e x t e n t  j u s t i f i e d  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  65/£ of  t h e  c o a l  im por te d
4.
by Germany i n  1922 was E n g l i s h .
On t h e s e  a s s u m p t io n s  t h e  amount of  c o a l  which would have
1. The l o s s  i n  May-December 1921 would have  been  200 m i l l i o n s  
( i n v i s i b l e )  and 200 m i l l i o n s  ( v i s i b l e ) .  Tha t  in  1922 would 
have  been  300 m i l l i o n s  ( i n v i s i b l e )  and 300 m i l l i o n s  ( v i s i b l e ) .
2 .  See a b o v e ,  p .  3 0 7 .
3 .  See a b o v e ,  p .  144 .
4 .  J .W .F .  T h e l w a l l ,  R epo r t  o n . . .G e rm a ny  t o  A p r i l .  1924 . p .69*
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been expor ted  i f  no r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  had been made in t h e  
t h i r t e e n  months between May 1921 and June 1922 would have been 
eq u a l  t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t o t a l  coa l  p ro d u c t io n  (153.7 
m i l l i o n  t o n s )  and th e  amount d i s t r i b u t e d  d u r ing  t h e  same per iod 
in 1913 (143 m i l l i o n  t o n s ) ,  viz,^~*
10.7  m i l l i o n  to n s ;
and t h e  impor ts  obv ia ted  in t h e  fo l low ing  seven months would have 
been
10.3  m i l l i o n  t o n s . “1 2*4
The f o r e i g n  exchange which would have been e i t h e r  earned or saved 
by Germany in t h i s  pe r iod  i f  no r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  had been 
made could have amounted,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  about  £27*1 m i l l i o n  or 
540 m i l l i o n  gold marks,  v i z , ^ *
£ m i l l i o n
10.7  m i l l i o n  t o n s  @ 29/3 a to n  15*5
10.3  m i l l i o n  t o n s  © 22/7 a to n  11.6
£ 27.1 m i l l i o n  
or 540 m i l l i o n  gold marks ) .
Of t h e s e  e a rn in g s  and s a v i n g s ,  approx im ate ly  190 m i l l i o n  gold marks
would have been e f f e c t e d  in th e  months May-Dec ember 1921; and 350
m i l l i o n  gold marks in  t h e  y e a r  1922.
Thus t h e  t o t a l  u n fa v o u ra b l e  e f f e c t  of a l l  d e l i v e r i e s  in
kind on Germany's  v i s i b l e  and i n v i s i b l e  t r a d e  ba lance  was
(400 + 190) = 590 m i l l i o n  gold marks in t h e  l a s t  e ig h t  months of
4
1921; and (600 + 350) = 950 m i l l i o n  gold marks in  1922.
R e p a ra t io n s  could t h e r e f o r e  be blamed fo r  t h e  g r e a t e r  par t  of  \  
Germany's a d v e r s e  t r a d e  b a l a n c e  in  t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d ,  when t h e
1. See above ,  p . 308.
2. i b i d .
3* B r i t i s h  c o a l  expor t  p r i c e s  f o r  1921: The S t a t  i s t . Banking and 
Commercial Supplement, l8  February  1922,  p.  44; f o r  1922:
i b i d . .  17 February 1923» P* 3^*
4.  See  above ,  p p . 312-3*
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v i s i b l e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  was 557 m i l l i o n  gold  m ark s .  ’ They were
however  f a r  l e a s  s i g n i f i c a n t  in  1922, when t h e  t o t a l  v i s i b l e  t r a d e
2 .
gap  was 2 ,2 1 1  m i l l i o n  go ld  m ark s .
In t h e  p e r i o d  be tw een  May 1921 and December 1922, i t
was n o t  d e l i v e r i e s  in  k ind  b u t  cash  payments of  some 1 .7  b i l l i o n
go ld  marks which had t h e  most im p o r t a n t  e f f e c t  on Germany's
e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n .  T hese  cash payments  were h e a v i e s t
in  t h e  second h a l f  of  1921 and t h e  e a r l y  months of 1922.  One
b i l l i o n  g o ld  marks were  pa id  in  a s i n g l e  i n s t a l m e n t  which ,  a l t h o u g h
due on 31 May 1921, was a c t u a l l y  p r o c u r e d  and t r a n s f e r r e d  ove r  a
p e r i o d  o f  s e v e r a l  months end ing  in  October  1921.  * Of t h e  r e m a in i n g
700 m i l l i o n  go ld  marks a lm o s t  300 m i l l i o n s  were pa id  b e f o r e  mid-  
4 .March 1922;  * and t h e  r e m i s s i o n  of  t h e  o u t s t a n d i n g  400 m i l l i o n s  
was s p r e a d  over  t h e  s u c c e e d i n g  n i n e  m on ths .  Thus i t  was in  t h e  
e l e v e n  months f o l l o w i n g  May 1921,  when cash  payments added 1 .3  
b i l l i o n  go ld  marks t o  Germany 's  e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  b u r d e n s ,  t h a t  
r e p a r a t i o n s  imposed t h e  most s e v e r e  d i r e c t  s t r a i n  upon t h e  b a l a n c e  
of  pa y m e n t s .  For  t h e  r e s t  of 1922 t h e  d i r e c t  f i n a n c i a l  burden  
of  r e p a r a t i o n  became much l i g h t e r ,  and t h e  s t r a i n s  imposed by t h e  
r e p a r a t i o n  p rob lem  were c h i e f l y  of a p s y c h o l o g i c a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
k i n d .
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  d i r e c t  f i n a n c i a l  impact  of r e p a r a t i o n s  , 
on t h e  German budge t  and b a l a n c e  of payments  was e x c e e d i n g l y  s e v e r e  
a f t e r  May 1921.  T hus ,  in  so  f a r  a s  t h e  s i z e  of  Germany's  d o m e s t i c
1.  See a b o v e ,  p .  2 9 8 .
2.  ib  id .
3 .  See b e lo w ,  pp .  328-9*
4 .  R . C , , IV, T a b l e  V I I I ,  p .  19 .
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and f o r e i g n  f i n a n c i a l  burdens was r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  i n f l a t i o n
1
and d e p r e c i a t i o n  which o c c u r r e d ,  r e p a r a t i o n  payments were 
l a r g e l y  t o  blame f o r  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  i n s t a b i l i t y  of German 
f i n a n c e s  in  t h i s  p e r i o d .  The i n f l a t i o n  and d e p r e c i a t i o n  would 
n o t ,  however,  have been so v i o l e n t  i f  i t  had not  been f o r  t h e  
huge domest ic  and e x t e r n a l  f l o a t i n g  debt  which had been 
accumulated by May 1921.  Thus ,  a l though  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  developments 
of 1921 and 1922 were p r e c i p i t a t e d  l a r g e l y  by r e p a r a t i o n  payments,  
t h e y  were in a broad s en s e  t h e  cl imax of a s tead y  f i n a n c i a l  
d e t e r i o r a t i o n  which had been proceeding  in Germany s in c e  t h e  
ou tb reak  of war .
1 . See below, p , 317
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SECTION III
GERMAN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN FINANCIAL POLICY 
BETWEEN M Y  1921 AND JANUARY 1923
Although reparation payments added considerably to 
Germany*s internal and external financial burdens between May 
1921 and the end of 1922, the violent exchange depreciation 
and price inflation of 1922 was caused ultimately by the reaction 
of political and psychological factors upon a financial system 
which v;as already in a serious state of imbalance as a result of 
the strains imposed by the war and the aftermath, and the failure 
of early post-war governments to achieve effective financial 
reform. After May 1921 political and psychological factors 
became increasingly important in preventing the government from 
checking inflationary forces weithin Germany and from limiting 
or consolidating the country* s external floating debt. Their 
influence was in the end such that they positively discouraged 
Germans and international speculators from holding mark notes, 
and thus helped to precipitate violent exchange depreciation and 
internal price inflation.
The reparation question had, by the end of this period, 
become the most important of these political and psychological 
influences. On increasingly frequent occasions it hastened the 
depreciation of the mark which undermined the German government’s 
efforts to swell its real revenues. It also aroused opposition to 
new tax proposals, encouraged tax evasion, and, finally, decreased 
the German government’s chances of borrowing either at home or
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a b ro ad .  However, t h e  impact of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  in a l l  
t h e s e  r e s p e c t s  did  not  become dominat ing u n t i l  t h e  middle of 
1922. Before  t h a t  d a t e  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  demands made upon Germany 
by t h e  A l l i e s  caused t h e  German government t o  make s t r en u o u s  
e f f o r t s  t o  ach ieve  f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i s a t i o n .  The i n i t i a l  f a i l u r e  
of t h e s e  e f f o r t s  and t h e  c o n s id e r a b l e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  mark in 
t h e  summer and autumn of 1921 was by no means due e n t i r e l y  t o  
r e p a r a t i o n ,  nor  did i t  put an end to hopes of f i n a n c i a l  re fo rm .
On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h e s e  hopes were kept  a l i v e  w e l l  i n t o  1922 by 
t h e  g r a n t i n g  of a p a r t i a l  morator ium on r e p a r a t i o n  payments in 
J anuary  1922 and by t h e  p ro spec t  of  a l a r g e - s c a l e  German 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  lo a n .  However, by March 1922 t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  
l i m i t e d  n a t u r e  of t h e  morator ium and t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  a t t a c h e d  t o  
i t  by t h e  A l l i e s  were caus ing  c o n s id e r a b l e  f i n a n c i a l  pessimism 
and i n c r e a s i n g  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i th  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  ques t ion  in 
Germany. T h e r e f o r e ,  when n e g o t i a t i o n s  on t h e  s u b j e c t  of an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  loan broke down in  June 1922, German hopes of 
f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  and t r e a t y  f u l f i l m e n t  sank r a p i d l y  and 
t h e  l a s t  o b s t a c l e  t o  u n i n h i b i t e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s p e c u l a t i o n  a g a i n s t  
t h e  h ig h l y  v u l n e r a b l e  mark was removed.  For t h e  l a s t  seven months 
of 1922 t h e  deadlock  over t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  was not only 
an insu rm oun tab le  b a r r i e r  t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r eco v e ry  of Germany 
but  was a l s o  a major cause  of t h e  v i o l e n t  e x t e r n a l  d e p r e c i a t i o n  
of t h e  mark and i n t e r n a l  p r i c e  i n f l a t i o n  which o c c u r r e d .  The 
r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  was,  f u r th e r m o r e ,  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a growing 
p o l i t i c a l  estrangement between France  and Germany which not only
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has tened  t h e  immediate d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  mark bu t  a l s o  led 
i n e v i t a b l y  t o  t h e  F ranco -B e lg ian  occupa tion  of t h e  Ruhr and t h e  
German p o l i c y  of " p a s s i v e  r e s i s t a n c e "  which were t o  cause t h e  
comple te  f i n a n c i a l  c o l l a p s e  of Germany in 1923*
Although r e p a r a t i o n s  were not  a c o n s i s t e n t  h in d ran c e  t o  
f i n a n c i a l  re fo rm a f t e r  t h e  end of A p r i l  1921,  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  
q u e s t i o n  from t h i s  t im e  onwards played a v i t a l  p a r t ,  f o r  good or 
i l l ,  in  shap ing  t h e  development of Germany’ s i n t e r n a l  and 
e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c e s .  The im por tance  of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  
was in  f a c t  such t h a t  an account  of i t s  development may be given 
as p a r t  of a g e n e r a l  d e s c r i p t i o n  of German f i n a n c i a l  h i s t o r y  in 
t h i s  p e r i o d .
( a ) The London Schedule  of Payments and F in a n c i a l  D e t e r i o r a t i o n , 
May t o  November 1921•
The c o n c i l a t o r y  t r e n d  in t h e  German government’ s r e p a r a t i o n
1.
p o l i c y  which had been expressed  by t h e  o f f e r  of 24 A p r i l  1921 had 
been t e m p o r a r i l y  checked by t h e  r e f u s a l  of t h e  A l l i e s  t o  e n t e r  
i n t o  f u r t h e r  d i r e c t  r e p a r a t i o n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  and by t h e i r  im p o s i t io n  
of t h e  London Schedule of Payments on Germany e a r l y  in May. The 
p o s s i b i l i t y  of a n e g o t i a t e d  r e p a r a t i o n  s e t t l e m e n t  had f i n a l l y  
d i s ap p ea red  when, on 27 A p r i l  1921, t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission, 
proceed ing  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  c la ims  and c o u n t e r - c l a i m s  which 
had been subm it ted  t o  i t  by t h e  A l l i e d  and German governments ,  
announced t h a t  i t  had f ix ed  Germany’ s t o t a l  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n
1. See above,  pp.  213-18
320.
a t  I 32 b i l l i o n  gold marks .  S h o r t l y b e f o re  t h i s  t h e r e  had been
a p r e l i m i n a r y  con fe ren c e  a t  Lympne (from 23 t o  25 A p r i l )  a t
which Lloyd George and Briand had d i s c u s s e d  means of en fo rc ing
t h e  Commiss ion's  impending award.  This  c o n fe r e n c e  had been
fol lowed  on 30 A p r i l  by a meet ing of  t h e  Supreme Counci l  a t
P a r i s  which had dec ided  on t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of m i l i t a r y  s a n c t i o n s
in t h e  event  of German r e f u s a l  t o  accep t  t h e  R ep a ra t io n
Commission's  r u l i n g .  F i n a l l y  t h e  Supreme Counci l  t o g e t h e r  w i th
t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission, which had been summoned t o  a s s i s t  on
4 May, had drawn up in London a "Schedule of Payments p r e s c r i b i n g
t h e  t im e  and manner f o r  s e c u r in g  and d i s c h a r g i n g  t h e  e n t i r e
o b l i g a t i o n  of Germany f o r  r e p a r a t i o n  under  A r t i c l e s  231, 232 and
2
233 of t h e  T re a ty  of V e r s a i l l e s " .  * This  Schedule  had been 
t r a n s m i t t e d  t o  Germany on 5 May t o g e t h e r  w i th  an A l l i e d  u l t im a tum  
which rebuked t h e  German government f o r  f a i l i n g  t o  f u l f i l  i t s  
o b l i g a t i o n s  under  A r t i c l e  235 of t h e  t r e a t y  and th r e a t e n e d  an 
occupa t ion  of t h e  Ruhr u n l e s s  t h e  new A l l i e d  te rms were accepted
3.w i t h i n  s i x  d a y s .
A r t i c l e  I  of t h e  London Schedule f i x e d  Germany's t o t a l  
o b l i g a t i o n  a t  132 b i l l i o n  gold marks " l e s s  (a)  t h e  amount a l r e a d y
1. See above,  pp.  213-18.
2. R. C . . V, pp.  34 -5 .  This  sum d id  no t  in c lu d e  t h e  v a l u e  of 
r e s t i t u t i o n s  which had been made or were t o  be made under  
A r t i c l e  238 of t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a ty ;  nor  d id  i t  i n c lu d e  t h e  
B e lg ian  d eb t s  t o  t h e  A l l i e s  which Germany had been ob l iged  t o  
assume under  parag raph  3 of A r t i c l e  232 of t h e  t r e a t y .
2.  Text of London Schedule :  i b i d . ,  I l l ,  p p . 4 -9 .  Summary of
ev e n t s :  A.J .Toynbee ,  op. c i t . ,  p p . 144-5.
3 . An occupa t ion  of t h e  Ruhr was a l s o  t h r e a t e n e d  i f  Germany 
evaded h e r  o b l i g a t i o n s  in  r e s p e c t  of d isarmament ,  t h e  t r i a l  
of  war c r im in a l s  and A r t i c l e s  264-7,  273? 321, 322 and 327 
of t h e  t r e a t y ,  i b i d . ,  p.  18.
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paid on account  of R e p a r a t i o n ,  (b) sums which may from t ime t o  
t im e  be c r e d i t e d  t o  Germany in r e s p e c t  of S t a t e  p r o p e r t i e s  in 
ceded t e r r i t o r y ,  e t c . ,  and (c)  any sums re c e iv e d  from o th e r  enemy 
or ex-enemy Powers in r e s p e c t  of  which t h e  (R e p a ra t io n )  Commission 
may d e c id e  t h a t  c r e d i t  should be given  t o  G e r m a n y . . . . ” . The 
amount of t h e s e  d e d u c t i o n s ,  l i k e  t h e  amount of t h e  Belg ian  debt  t o  
t h e  A l l i e s ,  which was t o  be added t o  Germany’ s t o t a l  o b l i g a t i o n ,  
was t o  be dec ided  l a t e r  by t h e  R epara t ion  Commission. The r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  burden of t h e  schedu le  was, however,  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
reduced by t h e  p ro v i s io n  in  A r t i c l e  2 t h a t  payments of i n t e r e s t  
and s in k in g  fund (6 j )  should be made f o r  t h e  t ime being only in 
r e s p e c t  of 50 b i l l i o n s  of t h e  t o t a l  o b l i g a t i o n .  Germany’ s 
immediate t o t a l  o b l i g a t i o n  was t h e r e f o r e  t o  be much l e s s  than  
t h e  g l o b a l  sum envisaged in t h e  P a r i s  R e s o lu t io n s  of t h e  
preced ing  J a n u a r y .
The annua l  payments p r e s c r ib e d  by A r t i c l e  4 of t h e  
schedu le  a l s o  promised t o  be f a r  s m a l l e r  t h a n  th o s e  p r e v io u s l y  
planned by t h e  A l l i e s .  In a normal year  t h e r e  was t o  be a b a s ic  
an n u i ty  of 2 b i l l i o n  gold marks payable in q u a r t e r l y  in s t a lm e n t s  
on t h e  f i f t e e n t h  day of J a n u a r y ,  A p r i l ,  J u ly  and October .  There 
were a l s o  t o  be payments amounting to  26^ of t h e  v a lu e  of German 
expo r ts  which were t o  be d i s ch a rg e d  every q u a r t e r  in t h e  months 
of F eb rua ry ,  May, August and November. The immediate f i n a n c i a l  
s t r a i n  of t h e s e  p ro v i s io n s  was inc reased  by t h e  d i r e c t i o n  in 
A r t i c l e  5 t h a t  in  t h e  y e a r  beg inn ing  1 May 1921 t h e  payments due 
in J u ly  and October shouh be re p la c e d  by a s i n g l e  in s t a lm e n t  of
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1 b i l l i o n  gold marks payable  on 31 May. This  was, however,  
balanced  by t h e  exemption of Germany from any payments under  
t h e  second head ing  u n t i l  15 November 1921. Thus ,  on t h e  
assumpt ion t h a t  t h e  va lue  of German expor ts  would be 5 m i l l i o n  
gold marks,  Germany's t o t a l  o b l i g a t i o n  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  yea r  of 
t h e  s c h e d u l e d  o p e r a t i o n  would be 2.65 b i l l i o n  gold marks.  This 
f i g u r e ,  a l though  im poss ib le  f o r  Germany u n l e s s  she  were accorded 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  r e p re s e n t e d  a s u b s t a n t i a l  
r e d u c t i o n  of  A l l i e d  e s t i m a t e s  of Germany’ s c a p a c i t y  t o  pay.
A r t i c l e s  6 and 7 of t h e  London Schedule d i r e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  
execu t ion  of t h e s e  payments should be s u p e rv is ed  by a new sub­
committee of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission known as t h e  Committee 
of G uarantees  which was t o  be s t a t i o n e d  in B e r l i n .  This
committee ,  which was t h e  A l l i e d  response  t o  t h e  d i s p u t e  over 
^ 1.
A r t i c l e  235» was t o  ensu re  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  of t h r e e  forms of
revenue  as s e c u r i t i e s  f o r  r e p a r a t i o n  payments.  These were (a)
customs r e c e i p t s ,  (b) a 25/£ levy on German expor t  ea rn ings  (excep t
on ea rn ings  from ex p o r t s  t o  B r i t a i n ,  from which deduc t ions  were
a l r e a d y  be ing  made under t h e  p ro v i s io n s  of t h e  B r i t i s h  R e p a ra t io n  
2
Recovery Act)  , and (c )  t h e  proceeds  of any d i r e c t  or i n d i r e c t  
t a x e s  sugges ted  by t h e  German government and approved by t h e  
Committee of G u a ra n te e s .  I t  was t h e  g e n e r a l  duty  of t h e  committee 
t o  ensu re ,  in accordance  w i th  A r t i c l e s  241 and 248 and p a r a . 1 2 ( b )  
of Annex I I  of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Chapter  of t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y ,  
t h a t  r e p a r a t i o n  payments were t r e a t e d  as a f i r s t  charge  upon
1. See above ,  pp .  209-12.
2.  This  Act was one of  t h e  s a n c t i o n s  which has  been imposed upon
Germany in March 1921: see above,  p.  205*
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r eve nue  and t h a t  t h e  l e v e l  of  German t a x a t i o n  was a t  l e a s t  as  
h igh  as  t h a t  of  A l l i e d  c o u n t r i e s .  However , t h e  comm it tee  was 
e x p r e s s l y  f o r b i d d e n  " t o  i n t e r f e r e  in  t h e  German a d m i n i s t r a t i o n " .
When t h e  t e x t  of  t h e  London S chedu le  a r r i v e d  in  Germany 
on 5 May t h e r e  was no governm ent  t o  r e c e i v e  i t ,  s i n c e  t h e  
F e h r e n b a c h  c a b i n e t ,  d i s i l l u s i o n e d  by i t s  f a i l u r e  t o  a r r i v e  a t  a 
n e g o t i a t e d  r e p a r a t i o n  s e t t l e m e n t  and em bar ra s sed  a t  i t s  i n a b i l i t y  
t o  r e s i s t  P o l i s h  i n c u r s i o n s  in  Upper  S i l e s i a ,  had r e s i g n e d  on 
t h e  p r e v i o u s  d a y .  D e s p i t e  t h e  a b s e n c e  of d e b a t e  on 6 May when
F e h r e n b a c h ,  s t i l l  a c t i n g  p r o v i s i o n a l l y  a s  C h a n c e l l o r ,  i n fo rm ed
1.
t h e  R e i c h s t a g  of  t h e  A l l i e d  com m un ica t ions ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  
i n i t i a l  German r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e  s c h e d u l e  was h i g h l y  u n f a v o u r a b l e .  
Even R a t h e n a u ,  who a few days l a t e r  j o i n e d  a c a b i n e t  commit ted  t o
f u l f i l m e n t  of  t h e  s c h e d u l e ,  e x p r e s s e d  i n i t i a l  h o s t i l i t y  t o  t h e
2 •
A l l i e d  t e rm s  in  an a r t i c l e  in  t h e  B e r l i n e r  T a g e b l a t t :
"A second V e r s a i l l e s .  Woe t o  t h e  v a n q u i s h e d  and d o u b l e  
woe t o  t h o s e  who do no t  l e a r n  from h i s t o r y .  The 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  which c o n f r o n t  us  t o d a y  a r e  no t  w h e t h e r  
t h e  Ruhr s h a l l  or  s h a l l  n o t  be  o c c u p i e d ,  bu t  w'hether  
t h i s  o c c u p a t i o n  w i l l  t a k e  p l a c e  now or l a t e r .  On t h e  
c h o i c e  between  "now" and " l a t e r "  depends  a l l  t h a t  
rem a ins  of our honour  and e x i s t e n c e .  The rem nants  o f  
our honour  demand t h a t  we p rom ise  what we p o s s e s s ,  and 
t h a t  we do n o t  p rom ise  what we canno t  p o s s e s s " .
S e v e r a l  f a c t o r s  a p a r t  f rom  t h e  c o n t e n t s  of t h e  s c h e d u l e  produced
t h i s  s h a r p  r e a c t i o n .  A co n te m p o ra ry  r i g h t - w i n g  commentator
a t t r i b u t e d  t h e  o u t c r y  in  p a r t  t o  t h e  m i s t a k e n  but  w i d e s p re a d
b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  f i g u r e  of  132  b i l l i o n s  r e p r e s e n t e d  t h e  " p r e s e n t
3 .
v a l u e "  o f  Germany 's  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s .  A nother
1.  R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  3^9? PP* 3623-4-.
2 .  Quoted by von Braun (DNVP), i b i d . ,  1 June  1921,  V o l . 34-9» P«3735
3 .  W. von R h e in b a b e n ,  Von V e r s a i l l e s  zu F r e i h e i t , p p . 3 7 - 8 .
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a g g r a v a t i n g  i n f l u e n c e  was t h e  A l l i e d  u l t i m a t u m  w h ic h ,  a s  
R a t h e n a u ' s  comment r e v e a l e d ,  c r e a t e d  an a tm o s p h e re  s i m i l a r  t o  
t h a t  wh ich had p r e v a i l e d  in  June  1919 when t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  
a c c e p t i n g  t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y  was b e in g  d e b a t e d .  The f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  p a r a l l e l  be tw een  t h e  two o c c a s i o n s  was drawn by t h e  g e n e r a l  
p u b l i c  d e c r e a s e d  t h e  r e a d i n e s s  of t h e  p a r t i e s ,  above a l l  t h o s e  
which  had b o r n e  t h e  b r u n t  o f  t h e  e a r l i e r  c r i s i s ,  t o  s h o u l d e r  t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a c c e d i n g  t o  A l l i e d  demands.  "No s e c t i o n , "
Lord D’A bernon ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  Ambassador ,  o b s e r v e d ,  "wished t o  b e l l  
t h e  c a t . "
D e s p i t e  t h e  v i o l e n c e  of  t h e  i n i t i a l  German r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e  
London S c h e d u le  an SPD-Zentrum-DDP c o a l i t i o n  commit ted t o  
a c c e p t a n c e  was formed by W ir t h  w i t h i n  t h e  t i m e - l i m i t  p r e s c r i b e d  
by t h e  u l t i m a t u m .  The d e b a t e  in  t h e  R e i c h s t a g  on 10 May, which 
ended in  a v o t e  of c o n f i d e n c e  of 220 t o  1 7 2 , r e v e a l e d  t h e  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  which  had prompted such an a c t i o n .  A l l  p a r t i e s ,  
i n c l u d i n g  t h o s e  which v o te d  f o r  a c c e p t a n c e ,  were conv inced  t h a t  
t h e  London S c h e d u le  w ou ld ,  i f  unamended, b r i n g  abou t  G e r m a n y ^  
f i n a n c i a l  and economic r u i n .  But t h e  USPD, SPD and Zen t rum ,  
a l l  of wh ich  v o t e d  una n im o u s ly  f o r  a c c e p t a n c e ,  were even more 
c o n c e r n e d ,  j u s t  a s  t h e y  had been  i n  June  1919» abou t  t h e  economic 
p o l i t i c a l  and s o c i a l  c o n s eq u e n c e s  of an A l l i e d  o c c u p a t i o n  of  t h e  
R uh r .  * They a l s o  hoped t h a t  a c c e p t a n c e  of  t h e  London S c h e d u l e ,
1 .  Lord D’Abernon ,  An Ambassador  of  P e a c e ,  V o l .  I ,  p .  170.
For SPD s e n s i t i v i t y  on t h e  s u b j e c t  of  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
a c c e p t i n g  t h e  S c h e d u le :  Wels (SPD), 10 May 1921,  R e i c h s t a g .
V o l .  349 ,  p .  3 6 3 0 . 1 2
2 .  W ir th  ( Z e n t r u m ) ,  10 May 1921,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  34 9 ,  p .  3629;  Weis 
(SPD), i b i d . ,  p .  363O; Ledebour  (USPD), i b i d . ,  p .  3 6 3 7 .
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f o l l o w e d  by a s i n c e r e  a t t e m p t  t o  f u l f i l  i t ,  would b r i n g  a bou t  
a prompt  r e v i s i o n  of A l l i e d  r e p a r a t i o n  demands .^* A f u r t h e r  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  which we ighed  h e a v i l y  w i t h  t h o s e  members of  t h e  
DDP and DVP who vo ted  in  f a v o u r  of a c c e p t a n c e ,  was t h e  p o s s i b i l ­
i t y  t h a t  t h e  A l l i e s  would make a d d i t i o n a l  c o n c e s s i o n s  which  
i n c l u d e d  t h e  l i f t i n g  of  t h e  s a n c t i o n s  which t h e y  had imposed in  
t h e  p r e c e d i n g  March and a s e t t l e m e n t  of  t h e  Upper  S i l e s i a n  
q u e s t i o n  in  a manner f a v o u r a b l e  t o  Germany, On 9 and 10 May 
S t re se m a nn  sough t  and r e c e i v e d  a s s u r a n c e s  f rom Lord D’Abernon 
t h a t  t h e  B r i t i s h  government  f av o u re d  ( l )  t h e  l i f t i n g  of t h e  March 
s a n c t i o n s ,  (2)  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  of t h e  B r i t i s h  l e v y  on German 
e x p o r t s  f rom 50% t o  26/£, and (3)  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  of German 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  A l l i e d  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  s o l e l y  t o  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  
of  war damage.  * On 10 May S t re sem ann  d e c l a r e d  in  t h e  R e i c h s t a g  
t h a t  i t  was on ly  h i s  f a i l u r e  t o  o b t a i n  a f i r m  B r i t i s h  a s s u r a n c e  
a bou t  t h e  f u t u r e  of Upper  S i l e s i a  which had p r e v e n t e d  a g roup  
w i t h i n  t h e  DVF from g i v i n g  a c t i v e  s u p p o r t  t o  an a t t e m p t  t o  f u l f i l
t h e  London S c h e d u l e . * As i t  was ,  6 members of  t h e  DVP, t o g e t h e r
4.
w i t h  17 D e m o c ra t s ,  v o t e d  f o r  a c c e p t a n c e .
The s u p p o r t  w i t h i n  t h e  R e i c h s t a g  f o r  t h e  p o l i c y  of 
a c c e p t i n g  t h e  London S c h e d u le  s hou ld  n o t  be o v e r e s t i m a t e d .  
A l though  t h e  DDF b e longe d  t o  t h e  government  c o a l i t i o n  and had 
a g re e d  p r o v i s i o n a l l y  t o  s u p p o r t  a p o l i c y  of f u l f i l m e n t  of 
A l l i e d  demands ,  only a m i n o r i t y  of i t s  38 members had r e c o r d e d
1 . Wirth, i b i d . ,  p. 36305 Ledebour, i b i d . ,  p, 3638.
2 .  Lord D*Abernon,  op.  c i t . ,  V o l .  1 ,  pp.  1 6 4 - 6 .
3« R e i c h s t a g , 10 May 1921,  V o l .  3 4 9 » P. 3&31*
4 ,  i b i d . ,  p p .  3 8 5 2 - 4 .  For  a s t a t e m e n t  of t h e  DDP v i e w p o i n t :  
H a a s ,  i b i d . ,  p .  3 6 4 0 .
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i t s  r a t h e r  c o n d i t i o n a l  v o t e  in  f a v o u r  of a c c e p t a n c e .  A s t r o n g  
g r o u p  w i t h i n  t h e  p a r t y  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t ,  b e c a u s e  of  t h e  i m p o s s i b i l ­
i t y  of  t h e  London S c h e d u l e ,  a p o l i c y  of  " f u l f i l m e n t ” would 
p o s t p o n e  t h e  o c c u p a t i o n  of t h e  Ruhr f o r  on ly  a s h o r t  p e r i o d . “1. 23
M o re o v e r ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  s i x  a f f i r m a t i v e  DVP v o t e s ,  t h e  o f f i c i a l  
v i e w p o in t  o f  t h e  P e o p l e d  P a r t y  was t h a t  t h e  London S c h e d u le  would
p ro v e  t o  be beyond t h e  economic c a p a c i t y  of  Germany, e s p e c i a l l y
2 .
w h i l e  t h e  f u t u r e  of  Upper S i l e s i a  remained  i n  d o u b t .
I f  t h e  DDP and DVP e n t e r t a i n e d  s t r o n g  r e s e r v a t i o n s  a b o u t  
t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  of  t h e  London S c h e d u l e ,  t h e  p a r t i e s  of t h e  ex tr eme  
L e f t  and R i g h t  wing e x p re s s e d  t h e  f i r m  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  i t  was 
i m p o s s i b l e .  In a sp e e c h  which emphasised t h e  p a r a l l e l  w i th  June  
1919» t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t  Herg t  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  a c c e p t a n c e  of t h e  A l l i e d  
u l t i m a t u m  would be i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  German n a t i o n a l  h o n o u r .  The 
r e a l  i n t e n t i o n  of t h e  A l l i e s ,  he c l a i m e d ,  was no t  t o  o b t a i n  
r e p a r a t i o n  but  t o  occupy t h e  Ruhr and t o  r u i n  Germany. The German 
government  shou ld  t h e r e f o r e  adop t  a p o l i c y  of  p a s s i v e  r e s i s t a n c e  
w h i c h ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  might  c a u s e  d i s l o c a t i o n ,  would a t  l e a s t  l e a d  t o
3 .
t h e  r e v i v a l  of  n a t i o n a l  s p i r i t .  The Communist Koenen a l s o  
a d v o c a t e d  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  A l l i e d  demands,  a l t h o u g h  h i s  views  were  
d e r i v e d  from a d i f f e r e n t  s e t  of  a s s u m p t i o n s .  The London S c h e d u le  
w a s ,  in  h i s  o p i n i o n ,  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t  by which  E n t e n t e  c a p i t a l i s t s ,  
hand in  hand w i t h  t h e  German b o u r g e o i s i e ,  would o p p r e s s  t h e  
w ork ing  c l a s s e s  no t  on ly  of  Germany bu t  of t h e  whole  of E u r o p e .
1 . ib  id .
2 . S t r e s e m a n n ,  i b i d . ,  p .  3631*
3 .  i b i d . ,  pp .  3 6 3 2 -6 .
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Moreover,  a l th o u g h  h i s  p o l i c y  was one of r e s i s t a n c e ,  he cons ide red  
t h a t  t h e  s h a c k le s  of t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T rea ty  would be f i n a l l y  
lo o s e d ,  n o t  th ro u g h  r e v a n c h i s t  n a t i o n a l i s m ,  but  th rough t h e  agency 
of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  p r o l e t a r i a t  of Europe."*'*
Although a m a j o r i t y  had been found t o  comply w i th  t h e  
u l t im a tum ,  t h e  r e a c t i o n  of t h e  R e ichs tag  t o  t h e  London Schedule 
had been a t  b e s t  e q u i v o c a l .  No pa r ty  believed t h a t  t h e  schedu le  
could be f u l f i l l e d  as i t  s to o d ,  and th o s e  groups which suppor ted  
a c c ep tan c e  did  so e i t h e r  in t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  Germany's o b l i g a t i o n s  
would be promptly r e v i s e d  or on t h e  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  accep tance  
would lead  t o  t h e  l i f t i n g  of t h e  March s a n c t i o n s  and t h e  
r e t e n t i o n  of Upper S i l e s i a .  The t e n t a t i v e  and c o n d i t i o n a l  n a t u r e  
of t h e  suppor t  fo r  " f u l f i l m e n t "  and t h e  s t r e n g t h  of  t h e  p o s i t i v e  
o p p o s i t i o n  t o  such a p o l i c y  soon exer ted  an im por tan t  i n f l u e n c e  
in t h e  e f f o r t s  of t h e  German government t o  d i s c h a r g e  i t s  
r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s  and s o ,  in  co n ju n c t io n  w i th  o th e r  f a c t o r s ,  
upon t h e  h i s t o r y  of German p u b l i c  f in a n c e  in t h i s  p e r io d .
I t  has  a l r e a d y  been shown t h a t  Germany's t o t a l  o b l i g a t i o n  
under  t h e  London Schedule in t h e  y e a r  beg inn ing  1 May 1921 was 
a pp rox im a te ly  2.65  b i l l i o n  gold marks.  This  sum was t o  have been 
paid in  t h e  fo l low ing  i n s t a l m e n t s :
Gold marks 
1 b i l l i o n  





31 May 1921 
15 November 1921 
15 January  1922 
15 February  1922 
15 A p r i l  1922.
Only two of t h e s e  i n s t a lm e n t s  were in f a c t  paid be fo re  t h e
1, ib i d p . 3650
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d e t e r i o r a t i o n  of Germany’s f i n a n c e s  caused t h e  London Schedule 
t o  be abandoned,  S ince  t h e  second in s ta lm e n t  was r e l a t i v e l y  
smal l  and r e p r e s e n t e d  t h e  v a l u e  of d e l i v e r i e s  in kind made between 
May and November 1921 , i t s  impact on German f in a n c e s  was almost 
c e r t a i n l y  n e g l i g i b l e .  Thus ,  in so f a r  as f i n a n c i a l  developments 
in t h e  second h a l f  of 1921 were l inked  w i th  t h e  a c t u a l  payment of 
r e p a r a t i o n ,  t h e y  were due l a r g e l y  t o  t h e  payment of t h e  f i r s t  
b i l l i o n  gold marks.
The s t e p s  t a k e n  by t h e  German government t o  c o l l e c t  and
t r a n s f e r  t h e  f i r s t  i n s t a lm e n t  due under t h e  London Schedule  were
f i n a n c i a l l y  d i s a s t r o u s .  In t h e  second h a l f  of May i t  took
advan tage  of t h e  temporary  improvement in  t h e  mark brought about
by t h e  ac c e p ta n c e  of  t h e  A l l i e d  u l t im atum in o rde r  to  buy gold
and f o r e i g n  exchange w i th  paper  m a r k s , O n  31 May "the y i e l d
from t h s e  buying o p e r a t i o n s  - 150 m i l l i o n  gold marks -  was
r e m i t t e d  t o  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission t o g e t h e r  w i th  th ree -m on th
_ . 2 .
T rea su ry  B i l l s  t o  t h e  v a l u e  of  850 m i l l i o n  gold marks.  In o rder  
t o  honour t h e s e  b i l l s  when t h e y  matured on 31 August th e  government 
s imply con t inued  t o  buy f o r e ig n  exchange and gold w i th in  Germany, 
Because of t h e  s c a r c i t y  of t h e s e  commodit ies  and t h e  u n w i l l i n g n e s s  
of Germans t o  p a r t  w i th  them in  a t ime of monetary i n s t a b i l i t y ,  
t h e  d o l l a r  r a t e  r o s e  by t h e  end of  t h e  f i r s t  week of  June t o  66 
( i t s  l e v e l  b e f o r e  t h e  a c c ep tan c e  of t h e  u l t im a tu m ) ,  and t h e n c e  
t o  75 on 30 J u n e ,  8 l  on 31 J u l y  and 86 on 31 August .^*  This
development in  t u r n  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  d e s i r e  of German c i t i z e n s  t o
1, Schmidt ,  M i n i s t e r  of Economics, 8 November 1921,  i b i d . ,
V ol .  351,  p. 4879.
2.  W i r t h ,  1 June 1921,  i b i d . ,  Vol.  3^9, p.  3709.
3* Die Entwicklung d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , pp, 18-19*
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hoard f o r e i g n  exchange.  The r e s u l t  was t h a t ,  as  t h e  31 August 
approached ,  t h e  government found i t s e l f  in need of 400 m i l l i o n  
gold marks of f o r e ig n  exchange which could only be purchased 
a t  t h e  r i s k  of v i o l e n t  d e p r e c i a t i o n .  This  sum was r a i s e d  a t  t h e  
l a s t  moment by drawing upon 68 m i l l i o n s  of t h e  Reichsbank*s 
gold r e s e r v e s  and by o b ta in in g  s h o r t - t e r m  high i n t e r e s t  f o r e ig n
c r e d i t s ,  t h e  l a r g e s t  of which was a Dutch c r e d i t  of 270 m i l l i o n
1.
gold marks.  The l a t t e r  p rocedure  merely postponed u n t i l  
September and October f u r t h e r  purchases  of f o r e ig n  exchange which 
c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  con t inued  r i s e  of th e  d o l l a r  r a t e  in t h o s e  
mont hs •
The German governm en t ' s  method of f i n a n c i n g  t h e  f i r s t  
b i l l i o n  of t h e  London Schedule  had been simply t o  in c re as e  i t s  
f l o a t i n g  debt  a t  t h e  Reichsbank and t o  borrow s h o r t  e x t e r n a l l y ,  
or worse ,  t o  buy f o r e i g n  cu r rency  wi th  paper  marks .  Th is  
p rocedure  was l i k e l y ,  in view of t h e  e x i s t i n g  imbalance of t h e  
German budget and t h e  p a s s i v i t y  of th e  b a l a n c e  of payments,  t o  
have a d i s a s t r o u s  e f f e c t  on t h e  v a l u e  of t h e  mark. This e f f e c t  
could not have been p reven ted  by any prompt i n c r e a s e  in r e g u l a r  
i n t e r n a l  or  e x t e r n a l  r e v e n u e s ,  s i n c e  an i n c r e a s e  in budgetary  
revenue  would have been de layed  by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  
and an improvement of t h e  b a l a n c e  of t r a d e  depended on f a c t o r s  
which were f o r  t h e  most p a r t  beyond t h e  c o n t r o l  of t h e  German 
government.  In t h e s e  c i rc um s tanc es  t h e  only f i n a n c i a l l y  sound 
method of c o l l e c t i n g  and t r a n s f e r r i n g  l a r g e  sums of f o r e ig n  cu r rency
1.  C. Bergmann, op. c i t . ,  p. 82; C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i ,  op. c i t , ,
pp. 95-6.
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would have been t o  r e s o r t  t o  s u b s t a n t i a l  lo n g - t e rm  domestic  and 
f o r e i g n  bor row ing .
The German government’ s s h o r t - s i g h t e d  approach t o  paying 
t h e  f i r s t  b i l l i o n  was p a r t l y  t h e  r e s u l t  of a s p e c u l a t i v e  
m i s c a l c u l a t i o n ,  H i r s c h ,  a S e c r e t a r y  of t h e  M in i s t r y  of  Economics ,  
had a s s u re d  t h e  F ore ign  A f f a i r s  Committee of  t h e  R e ichs tag  e a r l y  
in May t h a t  a c c ep tan c e  of t h e  A l l i e d  u l t im atum would cause  such 
a r ecove ry  of t h e  mark t h a t  c o n s id e r a b l e  pu rchases  of f o r e ig n  
exchange would become p o s s i b l e .  “When t h e  government’ s r i g h t - w i n g  
c r i t i c s  su b se q u e n t ly  a t t a c k e d  H irsch  f o r  h i s  p r e d i c t i o n  Schmidt ,  
t h e  M i n i s t e r  of Economics,  defended h i s  s u b o r d i n a t e  by denying 
t h a t  he (H i r sch )  had expec ted any s u s t a in e d  improvement of t h e  
mark.  Schmidt adm it ted  however t h a t ,  because  of t h e  u n fa v o u ra b le  
impact ex e r t ed  on th e  money market by t h e  disarmament q u e s t i o n  and 
^ by t h e  c u r r e n t  d i s p u t e  between t h e  F e d e ra l  government and B a v a r i a ,  
t h e  f a l l  of t h e  mark had been more r ap id  than  a n t i c i p a t e d .
The fundamenta l  reason  f o r  t h e  German government’s b eh a v io u r  
i s  t o  be sought  in t h e  b a l a n c e  of  power in  German f i n a n c i a l
p o l i t i c s .  In s imple t e r m s ,  i t  lacked s u f f i c i e n t  domestic  s u ppo r t
2 .
e i t h e r  t o  g u a ra n t e e  t h e  s uccess  of a domestic  loan  o r ,  a f o r t i o r i ,  
t o  i n s p i r e  t h e  c o n f id e n c e  of p o t e n t i a l  lo n g - te rm  fo r e ig n  l e n d e r s .
I t  was denied  t h i s  s u ppo r t  f i r s t l y  because  of f a c t o r s  which had 
been i n f l u e n t i a l  b e f o r e  May 1921,  and secondly  because  of t h e  
i n c r e a s i n g l y  u n fa v o u ra b le  p o l i t i c a l  im pac t ,  both of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n
1. R e i c h s t a g . 8 November 1921,  Vol.  35l> P» 4-879» For a r i g h t - w i n g
a t t a c k  on H i r sch :  Becker (DVP), i b i d . ,  p.  4881.
2. C, Bergmann, op. c i t . ,  p .  82.
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prob lem  i t s e l f ,  and of  o t h e r  i s s u e s ,  such a s  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  of 
t h e  s a n c t i o n s  which had been imposed by t h e  A l l i e s  i n  March and 
t h e  d i s p u t e  ove r  t h e  f u t u r e  of  Upper S i l e s i a ,  which had come t o  
be l i n k e d  in  t h e  mind of t h e  German p u b l i c  w i t h  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of 
Germany 's  c a p a c i t y  t o  pay r e p a r a t i o n .
When t h e  R e i c h s t a g  d e b a t e d  W i r t h ' s  p o l i c y  s t a t e m e n t  a t  
t h e  b e g i n n i n g  of J u n e ,  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  government  s t r e s s e d  
t h e  need  f o r  t h e  c o - o p e r a t i o n  of t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  g r o u p s ,  above a l l  
of t h e  f i n a n c i a l l y  i n f l u e n t i a l  DVP, i f  t h e  p o l i c y  of " f u l f i l m e n t "  
was t o  be f e a s i b l e . ^ *  The Democrat P e t e r s e n  s t a t e d  e x p l i c i t l y  
t h a t  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of  t h e  DVP in  t h e  government  was e s s e n t i a l
i f  Germany was t o  become c r e d i t - w o r t h y  in  t h e  eyes  of o v e r s e a s
2 .
f i n a n c i e r s .  However , t h e  r e s e n t m e n t  e x p r e s s e d  by S t r e s e m a n n ,
bo th  a t  SPD a t t a c k s  on h i s  p a r t y  and a t  t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  A l l i e s  
t o  l i f t  t h e  s a n c t i o n s  t h e y  had imposed in  March,  did  no t  a ugur  
w e l l  f o r  t h e  e n t r y  of  t h e  DVP i n t o  t h e  c o a l i t i o n .  F a r  f rom 
o f f e r i n g  p r a c t i c a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  a p o l i c y  of  " f u l f i l m e n t "  
S t r e s e m a n n ,  o b s e r v i n g  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  b i l l i o n  g o ld  marks had s t i l l
t o  be p a i d ,  r a t h e r  ominously  r e s e r v e d  judgment  a bou t  t h e
4.
p r a c t i c a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  London S c h e d u le .
When W i r t h  o u t l i n e d  h i s  f i n a n c i a l  programme on 6 J u l y  - 
b e f o r e  t h e  R e i c h s t a g  a d jo u r n e d  f o r  i t s  summer r e c e s s  -  h i s
1. Wels  (SPD).  2 Ju n e  1 9 2 i r ~ ^ ^ s t a ~ V o l7  349. p .  3727; Becker  
( Z e n t r u m ) ,  i b i d . ,  pp .  3729-30 ;  P e t e r s e n  (DDP), 3 Ju n e  1921,  
i b i d . ,  pp .  3 7 6 5 -8 .
2 .  i b i d . ,  p .  3765.
3 .  i b i d . ,  pp .  3760,  3765.
4.  i b i d . ,  p .  3764.
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government was, i f  a n y t h in g ,  l e s s  fav o u ra b ly  s i t u a t e d  t o  f u l f i l
A l l i e d  r e p a r a t i o n  demands. Wirth p r e d i c t e d  t h a t  expen d i tu re  f o r
t h e  b udge ta ry  yea r  1921/2 would amount t o  between 145 and 150
b i l l i o n  Paper marks. Of t h i s  sum, 48 .5  b i l l i o n s  were c l a s s i f i e d
as o rd in a ry  e x p e n d i tu r e ,  59 b i l l i o n s  as  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  e x p e n d i tu r e ,
and a f u r t h e r  40 t o  45 b i l l i o n s  as ex p e n d i tu re  a r i s i n g  out of t h e
f u l f i l m e n t  of t h e  London Schedule .  Since  26 .6  b i l l i o n s  of t h e
e x t r a o r d i n a r y  budget  were earmarked fo r  t r e a t y  e x p e n d i tu re s  o the r
th a n  r e p a r a t i o n ,  t h e  t o t a l  budge ta ry  ex p e n d i tu r e  occasioned by
t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T re a ty  was t o  be between 67 and 72 b i l l i o n  paper
marks.  Against  t h e s e  e x p e n d i tu r e s  were s e t  an es t imated  revenue
of 80 b i l l i o n  paper marks,  of  which some 30 b i l l i o n s  were t o  be
. 1.
r a i s e d  by new t a x a t i o n .  These f i g u r e s  produced a sharp  r e a c t i o n  
from r i g h t - w i n g  s p e a k e r s ,  who complained a t  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  d e f i c i t
and of t h e  t r e a t y  e x p e n d i tu r e s  and claimed t h a t  a balanced budget
2 .
was now im p o s s ib l e .  Even K e in a th ,  t h e  spokesman f o r  t h e  DDP, 
which belonged t o  t h e  government c o a l i t i o n ,  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  was more s e r io u s  th a n  Wirth had made out^* In 
f a c t ,  a p a r t  from Wirth h i m s e l f ,  t h e  only s p eak e r s  who cons idered  
t h a t  th e  government was capab le  of  d e v i s i n g  measures t o  d e a l  more 
e f f e c t i v e l y  w i th  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  were t h e  M a jo r i ty  S o c i a l i s t  K e i l
4 #
and t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  l e f t - w i n g  o p p o s i t i o n  g roups .
The un fav o u rab le  impact of t h e  budget f i g u r e s  was aggrava ted
77 i b i d . ,  W i r t h 7 ”6 J u ly  19217 V o l .  350,  pp.  44 6 8 ^ 7 ^
2.  H e l f f e r i c h  (DNVP), i b i d . ,  pp.  4474-6; Becker (DVP), i b i d . ,  
p. 4487.
3 .  i b i d . ,  p.  4498.
4. K e i l  (SPD), i b i d . ,  p.  4482; C r i s p i e n  (USPD), i b i d . ,  p p . 4 4 9 2 - 8 ;  
Geyer (VKP), i b i d . ,  pp. 4500- 3 *
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by g rowing  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  a t  t h e  f a i l u r e  of  t h e  A l l i e s  t o  make 
c o n c e s s i o n s  in  r e t u r n  f o r  German a c c e p t a n c e  of  t h e  London 
Schedu le*  The c o n t i n u a t i o n  of  economic and m i l i t a r y  s a n c t i o n s
imposed in  March had been t h e  s u b j e c t  of a DVF i n t e r p e l l a t i o n  on
1.
30 J u n e ,  and s p e a k e r s  of  b o t h  government  and o p p o s i t i o n  s t r e s s e d  
on 6 J u l y  t h a t  Germany 's  a b i l i t y  t o  f u l f i l  h e r  r e p a r a t i o n  
o b l i g a t i o n s  would depend on prompt  A l l i e d  a c c e s s i o n  t o  German
2 .
w i s h e s  b o t h  on t h i s  s u b j e c t  and a bou t  t h e  f u t u r e  of  Upper  S i l e s i a .
A f i n a l  symptom and c a u s e  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  f i n a n c i a l  
im po tence  was t h a t  t h e  schemes which i t  fo re shadowed  ( i n  a d d i t i o n  
t o  o r thodox  t a x a t i o n )  f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s  were 
of  a t y p e  which  was u n a c c e p t a b l e  t o  r i g h t - w i n g  b u s i n e s s  g r o u p s ,  
whose s u p p o r t  was e s s e n t i a l  i f  German f i n a n c e s  were t o  be 
s t a b i l i s e d .  Although  on 6 J u l y  W ir th  made s p e c i f i c  p r o p o s a l s  
on ly  abou t  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  and improvement  of e x i s t i n g  forms of 
t a x a t i o n ,  he a l s o  r e f e r r e d  t o  p l a n s  which were u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n
3.
f o r  gove rnment  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o f i t s .  The 
S o c i a l i s t  K e i l  went  f u r t h e r  t h a n  t h i s  by p r e s s i n g  t h a t  t h e  
government  shou ld  p roceed  t o  an " a p p r o p r i a t i o n  of r e a l  v a l u e s "  
( " E r f a s s u n g  d e r  S a c h w e r t e " ) .  K e i l  env isaged  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  
a p p r o p r i a t i o n  of a p o r t i o n  of l a n d ,  p r o p e r t y ,  h o u s e s ,  machinery  
and raw m a t e r i a l s  -  which in  a t i m e  of  m one ta ry  i n f l a t i o n  were  
t h e  s o l e  r e p o s i t o r i e s  of  r e a l  w e a l t h  -  no t  only a s  a means of
77 i b i d . ,  V o l .  350 ,  pT 4235* 1 J u l y  1921,  pp .  4 2 5 8 f f .
2 .  W i r t h ,  6 J u l y  1921,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  350 ,  p .  4473; K e i l  (SPD), 
i b i d . ,  pp .  4481-2 ;  K e i n a th  (DDP), i b i d . ,  p .  4498;
Becker  (DVP), i b i d . ,  p .  4491 .
3 .  i b i d . ,  p .  4470.
334
b a l a n c i n g  t h e  budget  and of  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  Germany’s c r e d i t  
a b road  bu t  a l s o  as  a means o f  making t h e  p r o p e r t i e d  c l a s s e s  b e a r  
more of t h e  f i s c a l  b u r d e n .  Such a p r o p o s a l  would no t  have  been 
p r e f e r r e d  t o  a more e x p e d i t i o u s  l o a n  scheme i f  t h e  p a r t i e s  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  i t  had commanded or had wished  t o  command t h e  
s u p p o r t  of  t h e  German p r o p e r t i e d  c l a s s e s  in  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  t o
r e f o r m  German f inances. '* '*  A l th o u g h  t h e  In d e p e n d e n t  S o c i a l i s t s
2 .
n a t u r a l l y  ga v e  e n t h u s i a s t i c  s u p p o r t  t o  K e i l ’ s s u g g e s t i o n ,  
i t  e m b a r ra s s e d  t h e  Dem ocra t i c  members of t h e  government  and 
o f f e n d e d  t h e  r i g h t - w i n g  o p p o s i t i o n  g r o u p s .  The a t t i t u d e  o f  t h e
3 #
Democra ts  can on ly  be i n f e r r e d  f rom  t h e i r  s i l e n c e  in  t h e  d e b a t e
and f rom t h e  comments of t h e  o t h e r  p a r t i e s . *  However ,  t h e  r e a c t i o n
of t h e  DVP and t h e  DNVP was in  no d o u b t .  Becker  of  t h e  P e o p l e ' s
P a r t y  opposed t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of t h e  f e d e r a l  government  in  German
i n d u s t r y  on t h e  grounds f i r s t l y  t h a t  i t  was s o c i a l i s t i c  and
s e c o n d l y  t h a t  t h e  s h a r e s  p l a c e d  i n  t h e  hands  o f  t h e  government
£
would be  s e i z e d  by t h e  A l l i e s . *  H e l f f e r i c h  (DNVP) went f u r t h e r  
and o b j e c t e d  on t h e  same g ro u n d s  even t o  t h e  o r thodox  t a x e s  w h ic h ,  
in  t h e i r  r e v i s e d  fo rm ,  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  e nc roa c h  upon t h e  s u b s t a n c e  
of t h e  t a x p a y e r ’ s w e a l t h . ^ *
D e s p i t e  t h e  u n f a v o u r a b l e  t o n e  of  t h i s  J u l y  budge t  d e b a t e ,  
i t  a p p e a r e d  f o r  a t im e  i n  Sep tem ber  1921 t h a t  t h e  German g o v e r n ­
m e n t ’ s f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  would be s t r e n g t h e n e d .  German
1.  i b i d . ,  p .  4484.
2 .  E . g ,  C r i s p i e n ,  i b i d . ,  p .  4494 .
3* K e i n a t h ,  i b i d . ,  p .  4498.
4 .  E . g .  C r i s p i e n  (USFD), i b i d . ,  p .  4494.
5 .  i b i d . ,  p p .  4489-90*
6 .  i b i d . ,  pp .  4479-80 .
i n d u s t r i a l  c i r c l e s ,  no doubt alarmed at  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
r a p id  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  mark which occurred  in t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  
of September -  when t h e  d o l l a r  r a t e  of t h e  mark rose  from 86 t o  
110 -  o f f e r e d  t o  p ledge t h e i r  c r e d i t  in o rd e r  t o  h e l p  t h e  
government o b ta in  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  from a b ro ad .  This  o f f e r ,  
which p robab ly  caused t h e  momentary r ecovery  of t h e  mark on 17 
Sep tember ,  was a l s o  prompted by t h e  d e s i r e  of German i n d u s t r y  t o  
p rov ide  an a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  t h e  schemes f o r  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  of 
r e a l  va lu e s  which were now being  cons idered  by t h e  M i n i s t r y  of 
Economics,"' '* I t  was approved in  p r i n c i p l e  a t  t h e  end of t h e  
month by a co n fe ren c e  of t h e  i n f l u e n t i a l  Reichsverband de r  
deu t schen  I n d u s t r i e  a t  Munich dur ing  which Rathenau made a speech 
d e p l o r i n g  t h e  d i s a s t r o u s  e f f e c t s  on t h e  mark exchange of r e c e n t  
purchases  of gold and f o r e i g n  cu r ren cy .  * Although subsequent  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  between t h e  German government and German i n d u s t r y  
y i e l d e d  no r e s u l t ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  th e y  were begun i s  evidence  of 
a t e m p o r a r i l y  c o - o p e r a t i v e  t r e n d  in German f i n a n c i a l  p o l i t i c s .
The German government was a t  t h i s  t im e  e x p lo r in g  o th e r  
means,  a p a r t  from borrow ing ,  of cush ion ing  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  e f f e c t s  of 
r e p a r a t i o n  payments.  On 6 October 1921 Rathenau and Loucheur,  t h e  
French M i n i s t e r  of I n d u s t r i a l  R e c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  s igned  t h e  Wiesbaden 
Agreement,  which was des igned  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  d e l i v e r i e s  in  kind 
t o  F ran ce .  I t  was p r o j e c t e d  t h a t  in th e  per iod  between 1 October
1. C. Bergmann, op. c i t . ,  p .  100. The Econom is t . 24 September 1921 
p.  476.* For t h e  d o l l a r  r a t e  in  September:  Die Entwicklung d e r  
R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p .  20.
2.  i b i d . ;  C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i , op. c i t . ,  p.  97} G.A. Neumann, 
Rathenaus  R e p a r a t i o n s p o l i t i k . p.  18.
3 . For t h e  t e x t  of t h e  Wiesbaden Agreement: R . C . , I I ,  pp.  3 -H »
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1921 and 1 May 1926 F rance  should r e c e i v e  from Germany d e l i v e r i e s  
of machinery and o the r  equipment r e f e r r e d  t o  in Annex IV of t h e  
R e p a ra t io n  Chapter  t o  t h e  v a l u e  of 7 b i l l i o n  gold marks.  The 
a t t r a c t i v e  f e a t u r e s  of t h i s  agreement from t h e  German po in t  of view 
were t h a t  i t  provided f o r  d i r e c t  co n ta c t  between Germany i n d u s t r y  
and t h e  French  r e c i p i e n t s ;  t h a t  d e l i v e r i e s  were t o  be made only 
t o  t h e  d e v a s t a t e d  r e g io n s  and only in so f a r  as  t h e y  did not  
ove r tax  t h e  German economy; and t h a t  v a l u a t i o n  was t o  be e n t r u s t e d  
t o  a Committee of Three composed of a Frenchman, a German and a 
n e u t r a l  a r b i t r a t o r  a c c e p ta b l e  t o  t h e  o the r  p a r t i e s .  Agains t  t h e s e  
advan tages  was t o  be s e t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  only 35/£ of t h e  v a l u e  of 
t h e s e  d e l i v e r i e s  was t o  be c r e d i t e d  t o  Germany’s r e p a r a t i o n  account  
or 45f0 i f  th e y  were wor th l e s s  tha n  1 b i l l i o n  marks in any y e a r .
The remain ing  sum was t o  be t r e a t e d  as an advance to  France  which 
would be r e p a i d  between May 1926 and December 1937« I t  was more­
over s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  va lue  of  a l l  t ype s  of d e l i v e r i e s  in  kind 
t o  France t o  be c r e d i t e d  t o  Germany's r e p a r a t i o n  account  should 
no t  exceed 1 b i l l i o n  gold marks in any one y e a r .  Thus,  i f  goods 
d e l i v e r e d  t o  France  under  t h e  o th e r  annexes of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  
Chapter  ( I I I ,  V and Vi)  were worth one b i l l i o n  marks by t h e m s e lv e s ,  
t h e  e n t i r e  v a l u e  of t h e  goods d e l iv e r e d  under  t h e  Wiesbaden 
Agreement would be t r e a t e d  a s  an advance t o  F ra n c e .
The obvious o b j e c t i v e  of t h e  Wiesbaden Agreement was t o  
induce France  t o  accep t  more of Germany’ s r e p a r a t i o n  payments in 
t h e  form of d e l i v e r i e s  in  t h e  k ind th an  she  had in  t h e  p a s t .  
Rathenau ,  t h e  c h i e f  a r c h i t e c t  of t h e  ag reement,  cons idered  t h i s
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t o  be d e s i r a b l e  on t h e  f i n a n c i a l  grounds t h a t  t h e  i n f l a t i o n a r y  
domest ic  government e x p e n d i tu r e s  occasioned by d e l i v e r i e s  in 
kind would cause l e s s  damage t o  t h e  mark exchange th a n  t h e  
pu rchases  of f o r e ig n  cu r rency  which were n e c e s s a r y  in o rd e r  t o  
make cash payments. '1 23'* Rathenau appears  t o  have r e a l i s e d  t h a t  h i s  
r e a s o n in g  was only c o r r e c t  in  so f a r  as  t h e  goods d e l iv e r e d  under  
t h e  Wiesbaden Agreement were n e i t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  e x p o r t s  nor  
p o t e n t i a l  import s u b s t i t u t e s  and were no t  manufactured  from 
im ported  m a t e r i a l s .  * But he was above a l l  p reoccupied  t o  
p reven t  a r e p e t i t i o n  of t h e  p s y c h o lo g i c a l l y - in d u e e d  "buyers* 
s t r i k e "  ( K ä u f e r s t r e i k )  a g a i n s t  t h e  mark which had occurred  as 
a r e s u l t  of t h e  l a r g e  cash payments which had been made in  t h e
3.summer of 1921.
T h eo th e r  main o b j e c t i v e  of t h e  Wiesbaden Agreement was t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  one of h a s t e n i n g  t h e  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  of t h e  d e v a s ta t e d  
a r e a s  in  F rance  in  o rder  t h a t  a v i s i b l e  i n c e n t i v e  t o  French a n t i -  
German f e e l i n g  should be removed.  This  could however only be 
achieved  w i t h i n  t h e  l i m i t s  imposed bo th  by French i n d u s t r i a l  groups,  
who were i n t e r e s t e d  in  o b t a in in g  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  c o n t r a c t s ,  and by 
t h e  o th e r  A l l i e s ,  whose s h a r e  in  Germany's c a p a c i t y  t o  pay 
r e p a r a t i o n  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  be reduced .  In f a c t  A l l i e d  o b j e c t i o n s  
de layed  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission's  app rova l  f o r  a modi fied  form
1. Speech of 27 J u l y  1921 t o  t h e  R e i c h s r a t .  Quoted in G.A, 
Neumann, op. c i t . ,  p .  18.
2. J ,  Ruppe l ,  " D e l i v e r i e s  in Kind from Germany under  t h e  Wiesbaden 
and Subsequent Agreements" ,  MGCRE. 28 September 1922,  p.  477»
3.  G.A. Neumann, op. c i t . ,  pp.  17-18.
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of t h e  agreement u n t i l  31 March 1922; and domestic  op p o s i t io n  
postponed i t s  r a t i f i c a t i o n  by t h e  French Chamber u n t i l  6 J u l y
and ensured t h a t  l i t t l e  p r a c t i c a l  u se  would be made of i t  by
1 .
France  in  succeeding  months.
Rathenau probab ly  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  t h e  Wiesbaden Agreement 
would not  y i e l d  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  f r u i t s  which he- 
p u b l i c l y  expected  from i t .  However, he c e r t a i n l y  regarded  i t  at 
t h e  worst  as  a g e s t u r e  des igned  t o  prove Germany’ s w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  
f u l f i l  t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y ,  Such an opin ion  of  t h e  agreement 
was shared  by w el l - in fo rm ed  co n te m p o ra r i e s ,  Bergmann, th e  German 
r e p a r a t i o n  e x p e r t ,  cons idered  t h a t  t h e  scheme was unworkable and 
d e s c r ib e d  i t  as  " p o l i t i c a l  window d r e s s i n g " ,  *and t h e  B r i t i s h  
Ambassador in B e r l in  r e f e r r e d  t o  i t  as  "a sw ind le  based on a
3*f a l l a c y "  which migh t ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  " p a c i fy  Europe" ,  The mere 
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  Wiesbaden Agreement was s igned  was a f u r t h e r  
i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  German government was, in Sept ember-Oct ober 
1921, t a k i n g  p o s i t i v e  s t e p s  t o  improve i t s  f o r e ig n  f i n a n c i a l  
r e l a t i o n s .
The German government’ s more c o n s t r u c t i v e  a t t i t u d e  t o  i t s  
i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  problems was g iven  some encourage­
ment on 1 October by t h e  removal  of t h e  customs b a r r i e r  which had 
been e r e c te d  by t h e  A l l i e s  in  t h e  previous  March between t h e  
Rhineland and t h e  r e s t  of  Germany, * However, t h e  e f f e c t  of t h i s  
concess ion  was more than  c a n c e l l e d  out by t h e  A l l i e d  Supreme
1.  i b i d . ,  p.  5 6 ; J* Ruppel ,  op.  c i t . ,  p. 477*
2. C. Bergmann, op. c i t , ,  p .  94.
3 . Lord D’Abernon,  op.  c i t . ,  V o l .  I ,  p.  214.
4.  Die Entwicklung, d er  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p. 20.
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C o u n c i l s  a n n o u n c e m e n t  on 20 O c t o b e r  1921 o f  the> f o r t h c o m i n g  
p a r t i t i o n  o f  Upp>er S i l e s i i a .  T i l l s  i m m e d i a t e l y  p r o v o k e d  an u p h e a v a l  
in German d o m e s t i c  p o l i t i c s  w h ic h  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  c a u s e  a  r a d i c a l  
change  i n  German f i n a n c i a l  and r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y .  The D e m o c r a t i c  
P a r t y ,  ■which had. o p p o s e d  t h e  c e s s i o n  o f  any U p p e r  S i l e s i a n  
t e r r i t o r y  t o  P o l a n d ,  p r e c i p i t a t e d  t h e  r e s i g n a t i o n  o f  t h e  W i r t h  
C a b i n e t  on 20 O c t o b e r  and s u b s e q u e n t l y  r e f u s e d  t o  j o i n  a gove ; rn -
1 .
ment w h i c h  was p r e p a r e d  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u n c i l ' s  d e c i s i o n .
On 26 O c t o b e r  "Wirth was  f o r c e d  t o  fo rm  a. Zentnum-SFD c o a l i t i o n  
w hich  d e p e n d e d  h e a v i l y  on t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  USPD i n  t h e  R e i c h s t a g .  
T h i s  m e an t  t h a t  an e f f e c t i v e  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  w ou ld  b e  more  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  s u s t a i n .  T h e  w e a k e n i n g  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  a l s o  c a u s e d  
a new n o t e  o f  c o n s e r v a t i s m  i n  i t s  r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y .  A l t h o u g h  
W i r t h  and h i s  s u p p o r t e r s  i n s i s t e d  on 26 Oot o b e r  t h a t  an a t t e m p t  
s h o u ld  s t i l l  be  made t o  f u l f i l  t h e  t r e a t y ,  t h e y  p r e d i c t e d  t h a t  
p rev io u s ;  e s t i m a t e s  o f  Germanic’ s c a p a c i t y  t o  pay  r e p a r a t i o n  would  
have  t o  b<e d r a s t i c a l l y  r e v i s e d .  * Even  t h i s  c h a n g e  o f
a t t i t u d e  d i d  n o t  s a t i s f y  t h e  now; n u m e r i c a l l y  p o w /e r fu l  r i g h t - w i n g  
o p p o s i t i o n ;  and t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t s ,  who were'  n a t u r a l l y  t h e  most  
o u t s p o k e n  c r i t i c s  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  condemned t h e  new p o l i c y  o f  
t e n t a t i v e  ' " f u l f i l m e n t ” a s  '"Erf  ü l l u n g s f  a n a t  isrnu s " .
T h e  A l l i e d  d e c i s i o n  t o  p a r t i t i o n  U p p e r  S i l e s i a  e x e r t e d  i t s
1 . Schflck in g  (DDP)„ 26 O ctob er 19 2 1 , i b i d . ,  Vo 1 .  3 5 1 , p . 4 7 6 0 .
2. W i r t h ,  i b i d . ,  pp .  4734—6; M ü l l e r  (SPD),,  i b i d , ,  p .  473$;  
B r e i t s c h e i d  ((USPD), p .  47(60’.
3 .  H e r g t  ( D W P ) ,  i b i d . ,  p .  4746;  c f .  K a h l  <DVP) , i b i d . ,  p . 4 7 5 0 ;  
S c h ü c k i n g  (DDP),  i b i d . , p p .  4 7 6 4 -5 «
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most  p ro found  e f f e c t  on German f i n a n c i a l  and r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y  
t h r o u g h  i t s  impact  on t h e  exchange  r a t e  of  t h e  mark, which was f a r  
more d r a m a t i c  t h a n  t h a t  o f  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of  t h e  f i r s t  b i l l i o n  go ld  
marks u n d e r  t h e  London S c h e d u le  of  Paym ents .  The recommendat ion 
of  t h e  League of  N a t io n s  C o u n c i l  i n  f a v o u r  of  p a r t i t i o n  had 
become known in  o u t l i n e  a t  l e a s t  a week b e f o r e  t h e  Supreme 
C o u n c i l ' s  f o r m a l  d e c l a r a t i o n  on 2C O c t o b e r .  The f a t e  of  Upper  
S i l e s i a  was t h e r e f o r e  an i m p o r t a n t  c a u se  of t h e  s p e c u l a t i o n  a g a i n s t  
t h e  mark which  prompted t h e  d o l l a r  r a t e  t o  r i s e  f rom 120 t o  150 
be tw een  10 and 15 O c t o b e r ,  and t h e n  t o  s o a r  f rom 158 on 20 O c tober  
t o  a peak o f  310 on 8 November.  Al though t h e  d o l l a r  f e l l  t o  l 8 0  
w i t h i n  a few weeks t h e  n e t  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  mark was s u f f i c i e n t  
t o  unde rm ine  c o m p l e t e l y  W i r t h ' s  p r o j e c t e d  t a x  r e f o r m s .
The v i o l e n t  f a l l  of  t h e  mark which had been caused  by t h e  
Upper  S i l e s i a n  d e c i s i o n  soon provoked e x p r e s s i o n s  of f i n a n c i a l  
p e s s im is m  and p a s s i v i t y  i n  t h e  R e i c h s t a g .  On 4 November 1921 t h e  
C e n t r i s t  Hermes,  who had t e m p o r a r i l y  r e p l a c e d  W i r t h  as  F i n a n c e  
M i n i s t e r ,  p r e d i c t e d  t h a t  in  t h e  b u d g e t a r y  y e a r  1921-2  t h e r e  would 
be  an enormous p a p e r  d e f i c i t  of  110 b i l l i o n  m arks ,  of which 60 
b i l l i o n s  cou ld  be  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y .  Hermes 
d i s m i s s e d  a l l  i d e a s  of  Germany ' s  i n t e r n a l  b a n k r u p t c y  or e x t e r n a l  
d e f a u l t .  However ,  i t  was c l e a r  t h a t  h i s  c o n t i n u e d  opt im ism was 
b a sed  on ly  on hopes  of d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  a s s i s t a n c e  and prompt 
r e v i s i o n  of  Germany’ s r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s .  * The F i n a n c e
1 .  D ie  E n t w i c k lu n g  d e r  Repa r a t i o n s f r a g e , p .  21; The E c o n o m i s t ,
15 O c tobe r  1921,  p .  566 .
2 .  Hermes,  4 November 1921,  R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  351» p p . 4823-4 ;  
c f .  Hero ld  ( Z e n t r u m ) ,  7 November 1921,  i b i d , ,  p .  4832.
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M i n i s t e r ’ s l i m i t e d  c o n f i d e n c e  was,  m o re o v e r ,  n o t  s h a re d  by t h e  
m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  R e i c h s t a g .  The Dem ocra t i c  P a r t y  j o i n e d  t h e  DVP 
and DNVP in  p r o c l a i m i n g  t h a t  Germany’ s b u d g e ta r y  and b a l a n c e  o f  
payments  prob lems were  i n s o l u b l e  and would rem ain  so u n t i l  t h e  
t r e a t y  was r e v i s e d . "  H e l f f e r i c h ,  in  a sp e ec h  which l a s t e d  f o r  
a lm o s t  two h o u r s ,  jugged  f i g u r e s  c o n v i n c i n g l y  so a s  t o  p r e d i c t  a 
d e f i c i t  of  300 b i l l i o n  p a p e r  marks (280 b i l l i o n s  o c c a s io n e d  by
t h e  t r e a t y )  w h ic h ,  he  a l l e g e d ,  was g r e a t e r  t h a n  Germany’ s a n n u a l
2 .
n a t i o n a l  incom e.  * The pes s im ism  of  t h e  ex treme  R igh t  was 
echoed by t h e  Communist H o l l e i n  who p r o p h e s i e d  i n e v i t a b l e  f i n a n c i a l  
c o l l a p s e  f o r  Germany."* Only t h e  s o c i a l i s t  p a r t i e s  s t i l l  e x p r e s s e d  
f i n a n c i a l  c o n f i d e n c e  and c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  a g r e a t e r  e f f o r t  m igh t  
be made t o  a c h i e v e  s t a b i l i s a t i o n .  But even t h e y  s t r e s s e d  t h e  
i m p o s s i b i l i t y  of t h i s  u n l e s s  t h e  t r e a t y  were  r e v i s e d  and s u b s t a n t i a l
4 #
f o r e i g n  a id  o b t a i n e d .
D e s p i t e  t h e  u n f a v o u r a b l e  f i n a n c i a l  and p s y c h o l o g i c a l  impac t  
of  t h e  Upper  S i l e s i a n  d e c i s i o n ,  t h e  inadequacy  of German f i n a n c i a l  
p o l i c y  in  t h e  ne x t  few months was s t i l l  due in  p a r t  t o  p u r e l y  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  On 3 November 1921 a DDF r e s o l u t i o n  
p r e c i p i t a t e d  a d e b a t e  i n  which a l l  p a r t i e s  f rom t h e  Indepe nde n t  
S o c i a l i s t s  t o  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t s  a g r e e d  t h a t  Germany 's  f i n a n c i a l  
problems w e re  s e r i o u s l y  a g g r a v a t e d  by t h e  d e l a y  in  t h e  a s s e s s m e n t  
of  t h e  Income Tax .  G o t h e i n ,  t h e  o r i g i n a t o r  of t h e  r e s o l u t i o n ,
7. D i e t r i c h  (l)DF77~ibi d 7 7 ~ P P ^ ~ 8 3$-41 ;  H e l f f e r i c h  (DNVP), i b i d . , 
p .  4858;  Becke r  (DVP), 8 November 1921,  i b i d . ,  pp .  4-885-6.
2 .  i b i d . ,  7 November 1921 ,  p .  4851 .
3 . i b i d . ,  8 November 1921 ,  p .  4906.
4 .  Braun (SPD),  7 November 1921 ,  i b i d . ,  p p .4 8 2 7 -  32 ; S c h m i d t (SPD) ,
8 November 1921,  i b i d . ,  p .  4879;  Her tz (USPD) , i b i d . ,  p .  4895*
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emphasi sed t h a t  t h e  r e c e n t  f a l l  of  t h e  mark was due l e s s  t o  
i n f l a t i o n  t h a n  t o  " th e  e x c e s s i v e  and absu rd  r e p a r a t i o n  demands 
of  t h e  A l l i e s ,  which  underm ined  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  c o n f i d e n c e  
in  Germany’ s economic p o s i t i o n " .  Bu t ,  s i n c e  i n f l a t i o n  had 
a g g r a v a t e d  t h i s  d e p r e c i a t i o n  by i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  p a p e r  mark 
h o l d i n g s  of t h e  p u b l i c ,  he  conc lu ded  t h a t  t a x e s  shou ld  be 
c o l l e c t e d  a s  q u i c k l y  a s  p o s s i b l e .  G o th e in  was s u ppo r te d  by 
a l l  p a r t i e s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  R igh t  blamed t h e  d e l a y  i n  t a x  c o l l e c t i o n
upon p o s t - w a r  changes  in  German f i s c a l  m ac h ine ry  and upon t h e
2 .
c o m p le x i ty  of  new t a x  l e g i s l a t i o n ;  whereas  t h e  L e f t  a t t r i b u t e d  
i t  t o  s y s t e m a t i c  e v a s i o n  and o b s t r u c t i o n  on t h e  p a r t  of  i n t e r e s t e d  
s o c i a l  g r o u p s  and p a r t i c u l a r i s t  s t a t e  g o v e r n m e n t s .3*
P u r e l y  d om es t ic  p r e s s u r e s  were a l s o  p a r t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  
t h e  shape  of  German f i s c a l  p o l i c y  in  November 1921.  The 
Independen t  S o c i a l i s t  B r e i t s c h e i d  a t t r i b u t e d  t h e  r e s i g n a t i o n  of 
t h e  DDF on 20 October  and t h e  s u b seque n t  government  c r i s i s  as  much 
t o  t h e  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  of  t h e  Democrats  w i t h  impending f i s c a l  
l e g i s l a t i o n  as  t o  t h e  Upper  S i l e s i a n  q u e s t i o n .  The DDF, and t h e  
C e n t r e  P a r t y  t o o ,  he c l a i m e d ,  had been concerned  a t  t h e  t i m e  t o  
draw t h e  DVP i n t o  t h e  government  c o a l i t i o n  " b e f o r e  t h e  s to rm  of
4 #
new t a x  p r o p o s a l s  b r o k e " .  * The s e n s i t i v i t y  of  t h e  " b o u r g e o i s "  
members of W i r t h ' s  c a b i n e t  on t h e  f i s c a l  q u e s t i o n  b e f o r e  t h e  
Upper  S i l e s i a n  d e c i s i o n  h e l p s  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g l y
1.  i b i d . ,  3 November 1921 ,  V o l .  351» p.  4788.
2.  E . g .  H e l f f  e r i c h  (DNVP), i b i d . ,  p .  4795; B ecker  (DVF), i b i d , ,  
pp.  4799-4801 .
3 .  E . g .  H e r t z  (USPD), i b i d . ,  p p . 4792-3 ;  Simon (SPD) ,  i b i d . ,
pp.  4 7 9 7 -8 .
4 .  i b i d . ,  26 Oc tober  1921,  V o l .  351 ,  p .  4757.
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c o n s e r v a t i v e  t o n e  of t h e  g o v e rn m e n t ’ s f i s c a l  programme in  
November 1921.  In h i s  budge t  speech  on 4 November Hermes made 
no r e f e r e n c e  t o  any scheme f o r  t h e  " a p p r o p r i a t i o n  of r e a l  
v a l u e s "  ( E r f a s s u n g  de r  S a c h w e r t e )  and even i n v e ig h e d  a g a i n s t  any 
fo rm  of  f i s c a l  i n n o v a t i o n .  The most  r a d i c a l  f e a t u r e  of  t h e  
c e n t r a l  m easu re  which he  p r o p o s e d ,  a P r o p e r t y  Tax ( V e rm ö g e n s s t e u e r )  
was t h a t  i t  was l e v i e d  on t h e  s h a r e s  of  j o i n t - s t o c k  com pan ies ,*
The p r o t e s t s  which t h i s  programme a roused  from t h e  L e f t  ’were  
o b v i o u s l y  l e s s  c a u s e  f o r  c o n c e r n  t o  t h e  government  t h a n  t h e  
s t r o n g  o p p o s i t i o n  which was v o i c e d  by bo th  t h e  R i g h t  and t h e
3.
Democrats  t o  t h e  i d e a  of  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  of  r e a l  v a l u e s .  Th is  
o p p o s i t i o n  was based  i n  ev e ry  c a s e  on a d e s i r e  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  
i n t e r e s t s  of  p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y  as  w e l l  as  on t h e  argument  t h a t  
p r o p e r t y  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  government  would f a l l  i n t o  t h e  hands  
of  t h e  E n t e n t e .
The s o c i a l l y  and f i n a n c i a l l y  c o n s e r v a t i v e  o u t lo o k  o f  a 
l a r g e  s e c t i o n  of  t h e  R e i c h s t a g  had an im p o r t a n t  e f f e c t  on t h e  
v a l u a t i o n  p r o v i s i o n s  of  t h e  new P r o p e r t y  T a x .  The R e i c h s ­
abgabenordnung  ( F e d e r a l  Tax O rd inance )  of  March 1920 had d i r e c t e d  
t h a t  t a x a b l e  p r o p e r t y  should  be v a lu e d  in  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  
s i z e  of  i t s  y i e l d - a c c o r d i n g  t o  i t s  " E r t r a g s w e r t " .  A r t i c l e s  16 and 
17 of  t h e  o r i g i n a l  d r a f t  of t h e  P r o p e r t y  Tax had suspended  t h e
1.  i b i d . ,  4 November 1921,  V o l .  351,  p .  4821.
2.  Braun (SPD),  7 November 1921,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  351? pp .  4830-1 ;
H er tz  (USFD), 8 November 1921,  i b i d . ,  pp .  4902-4 ;  11 th  Commit tee , 
22 November 1921,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  371 ,  A n l .  3728,  p .  3792*
3. H e l f f e r i c h  (DNVF), 7 November 1921,  i b i d . ,  pp. 4856-7; Becker  
(DVP), 8 November 1921,  i b i d . ,  pp .  4882, 4886; D i e t r i c h  (DDP),
7 November 1921,  i b i d . ,  p p .  4841 -2 .
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r e l e v a n t  p r o v i s io n s  of t h e  Tax Ordinance and had d i r e c t e d  t h a t  
t h e  v a l u a t i o n  of p r o p e r t y  should be t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of t h e  
F inance  M i n i s t e r ,  who was t o  " take  account  of t h e  va lu e  of t h e  
mark and t h e  g e n e r a l  economic s i tua t ion" ,"* ’* This  amounted t o  
s u b s t i t u t i n g  fo r  t h e  somewhat r i g i d  n o t io n  of " E r t r a g s w e r t "  
t h e  more f l e x i b l e  concep t  of "gemein Wert" or " p r a c t i c a l  v a l u e " ,  
which was more a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a period of i n f l a t i o n  in which 
p r o p e r t y  had come t o  be sought  because  i t  was a s t a b l e  r e p o s i t o r y  
of v a l u e  r a t h e r  t h a n  on account  of t h e  s i z e  of i t s  y i e l d .  The 
idea  of v a l u a t i o n  acc o rd ing  t o  "gemein Wert"  i n i t i a l l y  gained  
t h e  suppor t  of t h e  DDF, but aroused t h e  immediate o p p o s i t i o n  of 
t h e  Zentrum, DVP and DNVP. Moreover,  i t  became c l e a r  in committee 
t h a t  t h e  DDP*s idea  of "gemein Wert"  in p r a c t i c e  amounted t o  
n o th in g  more tha n  t h e  ave ra ge  " E r t r a g s w e r t "  of p ro p e r ty  over t h e
3.
pas t  t h r e e  y e a r s .  The e v e n t u a l  adopt ion  of t h i s  l e s s  f l e x i b l e  
measure of v a l u e ,  which s e r i o u s l y  reduced t h e  e f f i c a c y  of t h e  
P r o p e r ty  Tax,  was due e n t i r e l y  t o  f e a r s  t h a t  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  
r e s o u r c e s  would be taxed  away.
The importance of domest ic  f i n a n c i a l  p r e s s u r e s  was f u r t h e r  
i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  breakdown of t h e  c r e d i t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  between 
t h e  German government and German i n d u s t r y .  This  breakdown, 
a l th o u g h  encouraged in a g e n e r a l  way by t h e  s i z e  of A l l i e d  
r e p a r a t i o n  demands and by t h e  Upper S i l e s i a n  d e c i s i o n ,  was
1. For t e x t  of o r i g i n a l  and subsequent  d r a f t s  of t h e  P ro p e r ty  Tax: 
i b i d . ,  V o l .  371, Anlage 3728,  pp.  3034- 7 .
2 .  D i e t r i c h  (DDP), 7 November 1921, i b i d , ,  V o l .  351,  p.  4841; 
Herold (Zentrum),  i b i d . ,  p .  4834; H e l f f e r i c h  (DNVP), i b i d . ,  
p p . 4855-6; Becker (DVP), 8 November 1921,  i b i d . ,  p.  4890.
3.  i b i d . ,  V o l .  371, Anl.  3728, p. 3802.
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a c t u a l l y  p r e c i p i t a t e d  by d i f f e r e n c e s  of op in ion  of a domest ic  
n a t u r e .  At a meeting on 4 and 5 November t h e  Reichsverband der  
deu tschen  I n d u s t r i e  made the  c o n t i n u a t i o n  of c r e d i t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
with  t h e  government c o n d i t i o n a l  upon " the  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of s t r i c t  
economy in t h e  e n t i r e  budget  of t h e  Reich ,  on t h e  r e l i e f  of 
economic l i f e  from a l l  r e s t r a i n t  upon i t s  o p e r a t i o n  and development,  
and on t h e  immediate t r a n s f e r  of a l l  pub l ic  u t i l i t i e s  t h e n  in 
government hands t o  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e ,  in o rde r  t h a t  t h e i r  
o p e r a t i o n  might produce s u f f i c i e n t  revenue t o  meet i n t e r e s t  and
a m o r t i s a t i o n  charges  on t h e  proposed f o r e ig n  loan in s te a d  of
1.
being a burden on t h e  government as h e r e t o f o r e " .  The
u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y  of t h e s e  p o l i t i c a l l y  r e a c t i o n a r y  demands even to  
t h e  modera te  Left  ensured t h a t  t h e  c r e d i t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  would f a i l .
On 7 November 1921 both  Braun (SPD) and Schmidt ,  t h e  S o c i a l i s t  
M i n i s t e r  of Economics,  dep lored  t h e  a t tachm ent of such c o n d i t i o n s  
t o  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s *  o f f e r .  * The more f o r t h r i g h t  extreme Left  
claimed t h a t  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ’ only  concern  had been t o  d i v e r t  
t h e  government from a c o n f i s c a t o r y  t a x  programme; and p ressed  
t h a t  p ro p e r ty  t a x e s  should be c o l l e c t e d  im media te ly ,  t h a t  t h e  
government should p a r t i c i p a t e  in t h e  c a p i t a l  of i n d u s t r y ,  t h a t  
f o r e i g n  exchange a cc ru in g  from expo r t s  should be c o n f i s c a t e d ,  and 
t h a t  t h e r e  should be import and export  c o n t r o l s . ' *  The r e t o r t  
of t h e  r i g h t - w i n g  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e s e  com pla in t s  and demands r e v e a le d
t h e  depth of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  r i f t  between t h e  government and
1. C. Bergmann, op.  c i t , ,  p .  101.
2. R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  351,  pp.  4828,  4846-7«
3.  Hertz (USPD), 8 November 1921,  i b i d . ,  V ol .  351,  p p . 4898-4900; 
H o l l e in  (KPD), i b i d . ,  pp.  4912-3.
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f i n a n c i a l l y  p o w e r fu l  g r o u p s .  Both B e c k e r ,  t h e  spokesman f o r  t h e  
DVP, and t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t  H e l f f e r i c h  i n s i s t e d  t h a t ,  i f  German 
i n d u s t r y  was t o  a s s i s t  t h e  government  a t  a l l  in  t h e  p r e s e n t  
f i n a n c i a l  emergency ,  i t  shou ld  do so in  i t s  own t i m e  and on i t s  
own t e r m s .  * I t  was no t  s u r p r i s i n g ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t ,  a l t h o u g h  
t h e  c r e d i t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  were p ro longed  f o r  a few more weeks ,  t h e y  
y i e l d e d  no p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t s ,  * Domest ic  p o l i t i c a l  c l e a v a g e s  
had c l e a r l y  h i n d e r e d  t h e  German government  c o n s i d e r a b l y  in  i t s  
e f f o r t s  t o  s e c u r e  t h e  f o r e i g n  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  which  i t  
needed  so  b a d l y .
( b ) M ora to r ium  and Loan N e g o t i a t i o n s :  a F i n a n c i a l  B r e a th i n g
S p a c e ,  November 1921 t o  June  1922•
The f i n a n c i a l  weakness  o f  t h e  German g o v e rn m e n t ,  above
a l l  i t s  i n a b i l i t y  t o  bor row d o m e s t i c a l l y  and i t s  consequen t  l a c k
of  s e c u r i t y  f o r  any o v e r s e a s  b o r ro w in g ,  soon a f f e c t e d  i t s
r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y .  L a t e  in  O c tober  1921 Montagu Norman, t h e
Governor  of t h e  Bank of  E n g l a n d ,  had informed H a v e n s t e i n ,  t h e
P r e s i d e n t  of t h e  R e i c h s b a n k ,  t h a t  t h e  p rocuremen t  of  funds  t o
make r e p a r a t i o n  payments  w i t h o u t  any d e f i n i t e  p r o s p e c t  of t h e i r
repaym ent  "was n o t  a ban k in g  m a t t e r  which could  b e  u n d e r t a k e n  by
3 #
e i t h e r  of  u s " .  On 8 November t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission,  
conc e rne d  a t  t h e  p o s s i b l e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  t h e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of  t h e  
mark f o r  f u t u r e  r e p a r a t i o n  pa y m e n t s ,  v i s i t e d  B e r l i n .  During  
d i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h  t h e  German government  t h e  Commission urged  i t
1. Becker (DVP), i b i d . ,  p. 4886; H e l f f e r i c h  (DNVP), 7 November 
1921, i b i d . ,  p. 4860.
2. W i r t h ,  22 November 1921,  11th Committee,  i b i d . ,  Anl.  3728, 
V o l .  371,  pp.  3789-90.
3.  H. Clay,  Lord Norman, pp.  197-8.
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t o  make every  p o s s i b l e  e f f o r t  " to  ob ta in  t h e  n e c e s s a ry  amount 
of f o r e i g n  exchange e i t h e r  from i t s  own n a t i o n a l s ,  who n o t o r i o u s l y  
have such exchange a t  t h e i r  d i s p o s a l ,  or from f o r e i g n  l e n d e r s " .
I t  went on t o  reco rd  i t s  opin ion  t h a t  " the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
encoun te red  by t h e  German government,  d i f f i c u l t i e s  which a r e  
c l o s e l y  connec ted  with  t h e  r e c e n t  s e r io u s  f a l l  in th e  mark 
exchange,  a r e  of a f i n a n c i a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  an economic c h a r a c t e r " ,  
and t h a t  t h e y  were due l a r g e l y  t o  t h e  government’ s f a i l u r e  " to  
t a k e  t i m e l y  s t e p s  t o  ba lance  t h e  Budget" and t o  t h e  consequent  
i n f l a t i o n a r y  no te  i s s u e s  of t h e  Re ichsbank . ^ * In view of t h e  
dead lock  in  German f i n a n c i a l  p o l i t i c s  on q u e s t i o n s  of f i s c a l  
p o l i c y  and c r e d i t ,  t h e  e x h o r t a t i o n s  of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission 
were u n l i k e l y  t o  have any e f f e c t .  On 25 November Havens te in  
a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  Bank of England fo r  a long- te rm  or s h o r t - t e r m  
advance of 500 m i l l i o n  gold marks.  However, he d id  so in  t h e  
knowledge t h a t  h i s  a p p l i c a t i o n  would be r e fu s e d  and because  he
wished t o  u s e  t h e  Bank of Eng land’ s r e f u s a l  in o rde r  t o  suppor t
2 .
a r e q u e s t  f o r  a moratorium of r e p a r a t i o n  payments.  Norman’ s 
n e g a t i v e  r e p l y  was r e f e r r e d  t o  by Wir th  when, on 14 December 1921, 
he informed t h e  R epara t ion  Commission t h a t  Germany would be unab le  
t o  make t h e  payments expec ted of h e r  on 15 January  and 15 February  
1922 .1 23 *
The German re q u e s t  f o r  a moratorium ushered  in a b r i e f  
pe r io d  d u r in g  which t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  problem was aga in  handled  in
1. L e t t e r  from t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission t o  t h e  German Government, 
December 2,  1921. R . C . , I l l ,  p .  49.
2. H. Clay ,  op. c i t . ,  pp.  200-1.
3* L e t t e r  from Dr.  vvirth t o  t h e  R ep a ra t io n  Commission, 14 December 
1921: R»C, , I I I ,  p.  50 5 C. Bergmann, op. c i t , ,  p .  101.
a r e l a t i v e l y  c o n c i l i a t o r y  manner and f i rm e r  s t e p s  were ta ken
t o  s t a b i l i s e  German f i n a n c e s .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  i n i t i a l  r e a c t i o n  
of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission t o  t h e  German no te  of 14 December 
was uncompromising.  The German government was reproved f o r  not  
accompanying i t s  r e q u e s t  f o r  a moratorium w i th  in fo rm a t ion  e i t h e r  
as  t o  t h e  sums which i t  would be ab le  t o  pay on 15 January  and 15 
F eb ru a ry ,  or as  t o  t h e  l e n g th  of t h e  e x t e n s i o n  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  
payment of t h e  b a l a n c e ,  or as  t o  t h e  s e c u r i t y  t o  be o f fe red  in
t h e  meantime.  The government was a l s o  ordered t o  o u t l i n e  t h e
1.
s t e p s  which i t  was t a k i n g  t o  b a lan ce  i t s  b u d g e t .  However, in
i t s  r e p l y  t h e  German government not  only v o lu n t e e r e d  t o  supply
d e t a i l s  of  i t s  budge ta ry  p o l i c y ,  but was a l s o  a b l e  t o  suggest  t h a t
any d e c i s i o n  on t h e  o the r  q u e s t i o n s  submit ted  t o  i t  should be
postponed pending t h e  outcome of t h e  A l l i e d  c a b i n e t - l e v e l
d i s c u s s i o n s  which had been t a k i n g  p l a c e  a t  t h e  end of 1921 on t h e
s u b j e c t  of r e v i s i n g  Germany*s r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s  and remedying
2
t h e  g e n e r a l  economic m a la i s e  of  Europe,
Between l8  and 22 December a co n fe rence  of E n g l i sh  and 
French e x p e r t s  a t  London had recommended t h a t  t h e  Supreme Counci l  
should hold d i s c u s s i o n s  a t  Cannes on t o p i c s  which included a 
proposed European economic co n fe r e n c e  and a d r a f t  scheme f o r  
r educ ing  Germany's r e p a r a t i o n  payments in  1922.  The l a t t e r  
envisaged a r e d u c t io n  of Germany's o b l i g a t i o n  in 1922 t o  500 
m i l l i o n  gold marks in cash and 1750 m i l l i o n  gold marks in k in d .
1. L e t t e r  from t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission t o  t h e  German Government 
16 December 1921: R.C. ,  LIJ.P« 5l*
2.  L e t t e r  from t h e  German Government t o  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission 
3 Jan u a ry  1922,  i b i d . ,  p.  52*
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In r e t u r n  f o r  t h i s ,  Germany was t o  check h e r  i n f l a t i o n a r y  
budget  p o l i c y  by c o l l e c t i n g  her  customs in  g o l d ,  by r a i s i n g  t h e  
c o a l  t a x ,  by i n c r e a s in g  r a i lw a y  t a r i f f s  and p o s t a l  charges  and 
by a b o l i s h i n g  s u b s i d i e s .  Advances of t h e  Reichsbank t o  t h e  
government and t h e  n o te  c i r c u l a t i o n  were t o  be r e s t r i c t e d  t o  
t h e i r  l e v e l  of December 1921; and t h e  Reichsbank was t o  be made 
in dependen t  of t h e  government and placed under t h e  s u p e r v i s io n  of 
a t e c h n i c a l  a d v i s e r  approved by t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission."^*
In s h o r t  Germany was t o  be g ran ted  a p a r t i a l  moratorium i f  she 
under took  t o  remedy f i n a n c i a l  weaknesses w hich ,  in t h e  op in ion  
of t h e  A l l i e s ,  had made t h i s  mora tor ium n e c e s s a r y .
The Cannes Conference opened a u s p i c i o u s l y  when, on 6 
January  1922,  i t  adopted unanimously a r e s o l u t i o n  in favou r  of 
summoning an Economic and F i n a n c i a l  Conference in February  or 
e a r l y  March " to  which a l l  t h e  Powers of Europe ,  i n c lu d in g  Germany, 
R u s s i a ,  A u s t r i a ,  Hungary and B u l g a r i a ,  should be i n v i t e d  t o  send 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s " .  The t e x t  of t h i s  r e s o l u t i o n ,  which reco rded  t h e  
op in ion  t h a t  a c o - o p e r a t i v e  e f f o r t  by t h e  econom ica l ly  s t r o n g e r  
powers was n e c e s s a r y  in o rde r  t o  ach ieve  t h e  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  of  
C e n t r a l  and E a s t e r n  Europe,  was forwarded t o  t h e  German government 
t o g e t h e r  w i th  an i n v i t a t i o n  t o  t h e  Genoa Conference on l6  January  
1922.  * Although  t h e  Genoa Conference was t o  end in f a i l u r e  t h e  
mere f a c t  t h a t  i t  was summoned re p re s e n t e d  an advance in t h e
1. For summary of t h e s e  s u g g e s t i o n s :  A .J .T oynbee ,  Survey of
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s  1920-3 . p .  159 f f»  See a l s o :  H# Clay,  
op. c i t . ,  p .  202.
2. German White Book, " M a te r i a l  über  d i e  Konferenz von Genua",  
R e i c h s t a g , V o l .  373? Anl.  4378» PP» 6 f f .
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t h i n k i n g  of t h e  major powers about  E u ro p e ' s  economic problems.
D i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  a t  Cannes was by 
no means as  u n e v e n t f u l  or  unanimous.  S e v e r a l  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  were 
i n t ro d u c e d  by t h e  A l l i e s  i n t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  Anglo-French scheme, 
t h e  most n o t a b l e  being an i n c r e a s e  in Germany's cash o b l i g a t i o n  
f o r  1922 from 500 m i l l i o n  t o  720 m i l l i o n  gold m a r k s . W h e n  t h e  
German d e l e g a t i o n  a t t e n d e d  a meeting of t h e  Supreme Counci l  f o r  
t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  on 12 January  t h e  gap between A l l i e d  and German 
id e a s  abou t  r e p a r a t i o n  soon became obv ious .  Lloyd George 
adm it ted  t h a t  Germany*s i n c a p a c i t y  f o r  making t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  
demanded of  h e r  was due p a r t l y  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  economic s t a t e  of
t h e  w o r ld .  I t  was however a l s o  due t o  t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  German
2 .
go v e rn m e n t ' s  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y .  In a r e p l y  which l a s t e d  f o r  
t h r e e  h o u r s ,  Rathenau p laced  t h e  blame s q u a re ly  on b a lan ce  of 
payments d i f f i c u l t i e s  f o r  which t h e r e  was no r ap id  cure  and upon 
b u d g e ta ry  problems which could not be r e s o lv e d  by i n c r e a s i n g  
c u r r e n t  r e v e n u e s .  In bo th  ca s e s  t h e  only  immediate remedy was 
in  h i s  op in ion  s u b s t a n t i a l  e x t e r n a l  and i n t e r n a l  long - te rm  
bor row ing .  However, i t  was, he emphasised,  p r e c i s e l y  in t h e  m a t t e r  
of r a i s i n g  such loans t h a t  t h e  German government was l e a s t  s u r e  of 
i t s  powers.  D e s p i t e  Germany's f i n a n c i a l  h e l p l e s s n e s s ,  Rathenau 
d e c l a r e d  t h a t  he was prepared  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  r ea sons  t o  acc ep t  most 
of t h e  A l l i e d  s u g g e s t io n s  concern ing  Germany's o b l i g a t i o n s  in 1922
and conce rn ing  budgetary  re fo rm .  He opposed however t h e
1. For t e x t  of A l l i ed  r e p a r a t i o n  p ro p o s a l  of 10 January  1922: 
"Aktens tücke  zur  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e  vom Mai 1921 b i s  Marz 1922" 
i b i d . ,  V o l .  372, Anl.  4140, pp.  185-8.
2 . i b i d . ,  p.  39 .
»
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s u b s t i t u t i o n  of 720 m i l l i o n  marks fo r  500 m i l l i o n  marks as 
Germanyfs cash o b l i g a t i o n ;  and he entered  a r e s e r v a t i o n  about  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  coa l  t a x .^ *
The f a l l  of t h e  Briand Cabinet  on 12 Janua ry  preven ted 
t h e  Supreme Council  from d e c i d in g  on t h e s e  i s s u e s ,  and p r e c i p i t a t e d  
t h e  b r e a k -u p  of t h e  Conference on t h e  fo l low ing  day .  However, 
t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission, which had been p r e s e n t  at  Cannes, now 
resumed c o n t r o l  of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u es t i o n  and g ran te d  Germany a 
p r o v i s i o n a l  postponement of t h e  payments which she was due t o  
make on 15 January  and 15 February  on t h e  cond i t  i o n s : ( l )  t h a t  she 
should c o n t in u e  t o  make cash payments of 31 m i l l i o n  gold marks 
every t e n  days from 18 Jan u a ry ;  (2)  t h a t  t h e  German government 
should w i t h i n  15 days submit a scheme of budge ta ry  and monetary 
reform and a programme of cash payments and d e l i v e r i e s  in kind 
f o r  t h e  yea r  1922; and (3) t h a t  t h e  A l l i ed  governments or t h e  
R e p a ra t io n  Commission should have t h e  power t o  end t h e  postponement 
as soon as t h e y  had cons idered  t h e  p ro p o sa l s  subm it ted  by th e  
German government.  ’ On 28 January  t h e  German government 
despa tched  t o  th e  R epa ra t ion  Commission a long memorandum in
f u l f i l m e n t  of t h e  second condit ion."^* The s e c t i o n  of t h i s  document
4.
which d e a l t  w i th  budge ta ry  r e fo rm  began w i th  an account  of how 
revenue  would be inc reased  by new d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n .
I t  went on t o  r e a s s u r e  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission t h a t  t h e  newly-
1. i b i d , ,  pp .  39-44.
2. Decision of J anuary  13,  1922,  from t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commiss ion. . ,
R . C . . I l l ,  p .  55.
3.  i b i d . ,  I l l ,  pp.  56-112.
4.  i b i d . ,  pp .  56-9*
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c r e a t e d  f e d e r a l  f i s c a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  which  was t o  c o l l e c t  t h e s e
t a x e s  was a t  l a s t  an " ac c o m p l i sh e d  f a c t " ;  and enumerated  t h e
s t e p s  which  had been t a k e n  t o  p r e v e n t  t a x  e v a s i o n  and t h e  f l i g h t
of  c a p i t a l .  I t  was hoped by t h e s e  means t o  r a i s e  r ev e n u e  in  t h e
f i n a n c i a l  y e a r  1922-3 t o  103*2 b i l l i o n  p a p e r  m a r k s .  Meanwhile
i t  was i n t e n d e d  t o  r e s t r i c t  o r d i n a r y  e x p e n d i t u r e s  t o  86 .7  b i l l i o n
p a p e r  m arks ,  m a in ly  by d i s c o n t i n u i n g  food s u b s i d i e s  -  which had
amounted t o  over  20 b i l l i o n  p a p e r  marks in  1921 -  and by r e d u c i n g
g e n e r a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o u t l a y s .  S i n c e  t h e  b u d g e t s  of t h e  p u b l i c
u t i l i t i e s  were  t o  be b a l a n c e d  e i t h e r  f rom c u r r e n t  r evenue  or f rom
s p e c i a l  l o a n s ,  t h e  s u r p l u s  of  l 6 . 5  b i l l i o n s  in  t h e  o r d i n a r y
budge t  cou ld  be devo ted  t o  d e f r a y i n g  e x p e n d i t u r e s  oc c as ioned  by
n 1.
t h e  t r e a t y ,  which  were  e s t i m a t e d  a t  18 7 .5  b i l l i o n  pape r  m arks .
The r e m a in i n g  171 b i l l i o n s  o f  t h e  t r e a t y  budget  cou ld  however  only
be  covered  by d om es t ic  b o r r o w i n g .  S i n c e  a d o m e s t i c  f r e e  l o a n  was ,
in  e x i s t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  u n l i k e l y  t o  succeed  i t  was in te n d e d  t o
r e s o r t  t o  a f o r c e d  l o a n ,  which  would e n a b l e  t h e  government  " t o
meet i t s  r e p a r a t i o n  payments a t  l e a s t  f o r  1922 w i t h  t h e  l e a s t
„ 2 .
p o s s i b l e  r e c o u r s e  t o  t h e  p r i n t i n g  p r e s s  .
In v iew of  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  which  t h e  government  was o b v i o u s l y  
go ing  t o  e n c o u n t e r  in i t s  e f f o r t s  t o  r e s t r i c t  t h e  g rowth  of  i t s  
f l o a t i n g  d e b t ,  i t  was no t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t h e  p l a n  of  r e p a r a t i o n  
payments  f o r  1922 c o n t a i n e d  in  t h e  second p a r t  o f  t h e  memorandum 
of  28 J a n u a r y  was more of  a p l e a  f o r  a r e d u c t i o n  o f  Germany’ s 
b u rd en  t h a n  a f o rm a l  s c h e d u l e .  On p u r e l y  f i n a n c i a l  and economic
1 .  i b i d . ,  pp .  104 -6 .
2 .  i b i d . ,  p .  59»
3.  i b i d . ,  pp .  5 9 - 6 1 .
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grounds  i t  was urged t h a t  Germany should be g ran te d  a complete 
r e l e a s e  from a l l  payments f o r  t h e  r e s t  of 1922.  I t  was r eco g n i se d  
t h a t  i t  might be p o l i t i c a l l y  n ece ss a ry  t o  endanger t h e  economic 
l i f e  of Germany by f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  demands which t h e  A l l i e s  had 
made a t  Cannes.  But such payments would only be f e a s i b l e  i f  ( l )  
t h e y  were spread  evenly over t h e  coming f i n a n c i a l  y e a r ;  i f  (2)  
t h e  c o s t s  of t h e  armies  of occupa t ion  which were payab le  in 
f o r e i g n  cu r r e n c y  were counted  as p a r t  of t h e  t o t a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
f o r  1922; and i f  (3) t h e  remain ing  charges  occasioned  by t h e  
t r e a t y ,  i n c lu d in g  t h e  c o s t s  of th e  armies  of occupa t ion  which 
were payab le  in paper marks,  were c o n s id e ra b ly  red u ce d .
The German government concluded i t s  memorandum of 28 
January  w i th  a reminder  of t h e  connec t ion  between a t o l e r a b l e  
ad jus tm en t  of Germany’s r e p a r a t i o n  problem and Germany’ s a b i l i t y  
t o  o b t a in  t h e  domestic  and f o r e i g n  c r e d i t  a s s i s t a n c e  which was 
e s s e n t i a l  f o r  any l a s t i n g  f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i s a t i o n .  ”At p r e s e n t , ” 
i t  obse rved ,  " n e i t h e r  t h e  German c a p i t a l i s t s  nor t h e  fo r e ig n  
c a p i t a l i s t s  d e s i r o u s  of making in v e s tm e n t s ,  c o n s id e r  Germany worthy 
of c r e d i t .  A u n i v e r s a l  d i s t r u s t  i s  making i t s e l f  f e l t ;  everyone 
doubts  w he the r  Germany w i l l  be a b l e  t o  r e c o v e r ,  in p r e s e n t  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  economic weapons s u f f i c i e n t  t o  make h e r  a so lven t  
d e b t o r  in a loan c o n t r a c t e d  on a l a r g e  s c a l e  f o r  r e p a r a t i o n  
p u rp o s e s .  To r e s t o r e  c o n f id e n c e  in  Germany’ s so lvency  t o  t h e  world 
a t  l a r g e  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  s o l u t i o n  of t h e  probleifT.
D e s p i t e  t h i s  a l t o g e t h e r  j u s t i f i e d  i n s i s t e n c e  on t h e  need 
f o r  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  c r e d i t ,  t h e  memorandum of 28 January
1 i b i d . ,  pp.  6 l -2
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r e v e a l s  t h a t  a t  t h e  beg inn ing  of 1922 t h e  German government was 
pu rsu ing  a more c o n c i l i a t o r y  r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y  and was adop t ing  
a more r e s o l u t e  a t t i t u d e  tow ards  f i n a n c i a l  re form tha n  i t  had in 
t h e  autumn of 1921. The former t r e n d  was a d i r e c t  r e sponse  t o  
A l l i e d  r e c o g n i t i o n  in December 1921 t h a t  a te mporary  r e d u c t io n  
of Germany’ s o b l i g a t i o n s  was n e c e s s a r y .  The l a t t e r  was t o  a 
l a r g e  e x t e n t  prompted by t h e  s im ul taneous  i n c r e a s e  in A l l i e d  
p r e s s u r e  f o r  a compensatory reform of German f i n a n c e s .  Both of 
t h e s e  t r e n d s  were a l s o  encouraged by t h e  b a l a n c e  of power in 
German domest ic  p o l i t i c s .  Th is  combinat ion of e x t e r n a l  and 
i n t e r n a l  f a c t o r s  f a v o u r a b l e  t o  " f u l f i l m e n t 1' and t o  f i n a n c i a l  
re form was t o  c o n t in u e  f o r  s e v e r a l  months in 1922. I t  was a 
symptom of t h e  atmosphere  which p r e v a i l e d  t h a t ,  on 31 January  
1922,  Wir th  brought Rathenau,  t h e  a p o s t l e  of " f u l f i l m e n t ” , back 
i n t o  h i s  Cabinet  as  F ore ign  M i n i s t e r .
On 26 January  1922 Yiri r t h  informed t h e  R e ic h s ta g  of t h e  
events  which had led t o  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission’ s moratorium 
announcement on 13 January  and a l s o  of t h e  s t e p s  which had been 
ta k e n  by t h e  German government t o  comply wi th  t h e  Commission’ s 
r e q u e s t .  On t h i s  occas ion  t h e  R e ich s tag  proved t o  be more 
o p t i m i s t i c  about f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  and more c o - o p e r a t i v e  about  
f i n a n c i a l  m a t t e r s  th an  i t  was t o  be f o r  t h e  r e s t  of 1922. The 
t o n e  of t h e  d eb a te  was s e t  by Wirth  h im se l f  who, d e s p i t e  h i s  
m i sg iv ings  about  t h e  e f f e c t s  on French p o l i c y  of P o i n c a r e ’s 
a c c e s s i o n  t o  power, expressed  s a t i s f a c t i o n  t h a t  a t  Cannes German
d e l e g a t e s  had at  l a s t  been a b l e  t o  d i s c u s s  Germany’s s i t u a t i o n  
r e a l i s t i c a l l y  b e f o r e  a c o n fe ren c e  on which th e  eyes of t h e  world
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■were f i x e d . ' *  W i r t h ' s  C e n t r i s t  c o l l e a g u e  Marx, a l t h o u g h  a l s o
u n e a s y  a bou t  t h e  f u t u r e ,  p r o c l a im e d  Cannes and t h e  summoning of
2 .
t h e  Genoa c o n f e r e n c e  a s  t r i u m p h s  f o r  W i r t h ’ s p o l i c y ;  w h i l e  
t h e  S o c i a l i s t  M ö l l e r  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  P o i n c a r e  was m ere ly  an 
added i n c e n t i v e  t o  Germany t o  f u l f i l  h e r  t r e a t y  o b l i g a t i o n s  in
3.
a p u n c t i l i o u s  manner .  S c e p t i c i s m  about  t h e  improvement  of
Germany’ s d i p l o m a t i c  p o s i t i o n  was p r e d i c t a b l y  e x p re s s e d  by t h e
ex t rem e  R ig h t  and L e f t ,  * j u s t  a s  t h e  e x p e c t e d  o p t i m i s t i c
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  P o i n c a r e ’ s i n t e n t i o n s  was g iv e n  by t h e  p a c i f i s t
cr
Indepe nde n t  S o c i a l i s t  B r e i t s c h e i d . * But t h e  c l e a r e s t  i n d i c a t i o n  
of  t h e  c o m p a r a t i v e l y  h o p e f u l  a t t i t u d e  which  p r e v a i l e d  was t h a t  
t h e  DVP spokesman,  B e c k e r ,  a l t h o u g h  s h a r p l y  c r i t i c a l  of  F rench
p o l i c y ,  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  Germany’s e x t e r n a l  r e l a t i o n s  were more
6 .f a v o u r a b l e .
The f i n a n c i a l  r e f o r m  programme which t h e  government  was 
a bou t  t o  submit  t o  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission r e c e i v e d  u n u s u a l l y  
broad s u p p o r t .  I t  was i n  f a c t  t h e  p r o d u c t  of  f i v e - p a r t y  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  which  had t a k e n  p l a c e  in  t h e  second h a l f  of  J a n u a r y  
be tween  t h e  S o c i a l  D e m oc ra t s ,  t h e  C e n t r e ,  t h e  D e m o c ra t s ,  t h e  
P e o p l e ’ s P a r t y  and t h e  B a v a r i a n  P e o p l e ' s  F a r t y .  The o c c u r r e n c e  
of  t h e s e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  " f i s c a l  compromise"
( S te u e r k o m p r o m i s s ) ,  which in c l u d e d  b o t h  a f o r c e d  lo a n  and
1. W i r t h ,  26 J a n u a r y  1922,  R e i c h s t a g , V o l .  352 ,  pp .  5557 -60 .
2.  27 J a n u a r y  1922,  i b i d . ,  p .  5584.
3. ib id . ,  p .  5581.
4. W e s t a rp  (DNVF), 26 J a n u a r y  1922 ,  i b i d . ,  p p .  5565, 5572-3? 
Koenen (KPD) 27 J a n u a r y  1922,  i b i d . ,  p .  56l6.
5 .  i b i d . ,  p .  5584.
6. i b i d . ,  p .  5593*
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s u b s t a n t i a l  i n c r e a s e s  in  i n d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n , were h a i l e d  by
C e n t r i s t  and Democratic sp eak e r s  as ev idence  of a c o - o p e r a t i v e
1.
t r e n d  in  German f i n a n c i a l  p o l i t i c s .  Although t h i s  c la im  was 
j u s t i f i e d ,  t h e  suppor t  accorded to  the  Steuerkompromiss by t h e  
DVP was m ot iva ted  p a r t l y  by a d e s i r e  t o  avoid an e l e c t i o n  on t h e  
f i s c a l  q u e s t i o n ,  and was a l s o  c o n d i t i o n a l  upon t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  
of t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of German i n d u s t r y .  The ap p ro v a l  of t h e  DVP 
f o r  t h e  fo r c e d  loan p ro p o s a l  was,  moreover,  encouraged not only  
by a d e s i r e  t o  check i n f l a t i o n  and t o  p l a c a t e  t h e  A l l i e s  but  
a l s o  by an u n d e r s t a n d in g  t h a t  t h e  proceeds of t h e  loan would be 
devoted  e n t i r e l y  t o  t h e  compensation of German i n d u s t r y  f o r  
r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  made t o  t h e  A l l i e s .  * The S o c i a l  Democrats 
were a l s o  uneasy about  t h e  " f i s c a l  compromise". They were a c u t e l y  
aware t h a t  t h e  fo rced  loan  was a s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  e a r l i e r  p lans  t o  
a p p r o p r i a t e  " r e a l  v a l u e s " ,  and t h a t  inc re ased  i n d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n  
was c o n t r a r y  t o  s o c i a l i s t  p r i n c i p l e s .  For t h i s  reason  th ey  
j u s t i f i e d  t h e i r  suppor t  f o r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s  p ro p o sa l s  l a r g e l y  
on th e  u n d e s i r a b i l i t y  of f o r c i n g  an e l e c t i o n  on t h e  eve of t h e
3.
Genoa C onference .
The c r i t i c i s m s  of t h e  " f i s c a l  compromise" voiced  by t h e  
extreme Lef t  and Right  both  r e v e a l  t h e  shor tcomings  of t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t s  programme and e x p la in  t h e  embarrassment of t h e  
p a r t i e s  which suppor ted  i t .  The Independent  S o c i a l i s t s ,  a p a r t
1. W i r t h ,  26 Jan u a ry  1922,  i b i d . ,  p .  5561; Marx (Zentrum),
27 J a n u a ry  1922,  i b i d . ,  pp.  5584-5;  P e t e r s e n  (DDP), i b i d , ,
p. 5601.
2.  Becker (DVP) , ib id .,  pp. 5595-9»
3. M ölle r  (SPD), i b i d , ,  pp. 5580-1 .
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from c r i t i c i s i n g  t h e  M a jo r i ty  S o c i a l i s t s  f o r  abandoning t h e i r  
f i s c a l  p r i n c i p l e s  and f o r  f a i l i n g  t o  f o r c e  an e l e c t i o n ,  cons ide red  
t h a t  no r e a l  s a c r i f i c e  had been imposed upon t h e  p r o p e r t i e d  
c l a s s e s .  B r e i t s c h e i d  po in ted  out t h a t  t h e  support  of t h e  midd le -  
c l a s s  p a r t i e s  f o r  t h e  fo rced  loan had only been bought by t h e  
s h e lv in g  of a p roposa l  f o r  a P r o f i t s  Tax,  by t h e  r e d u c t io n  of a 
s u r c h a rg e  on t h e  P ro p e r ty  Tax and by t h e  r e t e n t i o n  of inadequa te  
v a l u a t i o n  p ro v i s io n s  in t h e  l a t t e r  m e a s u r e . 1* The Communists 
■went f u r t h e r  and c a l l e d  f o r  a u n i t e d  p r o l e t a r i a n  f r o n t  a g a i n s t  
t h e  b o u r g e o i s i e  and t h e  S o c i a l  Democrats ( " s o c i a l  t r a i t o r s " )  
in o rde r  t o  a p p r o p r i a t e  " r e a l  v a l u e s " ,  t o  s o c i a l i s e  t h e  c o a l  
i n d u s t r y ,  t o  c o n f i s c a t e  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange e a rn in g s  of e x p o r t e r s ,
t o  impose import c o n t r o l s  and t o  b r in g  about t h e  prompt c o l l e c t i o n
2 .
of t h e  R e i c h s n o to p f e r .
The com pla in t s  of t h e  Lef t  about  t h e  inadequacy of t h e  
" f i s c a l  compromise" were balanced  by N a t i o n a l i s t  p r o t e s t s  t h a t  
t h e  government1 s f i n a n c i a l  programme would both  r u i n  t h e  German 
economy and p l a c e  i t  under  t h e  c o n t r o l  of f o r e i g n e r s .  Although 
W es ta rp ,  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t  spokesman,  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  concerned 
about  t h e  fo rced  loan  on t h i s  acc o u n t ,  he was a l s o  alarmed a t  
t h e  p r i c e  r i s e s  which would be caused by t h e  p r o j e c t e d  in c r e a s e s  
in r a i l w a y  and p o s t a l  r a t e s  and t h e  c o a l  t a x  and a l s o  by t h e  
government’ s p ro p o s a l  t o  a b o l i s h  food s u b s i d i e s  and t o  c o l l e c t
3*customs in  g o l d .
F u r t h e r  evidence of t h e  s t r e n g t h  of t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  th e
1. i b i d * ,  pp.  5590-2; c f .  Levi  (Komm.Arb.), i b i d . ,  p.  56o8.
2 . Koenen (KPD), i b i d , ,  pp.  5 6 l 5 - l 8 .
3 .  i b i d . ,  pp.  5568-73*
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" f i s c a l  compromise" and of t h e  p r o v i s i o n a l  n a t u r e  of t h e  support  
accorded t o  i t  was provided  by t h e  ensuing d e b a t e  on t h e  budget 
f i g u r e s  which were con ta ined  in  t h e  German Note of 28 J anua ry .  
Hermes s t r e s s e d  f i r s t  of  a l l  t h a t  th e  r e d u c t i o n  of  Germany's 
o b l i g a t i o n s  envisaged a t  Cannes would not  enable  t h e  German 
government t o  ba lance  i t s  b u d g e t .  Although he procla imed Germany's 
d e s i r e  t o  f u l f i l  her  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  he doubted whether  t h e  A l l i e s  
would r e a l i s e  t h e  need f o r  f u r t h e r  c once ss ions  soon enough t o  
prevent  German f i n a n c i a l  c o l l a p s e .  The F inance  M i n i s t e r  then  
went on t o  emphasise t h e  need t o  bury domest ic  d i s p u t e s  i f  Germany*s 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o s i t i o n  was t o  be improved."*"* The achievement of 
t h e  l a t t e r  c o n d i t i o n  was ,  however,  made l e s s  l i k e l y  by t h e  
i n s i s t e n c e  of t h e  DVP spokesman,  Quaatz ,  t h a t  he suppor ted  t h e  
" f i s c a l  compromise" only on t h e  c o n d i t i o n  of t h e  economic 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  of  Germany in a manner which was a c c e p t a b l e  t o  h i s  
p a r t y . ' *  The p ro s p e c t s  f o r  con t inued  f i v e - p a r t y  f i n a n c i a l  
c o -o p e r a t i o n  were a l s o  dimmed by t h e  le n g th y  reminder  of 
Scheidemann t h a t  w o r k in g - c l a s s  suppor t  f o r  t h e  government ' s  
r i g o ro u s  budge ta ry  p o l i c y  depended on t h e  passage  of s o c i a l  
reforms and t h e  improvement of t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of j u s t i c e .
The d e l i c a t e  b a l a n c e  of f o r c e s  upon which t h e  " S te u e r ­
kompromiss" was based was somewhat d i s t u r b e d  by t h e  t ime  th e  
government ' s  f i s c a l  p roposa l s  emerged from committee in March 1922.  
This  was because  t h e  m i d d l e - c l a s s  p a r t i e s  had,  by means of 
c o -o p e r a t i o n  in committee,  g iven  t h e  tax  programme a c o n s e rv a t iv e
1 . Hermes, 30 January  1922,  i b i d . ,  p p .5641-2 .
2.  i b i d . ,  p .  5664,
3 . i b i d . ,  pp.  5642-52.
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emphasis .  A symptom of t h i s  was Becker ’s e v id e n t  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
not  only about  m i t i g a t i n g  p r o v i s i o n s  of t h e  P r o p e r t y ,  C orpora t ion  
and S a le s  Taxes but a l s o  about  t h e  government’ s accep tance  of  
t h e  P e o p l e ’ s P a r t y ' s  id e a s  conce rn ing  r e t re nchm en t  and th e  
removal of r e s t r a i n t s  on economic a c t i v i t y . 1* A f i n a n c i a l  
programme which was so a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  DVP i n e v i t a b l y  offended 
t h e  S o c i a l  Democrats .  B e r n s t e i n  was now h ig h l y  c r i t i c a l  of t h e  
t a x  burden which had been p laced on t h e  p r o p e r t y l e s s  c l a s s e s .
He a l s o  dep lo re d  t h e  e x t e n t  of t h e  evas ion  of d i r e c t  taxes  and 
p r o t e s t e d  t h a t  no " a p p r o p r i a t i o n  of  r e a l  v a l u e s "  had taken  p l a c e .  
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  he s t i l l  defended t h e  " f i s c a l  compromise" as th e  
bes t  f i n a n c i a l  programme which could be ob ta ined  in  t h e  circum­
s t a n c e s ,  g iv e n  t h a t  t h e  domest ic  and d ip lo m a t ic  s i t u a t i o n  made an
e l e c t i o n  u n d e s i r a b l e .  He was, moreover ,  s t i l l  h o p e fu l  t h a t  t h e
2 .
fo rced  loan would make t h e  burden of d i r e c t  t a x a t i o n  h e a v i e r .
While t h e r e  had been a g r a d u a l  c r y s t a l l i s a t i o n  of 
d i f f e r e n c e s  of opin ion over domestic  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y ,  i t  was s t i l l  
no t  c e r t a i n  in t h e  middle of March t h a t  t h e  f i s c a l  compromise 
would be undermined by t h e  u n fa v o u ra b l e  f i n a n c i a l  impact of t h e  
r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n .  In th e  d e b a t e  of l6  March t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t s  
made t h e i r  u s u a l  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  f i n a n c i a l  re fo rm i n  g e n e r a l ,  and 
th e  fo rced  loan in p a r t i c u l a r ,  were p o i n t l e s s  and u n d e s i r a b l e  
because  of t h e  enormous f i n a n c i a l  demands of t h e  A l l i e s B e c k e r  
of t h e  DVP a l s o  s t r e s s e d ,  as  indeed did  everybody e l s e ,  t h a t
77 Becker (DVP), 17 March 1922, i b i d 77 Vo1. 353» PP.6329-3o7 "
2. i b i d . ,  l6 March 1922,  pp.  6302-7.
3 .  H e l f f e r i c h  (DNVP), i b i d . ,  pp.  6 3 H - I 9 .
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con t inued  payment of r e p a r a t i o n  a t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  r a t e  of  31 
m i l l i o n  gold marks every  t e n  days 'would be d i s a s t r o u s .  However, 
he  did  not  c o n s id e r  t h a t  Germany's e x t e r n a l  payments problem 
should be used as an excuse f o r  f a i l u r e  t o  a t tempt  i n t e r n a l  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i s a t i o n .  On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h e  " f i s c a l  compromise" 
was a n e c e s s a r y  d ip lo m a t ic  p r e l i m i n a r y  t o  any a t tempt t o  ob ta in  
a r e m is s io n  of p a r t  of Germany's  r e p a r a t i o n  burden.^* This 
r e v e a l s  t h a t  A l l i ed  r e p a r a t i o n  demands were as yet  no t  a compel l­
ing reason  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  p a s s i v i t y  even amongst t h o s e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
in t h e  " f i s c a l  compromise" who were most s e n s i t i v e  on t h i s  s u b j e c t .
The p s y c h o lo g ic a l  and p o l i t i c a l  atmosphere was tr ans fo rm ed  
by two n o te s  which were t r a n s m i t t e d  by t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission 
t o  t h e  German government on 21 March. The f i r s t  of t h e s e  dashed 
hopes of a f u r t h e r  r e d u c t i o n  of Germany's c u r r e n t  r e p a r a t i o n  
o b l i g a t i o n s  by conf irming t h e  Commission's  d e c i s i o n  of 13 January  
t h a t  payments f o r  1922 should amount t o  720 m i l l i o n  gold marks 
in cash and 1450 m i l l i o n  gold marks in k i n d .  S ince  cash payments 
of 282 m i l l i o n  gold marks had a l r e a d y  been made in 1922, i t  was
d i r e c t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  should be f u r t h e r  i n s t a lm e n t s  of 
Gold marks On
l 8 m i l l i o n  15 A p r i l
50 m i l l i o n  15 May, June ,  J u l y ,  August ,
September ,  October
60 m i l l i o n  15 November and December.
I t  was f u r t h e r  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  cash  payments and d e l i v e r i e s  in 
kind were t o  be used f i r s t  t o  cover  t h e  c o s t s  of t h e  A l l ied  armies 
of o c c u p a t io n ,  and t h a t  only t h e  b a l a n c e  should be reckoned as a
1. See above,  p.  351.
2.  Becker (DVF), 17 March 1922,  R e i c h s t a g . T o l .  353,  PP.^323-5 ,  
6327,  6329.
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c r e d i t  a g a i n s t  Germany’ s t o t a l  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n  u n d e r  t h e
1.
London S c h e d u le  of  Paym ents .
The second n o t e ,  which  c o n s i s t e d  o f  a s e r i e s  of u n f a v o u r ­
a b l e  o b s e r v a t i o n s  on t h e  f i n a n c i a l  programme w h ich  t h e  German 
government  had sub m i t t e d  on 28 J a n u a r y ,  was bound t o  p ro d u ce  a 
h i g h l y  u n f a v o u r a b l e  r e a c t i o n  b o t h  in  Germany and a b r o a d .  I t  was 
i n f l u e n c e d  by a memorandum drawn up by t h e  F re n ch  d e l e g a t i o n  t o  
t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission which  accused  Germany of  bad f a i t h  in  
t h e  f u l f i l m e n t  of h e r  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s  b e c a u s e  of h e r  
f a i l u r e  t o  a c h i e v e  e f f e c t i v e  f i n a n c i a l  r e f o r m .  * A c c o r d i n g l y  i t  
in fo rm ed  t h e  German government  t h a t  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission 
e x p e c t e d  "a much more r a d i c a l  r e f o r m  of t h e  f i n a n c e s  of  Germany 
and a f i n a l  abandonment  of  t h e  m i s t a k e n  p o l i c y  h i t h e r t o  
f o l l o w e d T h e  main s p e c i f i c  demands of t h e  n o t e  were t h a t  
l e g i s l a t i o n  shou ld  be e n a c t e d  by 31 May 1922 which  would i n c r e a s e  
p u b l i c  r e v e n u e  by 60 b i l l i o n  marks in  t h e  b u d g e t a r y  y e a r  1922- 3 ; 
and t h a t  40 b i l l i o n s  of t h i s  sum shou ld  a c t u a l l y  be  c o l l e c t e d  by 
31 December 1922.  The n o t e  a l s o  p r e s c r i b e d  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  of  
p u b l i c  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  t h e  f l o t a t i o n  of  d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  l o a n s ,  
t h e  p a s s a g e  of  l e g i s l a t i o n  t o  c o u n t e r  t h e  f l i g h t  of  c a p i t a l  f rom 
Germany and t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  in d ep e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  
R e ic hsba nk  from t h e  g o v e rn m e n t ,  t h e  p u b l i c a t i o n  of  c om p le te  
German economic and f i n a n c i a l  s t a t i s t i c s ,  a n d ,  f i n a l l y ,  c l o s e r  
s u p e r v i s i o n  of t h e  German g o v e rn m e n t ’ s f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  by t h e
1. L e t t e r  f rom t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission t o  t h e  German Government ,  
21 March 1922,  R . C . . I l l ,  pp .  118-21 .
2 .  Memorandum of 15 March 1922,  i b i d . ,  V I ,  pp .  4 - 3 0 .
3» L e t t e r  f rom  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission t o  t h e  German C h a n c e l l o r ,  
21 March 1922,  i b i d . ,  I l l ,  pp .  113-8 a t  p .  114.
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Committee  of  G u a r a n t e e s ,
The p s y c h o l o g i c a l  and p o l i t i c a l  impact  of  t h e s e  communic­
a t i o n s  was r e v e a l e d  in  t h e  d e b a t e s  which t h e y  o c c as io n ed  in  t h e  
R e i c h s t a g ,  On 28 March W i r t h  cla imed t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t  which t h e  
n o t e s  had a l r e a d y  e x e r t e d  on t h e  mark e x c h a n g e ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  
t h e  e f f e c t  of  f u t u r e  payments  a t  t h e  r a t e  p r e s c r i b e d  by t h e  
R e p a r a t i o n  Commission, would c o m p l e t e l y  unde rm ine  t h e  e f f e c t i v e ­
n e s s  of  t h e  " f i s c a l  compromise" which was a bou t  t o  become law.
He went  on t  o p r o t e s t  t h a t  t h e  t a s k  of  l e v y i n g  t a x e s  which 
would y i e l d  a n o t h e r  60 b i l l i o n  p a p e r  marks would be i m p o s s i b l e  
w i t h i n  t h e  t i m e  l i m i t s  imposed by t h e  Commission. ' ' '* Even t h e  
S o c i a l i s t  p a r t i e s ,  which w e r e ,  in  v a r y i n g  d e g r e e s ,  d i s s a t i s f i e d  
w i t h  t h e  " f i s c a l  compromise",  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e  r e q u e s t s  of  t h e
R e p a r a t i o n  Commission were  b o t h  t e c h n i c a l l y  and p o l i t i c a l l y
2 .
i m p o s s i b l e ,  * In t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i t  was n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  
spokesmen f o r  t h e  more f i n a n c i a l l y  c o n s e r v a t i v e  p a r t i e s  such as  
R a the nau  (DDP) and S t re sem ann  (DVP) i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e  " f i s c a l  
compromise" was t h e  e x t r e m e  l i m i t  of  t a x a t i o n  which  Germany could
b e a r ; ^ *  and t h a t  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t  Hergt  demanded a f l a t  r e f u s a l
4.
by t h e  gove rnment  t o  impose new t a x e s .
1.  W i r t h ,  28 March 1922,  Re i c h s t a g , V o l .  353) PP* 6613,  6621,  
6 6 l 6 .  C f .  Marx ( Z e n t r u m ) ,  29 March 1922,  i b i d , ,  V o l .  354 ,  
p .  6642.  W ir th  p o i n t e d  out  t h a t  t h e  d o l l a r  r a t e ,  which had 
r i s e n  s t e a d i l y  f rom 200 a t  t h e  end of J a n u a r y  a s  a r e s u l t  of 
t h e  10-day  s c h e d u l e ,  had jumped from 289 on 21 March t o  332 
on 24 March.
2 .  S t a m p fe r  (SPD), 28 March 1922,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  353)  p .  6635; 
B r e i t s c h e i d  (USPD), 29 March 1922,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  354 ,  p p . 6660-2 .
3 .  R a t h e n a u ,  i b i d . ,  p .  6655;  S t r e s e m a n n ,  i b i d . ,  p .  6647.
4 .  i b i d . ,  28 March 1922,  V o l .  353) P* 6627.
3 3^.
A p a r t i c u l a r  s o u r c e  o f  i l l - f e e l i n g  was t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of  
t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission t h a t  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r y  powers  of t h e  
Committee  of  G u a ra n te e s  shou ld  be e x t e n d e d .  The N a t i o n a l i s t s  
p r e d i c t e d  t h a t  t h e  Commit tee would become an i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  
spy in g  upon and s a b o t a g i n g  German industry."*'* W i r t h  p r o t e s t e d
t h a t  t h e  demands of t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission were  " i n c o m p a t i b l e
2
w i t h  t h e  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  and t h e  honour  of  a g r e a t  n a t i o n ” ; * 
and Ra thenau  f i r m l y  opposed any t h r e a t e n e d  i n v a s i o n  of  German 
s o v e r e i g n t y . 3  456’ The S o c i a l  Democrats  were t h e  on ly  government  
p a r t y  which p layed  down t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h e  Commission’ s
demands and s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t h e  Committee  could recommend bu t  n o t
4 .
d i c t a t e  f i n a n c i a l  m e a s u r e s .
In v iew  of  t h e  Com miss ion 's  r e f u s a l  t o  lower  Germany' s  
o b l i g a t i o n s  and in  v iew of  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  t a x a t i o n  and more r i g i d  
c o n t r o l s  which  i t  demanded i t  was on ly  t o  be  e x p e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  
p o l i c y  of  f u l f i l m e n t  would l o s e  a g r e a t  d e a l  of  i t s  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s .  
On t h e  R i g h t ,  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t s  b l u n t l y  p ro c l a im e d  t h e  b a n k r u p t c y  
of  f u l f i l m e n t  and a d v o c a t e d  " p a s s i v e  r e s i s t a n c e "  t o  t h e  Com m iss ion ' s  
demands;  * and S t re sem ann  i n s i s t e d  more m o d e r a t e l y  t h a t  r e p a r a t i o n  
payments  c o u ld  only be  c o n t i n u e d  w i t h i n  s t r i c t  economic l i m i t s , ' 1 2* 
A l though  government  s p e a k e r s  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  an a t t e m p t  would s t i l l  
be  made t o  comply w i t h  A l l i e d  demands,  t h e  Democrats  were v e r y  
much on t h e  d e f e n s i v e  and p r e s s e d  f o r  a downward r e v i s i o n  of
1.  i b i d . ,  p.  6624.
2.  i b i d . ,  p .  6 6 l 7 .
3 . i b i d . ,  29 March 1922,  V o l .  354,  p .  6655.
4 .  S t a m p f e r  (SPD), 28 March 1922,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  353? P.  6634.
5 .  Hergt  (DNVP), i b i d . ,  pp .  663O - I .
6 . i b i d . ,  29 March 1922,  V o l .  354, p.  6650.
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Germany 's  o b l i g a t i o n s . ' 1 2345'* Even r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of  t h e  C e n t r e  and
S o c i a l  D em ocra t i c  p a r t i e s  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  p o l i c y  of f u l f i l m e n t
would l ea d  t o  f i n a n c i a l  d i s a s t e r  u n l e s s  t h e  t r e a t y  were r e v i s e d ,
and t h e y  a dvoc a te d  c o m p l ia n c e  w i t h  A l l i e d  demands l a r g e l y  b e c a u s e
2
a p o l i c y  o f  r e s i s t a n c e  would p l a y  i n t o  P o i n c a r e ' s  h a n d s . O n l y  
t h e  Indepe nde n t  S o c i a l  Democra ts  were a t  a l l  o p t i m i s t i c  a b o u t  
t h e  f u t u r e ,  bu t  even t h e i r  a t t i t u d e  d e r i v e d  s o l e l y  from t h e  
a s s u m p t io n  t h a t  t h e  A l l i e s  would be  u n a b l e  t o  a b s o rb  t h e  f u l l  
amount of d e l i v e r i e s  in  k ind  which  t h e y  had demanded.
D e s p i t e  t h e  i n i t i a l  g loom of  t h e  R e i c h s t a g  and t h e  s lump 
in  t h e  mark exchange ,  t h e  l o n g - t e r m  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  and f i n a n c i a l
r e p e r c u s s i o n s  of t h e  Notes  o f  21 March were  n o t  a s  s e r i o u s  as
4.
i t  had a t  f i r s t  seemed t h e y  might  b e .  One r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  was 
t h a t  t h e  g a p  between t h e  t a x  programme demanded by t h e  A l l i e s  
and German f i s c a l  p e r f o r m a n c e  was c o n s i d e r a b l y  narrowed by t h e  
f o r c e d  l o a n  scheme,  w h i c h ,  a l t h o u g h  p a r t  of t h e  " f i s c a l  com prom ise" ,  
had no t  been  f o r m a l l y  e n a c t e d .  A second r e a s o n  wa3 t h a t ,  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  t h e  German r e p a r a t i o n  e x p e r t  Bergmann,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  
i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  powers of  t h e  Committee  of  G u a r a n te e s  proved on 
c l o s e r  e x a m in a t io n  " t o  be more or  l e s s  empty p h r a s e s "  which
5 •demanded "no r e a l l y  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  of  r e v e n u e  and e x p e n d i t u r e " .
1 . Haas (DDF), i b i d . ,  pp. 666 9 -7 0 .
2 .  W i r t h ,  28 March 1922,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  353,  p .  6621;  S t a m p f e r  (SPD),  
i b i d . ,  pp .  6632-4;  Marx ( Z e n t r u m ) ,  29 March 1922,  i b i d . ,  V o l .  
354,  p .  6641.
3 . B r e i t  sehe  i d ,  i b i d . ,  p.  6658.
4 .  In A p r i l  t h e  mark r e c o v e r e d  t o  i t s  mid-March l e v e l  of  280 t o  t h e  
d o l l a r .  Di e  E n tw ic k lu n g  d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , pp.  25- 1 *
5 .  C. Bergmann, op.  c i t . ,  p .  123*
T h e s e  f a c t s  even t e n d  t o  encou rage  a c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  
v i o l e n c e  of t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’s p r o t e s t  a g a i n s t  t h e  A l l i e d  n o t e s
was in  p a r t  due t o  i t s  d e s i r e  t o  i n c r e a s e  i t s  do m es t i c  p o p u l a r i t y
1.
b e f o r e  t h e  Genoa C o n f e r e n c e ,  which  was t o  b e g in  on 10 A p r i l .
The most i m p o r t a n t  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  s l i g h t  
u n f a v o u r a b l e  impact of  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Com m iss ion 's  demands was 
t h e  enhanced p r o s p e c t  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  a t  
t h i s  t i m e .  Few hopes  w ere  a r o u s e d  by t h e  imminence of t h e  Genoa 
C o n f e r e n c e ,  f rom which men such  as  Rathenau  and S t resemann  
e x p e c t e d  no c o n c r e t e  r e s u l t s  b e c a u s e  of t h e  n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and b e c a u s e  of  t h e  e x c l u s i o n  of  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  
q u e s t i o n  from t h e  s u b j e c t s  t o  be d i s c u s s e d *  * A g r e a t e r  c a u s e  
f o r  op t im ism  was t h e  d e c i s i o n  of t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission on 
4 A p r i l  t o  a p p o i n t  a com mit tee  o f  German, F r e n c h ,  B r i t i s h ,  American
and n e u t r a l  e x p e r t s  t o  examine t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a l a r g e - s c a l e
3 .
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  loan  f o r  Germany. I t  was in  f a c t  t h e  p r o s p e c t  
t h a t  t h i s  c o m m i t t e e ' s  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  migh t  y i e l d  p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t s  
which k e p t  hopes  of  f i n a n c i a l  r e f o r m  and f u l f i l m e n t  a l i v e  u n t i l  
t h e  m id d le  of  1922.
365.
1 . E . S c hma eke ,  Die Aus s e n p o l i t  ik  d e r  Weimarer  R e p u b l i k * .  * ,
pp .  79- 8 0 .
2 . W i r t h ,  28 March 1922 , R e i c h s t a g  * V o l .  353? p .  6622; Haas (DDP), 
29 March 1922 , i b i d . ,  V o l .  354 ,  p .  6672;  S t re sem ann  (DVP), 
i b i d . ,  p .  6651; Ra thenau  (DDP), i b i d . ,  p ,  6655» A m e r i c a ' s  
r e f u s a l  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  Genoa C o n f e re n c e  was a t t r i b u t e d  
by Ra thenau  f i r s t l y  t o  h e r  ’’Europamöd i g k e i t " ,  s e co n d ly  t o  t h e  
s m a l l  p r o p o r t i o n  of  h e r  n a t i o n a l  income which  was d e r i v e d  
f rom e x p o r t s ,  and t h i r d l y  t o  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  American b e l i e f  
t h a t  money l e n t  t o  Eu rope  would be s p e n t  on armaments:  i b i d . ,  
p .  6656.  On t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  of t h e  agenda  of t h e  Genoa C o n f e r ­
ence  b e c a u s e  of  F re nch  p r e s s u r e :  A . J .T o y n b e e ,  op. c i t , , p p . 2 6 - 7 .
3 .  Fo r  t h e  Loan C om m i t t e e ' s  t e rm s  of r e f e r e n c e :  Documents
R e l a t i f s  aux R e p a r a t i o n s .  V o l .  I ,  pp.  2 4 1 - 2 .
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For  a l l  t h e  r e a s o n s  r e f e r r e d  t o ,  t h e  German g o v e rn m e n t ' s  
r e p l y  of  7 A p r i l  t o  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commiss ion 's  n o t e s  was rem a rk ­
a b l y  c o n c i l i a t o r y .  In t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e  i t  p o i n t e d  out  t h a t  t h e  
10-day  payments  and t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commiss ion’ s r e c e n t  demands 
had caused  a f a l l  in  t h e  mark which was t h r e a t e n i n g  t o  a n n i h i l a t e  
t h e  d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  p u r c h a s i n g  power of  German c u r r e n c y .  
A c c o r d in g l y  i t  asked t h e  Commission t o  r e c o n s i d e r  i t s  demands 
of  21 March and t o  conduc t  a f r e s h  e x a m i n a t i o n  of  Germany's  
c a p a c i t y  t o  pay .  The government  t h e n  r e i t e r a t e d  i t s  c o n v i c t i o n  
t h a t  i t  cou ld  no t  make s u b s t a n t i a l  r e p a r a t i o n  payments  or  a c h i e v e  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  w i t h o u t  f o r e i g n  a s s i s t a n c e ;  and 
e x p r e s s e d  t h e  hope t h a t  t h e  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  of  t h e  Loan Commit tee 
would p roduce  " p r a c t i c a l  r e s u l t s  as  soon a s  p o s s i b l e " .  F i n a l l y ,  
a l t h o u g h  i t  s t r e s s e d  t h e  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  of r a i s i n g  60 b i l l i o n  
marks of new t a x e s  and t h e  u n d e s i r a b i l i t y  of  any i n f r i n g e m e n t  of 
German f i n a n c i a l  i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  t h e  government  p o i n t e d  out t h a t  
t h e  p r o j e c t e d  f o rc e d  lo a n  "would y i e l d  t h e  f i g u r e  r e p r e s e n t i n g  
t h e  i n c r e a s e  demanded by t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commiss ion",  and a f f i r m e d  
i t s  w i l l i n g n e s s  " t o  f u r n i s h  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission w i t h  any
i n f o r m a t i o n  i t  (m igh t )  r e q u i r e  on t h e  s i t u a t i o n  and on t h e
1 .
f i n a n c i a l  o p e r a t i o n s  c a r r i e d  out  i n  Germany".
In i t s  r e p l y  of 13 A p r i l  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission a p p e a r s
t o  have  been  concerned  p r i m a r i l y  t o  a s s e r t  i t s  a u t h o r i t y  in  t h e
f a c e  of  what i t  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be a c h a l l e n g e  by t h e  German
g o v e rn m e n t .  T h e r e f o r e ,  on t h e  g rounds  t h a t  t h e  German b u d g e t a r y
1.  Rep ly  f rom  t h e  German Government  t o  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  
Commiss ion,  R . C. , I I I ,  pp.  121-4 .
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d e f i c i t  cou ld  not  be covered  e n t i r e l y  by f o r c e d  or  f r e e  l o a n s ,  
i t  made much of  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  r e f u s a l  t o  impose f u r t h e r  
t a x a t i o n .  I t  even a s s e r t e d  t h a t ,  s i n c e  i n t e r n a l  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  
was a p r e r e q u i s i t e  f o r  t h e  f o r e i g n  lo a n s  which were  e s s e n t i a l  
in  any r e p a r a t i o n  scheme,  t h e  German n o t e  o f  7 A p r i l  was 
t a n t a m o u n t  t o  a r e f u s a l  t o  make any s e r i o u s  e f f o r t  t o  p r o v i d e  
f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c i e s  f o r  r e p a r a t i o n " .  The same d e s i r e  t o  a s s e r t  
i t s  a u t h o r i t y  was e v i d e n t  in  t h e  Commiss ion 's  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  of  i t s  s u p e r v i s o r y  pow ers .  Because  o f  t h e  m o r a t o r i u m ,  
t h e  Commission c l a i m e d ,  i t  was e n t i t l e d  t o  impose "w ha te ve r  
c o n d i t i o n s  i t  might  r e g a r d  a3 n e c e s s a r y " .  However , a l t h o u g h  t h e  
Commission i n s i s t e d  upon i t s  t h e o r e t i c a l  r i g h t s  in  t h e s e  m a t t e r s ,  
i t  was in  p r a c t i c e  p r e p a r e d  t o  be  c o n c i l i a t o r y .  A f i r m  a s s u r a n c e  
was g i v e n  t h a t  German f i n a n c i a l  s o v e r e i g n t y  would no t  be 
t r e s p a s s e d  upon;  and t h e  way was p re p a r e d  f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  a b o u t  
Germany 's  o b l i g a t i o n s  by a d e c l a r a t i o n  of  w i l l i n g n e s s  " t o  examine 
any p r a c t i c a b l e  s u g g e s t i o n s  which (m ig h t )  be put  fo rw ard  by t h e  
German government  f o r  m e e t in g  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  which t h e y  
( w e r e ) p l a c e d " .
The r e j o i n d e r  of  t h e  German government  t o  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  
C om m iss ion 's  Note o f  13 A p r i l  was d e la y e d  f o r  some weeks by t h e  
Genoa C o n f e r e n c e .  D e s p i t e  t h e  n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  and d e s p i t e  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  of t h e  agenda ,*  Genoa o f f e r e d  
a v a l u a b l e  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  l e a d i n g  European  s t a t e s m e n  and American
1. L e t t e r  f rom t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission t o  t h e  German Government ,  
13 A p r i l  1922,  i b i d . ,  I l l ,  pp.  124-6 .
2 .  See a b o v e ,  p .  365*
f i n a n c i e r s  t o  hold  i n f o r m a l  d i s c u s s i o n s  on t h e  s u b j e c t  of  
r e p a r a t i o n .  The members of  t h e  r e c e n t l y  a p p o i n t e d  Loan Committee  
of  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission who were among t h e  d e l e g a t e s  even 
suc ce e de d  in  d raw ing  up a p l a n  f o r  a p r o v i s i o n a l  r e p a r a t i o n  
s e t t l e m e n t  and a German i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l o a n .  T h i s  p l a n  e nv isa ge d  
t h a t  Germany shou ld  make a n n u a l  cash payments of  720 m i l l i o n  
go ld  marks f o r  f o u r  y e a r s  and t h a t  s h e  s h o u l d ,  in  a d d i t i o n ,  
e f f e c t  d e l i v e r i e s  i n  k ind  u n d e r  c o n t r a c t  w i t h  i n d i v i d u a l  c r e d i t o r s .  
In r e t u r n  s h e  was t o  be a l low ed  t o  f l o a t  a f o r e i g n  lo a n  of  4
b i l l i o n  go ld  m ark s ,  p a r t  of which  w'as t o  be used t o  s t a b i l i s e  h e r
1.c u r r e n c y .
In view of  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  b o th  in  F r a n c e  and in  Germany 
t o  t h e  i d e a  of  a p r o v i s i o n a l  r e p a r a t i o n  s e t t l e m e n t ,  i t  i s  d o u b t f u l  
w h e t h e r  t h e  f i n a n c i e r s ’ d i s c u s s i o n s  a t  Genoa would have  led  t o  
any p r a c t i c a l  r e s u l t .  In any c a s e ,  t h e y  were b r o u g h t  s u d d e n ly  t o  
a h a l t  and t h e i r  b e n e f i c i a l  e f f e c t  was more t h a n  c a n c e l l e d  out  by 
t h e  s i g n a t u r e  of  t h e  R a p a l lo  T r e a t y  between  Germany and R u s s i a  on 
15 A p r i l ,  The most  i m p o r t a n t  s e c t i o n  of  t h i s  t r e a t y  was an 
agreement  u n d e r  w/hich Germany renounced  a l l  h e r  c l a i m s  t o  compen­
s a t i o n  f o r  h e r  p r e - w a r  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  R u s s i a  in  r e t u r n  f o r  an 
u n d e r t a k i n g  by t h e  R u s s i a n  government  t o  r e f r a i n  f rom e x e r c i s i n g  
i t s  r i g h t  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  116 of  t h e  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y  t o  e x t r a c t  
r e p a r a t i o n  from Germany.  The r e m a in i n g  c l a u s e s  r e - e s t a b l i s h e d  
f u l l  d i p l o m a t i c  and c o n s u l a r  r e l a t i o n s  between t h e  s i g n a t o r i e s
1 .  C. Bergmann, op.  c i t . ,  pp .  1 2 6 -8 .
3^9
and prov ided  fo r  a ‘'most- favoured  n a t i o n ” t r a d i n g  agreement and
1.
g e n e r a l  economic c o - o p e r a t i o n  between them. There i s  no 
r ea s o n  t o  d i s b e l i e v e  W irth*s  c la im  t h a t  t h i s  t r e a t y  owed i t s  
o r i g i n  simply t o  t h e  r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of economic con tac t
between Russ ia  and Germany which had been p roceed ing  s in c e  t h e
2 .
co n c lu s io n  of th e  Russo-German Trade T re a ty  of 6 May 1921•
I t  a l s o  seems c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  u n f o r t u n a t e  t i m in g  of t h e  t r e a t y  was 
caused by t h e  mis lead ing  behav iou r  of t h e  B r i t i s h  and Russ ian  
d e l e g a t e s  a t  Genoa which aroused  b a s e l e s s  German f e a r s  about 
t h e  p o s s i b l e  im plementa t ion of A r t i c l e  116;^  and which momentari ly 
al lowed M al tzan ,  who favoured  c l o s e r  German r e l a t i o n s  w i th  R u s s i a ,  
t o  a s s e r t  h i s  i n f l u e n c e  over t h a t  of Rathenau.  I t  would t h e r e f o r e  
be wrong t o  regard  t h e  R ap a l lo  T rea ty  as a s ign  of any d e l i b e r a t e  
change in German r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y .  I t  is  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  r i g h t -  
wing p a r t i e s ,  d e s p i t e  t h e i r  r e s e r v a t i o n s  about  d e a l i n g s  w i th  a
communist power, subsequen t ly  h a i l e d  R apa l lo  as t h e  beg inn ing  of
4.
" a c t i v e "  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  The Democrat Dernburg ,  moreover,  
expressed  t h e  hope t h a t  t h e  Russo-German mutual  r e n u n c i a t i o n  of 
f i n a n c i a l  claims  would be t h e  p re lude  t o  a g e n e r a l  c a n c e l l a t i o n  
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d e b t s .  However, a g a i n s t  t h i s  must be s e t  t h e
c l e a r  d e n i a l  of t h e  M a jo r i ty  S o c i a l i s t ,  M ö l le r ,  t h a t  Rapa l lo  in
6 ,
any way s i g n i f i e d  t h e  end of t h e  p o l i c y  of " f u l f i l m e n t " ,
1, L, Kochan, Russ ia  and t h e  Weimar R e p u b l i c , pp.  52-3»
2,  W ir th ,  29 May 1922, R e i c h s t a g . V ol ,  355» P* 7&75« Cf,  L# 
Kochan, op.  c i t . ,  pp.  41-2;  E .H .C a r r ,  German-Soviet  R e l a t i o n s  
between t h e  Two World Wars , Ch. 3»
3« W i r th ,  l o c .  c i t . ,  sup ra ;  M ö l le r ,  i b i d , ,  p.  7679» L» Kochan, 
op. c i t . ,  pp .51 -2 ;  E.H. C a r r ,  op. c i t . ,  pp.  62-4 .
4.  Hoetzsch (DNVP), 30 May 1922, Rei c h s t a g , V o l .  355,  p. 7710; 
Becker (D V P ) , ib id . ,  p .7723;  Böhm (Bay.VP),  i b i d . ,  p.  7734--
5 .  i b i d . ,  p.  7731»
6. 29 May 1922,  i b i d . ,  p.  7680•
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The m o t iv e s  of  t h e  German government  f o r  s i g n i n g  t h e  
R a p a l l o  T r e a t y  must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from t h e  impact  of  t h e  
t r e a t y  on w or ld  o p i n i o n .  Such an a c t  of  b i l a t e r a l  f i n a n c i a l  
r e n u n c i a t i o n  i n e v i t a b l y  p roduced  a v i o l e n t  r e a c t i o n  from t h e  
many c r e d i t o r s  of  t h e  two s i g n a t o r i e s .  Bergmann,  t h e  German 
r e p a r a t i o n  e x p e r t ,  was h i g h l y  c r i t i c a l  of  R a p a l l o  on t h e  grounds  
t h a t ,  by s p r e a d i n g  s u s p i c i o n  o f  Germany 's  f i n a n c i a l  good f a i t h ,  
i t  s t r e n g t h e n e d  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  Poincare'",  whose r e l e n t l e s s  )(
r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y  had u n t i l  t h e n  caused i n c r e a s i n g  French  
d i p l o m a t i c  i s o l a t i o n . ^ *  I t  was l a r g e l y  b e c a u s e  of  R a p a l lo  t h a t  
Poincare'" was a b l e ,  i n  a s p e e c h  a t  B a r - l e -D u c  on 24 A p r i l ,  t o
t h r e a t e n  F re n ch  r e t a l i a t i o n  i f  Germany d i d  no t  comply w i t h  t h e
2 .
R e p a r a t i o n  Com miss ion 's  n o t e  of  21 March.
The p o l i c y  of  f u l f i l m e n t  and f i n a n c i a l  r e f o r m  was in 
f a c t  g i v e n  a f i l l i p  f o r  s e v e r a l  weeks a f t e r  t h e  R a p a l l o  T r e a t y  
by t h e  c o n t i n u e d  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  of  t h e  Loan Commit tee .  S in c e  an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  loan  was out  of  t h e  q u e s t i o n  in  t h e  a b s e n c e  of  any 
ag reem en t  on t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n ,  a d e t e r m i n e d  e f f o r t  was 
now made t o  h e a l  t h e  b r e a c h  between t h e  German government  and 
t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission.  A f t e r  p r e l i m i n a r y  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  t h e  
German government  d e s p a t c h e d  a n o t e  t o  t h e  Commission on 9 May 
which  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  d e s i r e  of  b o t h  p a r t i e s  " t o  remove c e r t a i n  
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s  which  (had )  a r i s e n  from t h e  p r e v i o u s  exchange o f  
n o t e s  and t o  c l e a r  t h e  p r e s e n t  s i t u a t i o n  by way of  a f u l l  exchange
of v i e w s ” .-'* The n o t e  went  on t o  a s s u r e  t h e  Commission t h a t  t h e
1. C. Bergmann, op.  c i t , ,  pp.  128-9.
2• Die E n t w i c k lu n g  d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p . 27*
3.  L e t t e r  from t h e  German Government t o  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission, 
9 May 1922, R . C . , I I I ,  pp. 128-9.
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German government  r e s p e c t e d  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of  c o v e r i n g  a l l  i t s  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  by t a x a t i o n  and d o m e s t i c  b o r r o w in g .  However i t  
p o i n t e d  out  once a g a i n  t h a t ,  b e c a u s e  of h e r  economic s i t u a t i o n  
and f i n a n c i a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  a b r o a d ,  Germany would be  l a r g e l y  
dependen t  on f o r e i g n  l o a n s  i f  s h e  were  t o  make t h e  payments  
demanded of  h e r .  The n o t e  t h e n  promised t h a t  a c om p le te  scheme 
f o r  b a l a n c i n g  t h e  German budge t  would be t r a n s m i t t e d  b e f o r e  31 
May, a l t h o u g h  i t  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e  enactment  of  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  
l e g i s l a t i o n  b e f o r e  t h a t  d a t e  would be i m p o s s i b l e .  Next i t  r e c o r d e d  
t h e  German g o v e r n m e n t ' s  s a t i s f a c t i o n  t h a t  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission 
had r e c o g n i s e d  t h e  " s o v e r e i g n t y  of  Germany in  q u e s t i o n s  of  p u b l i c  
e x p e n d i t u r e ,  t a x a t i o n  and f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y " ;  and r e p e a t e d  i t s  
o f f e r  of  7 A p r i l  t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  and 
c o n s u l t a t i o n  r e q u e s t e d  by t h e  Commission.  The n o t e  conc luded  
w i t h  a g e n e r a l  u n d e r t a k i n g  t o  comply w i t h  t h e  demands of  t h e  
Commiss ion 's  n o t e s  of 21 March.  I t  c l a i m e d ,  however ,  t h a t  some 
of  t h e s e  demands were i m p o s s i b l e  and s t r e s s e d  t h e  need f o r  t h e  
f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  of  Germany 's  o b l i g a t i o n s  which t h e  Commission 
had promised  in  i t s  n o t e  of  13 A p r i l .
A few days l a t e r  t h e  German F in a n c e  M i n i s t e r ,  Hermes,  
j o u r n e y e d  t o  P a r i s  t o  n e g o t i a t e  a d e t a i l e d  agreement  on t h e  l i n e s
which had been  s u g g e s t e d .  A l though  t h i s  proved t o  be no ea sy
1.
t a s k  i n  t h e  a tm o s p h e re  of m u tu a l  d i s t r u s t  which p r e v a i l e d ,  a 
fo rm u la  was e v e n t u a l l y  a g r e e d  upon which  was t r a n s m i t t e d  in  a n o t e
t o  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission on 28 May. * T h i s  u n d e r t o o k  t o  b a l a n c e
1. C. Bergmann,  op.  c i t . ,  pp .  1 3 0 - 1 .
2.  Reply f rom  t h e  German Government  t o  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commiss ion ,  
28 May 1922,  R . C , . I l l ,  pp .  129-38 .
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t h e  budge t  by i n c r e a s i n g  r e v e n u e s ,  by a b o l i s h i n g  s u b s i d i e s  and 
by r e d u c i n g  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  i t  
g u a r a n t e e d  t h a t ,  i f  a f o r e i g n  loan  were  o b t a i n e d ,  t h e  f l o a t i n g  
de b t  would no t  be a l low e d  t o  r i s e  f o r  more t h a n  a l i m i t e d  p e r i o d  
above i t s  l e v e l  of 31 March 1922.  I t  f u r t h e r  ag re e d  t o  t h e  
s u p e r v i s i o n  demanded by t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission on t h e  u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g  t h a t  t h i s  would " in  no way a f f e c t  t h e  s o v e r e i g n t y  of 
t h e  German Government ,  . . . . d i s t u r b  t h e  work ing  of  t h e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  and . . .  v i o l a t e  t h e  s e c r e c y  of t h e  f o r t u n e  or  of  
t h e  p r i v a t e  a f f a i r s  of t a x p a y e r s " .  F i n a l l y ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  p l eaded  
t h a t  t h e r e  had so  f a r  been  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t i m e  t o  d e v i s e  m easu res  
a g a i n s t  t h e  f l i g h t  of  c a p i t a l ,  i t  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  t h e  R e i c h s bank 
had been  made in d e p e n d e n t  of t h e  German government  by a law of 
25 May 1922,  and t h a t  o r d e r s  had been g i v e n  f o r  t h e  p u b l i c a t i o n  of  
s t a t i s t i c s  in  t h e  pre-w'ar  m anner .  Appended t o  t h e  n o t e  was a 
d r a f t  budge t  f o r  1922 which  p r e d i c t e d  a s u r p l u s  on o r d i n a r y  
a c c o u n t  of  71 b i l l i o n  p a p e r  m a r k s , A g a i n s t  t h i s  was s e t  an 
e s t i m a t e d  t r e a t y  e x p e n d i t u r e  of  213 b i l l i o n  p a p e r  marks 
( c a l c u l a t e d  a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  70 p a p e r  marks t o  1 go ld  m a rk ) .  T h i s  
l e f t  a d e f i c i t  of  142 b i l l i o n  marks w h i c h ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  
a d d i t i o n a l  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  d o m e s t i c  e x p e n d i t u r e s  of 23 b i l l i o n  p a p e r  
mark3 , was t o  be cove re d  by b o r r o w i n g .  A s u p p le m e n ta r y  n o t e  of 
30 May t r a n s m i t t e d  d e t a i l s  of  t h e  p roposed  f o r c e d  l o a n ,  t h e  
p ro ce e d s  of  which (60 b i l l i o n  p a p e r  m arks )  had been  in c lu d e d  in
1. i b i d . ,  pp.  133-8
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t h e  e s t i m a t e s  of o r d i n a r y  r e v e n u e ,  *
A l though  t h e s e  c o n c i l i a t o r y  p r o p o s a l s  met w i t h  t h e
2 ,
immedia te  a p p r o v a l  of t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission,  t h e y  were  made 
in  t h e  t e e t h  of  growing o p p o s i t i o n  w i t h i n  Germany t o  t h e  p o l i c i e s  
of  f i n a n c i a l  r e f o r m  and f u l f i l m e n t .  On 24 May, a f t e r  Hermes had 
r e t u r n e d  t o  B e r l i n  f rom P a r i s ,  a government  c r i s i s  t h r e a t e n e d
3.
b e c a u s e  of  W i r t h ’ s c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  t o o  much had been  c o n c e d e d .
The main c a u s e  f o r  c onc e rn  was t h e  Commission’ s i n s i s t e n c e  on 
t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  of t h e  f l o a t i n g  d e b t .  A l though  t h i s  r e s t r i c t i o n  
was t o  be  c o n d i t i o n a l  upon Germany 's  a b i l i t y  t o  c o v e r  h e r  t r e a t y  
o b l i g a t i o n s  by means of f o r e i g n  b o r ro w in g ,  t h e  German government  
was h i g h l y  s u s p i c i o u s  of such an a r r a n g e m e n t ,  and demanded 
u n s u c c e s s f u l l y  t h a t  i n  t h e  e ve n t  o f  " f o r c e  m a j e u r e "  t h e  whole  
agreement  shou ld  become v o i d .  I t  e v e n t u a l l y  a g r e e d  t o  t h i s  
p r o v i s i o n  on ly  when t h e  Loan Commit tee d e c l a r e d  t h a t  i t  cou ld  not
c o n t i n u e  i t s  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  u n l e s s  an agreement  was r ea c he d
4.
be tween  t h e  government  and t h e  Commission,
I t  was not  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t h e  government  came u n d e r  heavy 
f i r e  in  t h e  R e i c h s t a g  on 29 and 30 May. A l though  t h e  o f f i c i a l  
t e x t  of  t h e  n o t e  of 28 May had not  been p u b l i s h e d ,  and a l t h o u g h  
government  spokesmen p leaded  t h a t  t h e  u n o f f i c i a l  t e x t s  which  
had a p p e a re d  in  t h e  p r e s s  s hou ld  no t  be d i s c u s s e d  w h i l e
n e g o t i a t i o n s  were s t i l l  in  p r o g r e s s  in  P a r i s ,  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t
1 . L e t t e r  f rom t h e  C h a n c e l l o r  of  t h e  Commonwealth t o  t h e  
R e p a r a t i o n  Commission,  30 May 1922,  i b i d . ,  I l l ,  pp.  139-40»
2 .  L e t t e r  f rom  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission t o  t h e  C h a n c e l l o r  of  
t h e  R e i c h ,  31 May 1922,  i b i d . ,  I l l ,  pp .  1 4 0 - 2 .
3» Die Entwicklung,  d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p .2 5 ;  H oe tz sc h  (DNVP),
30 May 1922,  R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  355> PP* 7705 -6 .
4 .  C. Bergmann, op.  c i t . ,  pp,  1 3 1 -2 .
5 * W i r t h ,  29 May 1922,  R e i c h s t a g , V o l .  355» P* 7673? M ö l le r ( S P D ) ,  
i b i d . ,  p .  7677«
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Hoetzsch tabled a motion of no confidence in the government on 
the grounds of its reparation policy. * Hoetzsch was violently 
critical of the government’s promise to balance its budget 
since, even if a foreign loan were obtained, the tax increases 
envisaged by the government would prove impossible. He also 
claimed that if there were no revision of Germany's reparation 
obligations the proceeds of any loan which Germany succeeded in 
floating would be immediately absorbed by Allied demands. He 
therefore insisted that any loan scheme should be based upon a 
definitive and reasonable settlement of Germany’s total 
reparation obligation, * The DVP spokesman, Becker, although 
reserving his opinion about the Nationalist vote of no confidence, 
echoed Hoetzsch's views about the impossibility of increased 
taxation and about the desirability of a final as opposed to a 
temporary reparation settlement. An important indication of 
the stiffening attitude of the DVP was Becker's declaration that * 
an Allied occupation of the Ruhr would be preferable to further 
concessions by the German government. Other signs of the same 
trend were his demand for a formal denial of German war guilt, 
for the lifting of the sanctions which had been imposed in March 
1921, for the reduction of the costs of the armies of occupation 
and for a revised settlement of the status of the Saar. * It was 
an even more ominous sign for the future of fulfilment and 
financial reform that the Democrats, apart from demanding a
77 Hoetzsch (DNVP), 3° May 1922, ibid., p. 7704.
2. ibid., pp. 7706-8.
3. ibid., pp. 7721-8.
375
f u n d a m e n t a l  r e - e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  Germany's  c a p a c i t y  t o  pay ,  a l s o
u rged  t h e  r e v i s i o n  of  t h e  "war g u i l t "  c l a u s e  upon which Germany 's
1.
r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n  was b a s e d .
( c ) From t h e  Repor t  of  t h e  Loan Commit tee t o  t h e  Occ u p a t i o n  of  
t h e  R u h r : F i n a n c i a l  C o l l a p s e .  June 1922 t o  J a n u a r y  1923 .
In v iew of  t h e  a t t i t u d e  of  t h e  b o u r g e o i s  p a r t i e s  a t  t h e  
end of  May, an u n f a v o u r a b l e  r e p o r t  of t h e  Loan Commit tee was 
l i k e l y  t o  be d i s a s t r o u s  f o r  t h e  cause  of f u l f i l m e n t  and f i n a n c i a l  
r e f o r m .  On 1 June  t h e  Commit tee had suspended  i t s  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  
pend in g  a d e c i s i o n  by t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission about  i t s  a b i l i t y  
t o  make recom mendat ions  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  s i z e  of Germany’s 
r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n .  On 7 J u n e  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission t r a n s ­
m i t t e d  a r e s o l u t i o n  which welcomed a l l  recom menda t ions  made by 
t h e  Committee  on any s u b j e c t  a f f e c t i n g  Germany’ s a b i l i t y  t o  r a i s e  
f o r e i g n  l o a n s .  T h i s  r e s o l u t i o n  h a d ,  however ,  been  adop ted  in  
s p i t e  of  t h e  n e g a t i v e  v o t e  of t h e  F rench  d e l e g a t e .  The r e l u c t a n c e  
of  Germany’ s p r i n c i p a l  c r e d i t o r  t o  a g r e e  t o  any d i s c u s s i o n  of  
Germany’ s o b l i g a t i o n s  was t h e  immedia te  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  C om m it tee ’ s 
d e c i s i o n  on 10 June  t h a t  i t  would be  u s e l e s s  t o  c o n t i n u e  i t s  
l a b o u r s .  In t h e  r e p o r t  which  i t  s u b m i t t e d  i t  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e  
o t h e r  e s s e n t i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  any f u t u r e  l o a n ,  a p a r t  f rom t h e  
r em ova l  of  u n c e r t a i n t y  a s  t o  Germany’ s o b l i g a t i o n s ,  were ( a )  t h a t  
Germany s hou ld  make a r e a l  e f f o r t  t o  s t a b i l i s e  h e r  f i n a n c e s ,
(b )  t h a t  t h e  l oan  should  be una n im o u s ly  r e q u e s t e d  by t h e  A l l i e s ,
2 .
and ( c )  t h a t  t h e r e  s hou ld  be a s e t t l e m e n t  of i n t e r - A l l i e d  d e b t s .
1 .  Dernburg  (DDP), i b i d . ,  p p .  7731-3« x
2 .  Rappor t  du Comite^de L’Emprunt a l a  Commission des  R e p a r a t i o n s ,  
Documents  R e l a t i f s  aux R e p a r a t i o n s ,  V o l .  I ,  pp .  24-3—50•
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The n e g a t i v e  r e p o r t  of  t h e  Loan Committee  had d r a m a t i c  
f i n a n c i a l  and d i p l o m a t i c  r e p e r c u s s i o n s .  From 10 June  onwards 
t h e r e  was l i t t l e  t o  d i s c o u r a g e  e i t h e r  t h e  h o l d e r s  of Germany’ s 
m a s s i v e  e x t e r n a l  f l o a t i n g  debt  or  German c i t i z e n s  from s p e c u l a t ­
in g  a g a i n s t  t h e  mark.  As a r e s u l t  t h e  d o l l a r  r a t e ,  which had
been h o v e r i n g  a t  abou t  280 s i n c e  A p r i l ,  s lumped t o  over  ^,00 by
1.
t h e  m id d le  o f  Ju n e  and t o  400 by t h e  b e g i n n i n g  of  J u l y .  T h i s  
deve lopm en t  s e rv e d  t o  deepen  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  d e a d lo c k  of  which i t  
was i t s e l f  t h e  p r o d u c t .  On t h e  one hand i t  d e c r e a s e d  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of  any s u c c e s s f u l  p o l i c y  of f i n a n c i a l  r e fo rm  and 
f u l f i l m e n t  w i t h i n  Germany: on t h e  o t h e r  hand i t  g ave  added p o i n t
t o  t h e  F re n ch  demand f o r  " p r o d u c t i v e  p l e d g e s " ,  which  would a c c o r d  
t h e  A l l i e s  a s h a r e  i n  Germany’ s p r o d u c t i v e  c a p a c i t y  a s  a s e c u r i t y  
b o t h  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  r e f o r m  and t h e  payment of r e p a r a t i o n s .
The h a r d e n i n g  a t t i t u d e  w i t h i n  Germany was r e f l e c t e d  in  a 
s to rm y  t h r e e - d a y  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  d e b a t e  in  t h e  R e i c h s t a g .  T h i s  
opened on 21 June  w i t h  a s e r i e s  of i n t e r p e l l a t i o n s  c o n c e r n in g  
b o t h  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  and o t h e r  b u r n i n g  i s s u e s  in  Germany’s 
e x t e r n a l  r e l a t i o n s .  The N a t i o n a l i s t ,  R e i c h e r t ,  began t h e  d e b a t e  
w i t h  an i n d i c t m e n t  of t h e  s e r i e s  o f  s u b s i d i a r y  a g re e m e n ts  which 
had r e c e n t l y  been conc lude d  f o r  e x p e d i t i n g  d e l i v e r i e s  in  k in d  
u n d e r  t h e  Wiesbaden  Agreement  by means of  d i r e c t  d e a l i n g s  
be tw een  A l l i e d  c l a i m a n t s  and German i n d u s t r y .  T h e s e  a g r e e m e n t s ,  
he a s s e r t e d ,  would add s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t o  Germany’ s r e p a r a t i o n  
1. Die En t w i c k l u n g  d e r  Repa ra t i o n s f r a g e , pp .  2 8 - 9 .
3 7 7 .
o b l i g a t i o n s ,  which were  a l r e a d y  r a p i d l y  d e s t r o y i n g  Germany* s
1.
n a t i o n a l  w e a l t h .  R e i c h e r t ' s  s peech  was f o l lo w e d  by a DVP 
p r o t e s t  a g a i n s t  an A ng lo -F re nc h  p r o p o s a l  f o r  t h e  n e u t r a l i s a t i o n  
of  t h e  R h in e la n d  which had been  made e a r l i e r  in  t h e  y e a r . *  The 
Indepe nde n t  S o c i a l i s t ,  L e v i ,  t h e n  i n t r o d u c e d  an i n t e r p e l l a t i o n  
w h ic h ,  a l t h o u g h  a p p r o v i n g  of t h e  p o l i c y  of  f u l f i l m e n t ,  emphas ised  
t h a t  t h i s  shou ld  no t  be  a c h i e v e d  a t  t h e  expense  of t h e  German
3 .
p r o l e t a r i a t .  F i n a l l y ,  p r o t e s t s  were r e g i s t e r e d  by C e n t r i s t
d e p u t i e s  a b o u t  A l l i e d  d e s t r u c t i o n  of  a l l e g e d l y  s t r a t e g i c  r a i l w a y s
4 c
i n  t h e  R h in e la n d  * and abou t  t h e  f u t u r e  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  S a a r .
The government  and i t s  s u p p o r t e r s  h e ld  t h e i r  own a g a i n s t  
t h i s  b a r r a g e  of  c o m p la in t  in  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  of t h e  d e b a t e .
Ra thenau  im m ed ia te ly  r e p l i e d  in  a calm and f a c t u a l  manner t o  t h e
6 •
d e t a i l e d  c h a r g e s  a g a i n s t  t h e  governm en t;  a n d ,  on t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
d a y ,  he  r e c e i v e d  s t r o n g  s u p p o r t  f rom t h e  M a j o r i t y  and Independen t
7.
S o c i a l i s t s .  However ,  t h e  only  p o s i t i v e  ach ie vem en t  which could
be  c la im ed  f o r  t h e  p o l i c y  of f u l f i l m e n t  was t h e  condemnation  o f
1 .  R e i c h e r t  (DNVP), 21 June  1922,  R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  355» P P . 7923-8«
The ag re e m e n ts  i n  q u e s t i o n  were  t h e  Bemelmans-Cuntze Agreement  
be tw een  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission and t h e  German government  
which  had been drawn up in  a p r e l i m i n a r y  fo rm  on 27 F e b r u a r y  
1922,  and f i n a l l y  s igne d  on 2 June  1922. For  t e x t :  R. C , ,
I I ,  pp .  1 4 - 3 1 .  T h i s  had been implemented by t h e  G i l l e t - R u p p e l  
Agreements  be tween  t h e  F r e n c h  and t h e  German governments  of 
l 5  March and June  6 - 9 :  i b i d . ,  pp .  32-3» 34-5« For  a
d e s c r i p t i o n  of  t h e s e  a g r e e m e n t s :  J .  R uppe l ,  " D e l i v e r i e s  in  Kind 
u n d e r  t h e  Wiesbaden and Subsequen t  A g re e m e n ts " ,  MGCRE, 28 
Sep tem ber  1922,  pp .  4 7 7 -8 .
2 .  Moldenhauer  (DVP), 21 June  1922,  R e i c h s t a g ,  V o l .  355» p p .7 9 2 8 - 3 1 .
3 .  i b i d . ,  pp.  7931-4.
4 .  L a u s c h e r  ( Z e n t r u m ) ,  i b i d . ,  pp .  7934- 7 .
5 .  B e l l  ( Z e n t r u m ) ,  i b i d . ,  pp .  7937-41 .
6 . i b i d . ,  pp .  7941-5*
7 .  S t a m p f e r  (SPD), 22 J u n e  1922,  i b i d . ,  pp .  7948-51 ;  B r e i t s c h e i d  
(USPD), i b i d . ,  pp .  7969-73 .
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French  r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y  which was i m p l i c i t  in t h e  n e g a t iv e  
r e p o r t  of t h e  Loan Committee.^* Against t h i s  was t o  be se t  t h e  
c l e a r  DVP s ta tem en t  t h a t  t ime  was no longer  working on th e  s id e  
of t h e  p o l i c y  of f u l f i l m e n t .  * Moreover, towards t h e  end of 
t h e  d e b a t e  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t ,  H e l f f e r i c h ,  d e l i v e r e d  a t i r a d e  which 
could perhaps be regarded  as t h e  dea th  s e n ten c e  of f u l f i l m e n t ,  
and which was at  any r a t e  p o p u la r ly  cons idered  a t  t h e  t ime t o  be 
t h e  d e a t h  sen ten c e  of t h e  " a p o s t l e "  of f u l f i l m e n t ,  Rathenau,  who 
was a s s a s s i n a t e d  on t h e  fo l l o w i n g  day.  H e l f f e r i c h * s  speech was 
a s u s t a in e d  ou tpour ing  of  scorn  and p a r t i s a n  abuse  upon a po l i cy  
which had,  he c la im ed ,  caused c a t a s t r o p h i c  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of  t h e  
mark, ru ined  t h e  middle c l a s s e s ,  d r iv e n  c o u n t l e s s  people t o  
d e s p a i r  and s u i c i d e ,  dep r ived  Germany of much of h e r  working
c a p i t a l ,  and shaken t h e  fo u n d a t io n s  of t h e  German economic and
3.s o c i a l  system. H e l f f e r i c h  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  vehement in
0 4 .
condemning t h e  German n o t e s  of 9 and 2o May which ,  he m a in ta in ed ,  
had committed Germany t o  a budge ta ry  programme and t o  i n f r i n g e ­
ments of he r  f i n a n c i a l  s o v e r e ig n t y  which had been s p e c i f i c a l l y
5.
r e j e c t e d  by t h e  R e i c h s t a g  a t  t h e  end of March. He caused a 
s e n s a t i o n  by c la im ing  t h a t  t h e  French t e x t  of t h e  German no te  of 
9 May co n fe r red  more e x t e n s i v e  powers on t h e  Committee of 
G uarantees  t h a n  did  t h e  German t e x t .  A German government which 
condoned such encroachment upon t h e  n a t i o n ' s  s o v e re ig n ty  without
1. B r e i t  sche id  (USFD), i b i d . ,  p.  7971; Gothein (DDP), i b i d . ,
P. 7953-
2.  Dauch (DVP), i b i d . ,  p .  7978.
3 . i b i d . ,  23 June 1922,  p .  7992.
4.  See above ,  pp.  370-3*
5 .  See above,  pp.  373-5*
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t h e  c o n s e n t  of  t h e  R e i c h s t a g  s h o u l d ,  he c o n c l u d e d ,  be impeached 
f o r  h i g h  t r e a s o n , ' * ’*
The a s s a s s i n a t i o n  o f  R a t h e n a u ,  wh ich  o c c u r r e d  on t h e  day 
a f t e r  t h e  campaign a g a i n s t  f u l f i l m e n t  had r ea c h e d  t h i s  e m o t io n a l  
and p a r t i s a n  p i t c h ,  caused  a pro found p o p u la r  r e a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  
t h e  r i g h t - w i n g  p a r t i e s .  T h i s  r e a c t i o n ,  which  gave  r i s e  t o  
t u m u l t u o u s  s c e n e s  i n  t h e  R e i c h s t a g ,  was e x p re s s e d  by W ir th  on 
25 J u n e  d u r i n g  a d e b a t e  on an "O rd inance  f o r  t h e  P r e s e r v a t i o n  of
t h e  R e p u b l i c "  which had been h a s t i l y  d e v i s e d  by t h e  government
2 .
on t h e  p r e v i o u s  d a y .  * In e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  g rowing  a n i m o s i t y  in  
German p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  which  had led  t o  R a t h e n a u ’ s d e a t h ,  W i r t h  
blamed f i r s t  of  a l l  t h e  A l l i e d  Powers ,  who " i n  t h e  c o u r s e  of  a 
y e a r  had g i v e n  only d i s c o u r a g e m e n t  t o  d e m o c r a t i c  Germany". Then 
he t u r n e d  a n g r i l y  upon t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  g roups  and denounced them  
f o r  " p o u r i n g  po i son  i n t o  t h e  n a t i o n ’ s wounds" .  The n a t i o n * s
3.
w o rs t  enemy, he conc luded  d r a m a t i c a l l y ,  " s tood  on t h e  R i g h t " .
The t e m p o r a r y  a b s o r p t i o n  of  t h e  R e i c h s t a g  in  t h e  d e b a t e  on 
t h e  " O r d in a n c e  f o r  t h e  P r e s e r v a t i o n  of  t h e  R e p u b l i c " ,  which became
law on l8  J u l y  w i th  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  a l l  p a r t i e s  f rom t h e  DVP t o
4 .
t h e  USPD, d id  no t  make t h e  Germany government  any more c a p a b l e  of  
f i n a n c i a l  r e f o r m  and f u l f i l m e n t .  On t h e  c o n t r a r y  t h e  t r a g e d y  of  
23 Ju n e  dimmed t h e  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  bo th  p o l i c i e s  by c a u s in g  t h e
5*mark t o  plummet v i o l e n t l y  t o  400 t o  t h e  d o l l a r  on 1 J u l y . *  T h i s  
f a l l  prompted t h e  German government  t o  a d d r e s s  a n o t e  t o  t h e
1. H e l f f e r i c h ,  23 Ju n e  1922,  R e i c h s t a g , V o l .  355? PP.7795-7.
2.  For  T e x t :  i b i d . ,  24 June  1922,  V o l .  355? PP* 8037-9«
3.  i b i d . ,  25 Ju n e  1922,  V o l .  35 6 , PP* 8056—8•
4 .  i b i d . ,  18 J u l y  1922,  V o l .  356 ,  p .  8739.
5* Die  E n t w i c k lu n g  d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p .  29»
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R e p a r a t i o n  Commission on 12 J u l y  which r e q u e s t e d  a m o ra to r iu m  
on cash r e p a r a t i o n  payments  u n t i l  t h e  end of 1924,  and which 
fo re shadow ed  a f u r t h e r  r e q u e s t  f o r  a r e d u c t i o n  of payments u n d e r  
t h e  c l e a r i n g  a g re e m e n t s  i n s t i t u t e d  by A r t i c l e  296 of t h e  
V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y . 1  2345* The r e a s o n s  advanced in  s u p p o r t  of t h e s e  
r e q u e s t s  were t h e  n e g a t i v e  r e p o r t  of t h e  Loan Commit tee  and t h e
d i s l o c a t i o n  which was b e i n g  induced  by t h e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e
2 »
mark ,  which had on 10 J u l y  been quoted a t  52o t o  t h e  d o l l a r .
In i t s  r e p l y  of  13 J u l y  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission e x p r e s s e d  t h e  
c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  r e p a r a t i o n  payments  were  no t  t h e  most  i m p o r t a n t  
c a u s e  of t h e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of German c u r r e n c y  and t h a t  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a b i l i t y  would u l t i m a t e l y  on ly  be a c h ie v e d  by d o m e s t i c  r e f o r m .  
Pend ing  t h e  r e p o r t  of  t h e  Commit tee of  G u a r a n t e e s ,  which  had 
j o u r n e y e d  t o  E e r l i n  in  t h e  second  h a l f  of  J u n e ,  i t  d i r e c t e d  t h e  
German government  t o  pay t h e  c a sh  i n s t a l m e n t  due on 15 J u l y . ^
The German government  compl ied  w i t h  t h i s  o r d e r  and a l s o  a g r e e d  on
21 J u l y  t o  t h e  r e q u e s t  of t h e  Commit tee of  G u a r a n te e s  f o r  more
4.
r i g i d  f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r o l s .  However , t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  d e a d lo c k  
between  t h e  A l l i e s  and Germany became s t e a d i l y  w o r s e .  On 26 
J u l y  t h e  F re nch  government  r e j e c t e d  t h e  German p l e a  of  17 J u l y
5 .f o r  a r e d u c t i o n  of c l e a r i n g  p a y m e n t s , ' *  T h i s  prompted a German 
d e c l a r a t i o n  of  i n a b i l i t y  t o  honour  e i t h e r  t h e  40 m i l l i o n  go ld
1. Documents R e l a t i f s  aux R e p a r a t i o n s , V o l .  I I ,  pp .  H 3 - 4 .  A 
r e q u e s t  f o r  a r e d u c t i o n  of  c l e a r i n g  payments  was f o r m a l l y  
made on 17 J u l y .  D i e E n tw ic k lu n g  d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p . 2 9 .
2.  Die  Entwicklung; d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p .  29»
3 .  Documents  R e l a t i f s  aux R e p a r a t i o n s , V o l .  I I ,  p .  115»
4 .  Die E n tw ic k lu n g  d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p .  29*
5 .  Documents  R e l a t i f s  aux R e p a r a t i o n s , V o l .  I I ,  pp .  1 5 5 - 8 .
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marks of c l e a r i n g  d e b t s  due t o  be d i s c h a r g e d  a t  t h e  end of  J u l y
or  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  i n s t a l m e n t  of  50 b i l l i o n  go ld  marks due on
1.
15 A u g u s t .  In r e p l y  t o  a F rench  t h r e a t  of s a n c t i o n s  on 2 
A u g u s t ,  t h e  German government  on 3 August ,when t h e  exchange  r a t e
of t h e  mark s to o d  a t  7&2 t o  t h e  d o l l a r ,  suspend ed i t s  p u r c h a s e s
2 .
of  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c i e s  f o r  r e p a r a t i o n  p u r p o s e s .  T h i s  i n t r a n s i g ­
ence  gave  r i s e  t o  a s e r i e s  o f  F re n ch  f i n a n c i a l  r e p r i s a l s  in  t h e
3.
days  t h a t  f o l l o w e d .
The gap  be tween  A l l i e d ,  or  r a t h e r  F r e n c h ,  views  and t h o s e
of  t h e  German government  was not b r id g e d  by t h e  m ee t ing  of t h e
A l l i e d  Supreme C o u n c i l  which  t o o k  p l a c e  in  London from 7 t o  14
4
August  a t  t h e  i n s t i g a t i o n  of Lloyd George .  * At t h e  opening 
s e s s i o n  of  t h i s  c o n f e r e n c e  P o i n c a r e  p laced  much emphasi s  upon
I Y !
F r a n c e ' s  f i n a n c i a l  d i s t r e s s ,  w h ic h ,  he c o m p la in e d ,  now t h r e a t e n e d
 ^ t o  become even more a c u t e  as  a r e s u l t  of  commencement of  Franc  0 -
, \ j C
American n e g o t i a t i o n s  on t h e  s u b j e c t  of i n t e r e s t  payments on
5 #
F rench  war d e b t s  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s . ' ' *
The B a l f o u r  Note o f  1 August  in  which t h e  B r i t i s h  government  
o f f e r e d  t o  r e n o u n c e  i t s  f i n a n c i a l  c l a im s  on t h e  A l l i e s  and on
Germany in  r e t u r n  f o r  a s i m i l a r  r e n u n c i a t i o n  by t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s ,  
i  had a l s o  i n c r e a s e d  P o i n c a r e ' s  u n e a s i n e s s  about  F r a n c e ' s  f i n a n c i a l
1. Di e  Entwi ck lung  d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p .  30.
2 .  i b i d .
3 .  i b i d .
4 .  C. Bergmann,  op.  c i t . ,  p .  141 .  For  t h e  p r o c e e d i n g s  of  t h e
London C o n f e re n c e :  Documents  R e l a t i f s  aux R e p a r a t i o n s . V o l . I I ,
pp .  9 - 1 0 1 .
5 .  On 1 J u l y  t h e  F re n ch  gove rnment  h a d ,  a t  t h e  r e q u e s t  of t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  d e s p a t c h e d  P a r m e n t i e r  t o  America 
t o  n e g o t i a t e  on t h i s  s u b j e c t .  Die  E n tw ic k lu n g  d e r  R-eparat i o n s ­
f r a g e . p .  29.
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f u t u r e .  T h i s  was b e c a u s e  t h e  B r i t i s h  o f f e r  im p l ie d  t h a t ,  i f  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  c la im ed  h e r  d e b t s  f rom B r i t a i n  i n  f u l l ,  F ra n ce  
would i n  t u r n  be  c o n f r o n t e d  w i t h  a r i g i d  c l a i m  from B r i t a i n . “"’
I t  was f o r  t h e s e  r e a s o n s ,  Fo incare*  s t r e s s e d , and n o t  f o r  m i l i t a r y  
m o t i v e s  or  out  of a d e s i r e  t o  d e s t r o y  Germany, t h a t  F rance
i n s i s t e d  on g r e a t e r  German e f f o r t s  t o  pay r e p a r a t i o n  and t o  a c h i e v e
2 .
f i n a n c i a l  r e f o r m .  The only means of e n s u r i n g  t h a t  t h i s  e f f o r t  
would be made was ,  he i n s i s t e d ,  t o  t a k e  p o s s e s s i o n  of  a s e r i e s
X
of  ’’p r o d u c t i v e  p l e d g e s "  in  t h e  Rh ine land  and t h e  Ruhr d i s t r i c t .  
These  p l e d g e s  should  t a k e  t h e  form of ( l )  t h e  c o n t r o l  a l r e a d y  
e x e r c i s e d  by t h e  R h in e la n d  High Commission over  t h e  g r a n t i n g  of  
e x p o r t  l i c e n c e s ;  (2)  a customs b a r r i e r  between  t h e  occupied  
t e r r i t o r i e s  and t h e  r e s t  of  Germany; ( 3 ) A l l i e d  e x p l o i t a t i o n  
of  German s t a t e  mines  and f o r e s t s ;  (4 )  A l l i e d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
in  60 p e r  c e n t ,  of t h e  s h a r e  c a p i t a l  of  German c h e m ic a l  i n d u s t r i e s  
on t h e  l e f t  bank of t h e  R h ine ;  (5)  l e v i e s  in  t h e  occupied  
t e r r i t o r i e s ;  and (6)  t h e  German cus tom s .  U n l e s s  t h e s e  p l ed g e s  
were t a k e n ,  P o i n c a r e ^ d e c l a r e d ,  i t  would be i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  F ra n c e
"5 #
t o  c o n s i d e r  any m o r a t o r i u m . *
P o i n c a r e ' s  p r o o o s a l s  w ere  s e v e r e l y  c r i t i c i s e d  by a /
4. *
Committee  of  A l l i e d  e x p e r t s  wh ich  c o n s id e r e d  them  a t  London; 
and t h e y  were  c o m p l e t e l y  u n a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  German gove rnm en t .
On 12 August  t h e  B r i t i s h  d e l e g a t e s  t o  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  s ubm i t te d
1 .  Documents  R e l a t i f s  aux R e p a r a t i o n s . V o l .  I I ,  p .  12.
2 .  i b i d . ,  p ,  13 .
3 .  i b i d . ,  pp,  15- 1 6 .
4 .  Rappor t  du Comite d e s  E x p e r t s ,  i b i d . ,  pp.  4 6 - 5 0 .
5 .  C. Bergmann, op.  c i t . ,  p .  142 .
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a compromise scheme which p r o v i d e d  f o r  a c om p le te  m ora to r iu m  
on ca sh  payments u n t i l  t h e  end of  1922.  The on ly  c o n d i t i o n  
on which  t h i s  i n s i s t e d ,  a p a r t  f rom co m p l ia n c e  w i t h  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
demands of  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission and t h e  Committee  of  
G u a r a n t e e s ,  was t h a t  t h e r e  sho u ld  he  A l l i e d  s u p e r v i s i o n  of 
German s t a t e  mines and f o r e s t s  in  t h e  even t  of a d e f a u l t  in  c o a l  
and t i m b e r  d e l i v e r i e s . ^ *  T h i s  p l a n  was ,  however ,  u n a c c e p t a b l e  t o  
P o i n c a r e ,  and t h e  c o n f e r e n c e  b ro k e  up on 14 August w i t h o u t  any 
a g r e e m e n t .  A l though  Bradbury  and M a u c l e r e ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  and F r e n c h  
d e l e g a t e s  t o  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission,  v i s i t e d  B e r l i n  be tw een  
20 and 25 August in  an e f f o r t  t o  d e v i s e  a scheme o f  p r o d u c t i v e  
p l e d g e s  which was a c c e p t a b l e  t o  b o t h  t h e  F r e n c h  and t h e  German 
g o v e r n m e n t s ,  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  met w i t h  no s u c c e s s .  The l a t t e r  
r e j e c t e d  t h e  p r o p o s a l  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  mines and f o r e s t s  s hou ld  be 
used e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  or i n d i r e c t l y  as  p l e d g e s  f o r  c o a l  and t i m b e r  
d e l i v e r i e s ;  and would o f f e r  no g r e a t e r  g u a r a n t e e  of  d e l i v e r i e s
t h a n  a d e p o s i t  of  50 m i l l i o n  go ld  marks and d i r e c t  c o n t r a c t s
2 .
be tw een  t h e  A l l i e s  and German p r o d u c e r s .  The on ly  a p p a r e n t  
r e s u l t  of  t h e s e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  was t h a t ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  s u s p e n s i o n  of  
p u r c h a s e s  of  f o r e i g n  exchange  f o r  r e p a r a t i o n  p u r p o s e s ,  t h e  d o l l a r  
r a t e ,  which  had r i s e n  t o  1170 on 21 A u g us t ,  s o a r e d  v i o l e n t l y  t o  
l850  f o u r  days  l a t e r . 1 23 * On 31 August a d e c i s i o n  on t h e  p r e s s i n g  
q u e s t i o n  o f  Germany's  im m ed ia te  c a sh  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s  was
1.  Memorandum A n g l a i s ,  Documents R e l a t i f s  aux R e p a r a t i o n s ,
V o l .  I I ,  pp .  69 -72 .
2 .  C. Bergmann,  op. c i t . ,  p .  143:  Lord D 'A bernon ,  op.  c i t . ,
V o l .  I I ,  pp .  8 4 - 5 ,  89 , 9 5 - 6 .
3 . D ie  E n t w i c k lu n g  d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p .  31»
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d e f e r r e d  by t h e  agreement  of Be lg ium, t o  whom t h e  rem a in ing  
ca sh  payments  f o r  1922 were d u e ,  t o  a c c e p t  s i x  months T r e a s u r y  
B i l l s  i n s t e a d  of  cash,"*" On 2 September  an agreement  a f f e c t i n g  
d e l i v e r i e s  of  b u i l d i n g  m a t e r i a l  t o  F rench  d e v a s t a t e d  a r e a s  was
conc lude d  between t h e  German and French  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ,  S t i n n e s
2 .
and L u b e r s a c .  ’ However , t h e  f u n d a m e n ta l  r e p a r a t i o n  d ead lock  
r em a ined  u n r e s o l v e d .
The d i s p u t e  be tw een  t h e  German government  and t h e  R e p a r a t i o n
Commission soon ha rdened  German o p i n io n  on t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n .
On 16 A u g u s t ,  a f t e r  t h e  b r e a k - u p  of  t h e  London C o n f e re n c e ,  W i r t h ,
a la rmed  a t  t h e  c a t a s t r o p h i c  f a l l  of  t h e  mark and concerned abou t
t h e  i n c r e a s e d  food im por t s  wh ich  would be made n e c e s s a r y  by t h e
poor  h a r v e s t  of 1922,  had announced t h a t  t h e  German p e o p l e ’ s food
•3
s u p p ly  would h e n c e f o r t h  have  p r i o r i t y  over  r e p a r a t i o n  p a y m e n t s . J * 
The c o n v i c t i o n  s p read  in  Germany, as  i t  d id  in  E n g l a n d ,  t h a t  
F r a n c e  was u s i n g  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  i n  o r d e r  t o  a c h i e v e  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  s u b j u g a t i o n  of  Germany. Th is  b e l i e f  was e l o q u e n t l y  
e x p r e s s e d  in  September  in  an a r t i c l e  w r i t t e n  f o r  J .M .  Keynes in  
t h e  Ma n c h e s t e r  G uard ian  by t h e  Democrat  e x - F i n a n c e  M i n i s t e r  
S c h i f f e r :
"The West i s  k e p t  occup ie d  by t r o o p s ;  t h e  s e c e s s i o n  
of  t h e  R h i n e l a n d ,  w i t h  t h e  c o n s eq u e n t  d e s t r u c t i o n  of  t h e  
u n i t y  of  t h e  R e i c h ,  i s  a d v o c a t e d ;  t h e  new mid-European  
S t a t e s ,  which a r e  t o  form an i r o n  r i n g  around Germany,
1.  Documents R ^ l a t i f s  aux R e p a r a t i o n s . V o l .  I I ,  pp .  116-7»
2 .  Die  E n tw ic k lu n g  de r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e . p .  31«
3 .  i b i d .  W i r t h ' s  words " E r s t  B r o t t  f ü r  das  d e u t s c h e  V o lk ,  dann 
R e p a r a t i o n e n "  l a t e r  became a s l o g a n .  Lord D 'A bernon ,  o p . c i t . ,  
V o l .  I I ,  p .  89.
4 .  E .  S c h i f f e r ,  "Germany's  A t t i t u d e  Towards t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  
P r o b le m " ,  MGCRE, 28 Sep tem ber  1922,  p .  473*
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a r e  suppor ted ;  t h e  un ion  of A u s t r i a  and Germany 
is  f o rb id d en ;  German p r i d e  i s  h u r t  and outraged by 
b r u t a l i t i e s  and m o r t i f i c a t i o n s ;  and,  l a s t l y ,  t h e  
r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  c o n t in u e s  t o  be used f o r  co n s tan t  
t h r e a t s  and claims  and f o r  t h e  l a s t i n g  s u p p re s s io n  of 
G e rm any . . . .  This  i s  t h e  p i c t u r e  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n  which 
i s  formed in  Germany. I t  i s  both d i s h e a r t e n i n g  and 
e x a s p e r a t i n g .  What i s  t h e  use  of a l l  t h e  s t renuous  
and hones t  endeavours t o  f u l f i l  t h e  t r e a t y ,  i f  a f t e r  
a l l  t h e  o the r  s i d e  i s  r e a l l y  in no way concerned w i th  
f u l f i l m e n t " .
The p r e v a l e n c e  of such d i s t r u s t  was t o  make t h e  p rospec t  f o r  any 
r e p a r a t i o n  s e t t l e m e n t  or  f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  h igh ly  
u n fa v o u r a b l e .
The autumn of 1922 brought some improvement in t h e  r e l a t i o n s  
between t h e  R epara t ion  Commission and t h e  German government.  E a r l y  
in October ,  when t h e  mark had slumped t o  2000 t o  t h e  d o l l a r ^ ' a  
f a r - r e a c h i n g  p roposa l  f o r  a moratorium of between two and f o u r  
y e a r s  and f o r  the  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  of  German cu r rency  and c r e d i t  
was made by Bradbury,  t h e  B r i t i s h  d e l e g a t e  t o  t h e  R epara t ion  
Commission. * This was opposed by t h e  French d e l e g a t i o n  on t h e
3.grounds  t h a t  i t  made no p r o v i s i o n  f o r  any c o n t r o l s  or g u a r a n t e e s .  
However, on 24 O c tober ,  when t h e  mark stood a t  4000 t o  t h e  d o l l a r ,  
t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission dec ided  t o  jo u rn ey  t o  B e r l in  t o  c o n s u l t  
t h e  German government about  means of  ach iev in g  monetary s t a b i l i s -  
a t  ion and budge ta ry  b a l a n c e .  * On 4 November, d u r in g  t h e  
Commission’ s v i s i t ,  t h e  government submit ted  t  o i t  a n o te  which 
a t t r i b u t e d  t h e  c u r r e n t  d e p r e c i a t i o n  t o  t h e  ev a p o ra t io n  of  domes t ic  
and f o r e i g n  con f idence  in  Germany's f i n a n c i a l  f u t u r e ,  and which
1. Die Entwicklung d e r  R e p a ra t io n s  f r a g e , p.  32*
2. Documents R e l a t i f s  aux R e p a r a t i o n s , V o l .  I I ,  pp.  120-9»
3.  Cf. Mömoire de l a  D e le g a t io n  F r a n c a i s e . . . ,  i b i d . ,  pp,  145-9»
4. D ec is ion  de l a  Commission des R e p a r a t i o n s . . . ,  i b i d , ,  p.  129*
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proposed  t h e  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  of  t h e  mark by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
„ 1.
s y n d i c a t e  w i t h  a c a p i t a l  of  500 m i l l i o n  go ld  m ark s .  In r e p l y
2 .
t o  t h e  Commiss ion’ s r e q u e s t  f o r  more d e t a i l s , *  t h e  government  on 
8 November t r a n s m i t t e d  t h e  r e p o r t s  of  a p a n e l  of  f o r e i g n  
f i n a n c i a l  e x p e r t s  wh ich  i t  had r e c e n t l y  i n v i t e d  t o  B e r l i n  t o  
g i v e  a d v i c e  on q u e s t i o n s  of  c u r r e n c y  and c r e d i t .  Two of  t h e s e  
r e p o r t s ,  which  were drawn up by t h e  B r i t i s h ,  Dutch  and F re n ch  
b a n k e r s ,  B ra nd ,  V i s s e r i n g  and D u b o i s ,  d i s c u s s e d  t h e  German 
p r o p o s a l  f o r  t h e  s h o r t - t e r m  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  of  t h e  mark by an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s y n d i c a t e , ^ ’ A t h i r d ,  s ig n e d  by Brand ,  Gus tav 
C a s s e l ,  t h e  Swedish e c o n o m i s t ,  J e r e m ia h  J e n k s ,  t h e  American 
f i n a n c i e r ,  and J .M .  K eynes ,  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  i f  permanent  
s t a b i l i s a t i o n  were t o  be a c h i e v e d ,  s t r i n g e n t  d o m es t ic  r e f o r m s
4 #
would be n e c e s s a r y  a s  w e l l  a s  f o r e i g n  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e .
A l l  t h r e e  r e p o r t s  emphas ised  t h a t  a r e p a r a t i o n  m ora to r ium  of  
s e v e r a l  y e a r s  would be a n e c e s s a r y  p r e r e q u i s i t e  f o r  b o t h  
s t a b i l i s a t i o n  and b u d g e t a r y  b a l a n c e .  On 14 November t h e  German
gove rnment  f o l l o w e d  i t s  communica t ion  of  8 November w i t h  a p l a n
5 .
f o r  f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  which was based  b o t h  on t h e  
r e p o r t s  "which had a l r e a d y  been  t r a n s m i t t e d  and a l s o  on a f u r t h e r  
m i n o r i t y  r e p o r t ,  wh ich  had been sub m i t t e d  t o  i t  on 9 November
1. P r o p o s i t i o n s  du Gouvernement  A l l e m a n d . . . ,  p p .  149-52 .
2.  Die E n t w i c k lung  d e r  R e p a r a t i ons f r a g e , p .  33*
3 .  Rappor t  des  E x p e r t s  I n t e r n a t i o n a u x . . . ,  7 November 1922,  
Documents R e l a t i f s  aux R e p a r a t i o n s , V o l .  I I ,  pp.  129-31*
4 .  Seconds R a p p o r t s  d e s  E x p e r t s  In t  e r n a t  i o n a u x . , . ,  i b i d . ,  pp .
1 3 1 -5 .
5 .  L e t t r e  du Gouvernement  A l l e m a n d . . . ,  14 November 1922,  i b i d . ,  
p p . 1 4 2 -4 .  Cf .  "Die den A l l i e r t e n  s e i t  dem W a f f e n s t i l l s t a n d  
lübermit t  i l t  en d e u t s c h e n  Angebo te  und V o r s c h l ä g e  zur  Lösung 
d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s - und W i e d e r a u f b a u f r a g e " ,  R e i c h s t a g , V o l .  379 
A n l .  6138, pp .  88- 98.
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by V i s s e r i n g ,  D ubo is  and Kamenka, and w h ic h  d i f f e r e d  o n ly  i n  
emphasis f r o m  t h e  B ra n d -C a s s e l-J e n k s -K e y n e s  memorandum o f  7 
N o vem be r . ’1 2* The g o v e rn m e n t 's  p r o p o s a l ,  w h i l e  s t r e s s in g  t h a t  
permanent f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  would be p o s s ib le  o n ly  a f t e r  
Germ any 's  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s  had been f i x e d  w i t h i n  h e r  
c a p a c i t y ,  d e c la re d  t h a t  t h e  u rg e n c y  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s i t u a t i o n
w a r ra n te d  s te p s  to w a rd s  p r o v i s i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  r e f o r m .  On t h e
2 .
c o n d i t i o n  o f  a r e p a r a t i o n  m o ra to r iu m  o f  t h r e e  or f o u r  y e a r s ,  
t h i s  r e fo r m  was t o  be a c h ie v e d  by means o f  a s t a b i l i s a t i o n  fu n d  
o f  1 b i l l i o n  g o ld  m a rks ,  o f  w h ic h  h a l f  was t o  be p ro v id e d  by 
t h e  R e ich sb a n k  and h a l f  s u b s c r ib e d  by f o r e i g n  b a n k e r s .  T h is  
fund  was t o  be used by an in d e p e n d e n t  o f f i c e  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  
m a rk .  Once i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  c o n f id e n c e  i n  German c u r re n c y  
had been r e s t o r e d ,  t h e  German governm ent would proceed t o  f l o a t  
a d o m e s t ic  and f o r e i g n  g o ld  lo a n ,  w h ic h  w ou ld  e n a b le  th e  budge t 
t o  be b a la n c e d .  For t h e  r e s t ,  t h e  governm en t u n d e r to o k  t o  
re d u c e  p u b l i c  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  t o  s t i m u l a t e  economic a c t i v i t y ,  and , 
i f  i t  were g iv e n  e q u a l  t r a d i n g  r i g h t s ,  t o  r e s t o r e  t h e  b a la n c e  
o f  G erm any 's  e x t e r n a l  paym en ts .
D e s p i te  i t s  t h e o r e t i c a l  soundn ess , th e  German o f f e r  o f  I  
November d id  l i t t l e  t o  b re a k  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  d e a d lo c k  o r  t o  b r i n g  
abou t t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  Germany. I t s  t r a n s m is s io n  
was i n  f a c t  n e v e r  even f o r m a l l y  acknow ledged by t h e  A l l i e s .
The a t t i t u d e  o f  Germ any 's  c r e d i t o r s  t o  t h e  scheme was, h o w e ve r ,
1. i b i d . ,  pp . 9 3 -8 .
2 . D e l i v e r i e s  in  k in d  w e re  t o  be c o n t in u e d  t o  t h e  d e v a s ta te d  
a r e a s ,  b u t  o n ly  i n  so f a r  as t h e i r  c o s t  c o u ld  be met w i t h o u t  
in c r e a s in g  t h e  f l o a t i n g  d e b t .
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made c l e a r  on 10 December when a c o n f e r e n c e  of  A l l i e d  Prime 
M i n i s t e r s ,  which met i n  London between 9 and 11 December t o  
d i s c u s s  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  p ro b le m ,  passed judgment  on a l e t t e r  
which  i t  r e c e i v e d  from W i r t h ’ s s u c c e s s o r ,  Cuno. Th i s  l e t t e r  
r e p e a t e d  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  Germany should  meet h e r  c u r r e n t  
r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s  and s t a b i l i s e  h e r  c u r r e n c y  by means of  
go ld  l o a n s  i s s u e d  b o t h  w i t h i n  Germany and a b r o a d .  Then ,  g o in g  
f u r t h e r  t h a n  t h e  n o t e  of  14 November,  i t  p roposed t h a t ,  i f  
f o r e i g n  c r e d i t s  cou ld  no t  be o b t a i n e d  i m m e d i a t e l y ,  Germany 
shou ld  p roceed  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  t o  s t a b i l i s e  h e r  c u r r e n c y .  F i n a l l y ,  
i t  i n s i s t e d  on a t w o - y e a r  m o ra to r iu m  on a l l  c a sh  payments  and 
on a l l  d e l i v e r i e s  in  k ind  which  could no t  be cove red  by t h e  
b u d g e t . 1  2* At t h e  i n s t i g a t i o n  of  P o i n c a r e ^ t h i s  p r o p o s a l  was 
summari ly  r e j e c t e d  by t h e  London C o n f e re n c e .  The F rench  P re m ie r  
i n s i s t e d  t h a t  no m o ra to r iu m  could  be  g r a n t e d  t o  Germany u n l e s s
E ssen  and Bochum, t h e  n e r v e  c e n t r e s  of  t h e  Ruhr d i s t r i c t ,  were
2 .
occup ie d  a s  a g u a r a n t e e  o f  German good f a i t h .  S i n c e  t h e  
c o n f e r e n c e  would n o t  s a n c t i o n  t h e  F rench  scheme and s i n c e  
P o i n c a r e ^ re m a i n e d  i n f l e x i b l e ,  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r s  d i s p e r s e d  
on 11 December w i t h o u t  h a v in g  d e c ide d  on any c o u r s e  of a c t i o n  , 
e x c e p t  t h a t  of  r e a s s e m b l i n g  on 2 J a n u a r y  1923*
In t h e  r e m a in i n g  weeks of  1922 t h e  F re nch  government  
c onc e rne d  i t s e l f  w i t h  p r o v i d i n g  a l e g a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  i t s  
p l a n  of  occupying  t h e  Ruhr d i s t r i c t .  A c o n v e n ie n t  casus b e l l i  
was p r o v id e d  by t h e  l a g  which  had occ u r r e d  in  German t i m b e r
1. "Die den A l l i e r t  e n . . .d eut  s e hen  A n g e b o t e . . . " ,  l o c  . c i t . , p p . 104 -6 .
2.  C. Bergmann, op. c i t . ,  p p . 158-9.  A .J .T o y n b e e ,  op. c i t . ,  
pp.  188-9»
d e l i v e r i e s  as a r e s u l t  of t h e  confus ion  in t h e  German t im ber  
t r a d e  caused by th e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  mark.  On 1 December 
German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  had been given an o p p o r tu n i ty  t o  e x p la in  
t h i s  lag  t o  t h e  R epara t ion  Commission,’*’* On 26 December, a f t e r  
p r o t r a c t e d  d e b a t e ,  t h e  Commission dec ided ,  a g a i n s t  t h e  v o t e  of 
t h e  B r i t i s h  d e l e g a t e ,  Bradbury ,  t h a t  t h e  lag  c o n s t i t u t e d  "a 
d e f a u l t  by Germany in h e r  o b l i g a t i o n s  w i th i n  t h e  meaning of
Paragraph 17 of Annex I I "  of t h e  R epa ra t ion  Chapter  of t h e
2.
T r e a t y .  I t  subsequen t ly  dec ided  t h a t  t h e  word " d e f a u l t "  in
Paragraph  17 had the  same meaning as t h e  e x p re s s io n  " v o lu n ta ry
3*d e f a u l t "  in  Paragraph 18 of t h e  same Annex. * This  implied t h a t  
t h e  A l l i e d  and A ssoc ia ted  Powers were e n t i t l e d  t o  t a k e  measures 
a g a i n s t  Germany which inc luded  "economic and f i n a n c i a l  p r o h i b i t i o n s  
and in g e n e r a l  such o th e r  measures as th e  r e s p e c t i v e  Governments 
(might)  de te rm ine  t o  be n e c e s s a ry  in th e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s " .
The German government had meanwhile tu rned  t o  t h e  r a t h e r  
d e s p e r a t e  exped ien t  of  fo rm u la t in g  "a comprehensive  o f f e r  f o r  
a comple te s o l u t i o n  of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  problem".  The p o in t  of 
such an o f f e r  was d o u b t f u l  in  view of the  s t a t e  of  A l l i e d  
o p in i o n .  Bergmann, t h e  German r e p a r a t i o n  e x p e r t ,  r e l a t e s  
t h a t ,  a l though  t h e  new p r o p o s a l  was formula ted  b e f o r e  the  end of 
1922, i t  was not  pub l i shed  because  " i t  would have been promptly 
cried down by t h e  P a r i s  p r e s s ,  and was s u re  t o  meet w i th  f l a t
1. Minutes of t h e  Meeting of  t h e  R epara t ion  Commission held on 
December 1 s t ,  1922,  R. C . , V, pp. 240-7. Cf.  C. Bergmann, 
op. c i t . ,  pp. I 6I - 2 .
2.  E x t r a c t  from t h e  Minutes of th e  Meeting of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  
Commission held  on December 26 th ,  1922, R.C. , V, p p . 248-64,  
a t  p.  260 .
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3 . i b i d . ,  pp.  263-4.
4.  See Appendix I .
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r e j e c t i o n  by P o i n c a r e ” . 1  *3 I t  was f o r  t h i s  r e a s o n  t h a t  t h e  
German government  m ere ly  informed t h e  A l l i e s  on 30 December
t h a t  t h e  o f f e r  had been p r e p a r e d ,  and r e q u e s t e d  an o p p o r t u n i t y
2 .
t o  p r e s e n t  i t  o r a l l y .
The a c t i v i t i e s  of  t h e  German government  had no e f f e c t  on 
t h e  c o u r s e  of  e v e n t s  when t h e  A l l i e d  Prime M i n i s t e r s  met a g a in
a t  P a r i s  be tw een  2 and 4 J a n u a r y  1923 a t  t h e  27”t h  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
3.
c o n f e r e n c e  on t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  problem s i n c e  t h e  w a r .  The c o n f e r ­
ence  opened w i t h  P o i n c a r e ' s  p r e s e n t a t i o n  of  F r e n c h  p r o p o s a l s  
which r e j e c t e d  any l i m i t a t i o n  of  Germany’ s r e p a r a t i o n  payments 
t o  w i t h i n  h e r  b u d g e ta r y  c a p a c i t y ;  and wh ich  env i s a g e d  a r e d u c t i o n  
of  Germany 's  t o t a l  o b l i g a t i o n  on ly  on t h e  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  F r a n c e  
would b e  a c c o r d e d  a g r e a t e r  s h a r e  o f  what r e m a i n e d .  As on 
p r e v i o u s  o c c a s i o n s ,  Po incare^w ou ld  e n t e r t a i n  t h e  idea  of a 
m o ra to r iu m  on ly  on t h e  c o n d i t i o n  of t h e  s e i z u r e  of  a number of 
p l e d g e s  which  were t o  e n s u r e  d e l i v e r i e s  of  c o a l ,  t i m b e r  and c a s h .  
Any German r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e s e  m easu res  was t o  r e s u l t  in
(1)  t h e  m i l i t a r y  o c c u p a t i o n  of t h e  d i s t r i c t s  of  Essen  
and Bochum and of  t h e  whole  p a r t  of t h e  Ruhr B a s in  
d e c id e d  upon by M a rs h a l  Foch;
(2)  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of a customs b a r r i e r  on t h e  e a s t  
of  a l l  t h e  o c c up ie d  t e r r i t o r i e s .
T hese  p r o p o s a l s  a ro u s e d  t h e  d i s a p p r o v a l  of  t h e  B r i t i s h
Prime M i n i s t e r ,  Bonar Law, who s t r e s s e d  t h e  need t o  f i x
Germany 's  t o t a l  o b l i g a t i o n  and t h e  u n d e s i r a b i l i t y  of any
o c c u p a t i o n  of  t h e  Ruhr i f  Germany' s  c r e d i t  were  t o  be  r e s t o r e d ,
1. C. Bergmann,  op.  c i t . ,  p ,  l 6 0 .
2 « Die  Entwicklung,  d e r  R e p a ra t i o n s f r a g e , p . 37*
3.  The f o l l o w i n g  accoun t  of t h e  P a r i s  C o n fe re n c e  i s  drawn from 
A . J .T o y n b e e ,  op.  c i t . ,  pp .  193-201 ,
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A B r i t i s h  p ro p o s a l  which had a l s o  been submit ted  t o  t h e  
con fe renc e  sugges ted  t h a t  t h e  d e s i r e d  f i n a n c i a l  reform and 
g u a r a n t e e s  could be ob ta ined  by s e t t i n g  up an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
F o re ign  F inance  Counci l  in B e r l i n  with  wide s u p e r v i s o r y  powers.
I t  was only i f  Germany re fu s e d  t o  acknowledge t h e  a u t h o r i t y  of 
t h i s  c o u n c i l  or f a i l e d  t o  ach ieve  f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  in 
accordance  w i th  t h e  E x p e r t s '  Report of 7 November 1922 t h a t  
t h e r e  was t o  be any r e s o r t  t o  f u r t h e r  measures of t h e  ty pe  
sugges ted  by Poincare^. A complete moratorium f o r  fou r  y e a r s  
and subsequen t  payments based upon a t o t a l  o b l i g a t i o n  of only 
50 b i l l i o n  gold marks were cons ide red  t o  be d e s i r a b l e  i f  
permanent German f i n a n c i a l  r ecovery  was t o  be ach iev ed .
Because of t h e  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  of t h e  French  and E n g l i s h  
p r o p o s a l s ,  t h e  P a r i s  Conference soon developed i n t o  a complete 
dead lock  and i t  broke up on 4 January  w i thou t  having made any 
p r o g r e s s .  The German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  who were p re s e n t  in P a r i s  
were not even req u es te d  t o  p r e s e n t  t h e i r  r e p a r a t i o n  scheme. 
Bergmann, however,  cons ide red  t h a t  t h e  submiss ion  of t h e  p lan 
would have been " d e t r i m e n t a l  t o  German i n t e r e s t s "  because  t h e
German p r o p o s a l  did not  even go as f a r  as  t h e  B r i t i s h  scheme,
1.
which was u n a c c e p ta b l e  t o  t h e  o th e r  A l l i e s .
The b reak -up  of t h e  P a r i s  Conference was t h e  s i g n a l  f o r  
t h e  commencement of F ranco -B e lg ian  p r e p a r a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  occupa t ion  
of t h e  Ruhr.  * The l e g a l  p r e l i m i n a r i e s  f o r  t h i s  were completed 
on 9 J a n u a r y ,  when, a f t e r  German r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  had been g iven
1. C. Bergmann, op. c i t . ,  pp,  l 6 8 —9•
2.  Die Entwicklung d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p . 37»
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a f u r t h e r  h e a r i n g ,  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission r u l e d  t h a t  Germany
1.
had " v o l u n t a r i l y  d e f a u l t e d "  in  h e r  r e p a r a t i o n  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s .
On 10 J a n u a r y  b o t h  F r a n c e  and Belgium announced t h e  imminent 
d e s p a t c h  of  E n g i n e e r i n g  Commissions unde r  m i l i t a r y  p r o t e c t i o n  
t o  t h e  Ruhr a r e a .  On t h e  same day German d i p l o m a t i c  r e p r e s e n t ­
a t i v e s  were  r e c a l l e d  from P a r i s  and B r u s s e l s ,  r e p a r a t i o n  
d e l i v e r i e s  t o  F r a n c e  and Belgium c e a s e d ,  and t h e  h e a d q u a r t e r s  of
t h e  R h e n i s h - W e s t p h a l i a n  Coa l  S y n d i c a t e  were e v acua ted  from E s s e n
2 .
t o  H a m b u r g . O n  11 J a n u a r y  when t h e  mark s tood  a t  10 ,000  t o  t h e  
d o l l a r ,  t h e  b a t t l e  f o r  t h e  Ruhr  was j o i n e d .
The c a u s e  and a l s o  t h e  b y - p r o d u c t  of  t h e  growing  
e s t r a n g e m e n t  of  t h e  A l l i e s  and Germany, which  c u lm in a t e d  in  t h e  
F r a n c o - B e l g i a n  o c c u p a t i o n  of t h e  Ruhr and t h e  German campaign 
of  " p a s s i v e  r e s i s t a n c e " ,  was t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  m u tu a l  r e s e n t m e n t  and 
d i s t r u s t  of  t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  d i s p u t e .  The u n y i e l d i n g  
demand of  Po incare^  f o r  " p r o d u c t i v e  p l e d g e s "  was t h e  outcome of  t h e  
b l i n d  f r u s t r a t i o n  of  t h e  F re n ch  p u b l i c  a t  hav in g  been d e p r i v e d  o f  
s u b s t a n t i a l  r e p a r a t i o n  payments  by t h e  c o n t i n u e d  i n s t a b i l i t y  of  
t h e  German f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m .  The economic and f i n a n c i a l  
u n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s  of  P o i n c a r e ’ s demand s hou ld  no t  be  r e g a r d e d  a s  
e v id e n c e  of  d e e p - s e a t e d  F r e n c h  s t r a t e g i c  and p o l i t i c a l  d e s i g n s .  
A lthough  F r e n c h  r i g h t - w i n g  and m i l i t a r y  c i r c l e s  c e r t a i n l y  
a d v o c a t e d  i t  f o r  o t h e r  r e a s o n s ,  t h e  o c c u p a t io n  of  t h e  Ruhr on ly  
became a p o l i t i c a l  n e c e s s i t y  b e c a u s e  of  t h e  r e s e n t m e n t  c r e a t e d  
in  F r a n c e  by t h e  f a i l u r e  of Germany t o  r e l i e v e  t h e  p r e s s i n g  
^  F r e n c h  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s .
1 . i b i d . ,  p .  38 .
2 . i b i d .
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The f i n a n c i a l  and economic i l l o g i c a l i t y  of F rench  
r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y  n a t u r a l l y  s t r e n g t h e n e d  German s u s p i c i o n s  t h a t  
t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  was b e in g  used t o  a t t a i n  u l t e r i o r  
p o l i t i c a l  e n d s .  On 24 November Wilhelm Cuno, in  h i s  i n a u g u r a l  
s p e e c h  as  C h a n c e l l o r ,  in fo rmed  t h e  R e i c h s t a g  t h a t  he w ou ld ,  
l i k e  W i r t h , c o n t i n u e  t h e  p o l i c y  of f u l f i l m e n t  on ly  in  so  f a r  as  
i t  d i d  no t  underm ine  t h e  German economy. "No c r e d i t o r , "  he  added 
d a r k l y ,  " f o r  whom t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  was an economic q u e s t i o n  
and n o t  an i n s t r u m e n t  of power p o l i t i c s  cou ld  o b j e c t  t o  such a 
p o l i c y . "  O ther  i n f l u e n t i a l  s p e a k e r s  such as  S t resemenn  and t h e
D em ocra t ,  S c h i f f e r ,  open ly  a t t r i b u t e d  French  r e p a r a t i o n  p o l i c y  t o
2 .
t h e  h i s t o r i c  d e s i r e  o f  F r a n c e  f o r  a f r o n t i e r  on t h e  R h in e .
T h i s  growing F r e n c h  r e s e n t m e n t  and German d i s t r u s t  e x p l a i n s  
t h e  i n a b i l i t y  of  b o th  s i d e s  t o  make p r o p o s a l s  which were  a c c e p t ­
a b l e  t o  each o t h e r ,  and a c c o u n t s  f o r  t h e  d i s a s t r o u s  f a l l  in  t h e  
v a l u e  of  t h e  mark which o c c u r r e d  in  t h e  second h a l f  of 1922.  T he se  
two  phenomena in  t u r n  d e c r e a s e d  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  any s u c c e s s f u l  
a t t e m p t  a t  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i s a t i o n .
The do m es t i c  f i n a n c i a l  impotence  of  t h e  German government  
i n  a t i m e  of  r a p i d  m o n e ta ry  d e p r e c i a t i o n  had become e v i d e n t  in  
O c tobe r  1922 when i t  had a t t e m p t e d  t o  impose c o n t r o l s  in  o r d e r  
t o  c o u n t e r  t h e  f l i g h t  of c a p i t a l  f rom Germany and t o  check t h e  
r e p u d i a t i o n  of t h e  mark in  d o m e s t i c  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  T h i s  a t t e m p t  
had no t  only f a i l e d  b e c a u s e  t h e  c o n t r o l s  were c i r c u m v e n te d  by
1, Cuno,  24 November 1922 ,  R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  357 5 P* 9101.
2.  S c h i f f e r  (DDP), i b i d . ,  p .  9124;  S t resemann  (DVP),
25 November 1922,  i b i d . ,  p .  9158*
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s p e c u l a t o r s .  In a d d i t i o n ,  by d e c r e a s i n g  c o n f i d e n c e  in  t h e
mark b o t h  i n s i d e  and o u t s i d e  Germany, i t  had encouraged  t h e
1.
v e r y  p r a c t i c e s  which  i t  had been  d e s ig n e d  t o  c o u n t e r a c t .
The f a l l  of t h e  W i r t h  c a b i n e t  on 16 November and i t s  
r e p l a c e m e n t  on 22 November by t h e  n o n - p a r t y  " b u s i n e s s "  c a b i n e t
o f  Cuno, t h e  managing d i r e c t o r  of  HAPAG, had no d e c i s i v e  impact
2 .
on t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of  German f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y .  The 
e x c l u s i o n  of  t h e  SPD from t h e  c a b i n e t  no doubt  d e c r e a s e d  t h e  
ene rgy  w i t h  which  t h e  government  approached  t h e  problem of 
f i n a n c i a l  r e f o r m .  T h e r e  w e r e ,  m oreove r ,  g rounds  f o r  t h e  m i s g i v ­
i n g s  of  t h e  ex tr eme  L e f t  a t  t h e  a p p o in tm e n t  of B e c k e r ,  one o f  
t h e  f o re m o s t  opponents  of  t h e  Fo rced  Loan,  a s  M i n i s t e r  of
3.
Econom ics .  However , t h e  change  of  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  was of  
l i t t l e  im p o r t a n c e  compared w i t h  t h e  f a l l  in  t h e  v a l u e  of  t h e  
mark as  an i n f l u e n c e  on a t t i t u d e s  t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  p rob lem .
The f i s c a l  d e b a t e s  of  December 1922 were d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
l e s s  by any c o n c e rn  f o r  m o n e ta ry  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  t h a n  by a d e s i r e  
t o  m i t i g a t e  t h e  immedia te  s o c i a l  d i s t r e s s  and f i s c a l  i n j u s t i c e
1 .  H. Schumache r ,  "The New Exchange  R e g u l a t i o n s  i n  Germany",  
MGCRE, 7 December 1922 ,  p .  666 .
2 .  The f a l l  of t h e  W i r t h  C a b ine t  oc c u r r e d  l a r g e l y  b e c a u s e  of  
t h e  s h i f t  in  t h e  p a r t y  b a l a n c e  of power caused  by t h e  
r e u n i o n  of  t h e  SPD and t h e  USPD a t  t h e  end o f  Sep tem ber  1922,  
and b e c a u s e  of  t h e  g rowing  i m p o r ta n c e  of  t h e  f i n a n c i a l l y -  
i n f l u e n t i a l  DVP in  a t i m e  of  a c u t e  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s i s .  On
9 N0vember W ir th  h a d ,  a t  t h e  prompt ing  of E b e r t ,  opened 
d i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h  t h e  DVP on t h e  s u b j e c t  of fo rm ing  a DVF-SPD 
"grand  c o a l i t i o n " .  T h e s e  d i s c u s s i o n s  had however  l e d  t o  t h e  
r e s i g n a t i o n  of  t h e  SPD, b e c a u s e  t h e  i d e a  of  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  
a government  w i t h  t h e  p a r t y  of  Hugo S t i n n e s  was r e p u g n a n t  t o  
i t s  n e w l y - a c q u i r e d  l e f t - w i n g .  B r e i t s c h e i d  (VSP), 24 November 
1922 ,  R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  357» pp.  9106-7;  F .  S t a m p f e r ,  Die  
v i e r z e h n  J a h r e  d e r  e r s t e n  d e u t s c h e n  R e p u b l i k , p . 306 .
• Koenen (KPD), 24 November 1 9 2 2 ,  R e i c h s t a g , V o l .  357» p . Q129»3
caused  by t h e  d w in d l in g  v a l u e  of t h e  German c u r r e n c y .  D i s c u s s i o n  
of  a p r o p o s a l  t o  amend t h e  Income Tax c e n t r e d  around t h e  p e r e n n i a l  
d i s p u t e  as  t o  t h e  r e l a t i v e  i n j u s t i c e  of  w a g e - p a c k e t  d e d u c t i o n s
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d u r i n g  a p e r i o d  of d e p r e c i a t i o n .  The S o c i a l i s t  H e r tz  c la im e d  
t h a t ,  a s  a r e s u l t  of  t h e  f a l l  of  t h e  mark, t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  of  t h e  
t o t a l  y i e l d  of t h e  Income Tax d e r i v e d  from wage d e d u c t i o n s  had 
r i s e n  from 57/^ in  A p r i l - J u l y  1922 t o  72% i n  O c t o b e r . 1  2* On t h e  
o t h e r  hand ,  r i g h t - w i n g  s p e a k e r s  a p p e a r  t o  have  been  p r i m a r i l y  
con c e rn e d  t o  p lay  down t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  t a x  b u rd en  o f  t h e
2 .
n o n - w a g e - e a r n i n g  c l a s s e s  had been  l i g h t e n e d  by t h e  d e p r e c i a t i o n .  
T h i s  u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  p a r t i s a n  p r e o c c u p a t i o n  w i t h  a d j u s t i n g  t h e  
f i s c a l  b a l a n c e  of  power r a t h e r  t h a n  w i th  r a i s i n g  t h e  d i m i n i s h e d  
r e a l  y i e l d  of  t h e  Income Tax boded i l l  f o r  any a t t e m p t  a t  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a b i l i s a t i o n .
The 3ame s p i r i t  pe rvaded  a d e b a t e  on 15 December on a
p r o p o s a l  t o  amend t h e  Forced  Loan.  When t h i s  l o a n  had been 
a pproved  by t h e  R e i c h s t a g  in  J u l y  1922,  t o t a l  s u b s c r i p t i o n s  had
been  f i x e d  a t  70 b i l l i o n  pa pe r  m arks .  The a c t u a l  y i e l d  of  t h e  
Forced  Loan be tween  J u l y  and December 1922 was
Month F a c e r  Marks Gold Marks
J u ly - A u g u s t  1 ,8 8 7 ,9 0 0 ,0 0 0
September  58 4 ,9 0 0 ,0 0 0
O c to b e r  2 5 8 ,400 ,000
November 10 8 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0
December_____________ 910 .600 ,000
J u ly - D e e  ember 3 , 7 4 8 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0
9 .7 3 0 .0 0 0
1 .670 .000  
3 3 0 ,0 0 0
60 ,000
900.000
1 2 , 290 ,000
These  f i g u r e s  r e v e a l  no t  on ly  t h a t  t h e  r e a l  v a l u e  of s u b s c r i p t i o n s
1.  H e r tz  (VSP), 14 December 1922 ,  i b i d . ,  p .  9309.
2 .  E . g .  H e l f f e r i c h  (DNVP), i b i d . ,  pp.  9310-2 .
3* J .W .F .  T h e l w a l l ,  Rep o r t  o n . . .Germany t o  March ,  1923 . pp .34 -5*
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was v e ry  much reduced  by t h e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of  t h e  mark,  but  a l s o  
t h a t  t h e r e  was a c o n s i d e r a b l e  d e c l i n e  in  t h e  y i e l d  in  t e r m s  of  
p a p e r  m arks ,  which could only have been t h e  r e s u l t  of c o n s i d e r a b l e  
t a x  e v a s i o n .  The n e t  e f f e c t  was t h a t  a f t e r  s i x  months t h e  y i e l d  
amounted t o  3 . 7  b i l l i o n  p a p e r  marks (12*9 m i l l i o n  gold  m a r k s ) ,  
which  was a t i n y  f r a c t i o n  of t h e  r e t u r n  o r i g i n a l l y  e n v i s a g e d .
The r e a c t i o n  of  t h e  R e i c h s t a g  t o  t h e  e m a s c u l a t i o n  of  t h e  
Forced  Loan was c o m p l e t e l y  i n e f f e c t u a l .  D e s p i t e  l e f t - w i n g
p r e s s u r e  i n  f a v o u r  of i n c r e a s i n g  paper  s u b s c r i p t i o n s  t o  a l e v e l
1.
w a r r a n t e d  by t h e  d i m i n i s h e d  v a l u e  o f  t h e  m ark ,  t h e  m a j o r i t y  
would a g r e e  on ly  t o  t h e  n e g a t i v e  s t i p u l a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  t o t a l
amount of t h e  l oan  s hou ld  no t  be  l i m i t e d  t o  70 b i l l i o n  pape r
2 .m a r k s .  * The p a s s i v i t y  o f  t h e  R e i c h s t a g  was e p i t o m i s e d  by t h e  
D em ocra t ,  F i s c h e r ,  who, a f t e r  n o t i n g  t h a t  t h e  mark had f a l l e n  t o  
o n e - t h i r t i e t h  of  i t s  J u l y  v a l u e ,  p r o p o s e d ,  no t  t h a t  t h e  v a l u e  of 
s u b s c r i p t i o n s  shou ld  be r a i s e d ,  but  t h a t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  which  had 
been  made in  J u l y  and August  shou ld  be r eckoned  a t  doub le  t h e i r  
f a c e  v a l u e . " *  Although F i s c h e r ’ s p r o p o s a l  was r e j e c t e d ,  t h e  
R e i c h s t a g ’ s amendments of  t h e  Forced  Loan d e s e r v e d  f u l l y  t h e  
c r i t i c i s m  of B e r n s t e i n  t h a t  t h e y  were  c o n d u c iv e  n e i t h e r  t o  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  n o r  t o  s o c i a l  j u s t i c e ,  and t h a t  t h e y  were
i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  t e r m s  of t h e  " f i s c a l  compromise" of
4 .
J a n u a r y  1922.
Apar t  f rom d e s t r o y i n g  a l l  i n c e n t i v e  t o  do m es t i c  f i n a n c i a l
1. E . g .  B e r n s t e i n  (VSP),  15 December 1922,  R e i c h s t a g , V o l .  357> 
pp.  9 3 6 2 -3 .
2 .  J .W .F .  T h e l w a l l ,  R e po r t  o n . . .G e rm a n y  t o  March.  1923,  p*35«
3 .  F i s c h e r  (DDF), 15 December 1922,  R e i c h s t a g , V o l .  357» P.9365«
4 .  B e r n s t e i n  (VSP), i b i d . ,  p .  9361.
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r e f o r m  by a c c e l e r a t i n g  t h e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  o f  t h e  mark ,  t h e  
w id e n in g  b r e a c h  between t h e  A l l i e s  and Germany p r e c l u d e d  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of  any l a r g e - s c a l e  f o r e i g n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  aimed a t  
r e s t o r i n g  Germany’ s f i n a n c e s *  The U n i t ed  S t a t e s  g o v e rn m e n t ,
p e rha ps  encouraged by t h e  a c c e s s i o n  t o  power of  t h e  Cuno c a b i n e t ,  
had begun in  December 1922 t o  c o n s i d e r  s e r i o u s l y  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
of  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  E u r o p e .  On 20 December 1922 i t  was 
announced in  P a r i s  t h a t  t h e  American a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  was in  f a v o u r
of  c a l l i n g  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  c o n f e r e n c e  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e
2 .
q u e s t i o n  of  Germany’ s c a p a c i t y  t o  pay r e p a r a t i o n .  On 29 
December,  Hughes,  t h e  American S e c r e t a r y  of  S t a t e  f o r  F o r e i g n  
A f f a i r s ,  p roposed  in  a speech  a t  New Haven t h a t  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  
p rob lem  shou ld  be examined by a comm it tee  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l
3.
f i n a n c i a l  e x p e r t s .  However ,  on t h e  same day P r e s i d e n t  Hard in g
r e a s s u r e d  t h e  i s o l a t i o n i s t  S e n a t o r  Borah t h a t  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s
would no t  i n t e r v e n e  in  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  u n l e s s  i n v i t e d  t o  
, . 4 .
do so by a l l  t h e  p a r t i e s  i n v o l v e d .  Such a unanimous i n v i t a t i o n  
was no t  t o  be  ex tended  u n t i l  t h e  r i f t  be tw een  F r a n c e  and Germany 
had b r o u g h t  t h e  fo rm er  t o  t h e  v e r g e  of b a n k r u p t c y  and t h e  l a t t e r  
t o  t h e  b r i n k  of  n a t i o n a l  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  and s o c i a l  r e v o l u t i o n .
The r e p a r a t i o n  p rob lem  h a d ,  u n t i l  m id -1922 ,  been a t  
t h e  w o r s t  only  one of  s e v e r a l  f a c t o r s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e
1 .  Cuno c e r t a i n l y  r e g a r d e d  h i s  p e r s o n a l  e x p e r t i s e  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f i n a n c e  and h i s  s t r o n g  c o n n e c t i o n s  w i t h  America as  h i s  main 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  a c c e p t i n g  t h e  C h a n c e l l o r s h i p .  See h i s  
l e t t e r  of  9 December 1922 in  "Die den A l l i e r t e n . . . d e u t s c h e n  
A n g e b o t e . . . " ,  l o c , c i t . ,  p .  104.
2 .  Die En tw ick lung  d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e , p .  3 6 .
3 .  i b i d .
4 .  i b i d .
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i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of German domest ic  and f o r e ig n  f i n a n c i a l  
p o l i c y  and a t  be s t  something of an i n c e n t i v e  t o  f i n a n c i a l  
re fo rm .  However, in t h e  l a t t e r  h a l f  of 1922 i t  had c l e a r l y  
become both  t h e  major p s y c h o l o g i c a l  i n c e n t i v e  t o  a d i s a s t r o u s  
s p e c u l a t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  h ig h ly  v u l n e r a b l e  mark and,  a t  t h e  
same t im e ,  t h e  most im por tan t  h in d ran c e  t o  a l l  a t t e m p t s  t o  
a ch iev e  bo th  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i s a t i o n .
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SECTION IV
POSTSCRIPT : FROM THE OCCUPATION OF THE RUHR AND FINANCIAL 
COLLAFSE TO THE DAWES FLAN AND FINANCIAL STABILISATION ,
JANUARY 1923 TO AUGUST 1924
( a ) The Ruhr C o n f l i c t  and F i n a n c i a l  C o l l a p s e
Between 11 J a n u a r y  1923» when t h e  F r a n c o - B e l g i a n  
o c c u p a t i o n  o f  t h e  Ruhr b e g a n ,  and 24 September  1923> when 
German p a s s i v e  r e s i s t a n c e  in  t h e  Ruhr and t h e  R h in e la n d  came t o  
an end ,  t h e r e  was a s t a t e  of  war  be tween  t h e  Franc o - B e lg i a n  
occupying  a u t h o r i t i e s  and t h e  German g o v e rn m e n t .  The fo rm er  
sought  t o  g a i n  c o n t r o l  of t h e  economic and f i n a n c i a l  k e y - p o i n t s  
in  t h e  Ruhr and R h i n e l a n d ,  and t h e  l a t t e r  r e t a l i a t e d  w i t h  a 
campaign of  i n d u s t r i a l  n o n - c o o p e r a t i o n  and c i v i l  d i s o b e d i e n c e .
In t h e  c o u r s e  of  t h i s  s t r u g g l e  t h e  occupying  a u t h o r i t i e s  
c o n f i s c a t e d  c o a l ,  m e t a l l u r g i c a l  p r o d u c t s  and s y n t h e t i c  d y e s t u f f s
which were  e s t i m a t e d  t o  have  an a c t u a l  or  p o t e n t i a l  v a l u e  of
1 .
a bou t  one b i l l i o n  f r a n c s .  However ,  t h e s e  c o n f i s c a t i o n s  were a 
r e l a t i v e l y  u n i m p o r t a n t  b y - p r o d u c t  of t h e  w a r f a r e  which was b e in g  
waged .
The o c c u p a t i o n  of t h e  Ruhr and t h e  p a s s i v e  r e s i s t a n c e  which  
i t  provoked caused economic s t a g n a t i o n  and d i s l o c a t i o n  as  s e v e r e
a s  t h a t  wh ich would have  been o c c as io n ed  i f  a war had been fo u g h t
2 .
in  t h e  a r e a .  The s u s p e n s i o n  of r e p a r a t i o n  c o a l  d e l i v e r i e s  on 
10 J a n u a r y  1923 and t h e  r e f u s a l  of  t h e  c o a l - o w n e r s  t o  pay t o  t h e
1.  J .W .F .  T h e l w a l l  and C. J .K avanagh  , Repor t  o n . . . Germanv. 
r e v i s e d  t o  A p r i l .  1924.  t o g et h e r  w i t h  a Repor t  on t h e  
Occupied T e r r i t o r i e s ,  p ,  118*
2.  The f o l l o w i n g  a c c o u n t  i s  drawn from A . J .T o y n b e e ,  Survey o f  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s .  1 9 2 4 , pp .  282- 5 .
4 0 0 .
occupy ing  a u t h o r i t i e s  t h e  p r o c e e d s  of  t h e  Coal  Tax l e d ,  on 
30 J a n u a r y ,  t o  a F r a n c o - B e l g i a n  ban on a l l  c o a l  e x p o r t s  t o  
u n o c c u p ie d  Germany; t o  t h e  s e i z u r e  of  German Customs 
O f f i c e s  a t  D ü s s e l d o r f ,  D u i s b e rg  and e l s e w h e r e ;  and t o  t h e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  between 2 and 12 F e b r u a r y  of  a customs b a r r i e r  
d i v i d i n g  t h e  Rh ine land  and t h e  Ruhr f rom t h e  r e s t  of  Germany.
As a r e s u l t  of t h e  r e f u s a l  of  t h e  German c o a l - o w n e r s  t o  t r a d e  
t h r o u g h  t h i s  customs b a r r i e r  c o n s i d e r a b l e  s t o c k s  of  c o a l  
a c cum ula te d  a t  t h e  p i t h e a d  and some of  t h e s e  were  s e i z e d  and 
t r a n s p o r t e d  t o  F ra n ce  and Belgium by t h e  occupying  a u t h o r i t i e s .  
However ,  t h e  amount of c o a l  o b t a i n e d  i n  t h i s  way was l i m i t e d  
by a r a i l w a y  s t r i k e ,  w h ich  p a r a l y s e d  t h e  German t r a n s p o r t  
s y s t e m  i n  F e b r u a r y  and March,  and by t h e  c e s s a t i o n  of  work in  
t h e  mines  ffom A p r i l  onw ards .  These  d e v e l o p m e n t s ,  t o g e t h e r  
w i t h  t h e  German g o v e r n m e n t ' s  o r d i n a n c e  of  l 6 t h  March 1923 
f o r b i d d i n g  payment of  t a x e s  and d u t i e s  t o  t h e  occupying  
a u t h o r i t i e s  and p r o h i b i t i n g  a p p l i c a t i o n s  t o  them f o r  expo r t
l i c e n c e s ,  d r a s t i c a l l y  r educ e d  t h e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of t h e  Ruhr
2 .
a d v e n t u r e  in  t h e  f i r s t  n i n e  months of 1923« But t h e y  a l s o  
had a d i s a s t r o u s  e f f e c t  on t h e  l e v e l  of  German i n d u s t r i a l  
a c t i v i t y .  In 1923 b l a c k  c o a l  p r o d u c t i o n  ( l l 8  m i l l i o n  t o n s  in  
1922 ) f e l l  1 0 62 m i l l i o n  t o n s ;  and p r o d u c t i o n  of  l i g n i t e
3 #
(137 m i l l i o n  t o n s  in  1922 ) was reduc e d  t o  l l 8  m i l l i o n  t o n s .
Output  of  i r o n  ( 4 .9  m i l l i o n  t o n s )  and s t e e l  ( 6 .3  m i l l i o n  t o n s )
4 .
was a l s o  on ly  h a l f  of i t s  1922 l e v e l .  ’ Another  i n d i c a t i o n  of  t h e
1, i b i d . ,  pp .  273 -4 .
2,  i b i d . ,  pp .  291- 3 *
3 ,  J .W .F .  T h e l w a l l ,  R e p o r t  o n . . .G ermany , r e v i s e d  t o  A p r i l ,  1924,
pp.  88-9 .
. C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i , op. c i t . ,  p. 193» Bee a b o v e ,p .  295*4
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d i s a s t r o u s  d e c l i n e  in economic a c t i v i t y  was t h a t  goods t r a n s ­
por ted  on t h e  German r a i lw a y s  f e l l  from an average  of 32.3 
m i l l i o n  t o n s  a month in 1922 t o  20.8 m i l l i o n  t o n s  a month in
1923.  * A f i n a l  s ign  of  s t a g n a t i o n  was t h a t  t h e  volume of e x p o r t s
2 .
f e l l  from 21.6  m i l l i o n  t o n s  in 1922 t o  12.7  m i l l i o n  t o n s  in  1923»
The occupa tion  of t h e  Ruhr and p a s s iv e  r e s i s t a n c e  were
l a r g e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  v i o l e n t  i n f l a t i o n  and d e p r e c i a t i o n  
which occurred  in t h i s  p e r i o d ,  v i z ,^ *
Dat e Notes in C i r c u l a t i o n D o l la r  Rate
1 Jan
exc lud ing  "emergency" 
i s  sues
(thousand b i l l i o n  marks) 
1.30 7,260
1 Feb 2.01 41,500
1 Mar 3 .54 22,800
1 Apr 5*5 4 21,152
1 May 6 .6 0 31,779
1 Jne 8.64 74,932
1 J u ly 17.39 160,400
1 Aug 43.89 1 , 102,750
1 Sep 668.80 11,027,500
1 Oct 28 ,244 .40 242,605,000
1 Nov 2 , 5 0 4 , 995.70 130 ,325,000,000
1 Dec 400 ,267 ,640 .00  4 , 210 , 500 , 000,000
Germany's ba lance  of t r a d e  does not  appea r  t o have c o n t r i b u t e d
t h i s  development ,  s ince  t h e  v a l u e ,  as  opposed t o  t h e  volume, of
4.
imports  and expo r ts  was almost  ex a c t ly  equa l  in  1923« The mam
cause  appea rs  t o  have been t h e  budge ta ry  burden inc u r re d  by
" p u t t i n g  t h e  whole of t h e  commercial l i f e  of  t h e  occupied
5 #
t e r r i t o r i e s  on a very  l i b e r a l  d o l e " . ' " ’ During t h e  per iod of
1 . C. B r e s c i a n i - T u r r o n i , op.
2. J .W .F . T h e lw a l l .  Report  on
p. 46.
3. ib id . , p.  111.
4. ib id . , p. 46.
5 . ib i d . , p.  109.
c i t . ,  p .  194.
, .  .Germany, r e v i s e d  t o  A p r i l 1924.
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p a s s i v e  r e s i s t a n c e  t h e  gove rnment  no t  on ly  s u p p o r t e d  wage-  
e a r n e r s  who were engaged in  u n p r o d u c t i v e  work and gave  c r e d i t s  t o  
i n d u s t r i e s  which were d e v o te d  s o l e l y  t o  b u i l d i n g  up t h e i r  s t o c k s , *  
bu t  a l s o  p a id  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  amount  of c o m pe nsa t ion  t o  p r o d u c e r s  
o f  goods which  were c o n f i s c a t e d  by t h e  occupying  a u t h o r i t i e s .  I t s  
o u t l a y  was a l s o  i n c r e a s e d  c o n s i d e r a b l y  by F r a n c o - B e l g i a n  
r e q u i s i t i o n i n g  of  German c u r r e n c y ,  and by m i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n  on
t h e  p a r t  of  t h e  i n h a b i t a n t s  of  t h e  Ruhr t h e m s e l v e s ,  whose m o ra l e
2 .
sank n o t i c e a b l y  d u r i n g  t h e  c o u r s e  of 1923»
The p s y c h o l o g i c a l  and p o l i t i c a l  e f f e c t  of  t h e  Ruhr 
c o n f l i c t  on f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  was by no means s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d .
The imm edia te  e f f e c t  of  t h e  F r a n c o - B e l g i a n  i n v a s i o n  was t h a t  t h e  
mark tumbled  from 10 ,000  t o  t h e  d o l l a r  on 9 J a n u a r y  t o  49 ,000
3 *
t o  t h e  d o l l a r  t h r e e  weeks l a t e r .  But t h e  u p s u r g e  of p a t r i o t i c
4.
f e e l i n g  which  t h e  c o n f l i c t  p rovoked soon made p o s s i b l e  u n u s u a l l y  
d e t e r m i n e d  and m o m e n ta r i l y  e f f e c t i v e  a t t e m p t s  a t  f i s c a l  r e f o r m
and a t  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  m ark .  On 13 J a n u a r y  a law which  was
d e s i g n e d  t o  a d j u s t  t h e  y i e l d  of  f o u r t e e n  d i f f e r e n t  t a x e s  t o  t h e
5 #
d e p r e c i a t i o n  of  t h e  mark was l a i d  b e f o r e  t h e  R e i c h s t a g . '  * Two
weeks l a t e r  t h e  R e ic hsba nk  began  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  mark w i t h  heavy
6 •
buy ing  o p e r a t i o n s  in  B e r l i n ,  Amsterdam and New Y ork .  However ,
1 . i b i d . ,  pp .  109- 1 1 0 .
2 . i b i d . ,  p .  109 .
3 . Die E n tw ic k lu n g  d e r  R e p a r a t i o n s f r a g e ,  pp.  38-9*
4 .  On 13 J a n u a r y  t h e  R e i c h s t a g  approved  Cuno ' s  p o l i c y  of  
p a t r i o t i c  r e s i s t a n c e  by a m a j o r i t y  of  248 t o  12.  R e i c h s t a g . 
V o l .  357, PP. 9 4 1 8 -3 7 .  The KPD was t h e  only  d i s s e n t i n g  p a r t y :  
F r ö l i c h  (KPD), i b i d . ,  pp .  91 234  563 3 - 4 «
5 . H. J o n u s c h a t ,  Di e  S t e u e r p o l i t i k  d e r  P a r t e i e n  im R e i c h s t a g ,
p .  3 8 .
6 . C. Bergmann, op.  c i t . ,  p .  l 8 6 .
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s e l f - i n t e r e s t  and t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  i n f l a t i o n  soon underm ined  t h e s e
e n d e a v o u r s .  On 9 March t h e  S o c i a l i s t  H e r tz  com pla ined  t h a t  t h e
proposed amendments d e a l t  only  w i t h  c a s e s  in  which  t a x p a y e r s
were harmed by t h e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  and no t  w i t h  t h o s e  i n  which  t h e y
had p r o f i t e d  from it. '*'* M oreover ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  of
t h e  Reichs bank kep t  t h e  mark f l u c t u a t i n g  a round 21 ,000  t o  t h e
d o l l a r  u n t i l  t h e  m idd le  of  A p r i l ,  t h e  p u r c h a s i n g  power r e l e a s e d
in t h e  community by t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s e x p e n d i t u r e s  made i t
i n e v i t a b l e  t h a t  t h e  R e ic hsba nk  would be  f o r c e d  t o  suspend  i t s
buy ing  o p e r a t i o n s  and t h a t  t h e  mark would resume i t s  downward
, 2 .
p l u n g e .  F i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  was on ly  t o  become p o s s i b l e  
when t h e  Ruhr c o n f l i c t  was b r o u g h t  t o  an end and when t h e  
R e i c h s t a g  had r e a s o n  t o  p r e f e r  e f f e c t i v e  f i s c a l  r e f o r m  t o  s h o r t ­
t e r m  f i s c a l  s e l f - p r o t e c t  i o n .
The n a t i o n a l i s t i c  f e e l i n g s  a ro u s e d  by t h e  Ruhr c o n f l i c t  
were so s t r o n g  t h a t  t h e  German government  d i s p l a y e d  no d e s i r e  t o  
n e g o t i a t e  w i t h  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission u n t i l  t h e  second h a l f  of  
A p r i l .  Even t h e n  a s p e a k e r  such  a s  S t r e s e m a n n ,  who s t r e s s e d  t h a t  
t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  problem was one of n e g o t i a t i o n  and of compromise ,  
d e c l a r e d  t h a t  t h e r e  cou ld  be n e i t h e r  compromise n o r  n e g o t i a t i o n
as  long as  F r a n c e  sough t  t o  annex t h e  R h in e la n d  and t h e  Ruhr
3 .  4 .
d i s t r i c t .  The German n o t e  of  2 May, which was t h e  German
g o v e r n m e n t ’ s f i r s t  a t t e m p t  t o  r e s o l v e  t h e  d e a d l o c k ,  was a
TT~ H e r tz  (VSP).  9 March~1923 . R e i c h s t a g , V o l .  3 5 8 , ~ p .~ 1 0 0 4 l 7 ~
2 .  C. Bergmann,  op.  c i t . ,  pp .  186-8 .
3 .  S t re se m a nn  (DVP), 17 A p r i l  1923,  R e i c h s t a g . V o l .  3 5 9 , P*10578.
4 .  "Die den A l l i e r t  e n . . . ü b e r m i t t e l t  en d e u t s c h e n  A n g e b o t e . . . " ,  
i b i d . ,  V o l .  379,  A n l .  6 1 3 8 , pp.  1 1 4 -6 .
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d i s a s t r o u s  f a i l u r e ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  Bergmann, b e c a u s e  c a b i n e t  
m i n i s t e r s  who were a f r a i d  of do m es t i c  c r i t i c i s m  " d i s f i g u r e d  
and d i l u t e d "  t h e  c o n c i l i a t o r y  p r o p o s a l  on which i t  was o r i g i n a l l y  
b a s e d .  As a r e s u l t ,  t h e  German o f f e r  of a lump sum r e p a r a t i o n  
s e t t l e m e n t  of  30 b i l l i o n  go ld  marks was hedged a round w i t h  so
many c o n d i t i o n s  and r e s e r v a t i o n s  t h a t  i t  was u n a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e
1.
A l l i e s .  I t  was t h e r e f o r e  u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  t h a t  a F re n ch  r e p l y  
of  6 May d e s c r i b e d  t h e  German o f f e r  as "a t h i n l y  v e i l e d  
e x p r e s s i o n  of  s y s t e m a t i c  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  T r e a t y  o f  V e r s a i l l e s " .  
Even t h e  B r i t i s h  and I t a l i a n  governments  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  t h e
t o t a l  sum o f f e r e d  was t o o  low and t h a t  t h e  g u a r a n t e e s  promised
2 .
were  t o o  v a g u e .  On 7 June  a n o t h e r  more a c c e p t a b l e  German
3 #
p r o p o s a l  was made a t  t h e  p rom p t ing  of t h e  B r i t i s h  gove rnm e n t . '
However ,  t h i s  met w i t h  no r e s p o n s e  from t h e  A l l i e s ,  who now'
4.
became embro i led  in  a war  of n o t e s  among t h e m s e l v e s .  The Cuno 
g o v e r n m e n t ,  a l r e a d y  d i s c r e d i t e d  by t h e  f a i l u r e  of  i t s  n o t e  o f
2 May, and on ly  kep t  in  power t h r o u g h  t h e  su p p o r t  of  St re semann
5.
and t h e  DVP, now l o s t  f u r t h e r  ground  by i t s  p o l i c y  of a w a i t i n g
t h e  outcome of  t h e  A l l i e d  e x c h an g e .  On 28 Ju n e  S t r e s e m a n n ,
r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  changed German a t t i t u d e  t o  n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  c r i t i c i s e d
t h e  governm ent  i n  "Die Z e i t "  f o r  i t s  i n a c t i v i t y .  By August
t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  government  t o  open n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  Germany 's
1.  C. Bergmann,  op. c i t . ,  pp.  1 9 1 - 2 .
2.. i b  id  .
3* "Die den A l l i e r t  e n . .  . ü b e r m i t t  e i t  en d e u t s c h e n  A n g e b o t e . . . " ,  
l o c .  c i t .  , pp.  116- 7 .
4 .  A . J .T o y n b e e ,  Survey of  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s .  1924 , p p . 3 2 7 -3 9 .
5 .  G. S t r e s e m a n n ,  Ve r m ä c h t n i s  , V o l .  I ,  p .  65.
6.  i b i d . ,  V o l .  I ,  p .  6 9 .
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c r e d i t o r s  had a ro u s e d  w i d e s p r e a d  d i s c o n t e n t ,  and i t  was one 
of  t h e  main i s s u e s  on which  t h e  Cuno c a b i n e t  was over th rown  on 
13 A u g u s t . 1 *
D e s p i t e  t h e  g rowing  f e e l i n g  in  f a v o u r  of  t h e  r e s u m p t io n  
of  n e g o t i a t i o n s  which b r o u g h t  him t o  power ,  S t re s e m a n n ,  Cuno’s 
s u c c e s s o r ,  e n c o u n te re d  v i o l e n t  N a t i o n a l i s t  o p p o s i t i o n  when he
2 .
d e c l a r e d  on 14 August  h i s  i n t e n t i o n  of  end ing  p a s s i v e  r e s i s t a n c e .
On 7 Sep tem ber  t h e  new C h a n c e l l o r  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  u n c o n d i t i o n a l  
r e n u n c i a t i o n  of  p a s s i v e  r e s i s t a n c e  would g i v e  o f f e n c e  t o  b road
and i n f l u e n t i a l  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  German p u b l i c  and would be
3.
e x p l o i t e d  by e x t r e m i s t s  o f  t h e  Le f t  and R i g h t .  He t h e r e f o r e  
i n s i s t e d  d u r i n g  Sep tember  t h a t  t h e  c e s s a t i o n  of p a s s i v e  r e s i s t ­
ance  shou ld  be c o n d i t i o n a l  upon a F r a n c o - B e l g i a n  u n d e r t a k i n g  
t o  w i thd raw  from t h e  R uhr .  However ,  on 24 September  S t re s e m a n n ,  
d e s p i t e  h i s  p r e v i o u s  d e c l a r a t i o n s ,  renounced  p a s s i v e  r e s i s t a n c e  
u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y .  He was d r i v e n  t o  t h i s  c o u r s e  p a r t l y  by F re n ch  
i n t r a n s i g e n c e  bu t  more by a d e s i r e  t o  a v e r t  t h e  s o c i a l  r e v o l u t i o n  
and n a t i o n a l  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  which  now t h r e a t e n e d  Germany a s  a 
r e s u l t  of  t h e  d e e pen ing  f i n a n c i a l  c h a o s .  The i n f l u e n c e  of  t h e  
f e a r  of  r e v o l u t i o n  upon t h e  members of  S t r e s e m a n n ’ s p a r t y  i s  
r e f l e c t e d  in  t h e  p r e d i c t i o n  o f  Hugo S t i n n e s  a t  a DVP m e e t in g  in
September  t h a t  t h e r e  would be  c i v i l  war in  Germany w i t h i n  a 
4
f o r t n i g h t .
1.  E.  Schmacke, Die A u s s e n p o l i t i k  d e r  Weimarer  R e p u b l i k . . , .
P- 132 .
2. S t re sem ann  (DVP), 14 August 1923? Re i c h s t a g , V o l .  3&1, 
pp.  11839-42;  Hergt  (DNVP), i b i d . ,  pp .  11843 -4 .
3 . G. S t r e s e m a n n ,  Ve r m ä c h t n i s , V o l .  I ,  p .  114.
4 . i b i d . ,  V o l .  I ,  p .  117 .
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("fr) S t a b i l i s a t i o n
The f e a r s  which  prompted t h e  r e n u n c i a t i o n  of p a s s i v e  
r e s i s t a n c e  a l s o  p r o v id e d  t h e  p o s i t i v e  i n c e n t i v e  t o  f i n a n c i a l  
r e f o r m  which had been  l a c k i n g  s i n c e  t h e  w a r .  The f i r s t  e f f o r t s  
a t  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  had been  made by H i l f e r d i n g ,  t h e  SPD F i n a n c e  
M i n i s t e r  of S t r e s e m a n n ’s C a b i n e t ,  who on 14 August  i n t r o d u c e d  a
1.
go ld  c u r r e n c y ,  denomina ted  in  d o l l a r s  and f r a c t i o n s  of a d o l l a r .  
A l though  t h i s  p rov ide d  a u s e f u l  s t a n d a r d  upon which t o  b a s e  
p r i c e  c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  i t  cou ld  n o t  p r e v e n t  t h e  f u r t h e r  d e p r e c i a t i o n  
of  no rm al  c u r r e n c y  so  long  as  t h e  governm ent  c o n t i n u e d  t o  r e s o r t  
t o  t h e  p r i n t i n g  p r e s s .  The c a b i n e t  t h e r e f o r e  sought  w ide  
emergency powers in  o r d e r  t o  a c h i e v e  a f u n d a m e n t a l  r e f o r m  of  
t h e  whole  s t r u c t u r e  of  c u r r e n c y  and c r e d i t .  At f i r s t  i t  a ppeared  
t h a t  f a m i l i a r  d i f f e r e n c e s  be tw een  t h e  DVF and 5PD would p r e v e n t  
t h e s e  powers f rom b e i n g  o b t a i n e d .  A d e a d lo c k  over  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  
of t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  t h e  e i g h t - h o u r  day in  t h e  " E n a b l in g  Law"
( E r m ä c h t i g u n g s g e s e t z ) ,  c aused  t h e  S t re sem ann  c a b i n e t  t o  r e s i g n
2 .
on 3 O c t o b e r .  However ,  t h e  c r i s i s  was surmounted  b e c a u s e  t h e  
SPD, f e a r f u l  of  a R i g h t i s t  d i c t a t o r s h i p ,  a g re e d  t h a t  t h e i r  
F i n a n c e  M i n i s t e r ,  H i l f e r d i n g ,  s h o u ld  be r e p l a c e d  by L u t h e r ,  who
3-
was more a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  b o u r g e o i s  p a r t i e s  in  t h e  c o a l i t i o n .  
Thus t h e  c a b i n e t  was r e c o n s t i t u t e d  and t h e  " E n a b l in g  Law" was 
passed  on 13 O c t o b e r ,  in  t h e  f a c e  o f  f i e r c e  o p p o s i t i o n  from b o t h
1.  J .W .F .  T h e I w a l l ,  R epo r t  o n . . .Germany.  r e v i s e d  t o  A p r i l .  1 9 2 4 , 
p ,  6; C. Bergmann, op.  c i t . ,  pp .  2 0 4 -5 .
2. E. Schmacke, op. c i t . ,  p .  139*
3 .  F. S tam pfer ,  op. c i t . ,  p .  352.
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t h e  KPD and DNVP.1  2345*
The p a s s a g e  of t h e  ’’E n a b l in g  Law" made p o s s i b l e  t h e
app o in tm e n t  of  Schach t  a s  "Commissioner  of N a t i o n a l  Cu r rency"  
and t h e  p r o c l a m a t i o n  on 15 November o f  a s e r i e s  of  emergency 
m e a s u r e s .  T h e s e  i n c l u d e d  t h e  c e s s a t i o n  of t h e  d i s c o u n t i n g  of 
T r e a s u r y  B i l l s  by t h e  Re ichsbank  and t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n  of  a l l  
Emergency Money. The community ’s needs  f o r  c u r r e n c y  were met 
by i s s u e s  of  Ren tenm arks ,  t e m p o r a r y  n o t e s  w i t h  a v a l u e  of one 
go ld  mark which were  in  t h e o r y  s e cu re d  bya4^ m o r tg a g e  on a l l  
German l anded  and i n d u s t r i a l  p r o p e r t y ,  bu t  wh ich  depended f o r
t h e i r  a c c e p t a n c e  and s t a b i l i t y  b a s i c a l l y  on t h e  s e n t i m e n t  of t h e
ß #
community.  The imm edia te  c r e d i t  needs  of  t h e  government  were 
met by an a dvance  of 1 .2  b i l l i o n  Rentenmarks from t h e  newly-  
founded  R e n te n b a n k .  * S i n c e  no f u r t h e r  c r e d i t s  were t o  be 
g r a n t e d  by t h e  R e n te nbank ,  t h e  government  was o b l ig e d  t o  i n s t i t u t e  
f u n d a m e n ta l  f i s c a l  r e f o r m s .  Payment of  e x i s t i n g  t a x e s  had
2 .
5 .
a l r e a d y  been p lac e d  on a go ld  b a s i s  by a d e c r e e  o f  11 O c t o b e r .
In t h e  f o l l o w i n g  months t h r e e  "Tax Emergency D e c r e e s "  were 
p rom u lga te d  which c r e a t e d  new s o u r c e s  of r e v e n u e ;  and e x p e n d i t u r e s  
were  cu t  down s h a r p l y  by a d r a s t i c  r e d u c t i o n  in  t h e  number of  
government  em ployees ,  by a r e f o r m  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e l a t i o n s
1 . F r ö l i c h  (KFD), 11 October 1923» R e i c h s t a g , V o l ,  3 6 l ,  p p . 12115-9)  
Henning (DF), i b i d . ,  pp, 12121-9«
2 .  Schacht r e l a t e s  t h a t  he accep ted  the  post  because  "Germany was 
in danger of  succumbing t o  Communism'! H. Schacht ,  Mv F i r s t  
S e v e n t y -S i x  Y e ar s , p.  l 8 2 .
3 . H, Sc hac ht ,  The S t a b i l i s a t i o n  of t h e  Mark , Ch. 4; c f .  J , F .
TheTwa11,  Repor t  o n . . .Germany,  r e v i s e d  t o  A p r i l ,  1 9 2 4 , p p . 6 - 7 «
4 .  i b i d . ,  p.  6 .
5 .  i b i d , ,  pp.  29-3°«
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be tw een  t h e  F e d e r a l  government  and t h e  S t a t e s ,  and by p r o v i s i o n
f o r  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  i n d e p e n d e n c e  of t h e  r a i l w a y  and p o s t a l
1.s e r v i c  e s .
A l though  t h e  Rentenmark r e t a i n e d  i t s  v a l u e  and a l t h o u g h ,  
by t h e  b e g in n i n g  of 1924,  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t ’ s f i s c a l  r e fo rm s  had 
y i e l d e d  a s u r p l u s  of  r e v e n u e  over  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  a permanent  
s t a b i l i s a t i o n  of German c u r r e n c y  and b a l a n c i n g  of t h e  budget  
cou ld  no t  have  been a c h ie v e d  w i t h o u t  a s e t t l e m e n t  of  t h e  
r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n  and t h e  p rom ise  of f o r e i g n  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t ­
a n c e .  T h e s e  were  v o u c h s a f e d  t o  Germany l a r g e l y  b e c a u s e  of t h e  
concern  which  l e a d i n g  Anglo-Saxon s t a t e s m e n  s h a re d  w i t h  t h e  
German government  a b o u t  t h e  da nge rous  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  u n r e s t  
wh ich  r e s u l t e d  from t h e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of  t h e  mark .  The t r e n d  of 
o p i n i o n  i s  r e f l e c t e d  in  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of  Smuts ,  who did  much 
e a r l y  in  O c tober  1923 t o  swing t h e  B r i t i s h  government  in  f a v o u r  
o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  q u e s t i o n .  * Smuts a l s o  p r o b a b l y  
h e lp e d  t o  g a l v a n i s e  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n t o  a c t i o n  
by c a b l i n g  an a p p e a l  t o  B a ruch ,  a f i n a n c i a l  a d v i s e r  of P r e s i d e n t  
C o o l i d g e ,  f o r  American m ora l  and f i n a n c i a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  in  a 
r e p a r a t i o n  and i n t e r - A l l i e d  d e b t  s e t t l e m e n t  "which would b r i n g
3 .
pe rm anen t  peace  t o  F r a n c e  and Germany".  A few days  l a t e r ,  on 9 
O c t o b e r ,  C o o l id g e  d e c l a r e d  in  Wash ing ton  t h a t  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  
s to o d  by H ughes ’ p r o p o s a l  of  29 December 1922 f o r  an i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  commiss ion t o  examine Germany’ s c a p a c i t y  t o
1. For  d e t a i l s  of  t h e  t a x  r e f o r m s  of  t h i s  p e r i o d :  i b i d . ,
p p . 3 0 - 4 5 .  See a l s o ,  C. Bergmann,  op .  c i t . ,  p.  211 .
2.  Brand t o  Smuts ,  3 O c tobe r  1923» Smuts P a p e r s .
3» Smuts t o  Baruch ,  3 O c tober  1923» i b i d
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pay r e p a r a t i o n .  T h i s  s t a t e m e n t  was con f i rm e d  by Hughes,  in  
r e p l y  t o  a f o rm a l  e n q u i r y  by t h e  B r i t i s h  g o v e rn m e n t ,  on 15 
O c t o b e r . ' “* S e v e r a l  weeks were t o  e l a p s e  b e f o r e  t h e  American 
s u g g e s t i o n  l e d  t o  any p o s i t i v e  a c t i o n  b e c a u s e  of F re nch  i n s i s t e n c e  
t h a t  t h e  p r opose d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  commission shou ld  c o n f i n e  i t s e l f  
t o  exa min ing  t h e  e x i s t i n g ,  a s  opposed t o  t h e  f u t u r e ,  c a p a c i t y  of 
Germany t o  pay r e p a r a t i o n .  However , on 30 November,  F rench  
o p p o s i t i o n  was f i n a l l y  c i r c u m v e n ted  by a d e c i s i o n  of t h e  
R e p a r a t i o n  Commission t o  c r e a t e  two e x p e r t  c o m m i t t e e s ,  t h e  f i r s t  
t o  c o n s i d e r  means of  b a l a n c i n g  t h e  German budge t  and s t a b i l i s i n g  
t h e  m a r k , and t h e  second t o  d i s c o v e r  t h e  amount of German c a p i t a l  
which  had been e x p o r t e d .  S inc e  t h e  t e rm s  of  r e f e r e n c e  of  t h e  
f i r s t  comm it tee  would o b v i o u s l y  o b l i g e  i t  t o  c o n s i d e r  Germany’ s 
f u t u r e  c a p a c i t y  t o  pay r e p a r a t i o n ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  government  
a g re e d  on 12 December t o  t a k e  an a c t i v e  p a r t  i n  i t s  d e l i b e r a t i o n s .
When t h e  f i r s t  com mit tee  met in  P a r i s  on 14 J a n u a r y  1924 
u n d e r  t h e  c h a i r m a n s h ip  of  t h e  American ,  C.G. Dawes, i t s  work 
was c o n s i d e r a b l y  s i m p l i f i e d  by t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  which t h e  German
government  had t a k e n  in  s t a b i l i s i n g  t h e  m ark ,  b a l a n c i n g  i t s
2 .
budge t  and in  r e s t o r i n g  i t s  e x t e r n a l  c r e d i t .  The comm it tee  
was in  f a c t  so  impressed  by t h e  e f f o r t s  of  t h e  German government  
t h a t ,  a f t e r  v i s i t i n g  B e r l i n  in  F e b r u a r y  t o  examine t h e  s t a t e  of 
German f i n a n c e s ,  i t  r e v i s e d  i t s  e s t i m a t e  of  Germany 's  c a p a c i t y
1, T h i s  a c c o u n t  i s  b a s e d  on: A . J .T o y n b e e ,  Survey  of  I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s .  1 9 2 4 . pp.  3 4 2 - 8 .
2 .  On t h e  e f f o r t s  of  S c h a c h t ,  now P r e s i d e n t  of t h e  R e i c h s b a n k ,  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  a G o ld d i s k o n tb a n k  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  of  o b t a i n i n g  
f o r e i g n  c r e d i t s ;  H« S c h a c h t ,  The S t a b i l i s a t i o n  of t h e  Mark, 
Ch. 5 .
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t o  pay r e p a r a t i o n  in  a no rm a l  y e a r  f rom 2 b i l l i o n  t o  2 .5  b i l l i o n
1.
go ld  m ark s .  A l l  t h a t  t h e  Dawes Commit tee had t o  do was t o  
c o n s t r u c t  on t h i s  s o l i d  f o u n d a t i o n  of r e fo rm e d  German f i n a n c e s  
a scheme f o r  r e p a r a t i o n  payments  which d id  no t  a b u s e  common s e n s e .
The com m it tee ’s r e p o r t  of 9 A p r i l  1924 answered t h e s e  r equ i rem en ts
2 .
a d m i r a b l y .  I t  recommended t h a t  Germany shou ld  pay amounts 
r i s i n g  in  f i v e  y e a r s  f rom 1 b i l l i o n  t o  2 . 5  b i l l i o n  m arks .  The 
f e a t u r e s  of t h e s e  payments wh ich  made them a c c e p t a b l e  f rom t h e  
German p o i n t  of  view were t h e  m o d e r a t io n  of  t h e  amounts  demanded 
in  t h e  e a r l y  y e a r s  and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  embraced c h a r g e s  a r i s i n g  
from a l l  p a r t s  of  t h e  t r e a t y .  The a t t r a c t i o n  of t h e  scheme from 
t h e  A l l i e d  p o i n t  of  view was t h a t  t h e r e  w e re  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  
ea rm ark ing  s t a t e  r a i l w a y  b o n d s ,  i n d u s t r i a l  d e b e n t u r e s ,  and a t r a n s ­
p o r t  t a x  a s  s o u r c e s  of r e v e n u e  f o r  t h o s e  p a r t s  of  Germany’s 
l i a b i l i t y  which were no t  c o v e re d  in  t h e  b u d g e t .  Apar t  f rom t h e s e  
s u g g e s t i o n s  abou t  t h e  s c a l e  of payments  and g u a r a n t e e s ,  t h e  
c o m m it t ee  p roposed  s o l u t i o n s  o f  t h e  p rob lem s  of  c r e d i t  and t r a n s f e r .  
I t  was recommended t h a t  Germany’ s immedia te  need f o r  c r e d i t  s hou ld  
be  met by a f o r e i g n  loan  of  800 m i l l i o n  g o l d  m a r k s .  The problem 
of  p r e v e n t i n g  a r e p e t i t i o n  of  t h e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  o f  t h e  mark was 
r e s o l v e d  by t h e  p r o p o s a l  t h a t  Germany s hou ld  make r e p a r a t i o n  
payments  i n  h e r  own c u r r e n c y  t o  an Agent f o r  R e p a r a t i o n  Paymen ts ,  
and t h a t  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  c o n v e r t i n g  t h e s e  payments  i n t o  
f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c i e s  shou ld  r e s t  w i t h  t h e  c r e d i t o r  n a t i o n s ,
1.  E.  Schmacke,  op.  c i t , ,  p* 155*
2.  Commit tee  of  E x p e r t s ,  R e p o r t s ,  R .C , , V I I I .
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The m o d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o p o s a l s  of  t h e  Dawes P la n  had a 
p ro found  e f f e c t  on t h e  f u t u r e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  Germany' s  f i n a n c e s  
by i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  of  t h e  German p e o p l e  t o  a c h i e v e  a 
w o r k a b l e  r e p a r a t i o n  s e t t l e m e n t .  Th is  e f f e c t  was v i s i b l e  in  
t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  in  March and A p r i l  1924 ove r  t h e  r e n e w a l  of 
t h e  i n t e r i m  r e p a r a t i o n  scheme which had been  o p e r a t i n g  s i n c e  23 
November 1923 u n d e r  t h e  M.I#C*U.M# Agreement .  T h i s  a g r e e m e n t ,  
which had been  t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  d i r e c t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  in  O c tober  
and November 1923 be tween  t h e  F r a n c o - B e l g i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  
( M is s io n  I n t e r a l l i e d  de  C o n t r o l e  des  U s ine s  e t  des  Mines)  and
t h e  Ruhr i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ,  was due t o  e x p i r e  on 15 A p r i l  1924.
1.
I t s  e x c e e d i n g l y  onerous  t e r m s ,  which a r e  an i n d i c a t i o n  of  t h e  
s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  d e s i r e  of  German i n d u s t r y  t o  resume normal  
p r o d u c t i o n  in  t h e  autumn of  1923? had by t h e  s p r i n g  of  1924 
a r o u s e d  su c h  v i o l e n t  o p p o s i t i o n  from t h e  i n t e r e s t e d  German 
p a r t i e s  t h a t  a r e s u m p t i o n  of t h e  Ruhr s t r u g g l e  a ppeared  l i k e l y .  
However ,  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  of t h e  Dawes Repor t  on 9 A p r i l  t r a n s ­
formed t h e  s i t u a t i o n  by g i v i n g  t h e  Ruhr i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  hope  of
prompt f i n a n c i a l  r e l i e f ,  and t h e  M.I.C,U*M. Agreement  was t h e r e f o r e
2 .
t e m p o r a r i l y  renewed .
1.  The M .I .C .U.M . Agreement  p r o v id e d  ( l )  t h a t  r e p a r a t i o n  
d e l i v e r i e s  of  c o a l  and o t h e r  goods shou ld  be  resum ed ,  (2)  t h a t  
t h e  c o a l - o w n e r s  were t o  pay a t a x  of t e n  f r a n c s  f o r  eve ry  t o n  
of  c o a l  s o l d ,  and ( 3 ) t h a t  t h e y  should  make a lump payment o f  
a r r e a r s  in  t h e  payment of  t h e  Coa l  Tax which had ac cu m u la t e d  
be tw een  J a n u a r y  and November 1923« C. Bergmann,  op.  c i t . ,  
pp .  2 1 3 -4 .  These  demands were made e s p e c i a l l y  onerous  by
t h e  r e f u s a l  of  t h e  German government t o  compensa te  t h e  c o a l  
i n d u s t r y  f o r  d e l i v e r i e s  made.  A. J  .Toynbee ,  S u r v e y - o f  I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s ,  1924 ,  pp .  288-90 ;  E.  Schmacke,  op.  c i t . ,
P.  137.
2 .  A . J .  Toynbee ,  Survey of I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s .  1 9 2 4 . p p . 2 9 6 -7 .
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The s a l u t a r y  impact  of  t h e  Dawes R epo r t  on German o p i n io n  
was r e f l e c t e d  in  t h e  German g o v e rn m e n t ’ s f a v o u r a b l e  r e p l y  on l 6  
A p r i l  1924 t o  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission’ s n o t e  o f  11 A p r i l ,  which 
recommended t h e  a d o p t i o n  of  t h e  Repor t  a s  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  a s o l u t i o n  
of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  p r o b l e m . H o w e v e r ,  t h e  t a s k  of  s e c u r i n g  t h e  
u l t i m a t e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  Dawes Plan  was t e m p o r a r i l y  
c o m p l i c a t e d  by t h e  R e i c h s t a g  e l e c t i o n  of  May 1924,  which was 
f o u g h t  c e n t r a l l y  on t h e  u n r e a l i s t i c  i s s u e  of  w h e t h e r  t o  a c c e p t  
t h e  F l a n  or  r e j e c t  i t .  In  t h e  c o u r s e  of  t h e  e l e c t i o n  campaign 
t h e  DNVP r e f e r r e d  i r r e s p o n s i b l y  t o  t h e  Dawes P l a n  as  a " second  
V e r s a i l l e s " .  The SPD, on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  r e v e a l e d  a s i n g u l a r l y
bad a p p r e c i a t i o n  of p o p u l a r  p sycho logy  by b a s i n g  t h e i r  campaign
2 .
on t h e  c a tc h -w o rd  " A c c ep ta n ce "  (Annahme). ’ S t re sem ann  
c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y  compromised be tween  t h e s e  two e x t r e m e s  by a d v o c a t ­
ing a c c e p t a n c e  of  t h e  Dawes P l a n  in  o r d e r  t o  a c h i e v e  t h e  
e v a c u a t i o n  of  t h e  R h in e la n d  and Ruhr .  But t h i s  s o r t  of  a p p ro a c h  
cou ld  not  compete  w i t h  t h e  s l o g a n s  of t h e  DNVP. The r e s u l t  of  
t h e  e l e c t i o n  r e v e a l e d  a pronounced swing t o  t h e  ex tr eme  R ig h t  and 
L e f t .  The n a t i o n a l i s t s  (95 s e a t s )  w/ere now, w i t h  t h e  s u p p o r t  
of  t h e  Landbund (10 s e a t s ) ,  t h e  s t r o n g e s t  p a r t y  in  t h e  R e i c h s t a g .  
The SPD, s i n c e  1922 u n i t e d  w i t h  t h e  U3PD, a p p e a r s  t o  have l o s t  
i t s  l e f t - w i n g  c o m p l e t e l y  t o  t h e  KPD. The DVP l o s t  20 of i t s  65 
s e a t s  l a r g e l y  b e c a u s e  of  t h e  d e f e c t i o n  of  t h e  r i g h t - w i n g  o f  t h e  
p a r t y ;  and t h e  Democrats  were reduced  by 11 1 0  a meagre t o t a l  
of 28 s e a t s .  The effect o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n  was in  s h o r t  t o  i n c r e a s e
1. E .  Schmacke, op. c i t . ,  p.  156.
2.  E .  Schmacke, op.  c i t . ,  p.  158. G. Zwoch, Die E r f t i l l u n g s -  
und V e r s t ä n d i g u n g s p o l i t i k  der Weimarer  R e p u b l i k ,  p. 35«
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t h e  s t r e n g t h  of  t h o s e  g r o u p s ,  namely t h e  DNVP and KPD, who 
opposed t h e  a d o p t i o n  of t h e  Dawes F l a n .  S t re sem ann  t r i e d  t o  
c o u n t e r a c t  t h i s  new deve lopm en t  by a p p e a l i n g  t o  t h e  DNVP t o
1.
j o i n  a b o u r g e o i s  c a b i n e t  commit ted t o  a " u n i t e d  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ” . 
However ,  t h e  p r i c e  which t h e  DNVP asked f o r  t h i s ,  a ’’change  of  
c o u r s e  in  d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  p o l i c y " ,  was t o o  h i g h ,  and a s  a 
r e s u l t  t h e  Marx c a b i n e t ,  which  had r u l e d  s i n c e  30 November 1923) 
remained  i n  o f f i c e  in  a s e v e r e l y  weakened s t a t e .  The no 
c o n f i d e n c e  m otion  which  t h e  DNVP p r o m p t l y  moved, and t h e  ensu in g  
d e b a t e  in  which  S t re sem ann  was r e f e r r e d  t o  as  "a good a d v o c a t e
f o r  t h e  o t h e r  s i d e " ,  r e v e a l e d  t h e  s u s c e p t i b i l i t y  of t h e  new
2 •
g o v e rn m e n t .  * A l though  w i t h  t h e  s u p p o r t  of  t h e  SPD t h e  government
,  3 .
was a b l e  t o  d e f e a t  t h i s  m o t ion  on 6 J u n e  by 239 v o t e s  t o  194 ,  
t h e  o u t lo o k  f o r  t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of  t h e  Dawes P lan  was no t  h o p e f u l ,  
b e c a u s e  t h o s e  p a r t s  of i t  which a f f e c t e d  t h e  o w ne r sh ip  o f  t h e  
s t a t e  r a i l w a y s  r e q u i r e d  r a t i f i c a t i o n  by a t w o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y .
In t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t h e  a t t i t u d e  which S t resemann  
ad o p te d  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  t h e  e v a c u a t i o n  of t h e  Ruhr in  s u b s e q u e n t  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i th  t h e  A l l i e s  ove r  t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  Dawes 
P lan  i s  u n d e r s t a n d a b l e .  On 11 J u l y  S t resemann  compla ined  t o  
D'Abernon  t h a t  i f  he were  no t  g i v e n  a s s u r a n c e  by t h e  A l l i e s  about  
t h e  e v a c u a t i o n  of t h e  Ruhr  he would be u n a b l e  t o  s t i f l e  t h e
o p p o s i t i o n  of  t h e  DNVP, o r  even t h a t  w i t h i n  t h e  DVP, t o  t h e  Dawes
4 .
P l a n .  And t h e r e  was one s t a g e  d u r i n g  t h e  London C onfe rence  in
1. G. S t r e s e m a n n ,  op. c i t . ,  V o l .  I ,  p .  408.
2.  E ,  Schmacke, op.  c i t .  , p .  159»
3 .  E.  Eyck ,  G e s c h i c h t e  d e r  V'eimarer R e p u b l i k , V o l .  I ,  p .  408 .
4 .  G. S t r e s e m a n n ,  op.  c i t . ,  V o l .  I ,  p .  454.
414
August ,  when a deadlock on t h i s  sub jec t  between Stresemann and 
H e r r i o t ,  each under  s e v e re  p r e s s u r e  from home, t h r e a t e n e d  t o  
cause  t h e  breakdown of n e g o t i a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  s i g n a t u r e  of t h e  
Dawes Protocol , '*'* The P r o t o c o l  was only s igned  on 16 August 
a f t e r  a compromise evacua t ion  formula had been agreed upon by 
Stresemann and H er r io t*
Although St resemann’ s concern about t h e  e f f e c t  of  t h e  non­
evacua t ion  of t h e  Ruhr on h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  pass  t h e  Dawes P lan was 
p robab ly  g e n u i n e ,  t h e r e  a re  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  a t t i t u d e  of a t  
l e a s t  a s e c t i o n  of t h e  DNVP t o  t h e  Dawes P lan  a r o s e  from a d e s i r e  
t o  s t r i k e  p a r t i s a n  b a r g a i n s  r a t h e r  than  from a s i n c e r e  wish  t o  
r e j e c t  t h e  p l a n .  Stresemann h im se l f  commented on 9 J u l y  t h a t  
t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t s w e r e  not fundam en ta l ly  opposed t o  t h e  Dawes P l a n ,
bu t  merely wanted t o  make t h e i r  acc ep tanc e  of i t  h inge  upon
2 .
c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s ,  * The behav iour  of t h e  DNVP dur ing  t h e  f i n a l  
s t r u g g l e  over t h e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  Dawes Plan a t  t h e  end of 
August seems t o  support  t h i s  c o n c l u s i o n .  On 29 August t h e  DNVP 
decided  t o  r e l e a s e  a number of i t s  members t o  v o t e  with  t h e  
government in  o rde r  t o  ensure  t h e  r e q u i r e d  m a j o r i t y .  Th is  "Umfall"  
has  been g e n e r a l l y  a t t r i b u t e d  t  o an a l l e g e d  promise  by t h e  govern ­
ment t h a t  i t  would g iv e  c a b in e t  s e a t s  in r e t u r n  f o r  suppor t  of t h e  
Dawes P l a n .  ’V o te s  in exchange f o r  P o r t f o l i o s , "  says  Stampfer 
t e r s e l y ,  " p a r l i a m e n ta ry  h o r s e - t r a d i n g  of t h e  lowest  k i n d . "  * Th is  
however i s  not  an adequa te  e x p l a n a t i o n  of  t h e  DNVP’ s b e h a v i o u r ,
1. E.  Schmacke, op. c i t . ,  pp.  164-5*
2.  G. S tresem ann,  op, c i t , ,  V ol .  I ,  p ,  454.
3» F.  S tam pfer ,  op. c i t . ,  p. 425*
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I t s  a im was no t  t o  g a in  s e a t s  in  t h e  c a b i n e t .  Membership of t h e  
c a b i n e t  on t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  t e r m s  would have  been a s ig n  of  
weakness  r a t h e r  t h a n  a g a i n .  In f a c t  t h e  "Um fa l l"  o f  t h e  DNVP 
should  be viewed a s  a d e f e n s i v e  r a t h e r  t h a n  as  an o f f e n s i v e  
m e a s u r e .  In t h e  p r e c e d i n g  months t h e  DNVP had f a i l e d  t o  s u g g e s t  
any c o n v i n c i n g  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  a c c e p t a n c e  of t h e  Dawes P l a n .  
Because  of  t h i s ,  t h e r e  had s i n c e  May been a g row ing  movement of  
p u b l i c  o p i n io n  in  f a v o u r  o f  a c c e p t i n g  t h e  p l a n .  S e c t i o n s  of  t h e  
DNVP i t s e l f  had been  a f f e c t e d  by t h i s  swing of  o p i n i o n ,  and t h e  
p a r t y  had on ly  remained  u n i t e d  in  i t s  n e g a t i v e  s t a n c e  b e c a u s e  of  
t h e  p o w e r fu l  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  o f f i c i a l  p a r t y  n e w s p a p e r s ,  t h e  
"Kreuz Z e i t u n g "  and t h e  " D e u tsc he  T a g e s z e i t u n g " ,  and of  t h e  
Hugenberg p r e s s . 1- 2* The e v e n t u a l  d e c i s i o n  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  Dawes 
P l a n  was t h e  p r oduc t  o f  a f e a r  t h a t  i t s  r e j e c t i o n  would c a u s e  a
new e l e c t i o n  wh ich ,  b e c a u s e  of t h e  s t a t e  o f  p u b l i c  o p i n i o n ,
2 .
might  r e d u c e  t h e  g a i n s  which  t h e  DNVP had made in  May.
The d i s c o m f i t u r e  o f  t h e  DNVP in  August  1924 r e v e a l e d  t h a t  
German p u b l i c  o p i n i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  p r e p a r e d  t o  v o t e  f o r  t h e  s l o g a n s  
of t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t  p a r t i e s  a t  e l e c t i o n  t i m e ,  was u n w i l l i n g  t o  
g i v e  p r a c t i c a l  s u p p o r t  t o  p o l i c i e s  which would l e a d  t o  a 
r e p e t i t i o n  of t h e  e v e n t s  o f  1923» The way was p r e p a r e d  f o r  
s e v e r a l  y e a r s  of  f u l f i l m e n t  and f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i t y .
1 .  G. Zwoch, op.  c i t . ,  p .  37
2 .  i b i d . ,  p .  58 .
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CONCLUSION
The i n f l a t i o n  and d e p r e c i a t i o n  of t h e  mark which o c c u r r e d  
be tw een  t h e  end of  t h e  war  and 1923> and t h e  economic d i s o r g a n i s ­
a t i o n  which  b o t h  p rovoked  and a t t e n d e d  i t ,  had i t s  o r i g i n  in  t h e  
war  of 1914-1918 ,  which  l e f t  Germany in  a s t a t e  of  economic 
e x h a u s t i o n  and b o th  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  i m b a la n c e .
The r u t h l e s s  d i v e r s i o n  of  a l l  economic r e s o u r c e s  t o  t h e  war 
e f f o r t  and t h e  g rowth  of  t h e  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  f l o a t i n g  
d e b t  a l s o  l e f t  a d a n g e ro u s  l e g a c y  of economic d i s t o r t i o n  and 
f i n a n c i a l  p a s s i v i t y .  T h u s ,  when t h e  war  e nde d ,  Germany was no t  
on ly  e c o n o m i c a l ly  run-down and on t h e  v e r g e  of  f i n a n c i a l  
c o l l a p s e  but  was a l s o  n e i t h e r  a b l e  n o r  w i l l i n g  t o  submit  h e r s e l f  
t o  t h e  economic c o n t r o l s  and f i n a n c i a l  r e f o r m s  which  would have  
been  n e c e s s a r y  in  o r d e r  t o  a c h i e v e  a b a la n c e d  economic r e c o v e r y  
and f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i s a t i o n .  On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h e  end of  t h e  war 
b r o u g h t  t h e  r em ova l  of  t h e  a r t i f i c i a l  r e s t r a i n t s  on d o m e s t i c  and 
o v e r s e a s  s p e n d in g  which had been  imposed by war l o a n s  and by t h e  
b l o c k a d e .  In t h e  a b s e n c e  of any i n t e r n a t i o n a l  European  r e c o n s t r u c ­
t i o n  scheme or  s u b s t a n t i a l  f o r e i g n  c r e d i t s ,  Germany c o u l d ,  a t  t h e  
b e g i n n i n g  of t h e  p o s t - w a r  p e r i o d ,  look fo rw ard  on ly  t o  economic 
d i s o r g a n i s a t i o n  and m o n e ta ry  i n s t a b i l i t y .
For  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  p a r t  of  t h e  f i r s t  t h i r t y  months of  peace  
t h e  German economic and f i n a n c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  d e t e r i o r a t e d  r a t h e r  
t h a n  im proved .  The economic d i s l o c a t i o n  which  p r e v a i l e d  was 
a g g r a v a t e d  by r e p a r a t i o n  d e l i v e r i e s  of  r a i l w a y  e q u ip m e n t ,  
m erchan t  s h i p p i n g ,  c o a l  and o t h e r  g o o d s .  However ,  r e p a r a t i o n
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deliveries were only one of a number of factors arising from 
either the war or the aftermath which contributed to the economic 
malaise. Similarly, reparation deliveries exerted no decisive 
direct effect on the budgetary and trade deficits of Germany 
before May 1921. Finally, the reparation problem had no crucial 
effect either on the ability of the German government to raise 
loans at home and abroad or on the adequacy of its fiscal 
reforms. The internal credit of the government and its fiscal 
power were reduced largely because of partisan differences of a 
purely domestic nature and because of administrative difficulties; 
and Germany’s external financial weakness was caused by the 
jamming of the mechanism of international finance which occurred 
in the early post-war years, largely as a result of the financial 
withdrawal of the United States from Europe,
In 1921 and 1922 there fas a quickening depreciation of the 
mark, which caused both budgetary imbalance and a noticeable 
recovery in the sector of the economy which was devoted to the 
manufacture of production, as opposed to consumption, goods.
The depreciation was at the outset due less to the economic 
impact of reparation deliveries than to the direct financial 
effect exerted in the second half of 1921 and the first half of 
1922 by the large cash payments made under the London Schedule 
of Payments and subsequent agreements. The really disastrous 
fall of the mark in the second half of 1922, and the distortion 
of economic activity which it encouraged, occurred at a time 
when cash payments and deliveries in kind had become relatively
4l8
unimportant and when, because of the failure of negotiations 
over an international loan, and because of growing tension over 
the question of a moratorium, the psychological impact of the 
reparation question had become highly unfavourable. But neither 
the increased financial burden of reparations after May 1921 nor 
its psychological effect from the middle of 1922 would have been 
able to cause the depreciation which took place if it had not 
been for the huge size of the internal and external floating 
debt which had been accumulated in preceding years.
The complete financial collapse of 1923 was not the result 
of reparation payments as such, but of the huge government 
expenditures and psychological panic occasioned by the struggle 
in the Ruhr which followed the breakdown of moratorium 
negotiations in January 1923»
The stabilisation of the mark after November 1923 was due 
partly to the cessation of the Ruhr struggle and the strict 
limitation of government expenditure, and partly to the growing 
desire, born of fear of social revolution and national disintegr­
ation, for a stable currency. Stabilisation was also made 
possible by the long-delayed intervention of the United States 
in the financial affairs of Europe. The transformation of the 
domestic and international financial atmosphere was so complete 
by 1924 that neither the resentment aroused by the onerous terms 
of the M.I.C.U.M. Agreement nor the partiality of the German 
electorate for Nationalist and Communist slogans at the Reichstag 
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a g a i n s t  Germany by such a g g r e s s io n  by l a n d ,  by sea and from th e  
a i r ,  and in g e n e r a l  a l l  damage as d e f ine d  in Annex I  h e r e t o .
In accordance  w i th  Germany’s p ledges ,  a l r e a d y  g iv e n ,  as  
t o  complete r e s t o r a t i o n  f o r  Belgium, Germany u n d e r t a k e s ,  in 
a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  compensation f o r  damage e lsewhere  in t h i s  P a r t
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prov ided  f o r ,  as a consequence of t h e  v i o l a t i o n  of t h e  
T r e a t y  of 1839» t o  make reimbursement of a l l  sums which 
Belgium has  borrowed from t h e  A l l i ed  and A ssoc ia ted  Governments 
up t o  November 11, 1918, t o g e t h e r  w i th  i n t e r e s t  a t  th e  r a t e  of 
f i v e  per  cent ,  ( 5/0 per  annum on such sums. Th is  amount s h a l l  
be de te rmined by t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission, and t h e  German 
Government u n d e r ta k es  t h e re u p o n  f o r t h w i t h  t o  make a s p e c i a l  
i s s u e  of b e a r e r  bonds t o  an e q u iv a le n t  amount payable  in marks 
g o ld ,  on May 1, 1926, o r ,  a t  t h e  option  of t h e  German Government,  
on May 1 in any year  up t o  1926. Sub jec t  t o  t h e  f o r e g o in g ,  
t h e  form of such bonds s h a l l  be determined by t h e  R epara t ion  
Commission. Such bonds s h a l l  be handed over t o  t h e  R ep a ra t io n  
Commission, which has a u t h o r i t y  t o  t a k e  and acknowledge r e c e i p t  
t h e r e o f  on b e h a l f  of Belgium,
A r t i c l e  233
The amount of t h e  above damage f o r  which compensation 
i s  t o  be made by Germany s h a l l  be de te rmined by an I n t e r - A l l i e d  
Commission, t o  be c a l l e d  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission and 
c o n s t i t u t e d  in t h e  form and w i th  the  powers s e t  f o r t h  he reunde r  
and in Annexes I I  t o  V I I  i n c l u s i v e  h e r e t o .
Th i s  Commission s h a l l  c o n s id e r  t h e  c la im s  and g iv e  t o  
t h e  German government a j u s t  o p p o r tu n i ty  t o  be hea rd .
The f i n d i n g s  of t h e  Commission as t o  t h e  amount of damage 
d e f in e d  as above s h a l l  be concluded and n o t i f i e d  t o  t h e  German 
Government on or b e f o r e  May 1,  1921, as  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  ex ten t
of t h a t  G overnm en ts  o b l i g a t i o n s .
The Commission s h a l l  c o n c u r r e n t ly  draw up  a schedu le  of
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payments p r e s c r i b i n g  t h e  t i m e  and manner f o r  s e c u r in g  and 
d i s c h a r g i n g  t h e  e n t i r e  o b l i g a t i o n  w i th in  a pe r iod  of t h i r t y  
y e a r s  from May 1 , 1921. I f ,  however, w i t h i n  t h e  per iod 
mentioned ,  Germany f a i l s  t o  d i s c h a r g e  h e r  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  any 
ba lance  remaining unpaid may, w i th in  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  of t h e  
Commission, be postponed f o r  s e t t l e m e n t  in  subsequent  y e a r s ,  
or may be handled  o th e rw is e  in  such manner as t h e  A l l i ed  and 
A ssoc ia ted  Governments,  a c t i n g  in accordance  w i th  t h e  p rocedure  
l a i d  down in  t h i s  Par t  of t h e  p resen t  T r e a t y ,  s h a l l  d e t e rm in e .
A r t ic l e  234
The R epara t ion  Commission s h a l l  a f t e r  May 1 , 1921, from 
t im e  t o  t i m e ,  c o n s id e r  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  and c a p a c i t y  of Germany, 
and,  a f t e r  g iv in g  her  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a j u s t  o p p o r tu n i ty  t o  be 
h e a rd ,  s h a l l  have d i s c r e t i o n  t o  extend th e  d a t e ,  and t o  modify 
t h e  form of payments,  such as a re  t o  be provided  f o r  in 
accordance  w i th  A r t i c l e  233» tort; not  t o  cance l  any p a r t ,  except  
w i th  t h e  s p e c i f i c  a u t h o r i t y  of the  s e v e r a l  Governments r e p r e s e n t e d  
upon t h e  Commission.
A r t i c l e  239
In order  t o  enab le  t h e  A l l i e d  and A ssoc ia ted  Powers t o  
proceed a t  once t o  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  of t h e i r  i n d u s t r i a l  and 
economic l i f e ,  pending t h e  f u l l  d e t e r m in a t io n  of t h e i r  c l a im s ,  
Germany s h a l l  pay in such i n s t a l m e n t s  and in such manner 
(whether  in g o ld ,  commodit ies ,  s h i p s ,  s e c u r i t i e s  or o th e rw is e )  
as  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission may f i x ,  du r ing  1919» 1920 and 
t h e  f i r s t  four  months of 1921,  t h e  equ iva len t  of  20 ,000 ,000 ,000  
gold marks.  Out of t h i s  sum t h e  expenses of t h e  armies  of
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occupa t ion  subsequent  t o  t h e  A rm is t i ce  of November 11,  1918 , 
s h a l l  f i r s t  be m e t , and such s u p p l i e s  of food and raw m a t e r i a l s  
as  may be judged by t h e  Governments of t h e  P r i n c i p a l  A l l i e d  and 
A ssoc ia ted  Powers t o  be e s s e n t i a l  t o  enable  Germany t o  meet 
h e r  o b l i g a t i o n s  f o r  r e p a r a t i o n  may a l s o ,  w i th  t h e  app rova l  of 
t h e  sa id  Governments,  be paid f o r  out of t h e  above sum. The 
b a l a n c e  s h a l l  be reckoned tow ards  l i q u i d a t i o n  of t h e  amounts 
due f o r  r e p a r a t i o n .  Germany s h a l l  f u r t h e r  d e p o s i t  bonds as 
p r e s c r ib e d  in parag raph  12(c)  of Annex I I  h e r e t o .
A r t i c l e  216
Germany f u r t h e r  ag ree s  t o  t h e  d i r e c t  a p p l i c a t i o n  of her  
economic r e s o u r c e s  t o  r e p a r a t i o n  as s p e c i f i e d  in  Annexes I I I ,
3V, V and V I ,  r e l a t i n g  r e s p e c t i v e l y  t o  merchant  s h ip p in g ,  t o  
p h y s i c a l  r e s t o r a t i o n  t o  co a l  and d e r i v a t i v e s  of c o a l ,  and t o  
d y e s t u f f s  and o th e r  chemica l  p ro d u c t s ;  provided  always t h a t  
t h e  va lu e  of t h e  p r o p e r t y  t r a n s f e r r e d  and any s e r v i c e s  r endered  
by her  under  t h e s e  Annexes,  a s se s se d  in t h e  manner t h e r e i n  
p r e s c r i b e d ,  s h a l l  be c r e d i t e d  t o  her  towards  l i q u i d a t i o n  of her  
o b l i g a t i o n s  under  t h e  above A r t i c l e s .
A r t i c l e  217
The s u c c e s s iv e  i n s t a l m e n t s ,  i n c lu d in g  t h e  above sum, 
paid over by Germany in  s a t i s f a c t i o n  of t h e  above c la ims w i l l  
be d iv ided  by t h e  A l l i e d  and Assoc ia ted  Governments in 
p r o p o r t i o n s  which have been de termined  upon by them in advance 
on a b a s i s  of g e n e r a l  e q u i ty  and of  t h e  r i g h t s  of each.
For t h e  purposes  of t h i s  d i v i s i o n  t h e  v a l u e  of p r o p e r ty
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t r a n s f e r r e d  and s e r v i c e s  rendered  under  A r t i c l e  243, and under  
Annexes I I I ,  IV, V, VI and V I I ,  s h a l l  be reckoned in  t h e  same 
manner as cash payments e f f e c t e d  in  t h a t  y e a r .
A r t i c l e  2 38
In a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  payments mentioned above Germany 
s h a l l  e f f e c t ,  in accordance  w i th  t h e  p rocedure  l a i d  down by 
t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission, r e s t i t u t i o n  in cash of cash t a k e n  
away, s e ized  or s e q u e s t r a t e d ,  and a l s o  r e s t i t u t i o n  of an im a l s ,  
o b j e c t s  of  every n a t u r e  and s e c u r i t i e s  t a k e n  away, se ized  or  
s e q u e s t r a t e d ,  in t h e  cases  in which i t  proves  p o s s i b l e  t o  
i d e n t i f y  them in  t e r r i t o r y  be long ing  t o  Germany or her  a l l i e s .
U n t i l  t h i s  procedure  i s  l a i d  down, r e s t i t u t i o n  w i l l  
co n t in u e  in  accordance  w i th  t h e  p r o v i s io n s  of t h e  A rm is t i ce  
of November 11, 1918» and i t s  renewals  and t h e  P r o to c o l s  t h e r e t o .
A r t i c l e  239
The German Government u n d e r t a k e s  t o  make f o r th w i t h  
t h e  r e s t i t u t i o n  contempla ted  by A r t i c l e  238 and t o  make t h e  
payments and d e l i v e r i e s  contempla ted  by A r t i c l e s  233» 234,
235 and 236.
A r t i c l e  240
The German Government r e c o g n i s e s  t h e  Commission provided  
f o r  by A r t i c l e  233 as t h e  same may be c o n s t i t u t e d  by t h e  A l l i e d  
and A ssoc ia ted  Governments in  accordance  w i th  Annex I I ,  and 
ag ree s  i r r e v o c a b l y  t o  t h e  p o s s e s s io n  and e x e r c i s e  by such 
Commission of t h e  power and a u t h o r i t y  g iven  t o  i t  under t h e
p r e s e n t  T rea ty
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The German Government w i l l  supply t o  t h e  Commission 
a l l  t h e  in fo rm a t io n  which t h e  Commission may r e q u i r e  r e l a t i v e  
t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  and o p e ra t io n s  and t o  t h e  p r o p e r t y ,  
p r o d u c t i v e  c a p a c i t y ,  and s to c k s  and c u r r e n t  p roduc t ion  of raw 
m a t e r i a l s  and manufactured  a r t i c l e s  of Germany and h e r  
n a t i o n a l s ,  and f u r t h e r  any in fo rm a t io n  r e l a t i v e  t o  m i l i t a r y  
o p e r a t i o n s  which in t h e  judgment of t h e  Commission may be 
n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  assessm ent  of Germany’s l i a b i l i t y  f o r  
r e p a r a t i o n  as d e f in e d  in  Annex I ,
The German Government w i l l  accord t o  t h e  members of 
t h e  Commission and i t s  a u t h o r i s e d  agen t s  t h e  same r i g h t s  and 
im munit ies  as a r e  enjoyed in Germany by du ly  a c c r e d i t e d  
d ip lo m a t ic  agen ts  of f r i e n d l y  Powers.
Germany f u r t h e r  ag rees  t o  p rov ide  fo r  t h e  s a l a r i e s  and 
expenses  of t h e  Commission and of such s t a f f  as i t  may employ.
A r t i c l e  241
Germany u n d e r ta k e s  t o  p a s s ,  i s s u e  and m a in ta in  in  f o r c e  
any l e g i s l a t i o n ,  o rd e r s  and d e c re e s  t h a t  may be n e c e ss a ry  t o  
g i v e  complete e f f e c t  t o  t h e s e  p r o v i s i o n s .
A r t i c l e  242
The p r o v i s i o n s  of  t h i s  P a r t  of  t h e  p r e s e n t  T rea ty  do not 
app ly  t o  t h e  p r o p e r t y ,  r i g h t s  and i n t e r e s t s  r e f e r r e d  t o  in 
S e c t i o n s  I I I  and IV of P a r t  X (Economic C lauses)  of t h e  p r e s e n t  
T r e a t y ,  nor t o  t h e  p roduct  of t h e i r  l i q u i d a t i o n ,  except  so f a r  
as  concerns  any f i n a l  b a l a n c e  in favour  of Germany under 
A r t i c l e  2 4 3 (a ) .
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A r t i c l e  243
The fo l lo w in g  s h a l l  be reckoned as c r e d i t s  t o  Germany 
in r e s p e c t  of her  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s
(a)  Any f i n a l  b a l a n c e  in favour  of Germany under  
S e c t io n  V ( A l s a c e -L o r r a in e )  of Far t  I I I  ( P o l i t i c a l  Clauses f o r  
Europe) and S ec t io n s  I I I  and IV of Par t  X (Economic C lauses)  of 
t h e  p r e s e n t  T re a ty ;
(b)  Amounts due t o  Germany in r e s p e c t  of t r a n s f e r s  
under  S e c t io n  IV (Saar  Bas in)  of Par t  I I I  ( P o l i t i c a l  C lauses  f o r  
E u ro p e ) ,  P a r t  IX ( F i n a n c i a l  C la u s e s ) ,  and P a r t  X I I  ( P o r t s ,  
Waterways and R a i lw ays ) ;
(c )  Amounts which in t h e  judgment of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  
Commission should be c r e d i t e d  t o  Germany on account  of any 
o th e r  t r a n s f e r s  under  t h e  p r e s e n t  T re a ty  of p r o p e r t y ,  r i g h t s ,  
c once ss ions  or o the r  i n t e r e s t s .
In no case  however s h a l l  c r e d i t  be g iven  f o r  p r o p e r ty  
r e s t o r e d  in accordance  w i th  A r t i c l e  238 of t h e  p r e s e n t  P a r t .
A r t i c l e  244
The t r a n s f e r  of  t h e  German submarine ca b l e s  which do 
not  form t h e  s u b je c t  of p a r t i c u l a r  p r o v i s io n s  of t h e  p r e s e n t  
T re a ty  i s  r e g u la t e d  by Annex V I I  h e r e t o .
Annex I
Compensation may be claimed from Germany under A r t i c l e  
232 above in r e s p e c t  of t h e  t o t a l  damage under  t h e  fo l l o w in g  
cat  e g o r i e s :
( l )  Damage t o  in j u r e d  persons  and t o  s u rv iv in g
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dependents  by p e r s o n a l  i n j u r y  t o  or de a th  of  c i v i l i a n s  caused 
by a c t s  of war,  i n c lu d in g  bombardments or o th e r  a t t a c k s  on 
la n d ,  on s e a ,  or from t h e  a i r ,  and a l l  t h e  d i r e c t  consequences  
t h e r e o f ,  and of a l l  o p e r a t i o n s  of war by t h e  two groups of 
b e l l i g e r e n t s  wherever a r i s i n g .
(2) Damage caused by Germany or h e r  a l l i e s  t o  c i v i l i a n  
v i c t i m s  of a c t s  of c r u e l t y ,  v i o l e n c e  or m a l t rea tm en t  ( i n c l u d i n g  
i n j u r i e s  t o  l i f e  or h e a l t h  as a consequence of im pr isonment ) ,  
d e p o r t a t i o n ,  in ternment or e v a c u a t io n ,  of exposure a t  sea or
of be ing  fo rced  t o  l a b o u r ,  wherever a r i s i n g ,  and t o  t h e  
s u r v iv in g  dependents  of such v i c t i m s .
( 3 ) Damage caused by Germany or he r  a l l i e s  in t h e i r  
own t e r r i t o r y  or in occupied or invaded t e r r i t o r y  t o  c i v i l i a n  
v i c t i m s  of a l l  a c t s  i n j u r i o u s  to  h e a l t h  or c a p a c i t y  t o  work,  
or t o  honour ,  as  w e l l  as  t o  t h e  s u r v iv in g  dependents  of such 
v i c t  im s .
(4)  Damage caused by any kind of m a l t rea tm en t  of 
p r i s o n e r s  of war.
(5) As damage caused t o  t h e  peop les  of t h e  A l l i e d  and 
A ssoc ia ted  Powers,  a l l  pens ions  and compensation in t h e  n a t u r e  
of pens ions  t o  n a v a l  and m i l i t a r y  v i c t i m s  of war ( i n c l u d i n g  
members of t h e  a i r  f o r c e ) ,  w hether  m u t i l a t e d ,  wounded, s i c k  or 
i n v a l i d e d ,  and t o  th e  dependen ts  of such v i c t i m s ,  t h e  amount 
due t o  t h e  A l l i ed  and A ssoc ia ted  Governments be ing  c a l c u l a t e d  
f o r  each of them as  be ing  t h e  c a p i t a l i s e d  cos t  of such pens ions  
and compensation a t  t h e  d a t e  of t h e  coming i n t o  f o r c e  of t h e
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p re s e n t  T r e a t y ,  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  s c a l e s  in f o r c e  in F rance  
at  such d a t e .
(6) The cos t  of a s s i s t a n c e  by t h e  Governments of t h e  
A l l i ed  and A ssocia ted  Powers t o  p r i s o n e r s  of war and t o  t h e i r  
f a m i l i e s  and dependen ts .
(7) Allowances by t h e  Governments of t h e  A l l i ed  and 
A ssoc ia ted  Powers t o  t h e  f a m i l i e s  and dependen ts  of m ob i l i s ed  
persons  or persons  s e r v in g  w i th  th e  f o r c e s ,  t h e  amount due t o  
them f o r  each ca lenda r  year  in  which h o s t i l i t i e s  occurred
being  c a l c u l a t e d  f o r  each Government on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  av e ra g e  
s c a l e  f o r  such payments in f o r c e  in France  dur ing  t h a t  y e a r .
(8)  Damage caused t o  c i v i l i a n s  by be ing  fo rced  by 
Germany or h e r  a l l i e s  t o  l a bou r  w ithou t  j u s t  r em u n e ra t io n .
( 9 ) Damage in r e s p e c t  of a l l  p r o p e r ty  wherever s i t u a t e d  
be long ing  t o  any of t h e  A l l i e d  or A ssoc ia ted  S t a t e s  or t h e i r  
n a t i o n a l s ,  w i th  t h e  excep t ion  of  nav a l  and m i l i t a r y  works or 
m a t e r i a l s ,  which has  been c a r r i e d  o f f ,  s e i z e d ,  i n j u r e d  or 
d e s t ro y ed  by t h e  a c t s  of Germany or her  a l l i e s  on la n d ,  on sea 
or from t h e  a i r  or damage d i r e c t l y  in consequence of h o s t i l i t i e s  
or of any o p e ra t io n s  of  war.
(10) Damage in  t h e  form of l e v i e s ,  f i n e s  and o th e r  
s i m i l a r  e x a c t io n s  imposed by Germany or her  a l l i e s  upon t h e  
c i v i l i a n  p o p u l a t i o n .
Annex I I
1* The Commission r e f e r r e d  t o  in A r t i c l e  233 s h a l l  be 
c a l l e d  "The R ep a ra t io n  Commission" and i s  h e r e i n a f t e r  r e f e r r e d
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t o  as " th e  Commission".
2. D e leg a te s  t o  t h i s  Commission s h a l l  be nominated by t h e  
United S t a t e s  of America,  Great  B r i t a i n ,  F rance ,  I t a l y ,  J a p a n ,  
Belgium and t h e  S e rb -C ro a t -S lo v e n e  S t a t e .  Each of t h e s e  Powers 
w i l l  appo in t  one D e le g a te  and a l s o  one A s s i s t a n t  D e le g a te ,  who 
w i l l  t a k e  h i s  p la c e  in  case of i l l n e s s  or n e c e s s a ry  absence ,  
but a t  o th e r  t im es  w i l l  only have the  r i g h t  t o  be p r e s e n t  a t  
p roceed ings  w i thou t  t a k i n g  any p a r t  t h e r e i n .
On no occas ion  s h a l l  t h e  D e lega te s  of more than  f i v e  
of t h e  above Powers have t h e  r i g h t  t o  t a k e  p a r t  in t h e  p roceed­
ings of t h e  Commission and t o  record  t h e i r  v o t e s .  The D e le g a te s  
of t h e  United  S t a t e s ,  Great  B r i t a i n ,  F rance  and I t a l y  s h a l l  have 
t h i s  r i g h t  on a l l  o c c a s i o n s .  The D e lega te  of Belgium s h a l l  have 
t h i s  r i g h t  on a l l  occas ions  o th e r  t h a n  t h o s e  r e f e r r e d  t o  below. 
The D e le g a te  of Japan s h a l l  have t h i s  r i g h t  on occas ions  when 
q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  damage at  s e a ,  and q u e s t i o n s  a r i s i n g  under  
A r t i c l e  260 of P a r t  IX ( F i n a n c i a l  C lauses)  in which Japanese  
i n t e r e s t s  a r e  conce rned ,  a r e  under  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  The D e le g a te  
of t h e  S e rb -C ro a t -S lo v e n e  S t a t e  s h a l l  have t h i s  r i g h t  when 
q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  A u s t r i a ,  Hungary or B u lg a r i a  a re  under  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
Each Government r e p r e s e n t e d  on t h e  Commission s h a l l  have  
t h e  r i g h t  t o  withdraw t h e re f ro m  upon tw elve  months '  n o t i c e  
f i l e d  w i th  t h e  Commission and confirmed in  t h e  co u r s e  of t h e  
s i x t h  month a f t e r  t h e  d a t e  of  t h e  o r i g i n a l  n o t i c e .
3.  Such of t h e  o th e r  A l l i e d  and A ssoc ia ted  Powers as may be
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i n t e r e s t e d  s h a l l  have t h e  r i g h t  t o  appoin t  a D e leg a te  t o  be 
p r e s e n t  and a c t  as  A ssesso r  only w h i le  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  
c la ims and i n t e r e s t s  a r e  under  examination or d i s c u s s i o n ,  but  
w i thou t  t h e  r i g h t  t o  v o t e .
4. In case  of t h e  d e a t h ,  r e s i g n a t i o n  or r e c a l l  of  any
D e le g a t e ,  A s s i s t a n t  D e le g a t e ,  or A ss e s s o r ,  a s u cces s o r  t o  him 
s h a l l  be nominated as  soon as p o s s i b l e .
5* The Commission w i l l  have i t s  p r i n c i p a l  permanent Bureau
in  P a r i s  and w i l l  hold i t s  f i r s t  meeting in  P a r i s  as  soon as 
p r a c t i c a b l e  a f t e r  t h e  coming i n t o  f o r c e  of  t h e  p r e s e n t  T r e a t y ,  
and t h e r e a f t e r  w i l l  meet in  such p la c e  or p la c e s  and a t  such t im e  
as i t  may deem conven ien t  and as may be n e c e s s a ry  f o r  t h e  most 
e x p e d i t i o u s  d i s c h a r g e  of i t s  d u t i e s .
6.  At i t s  f i r s t  meet ing t h e  Commission s h a l l  e l e c t ,  from 
among t h e  D e lega tes  r e f e r r e d  t o  above ,  a Chairman and a V ic e -  
Chairman,  who s h a l l  hold  o f f i c e  f o r  one y ea r  and s h a l l  be 
e l i g i b l e  f o r  r e - e l e c t i o n .  I f  a vacancy in t h e  Chairmanship
or V ice-Cha i rm ansh ip  should occur du r ing  t h 6  annua l  p e r io d ,  t h e  
Commission s h a l l  proceed t o  a new e l e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  remainder  of 
t h e  sa id  p e r i o d .
7 .  The Commission i s  a u t h o r i s e d  t o  appo in t  a l l  n e c e s s a ry  
o f f i c e r s ,  ag e n t s  and employees who may be r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  
e x ec u t io n  of i t s  f u n c t i o n s ,  and t o  f i x  t h e i r  r em une ra t ion ;  t o  
c o n s t i t u t e  commit tees ,  whose members need not  n e c e s s a r i l y  be 
members of t h e  Commission, and t o  t a k e  a l l  e x e c u t iv e  s t e p s  nec ­
e s s a r y  f o r  t h e  purpose of  d i s c h a r g i n g  i t s  d u t i e s ;  and t o
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d e l e g a t e  a u t h o r i t y  and d i s c r e t i o n  t o  o f f i c e r s ,  ag e n t s  and 
com m it tee s .
8. A l l  p roceed ings  of t h e  Commission s h a l l  be p r i v a t e ,  
u n l e s s ,  on p a r t i c u l a r  o c c a s i o n s ,  t h e  Commission s h a l l  o the rw ise  
de te rm ine  f o r  s p e c i a l  r e a s o n s .
9. The Commission s h a l l  be r e q u i r e d ,  i f  t h e  German 
Government so d e s i r e ,  t o  h e a r ,  w i th in  a per iod  which i t  w i l l  
f i x  from t ime t o  t i m e ,  ev idence  and arguments on t h e  p a r t  of 
Germany on any q u es t i o n  connected w i th  h e r  c a p a c i t y  t o  pay.
10. The Commission s h a l l  c o n s id e r  t h e  c la im s  and g ive  t o  
t h e  German Government a j u s t  o p p o r tu n i ty  t o  be h e a rd ,  but not  
t o  t a k e  any p a r t  w hatever  in  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  of  t h e  Commission.
The Commission s h a l l  a f f o r d  a s i m i l a r  o p p o r tu n i ty  t o  t h e  a l l i e s  
of Germany, when i t  s h a l l  c o n s id e r  t h a t  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  in 
q u e s t i o n .
11.  The Commission s h a l l  not  be bound by any p a r t i c u l a r  code 
or r u l e s  of law or by any p a r t i c u l a r  r u l e  of ev idence  or of 
p ro c e d u re ,  but s h a l l  be guided by j u s t i c e ,  e q u i ty  and good f a i t h .  
I t s  d e c i s i o n s  must f o l l o w  t h e  same p r i n c i p l e s  and r u l e s  in  a l l  
cases  where th e y  a r e  a p p l i c a b l e .  I t  w i l l  e s t a b l i s h  r u l e s  r e l a t i n g  
t o  methods of proof of c l a im s .  I t  may a c t  on any t r u s t w o r t h y  
modes of com puta t ion .
12. The Commission s h a l l  have a l l  t h e  powers con fe r red  upon 
i t ,  and s h a l l  e x e r c i s e  a l l  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  ass igned  t o  i t ,  by t h e  
p r e s e n t  T r e a t y .
The Commission s h a l l  in g e n e r a l  have wide l a t i t u d e  as t o
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i t s  c o n t r o l  and hand l ing  of  t h e  whole r e p a r a t i o n  problem as 
d e a l t  w i th  in  t h i s  Pa r t  of t h e  p resen t  T rea ty  and s h a l l  have 
a u t h o r i t y  t o  i n t e r p r e t  i t s  p r o v i s i o n s .  S ub jec t  t o  t h e  
p r o v i s i o n s  of  t h e  p resen t  T r e a t y ,  t h e  Commission i s  c o n s t i t u t e d  
by t h e  s e v e r a l  A l l i ed  and A ssoc ia ted  Governments r e f e r r e d  t o  in 
pa rag raphs  2 and 3 above as t h e  e x c l u s i v e  agency of t h e  s a id  
Governments r e s p e c t i v e l y  f o r  r e c e i v i n g ,  s e l l i n g ,  h o ld in g ,  and 
d i s t r i b u t i n g  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  payments t o  be made by Germany 
under  t h i s  Pa r t  of t h e  p re s en t  T r e a t y ,  The Commission must 
comply w i th  the  fo l low ing  c o n d i t i o n s  and p r o v i s i o n s :
(a )  Whatever p a r t  of t h e  f u l l  amount of t h e  proved 
c la ims  i s  no t  paid in  go ld ,  or in s h i p s ,  s e c u r i t i e s  and 
commodit ies  or o th e rw is e ,  Germany s h a l l  be r e q u i r e d ,  under  such 
c o n d i t i o n s  as t h e  Commission may d e te rm in e ,  t o  cover  by way of 
g u a ra n t e e  by an e q u i v a le n t  i s s u e  of bonds,  o b l i g a t i o n s  or o t h e r ­
w i s e ,  in o rder  to  c o n s t i t u t e  an acknowledgment of t h e  sa id  p a r t  
of t h e  d e b t ,
(b)  In p e r i o d i c a l l y  e s t i m a t in g  Germany* s c a p a c i t y  t o  
pay,  t h e  Commission s h a l l  examine t h e  German system of t a x a t i o n ,  
f i r s t ,  t o  t h e  end t h a t  t h e  sums f o r  r e p a r a t i o n  which Germany is  
r e q u i r e d  t o  pay s h a l l  become a charge upon a l l  h e r  revenues  
p r i o r  t o  t h a t  f o r  t h e  s e r v i c e  or d i s c h a r g e  of any domestic  l o a n ,  
and se c o n d ly ,  so as to  s a t i s f y  i t s e l f  t h a t ,  in g e n e r a l ,  t h e  
German scheme of t a x a t i o n  i s  f u l l y  as heavy p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  as 
t h a t  of any of  t h e  Powers r e p r e s e n t e d  on t h e  Commission,
(c )  In order  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  and con t inue  t h e  immediate
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r e s t o r a t i o n  of t h e  economic l i f e  of t h e  A l l i e d  and A ssoc ia ted  
c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  Commission w i l l  as  provided in A r t i c l e  235 t a k e  
from Germany by way of s e c u r i t y  f o r  and acknowledgment of h e r  
debt  a f i r s t  in s t a lm e n t  of gold b e a r e r  bonds f r e e  of a l l  t a x e s  
and charges  of  every d e s c r i p t i o n  e s t a b l i s h e d  or t o  be e s t a b l i s h e d  
by th e  Government of t h e  German Empire or of t h e  German S t a t e s ,  
or by any a u t h o r i t y  s u b j e c t  t o  them; t h e s e  bonds w i l l  be 
d e l i v e r e d  on account  and in t h r e e  p o r t i o n s ,  t h e  marks gold 
be ing  payab le  in confo rm i ty  wi th  A r t i c l e  262 of Pa r t  DC 
( F i n a n c i a l  Clauses)  of t h e  p r e s e n t  T r e a ty  as f o l l o w s ;
(1) To be i s sued  f o r t h w i t h ,  20 ,000 ,000 ,000  Marks 
gold b e a r e r  bonds payable  n o t  l a t e r  t h a n  May 1, 1921, w i th o u t  
i n t e r e s t .  There  s h a l l  be s p e c i a l l y  a p p l i e d  tow ards  t h e  
a m o r t i s a t i o n  of t h e s e  bonds t h e  payments which Germany i s  
pledged t o  make in confo rm i ty  w i th  A r t i c l e  235» a f t e r  ded u c t io n  
of t h e  sums used f o r  t h e  reimbursement of expenses of t h e  armies  
of occupa t ion  and f o r  payment of f o o d s t u f f s  and raw m a t e r i a l s .  
Such bonds as have not  been redeemed by May 1,  1921, s h a l l  t h e n  
be exchanged fo r  new bonds of t h e  same ty p e  as t h o s e  provided 
f o r  below (Paragraph 12, c ,  2 ) .
(2)  To be i s sued  f o r t h w i t h ,  f u r t h e r  40 ,000 ,000 ,000  Marks 
gold b e a r e r  bonds,  b e a r i n g  i n t e r e s t  a t  2^ per  c e n t ,  per  annum 
between 1921 and 1926, and t h e r e a f t e r  a t  5 per  c e n t ,  per annum 
w i th  an a d d i t i o n a l  1 per c e n t ,  f o r  a m o r t i s a t i o n  beg inn ing  in 
1926 on th e  whole amount of t h e  i s s u e .
( 3 ) To be d e l i v e r e d  f o r t h w i t h  a cove r ing  u n d e r t a k in g
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in w r i t i n g  t o  i s s u e  when, but  not  u n t i l ,  t h e  Commission i s  
s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  Germany can meet such i n t e r e s t  and s in k in g  
fund o b l i g a t i o n s ,  a f u r t h e r  in s t a lm e n t  of 40 ,000,000,000 
Marks gold 5 per  c e n t ,  b e a r e r  bonds,  t h e  t im e  and mode of 
payment of p r i n c i p a l  and i n t e r e s t  t o  be de termined  by t h e  
Commission.
The d a t e s  f o r  payment of i n t e r e s t ,  t h e  manner of 
a pp ly ing  t h e  a m o r t i s a t i o n  f u n d s ,  and a l l  o th e r  q u e s t i o n s  
r e l a t i n g  t o  th e  i s s u e ,  management and r e g u l a t i o n  of t h e  bond 
i s s u e  s h a l l  be determined by t h e  Commission from t ime t o  t im e .
F u r th e r  i s s u e s  by way of acknowledgment and s e c u r i t y  
may be r e q u i r e d  as t h e  Commission s ubse quen t ly  de te rm ines  from 
t i m e  t o  t i m e .
(d) In t h e  event  of  bonds ,  o b l i g a t i o n s  or  o the r  
ev idence  of in de b tedness  i s sued  by Germany by way of s e c u r i t y  
f o r  or acknowledgment of her  r e p a r a t i o n  debt  be ing  d isposed  of 
o u t r i g h t ,  no t  by way of p le d g e ,  t o  persons  o th e r  th a n  t h e  
s e v e r a l  Governments in whose f a v o u r  Germany’s o r i g i n a l  
r e p a r a t i o n  in de b tedness  was c r e a t e d ,  an amount of such r e p a r a t i o n  
i n d e b te d n e s s  s h a l l  be deemed to  be ex t in g u i s h e d  co r respond ing
t o  t h e  nominal  va lu e  of t h e  bonds ,  e t c . ,  so d i s p o s e d  of o u t r i g h t ,  
and t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  of Germany in r e s p e c t  of such bonds s h a l l  be 
conf ined  t o  h e r  l i a b i l i t i e s  t o  t h e  h o ld e r s  of t h e  bonds,  as 
expressed  upon t h e i r  f a c e .
(e)  The damage f o r  r e p a i r i n g ,  r e c o n s t r u c t i n g  and r e ­
b u i l d i n g  p ro p e r ty  in t h e  invaded and d e v a s t a t e d  d i s t r i c t s ,
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in c lu d in g  r e i n s t a l l a t i o n  of f u r n i t u r e ,  machinery  and o th e r  
equipment,  w i l l  be c a l c u l a t e d  accord ing  t o  t h e  c o s t  a t  t h e  
d a t e s  when t h e  work i s  done.
( f )  D ec is ions  of t h e  Commission r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  t o t a l  
or p a r t i a l  c a n c e l l a t i o n  of t h e  c a p i t a l  or i n t e r e s t  of any 
v e r i f i e d  debt  of Germany must be accompanied by a s ta tem en t  of 
i t s  r e a s o n s .
13.  As t o  v o t i n g ,  t h e  Commission w i l l  observe t h e  f o l l o w in g  
r u l e s :
When a d e c i s i o n  of t h e  Commission i s  t a k e n ,  t h e  v o t e s  
of a l l  t h e  D e lega tes  e n t i t l e d  t o  v o t e ,  or in t h e  absence of any 
of them, of t h e i r  A s s i s t a n t  D e l e g a t e s ,  s h a l l  be r e c o r d e d .  
A b s ten t io n  from v o t i n g  i s  t o  be t r e a t e d  as  a v o te  a g a i n s t  t h e  
p r o p o s a l  under  d i s c u s s i o n .  A sses so rs  have no v o t e .
On t h e  fo l lo w in g  q u e s t i o n s  unan im i ty  i s  n e c e s s a ry :
(a )  Quest ions  i n v o lv in g  t h e  s o v e re ig n t y  of any of t h e  
A l l i e d  and A ssocia ted  Powers,  or t h e  c a n c e l l a t i o n  of t h e  whole 
or any p a r t  of t h e  debt  or o b l i g a t i o n s  of Germany;
(b)  Quest ions of de t e rm in in g  t h e  amount and c o n d i t i o n s  
of bonds or o th e r  o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  be is sued  by t h e  German 
Government and of f i x i n g  t h e  t i m e  and manner f o r  s e l l i n g ,  
n e g o t i a t i n g  or d i s t r i b u t i n g  such bonds;
(c )  Any postponement,  t o t a l  or p a r t i a l ,  beyond t h e  
end of 1 9 3 0 , of t h e  payment of i n s t a lm e n t s  f a l l i n g  due between 
May 1,  1921,  and t h e  end of 1926 i n c l u s i v e ;
( d ) Any pos tponement,  t o t a l  or p a r t i a l ,  of any in s t a l m e n t  
f a l l i n g  due a f t e r  1926 f o r  a per iod  exceeding t h r e e  y e a r s ;
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( e )  Q u e s t io n s  o f  a p p l y i n g  in  any p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  a 
method of m ea su r ing  damages d i f f e r e n t  f rom t h a t  which has  been 
p r e v i o u s l y  a p p l i e d  i n  a s i m i l a r  c a s e ;
( f )  Q u e s t io n s  of  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  
of  t h i s  P a r t  of t h e  p r e s e n t  T r e a t y .
A l l  o t h e r  q u e s t i o n s  s h a l l  be d e c id e d  by t h e  v o t e  o f  a 
maj o r i t y .
In c a s e  of any d i f f e r e n c e  of  o p i n i o n  among t h e  D e l e g a t e s ,  
wh ich cannot  be s o lved  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e i r  Governments ,  upon 
t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e th e r  a g i v e n  c a se  i s  one which r e q u i r e s  a 
unanimous  v o t e  f o r  i t s  d e c i s i o n  o r  n o t ,  such d i f f e r e n c e  s h a l l  
be  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  immedia te  a r b i t r a t i o n  of  some i m p a r t i a l  
p e r s o n  t o  be ag reed  upon by t h e i r  Governments ,  whose award t h e  
A l l i e d  and A s s o c i a t e d  Governments  a g r e e  t o  a c c e p t .
14.  D e c i s i o n s  of  t h e  Commission,  in  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  
powers c o n f e r r e d  upon i t ,  s h a l l  f o r t h w i t h  become b i n d i n g  and 
may be put  i n t o  immed ia te  e x e c u t i o n  w i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  p r o c e e d i n g s .
15.  The Commission w i l l  i s s u e  t o  each of  t h e  i n t e r e s t e d  
Pow ers ,  in  such form a s  t h e  Commission s h a l l  f i x :
(1 )  A c e r t i f i c a t e  s t a t i n g  t h a t  i t  h o l d s  f o r  t h e  a c c o u n t  
of  t h e  s a id  Power bonds of t h e  i s s u e s  men t ioned  a bove ,  t h e  s a i d  
c e r t i f i c a t e ,  on t h e  demand of  t h e  Power c o n c e r n e d ,  b e in g  d i v i s i b l e  
i n  a number of  p a r t s  n o t  e x c e e d in g  f i v e ;
(2 )  From t i m e  t o  t i m e  c e r t i f i c a t e s  s t a t i n g  t h e  goods  
d e l i v e r e d  by Germany on a c coun t  of  h e r  r e p a r a t i o n  deb t  wh ich  i t  
h o l d s  f o r  t h e  accoun t  of  t h e  s a i d  Power.
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The sa id  c e r t i f i c a t e s  s h a l l  be r e g i s t e r e d ,  and ,  upon 
n o t i c e  t o  t h e  Commission, may be t r a n s f e r r e d  by endorsement.
When bonds a r e  i s sued  f o r  s a l e  or n e g o t i a t i o n ,  and 
when goods a r e  d e l i v e r e d  by t h e  Commission, c e r t i f i c a t e s  t o  
an e q u i v a l e n t  va lue  must be withdrawn.
16.  I n t e r e s t  s h a l l  be d e b i t e d  t o  Germany as from May 1,
1921, in r e s p e c t  of h e r  debt  as  determined by t h e  Commission, 
a f t e r  a l low ing  f o r  sums a l r e a d y  covered by cash payments or 
t h e i r  e q u i v a l e n t ,  or  by bonds is sued  t o  t h e  Commission, or  under  
A r t i c l e  243.  The r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  s h a l l  be 5 per  c e n t ,  u n l e s s  
t h e  Commission s h a l l  d e te rm in e  a t  some f u t u r e  t i m e  t h a t  
c i rc u m s tan c es  j u s t i f y  a v a r i a t i o n  of t h i s  r a t e .
The Commission, in f i x i n g  on May 1,  1921, t h e  t o t a l  
amount of t h e  debt  of Germany, may t a k e  account  of i n t e r e s t  due 
on sums a r i s i n g  out of t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  of m a t e r i a l  damage as from 
November 11,  1918, up t o  May 1, 1921.
17. In case of d e f a u l t  by Germany in t h e  per formance of any 
o b l i g a t i o n  under  t h i s  P a r t  of t h e  p r e s e n t  T r e a t y ,  t h e  Commission 
w i l l  f o r t h w i t h  g iv e  n o t i c e  of such d e f a u l t  t o  each of t h e  
i n t e r e s t e d  Powers and may make such recommendations as t o  t h e  
a c t i o n  t o  be ta ken  in consequence of such d e f a u l t  as  i t  may t h i n k  
nec e s s a r y .
18. The measures which t h e  A l l i e d  and A ssoc ia ted  Powers s h a l l  
have t h e  r i g h t  t o  t a k e ,  in case of v o l u n t a r y  d e f a u l t  by Germany, 
and which Germany a g re e s  not  t o  regard  as a c t s  of war,  may 
i n c lu d e  economic and f i n a n c i a l  p r o h i b i t i o n s  and r e p r i s a l s  and in
437
g e n e r a l  such o th e r  measures as t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  Governments may 
de te rm ine  t o  be n e c e s s a r y  in t h e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s .
19* Payments r e q u i r e d  t o  be made in gold or i t s  e q u iv a le n t  
on account  of t h e  proved c la ims of t h e  A l l i e d  and Assoc ia ted  
Powers may a t  any t ime be accep ted  by t h e  Commission in t h e  
form of c h a t t e l s ,  p r o p e r t i e s ,  commodit ies ,  b u s i n e s s e s ,  r i g h t s ,  
c o n c e s s i o n s , ' w i t h i n  or w i th o u t  German t e r r i t o r y ,  s h i p s ,  bonds ,  
sha re s  or s e c u r i t i e s  of  any k in d ,  or c u r r e n c i e s  of  Germany or 
o th e r  S t a t e s ,  t h e  v a l u e  of such s u b s t i t u t e s  f o r  gold be ing  
f ix e d  a t  a f a i r  and j u s t  amount by t h e  Commission i t s e l f .
20. The Commission, in f i x i n g  or a c c e p t in g  payment in 
s p e c i f i e d  p r o p e r t i e s  or r i g h t s ,  s h a l l  have due reg a rd  f o r  any 
l e g a l  or e q u i t a b l e  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  A l l i e d  and A ssoc ia ted  
Powers or  of n e u t r a l  Powers or of t h e i r  n a t i o n a l s  t h e r e i n .
21. No member of t h e  Commission s h a l l  be r e s p o n s i b l e ,  except  
t o  t h e  Government a p p o i n t in g  him, f o r  any a c t i o n  or omission as 
such member. No one of t h e  A l l i e d  or A ssoc ia ted  Governments 
assumes any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  in r e s p e c t  of any o t h e r  Government.
22. S u b jec t  t o  t h e  p r o v i s io n s  of t h e  p r e s e n t  T r e a ty  t h i s  
Annex may be amended by t h e  unanimous d e c i s i o n  of t h e  Governments 
r e p r e s e n t e d  from t im e  t o  t ime upon t h e  Commission.
23* When a l l  t h e  amounts due from Germany and h e r  a l l i e s  
under  t h e  p r e s e n t  T r e a t y  or t h e  d e c i s i o n s  of t h e  Commission have 
been d i s c h a rg e d  and a l l  sums r e c e i v e d ,  or t h e i r  e q u i v a l e n t s ,  s h a l l  
have been d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  Powers i n t e r e s t e d ,  t h e  Commission
s h a l l  be d i s s o lv e d
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Annex I I I
1. Germany r e c o g n i s e s  t h e  r i g h t  of  t h e  A l l i e d  and 
A s s o c i a t e d  Powers t o  t h e  r e p l a c e m e n t ,  t o n  f o r  t o n  ( g r o s s  
t o n n a g e )  and c l a s s  f o r  c l a s s ,  of  a l l  merchan t  s h i p s  and 
f i s h i n g  b o a t s  l o s t  or damaged owing t o  t h e  w a r .
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  and in  s p i t e  of  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  t o n n a g e  
of  German s h i p p i n g  a t  p r e s e n t  in  e x i s t e n c e  i s  much l e s s  t h a n  
t h a t  l o s t  by t h e  A l l i e d  and A s s o c i a t e d  Powers in  consequence  of 
t h e  German a g g r e s s i o n ,  t h e  r i g h t  t h u s  r e c o g n i s e d  w i l l  be e n f o r c e d  
on German s h i p s  and b o a t s  u n d e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o n d i t i o n s :
The German Government ,  on b e h a l f  of t h e m s e l v e s  and so 
as  t o  b ind  a l l  o t h e r  p e r s o n s  i n t e r e s t e d ,  cede t o  t h e  A l l i e d  and 
A s s o c i a t e d  Governments  t h e  p r o p e r t y  i n  a l l  t h e  German m erc h an t  
s h i p s  which a r e  of 1 ,600  t o n s  g r o s s  and upwards ;  in o n e - h a l f ,  
r e c k o n e d  in  t o n n a g e ,  of t h e  s h i p s  which  a r e  be tw een  1 ,000  t o n s  
and 1 ,600  t o n s  g r o s s ;  in  o n e - q u a r t e r ,  r eckoned  in  t o n n a g e ,  of  
t h e  s team t r a w l e r s ;  and in  o n e - q u a r t e r ,  r eckoned  in  t o n n a g e ,  
of t h e  o t h e r  f i s h i n g  b o a t s .
2 .  The German Government w i l l ,  w i t h i n  two months of t h e  
coming i n t o  f o r c e  of  t h e  p r e s e n t  T r e a t y ,  d e l i v e r  t o  t h e  
R e p a r a t i o n  Commission a l l  t h e  s h i p s  and b o a t s  m ent ioned  in  
p a r a g r a p h  1.
3 .  The s h i p s  and b o a t s  ment ioned  in  p a r a g r a p h  1 i n c l u d e  a l l  
s h i p s  and b o a t s  which ( a )  f l y ,  or may be e n t i t l e d  t o  f l y ,  t h e  
German m erchan t  f l a g ;  or  (b)  a r e  owned by any German n a t i o n a l ,  
company or  c o r p o r a t i o n  or by any company or c o r p o r a t i o n  b e l o n g i n g
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t o  a coun t ry  o ther  t h a n  an A l l i e d  or A ss o c i a te d  count ry  and 
under  t h e  c o n t ro l  or d i r e c t i o n  of German n a t i o n a l s ;  or (c)  a r e  
now under c o n s t r u c t i o n  ( l )  in Germany, (2)  in o th e r  th a n  A l l i e d  
or A ssoc ia ted  c o u n t r i e s  f o r  t h e  account  of  any German n a t i o n a l ,  
company or c o r p o r a t i o n .
4.  For t h e  purpose of p ro v id in g  documents of t i t l e  f o r  t h e  
s h ip s  and boa ts  t o  be handed over as above men tioned ,  t h e  
German Government w i l l :
(a )  D e l ive r  t o  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission in r e s p e c t  of 
each v e s s e l  a b i l l  of s a l e  or o th e r  document of t i t l e  ev idenc ing  
t h e  t r a n s f e r  t o  t h e  Commission of t h e  e n t i r e  p ro p e r ty  in t h e  
v e s s e l ,  f r e e  from a l l  encumbrances, charges  and l i e n s  of a l l  
k i n d s ,  as  t h e  Commission may r e q u i r e ;
(b) Take a l l  measures  t h a t  may be i n d i c a t e d  by t h e  
R e p a ra t io n  Commission f o r  ensu r in g  t h a t  t h e  s h ip s  them se lves  
s h a l l  be placed a t  i t s  d i s p o s a l .
5 .  As an a d d i t i o n a l  p a r t  of r e p a r a t i o n ,  Germany ag re e s  t o  
cause merchant  sh ips  t o  be b u i l t  in German yards  f o r  t h e  accoun t  
of t h e  A l l i e d  and A ssoc ia ted  Governments as f o l l o w s :
(a )  Wi thin t h r e e  months of t h e  coming i n t o  f o r c e  of  t h e  
p r e s e n t  T r e a t y ,  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission w i l l  n o t i f y  t o  t h e  
German Government t h e  amount of tonnage  t o  be l a i d  down in  German 
sh ipya rds  in each of t h e  two y e a r s  next  succeed ing  t h e  t h r e e  
months mentioned above.
(b)  Within  two y e a r s  of t h e  coming i n t o  f o r c e  of  t h e  
p r e s e n t  T r e a t y ,  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission w i l l  n o t i f y  t o  t h e
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German Government  t h e  amount of  t o n n a g e  t o  be l a i d  down in  each 
of t h e  t h r e e  y e a r s  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  two y e a r s  men t ioned  a b o v e .
( c )  The amount of  t o n n a g e  t o  be l a i d  down in each y e a r
s h a l l  no t  exceed 200 ,000  t o n s ,  g r o s s  t o n n a g e .
(d )  The s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  of  t h e  s h i p s  t o  be b u i l t ,  t h e
c o n d i t i o n s  unde r  which  t h e y  a r e  t o  be b u i l t  and d e l i v e r e d ,  t h e
p r i c e  pe r  t o n  a t  which t h e y  a r e  t o  be a c c o u n t e d  f o r  by t h e
R e p a r a t i o n  Commission,  and a l l  o t h e r  q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  
a c c o u n t i n g ,  o r d e r i n g ,  b u i l d i n g  and d e l i v e r y  of t h e  s h i p s ,  s h a l l  
be d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  Commission.
6.  Germany u n d e r t a k e s  t o  r e s t o r e  in  k ind  and in  normal
c o n d i t i o n  of upkeep  t o  t h e  A l l i e d  and A s s o c i a t e d  Powers ,  w i t h i n  
two months of  t h e  coming i n t o  f o r c e  of t h e  p r e s e n t  T r e a t y ,  in  
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  p r o c e d u r e  t o  be l a i d  down by t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  
Commission,  any b o a t s  and o t h e r  movable  a p p l i a n c e s  b e lo n g i n g  
t o  i n l a n d  n a v i g a t i o n  which  s i n c e  August 1 ,  1914,  have  by any 
means w h a t e v e r  come i n t o  h e r  p o s s e s s i o n  o r  i n t o  t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  
of  h e r  n a t i o n a l s ,  and which  can be  i d e n t i f i e d .
W ith  a view t o  make good t h e  l o s s  in  i n l a n d  n a v i g a t i o n  
t o n n a g e ,  f rom w h a t e v e r  c a u se  a r i s i n g ,  which  has  been i n c u r r e d  
d u r i n g  t h e  war by t h e  A l l i e d  and A s s o c i a t e d  Pow ers ,  and which 
cannot  be made good by means of  t h e  r e s t i t u t i o n  p r e s c r i b e d  a b o v e ,  
Germany a g r e e s  t o  cede  t o  t h e  R e p a r a t i o n  Commission a p o r t i o n  o f  
t h e  German r i v e r  f l e e t  up  t o  t h e  amount of  t h e  l o s s  men t io ned  
a b o v e ,  p r o v id e d  t h a t  such  c e s s i o n  s h a l l  no t  exceed  20 pe r  c e n t ,  
of  t h e  r i v e r  f l e e t  as  i t  e x i s t e d  on November 11 ,  1918»
441
The c o n d i t i o n s  of t h i s  c e s s io n  s h a l l  "be s e t t l e d  by 
t h e  a r b i t r a t o r s  r e f e r r e d  t o  in  A r t i c l e  339 of P a r t  X I I  ( P o r t s ,  
Waterways and Rai lways) of  t h e  p resen t  T r e a t y ,  who a r e  charged 
w i th  the  s e t t l e m e n t  of d i f f i c u l t i e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  appor t ionment 
of r i v e r  tonnage r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  regime 
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  c e r t a i n  r i v e r  systems or from t h e  t e r r i t o r i a l  
changes a f f e c t i n g  t h o s e  sy s tem s .
7.  Germany ag ree s  t o  t a k e  any measures  t h a t  may be i n d i c a t e d  
t o  he r  by t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission f o r  o b t a in in g  t h e  f u l l  t i t l e  
t o  t h e  p ro p e r ty  in a l l  sh ips  which have dur ing  t h e  war been 
t r a n s f e r r e d ,  or a r e  in p ro ces s  of t r a n s f e r ,  t o  n e u t r a l  f l a g s ,  
w i thou t  t h e  consent  of t h e  A l l i e d  and A ssoc ia ted  Governments.
8 .  Germany waives a l l  c la ims  of any d e s c r i p t i o n  a g a i n s t  
t h e  A l l i e d  and A ssoc ia ted  Governments and t h e i r  n a t i o n a l s  in 
r e s p e c t  of t h e  d e t e n t i o n ,  employment, l o s s  or damage of any 
German sh ips  or b o a t s ,  e x c e p t io n  being  made of payments due in 
r e s p e c t  of t h e  employment of sh ip s  in  confo rm i ty  with  th e  
A rm is t i c e  Agreement of J anua ry  13» 1919» and subsequent  
Agreements .
The handing over of s h ip s  of t h e  German m e rc a n t i l e  
marine must be cont inued  w i thou t  i n t e r r u p t i o n  in  accordance  
w i th  t h e  sa id  Agreement.
9 .  Germany waives a l l  c la ims  t o  v e s s e l s  or cargoes  sunk by 
or  in consequence of n a v a l  a c t i o n  and s u b se q u e n t ly  s a lv e d ,  in 
which any of t h e  A l l i e d  or A ssoc ia ted  Governments or t h e i r  
n a t i o n a l s  may have any i n t e r e s t  e i t h e r  as  owners,  c h a r t e r e r s ,
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i n s u r e r s  or o th e rw is e ,  n o tw i t h s t a n d in g  any d e c re e  of 
condemnation which may have been made by a P r i z e  Court of  
Germany or of he r  a l l i e s .
Annex IV
1. The A l l i e d  and A ssoc ia ted  Powers r e q u i r e ,  and Germany 
u n d e r t a k e s ,  t h a t  in p a r t  s a t i s f a c t i o n  of  he r  o b l i g a t i o n s  
expressed in  t h e  p r e s e n t  P a r t  she w i l l ,  as  h e r e i n a f t e r  p ro v id ed ,  
devo te  her  economic r e s o u r c e s  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  p h y s i c a l  r e s t o r a t i o n  
of t h e  invaded a r e a s  of t h e  A l l i e d  and A ssoc ia ted  Powers,  t o  t h e  
ex ten t  t h a t  t h e s e  Powers may de t e rm in e .
2. The A l l i e d  and A ss o c ia ted  Governments may f i l e  w i th  t h e  
R e p a ra t io n  Commission l i s t s  showing:
(a )  Animals,  machinery ,  equipment,  t o o l s  and l i k e  
a r t i c l e s  of a commercial  c h a r a c t e r ,  which have been s e i z e d ,  
consumed or des t royed  by Germany or des t royed  in d i r e c t  
consequence of m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s ,  and which such Governments,  
f o r  t h e  purpose of  meeting immediate and u rg e n t  needs ,  d e s i r e  
t o  have r e p la c e d  by an imals  and a r t i c l e s  of t h e  same n a t u r e  
which a r e  in  being  in German t e r r i t o r y  a t  t h e  d a t e  of t h e  
coming i n t o  f o r c e  of t h e  p r e s e n t  T re a ty ;
(b) R e c o n s t ru c t io n  m a t e r i a l s  ( s t o n e s ,  b r i c k s ,  r e f r a c t o r y  
b r i c k s ,  t i l e s ,  wood, w in dow -g lass ,  s t e e l ,  l ime ,  cement,  e t c . ) ,  
machinery ,  h e a t in g  a p p a r a t u s ,  f u r n i t u r e  and l i k e  a r t i c l e s  of a 
commercial  c h a r a c t e r  which t h e  sa id  Governments d e s i r e  t o  have 
produced and manufactured in  Germany and d e l i v e r e d  t o  them t o  
permit  of t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  of t h e  invaded a r e a s .
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3.  The l i s t s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  a r t i c l e s  mentioned in 2 (a )  
above s h a l l  be f i l e d  -within s i x t y  days a f t e r  t h e  d a t e  of t h e  
coming i n t o  f o r c e  of t h e  p r e s e n t  T r e a t y .  The l i s t s  r e l a t i n g  
t o  t h e  a r t i c l e s  in  2(b) above s h a l l  be f i l e d  on or b e fo re  
December 31> 1919* The l i s t s  s h a l l  c o n t a i n  a l l  such d e t a i l s  
as  a r e  customary in  commercial  c o n t r a c t s  d e a l in g  w i th  t h e  
s u b j e c t  m a t t e r ,  in c lu d in g  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s ,  d a t e s  of d e l i v e r y  
(but  not ex tend ing  over more than  f o u r  y e a r s ) ,  and p la ces  of  
d e l i v e r y ,  but  not  p r i c e  or v a l u e ,  which s h a l l  be f ixed  as 
h e r e i n a f t e r  prov ided  by t h e  Commission.
4.  Immediately upon t h e  f i l i n g  of such l i s t s  w i th  t h e  
Commission, t h e  Commission s h a l l  co n s id e r  t h e  amount and number 
of t h e  m a t e r i a l s  and an imals  mentioned in  t h e  l i s t s  p rovided  
f o r  above which a r e  t o  be r e q u i r e d  of Germany. In r eac h ing  a 
d e c i s i o n  on t h i s  m a t t e r  t h e  Commission s h a l l  t a k e  i n t o  account  
such domest ic  re q u i re m e n t s  of Germany as i t  deems e s s e n t i a l  f o r  
t h e  main tenance  of Germany's s o c i a l  and economic l i f e ,  t h e  p r i c e s  
and d a t e s  a t  which s i m i l a r  a r t i c l e s  can be ob ta ined  in t h e  A l l i e d  
and A ss o c i a te d  c o u n t r i e s  as compared w i th  t h o s e  t o  be f i x e d  f o r  
German a r t i c l e s ,  and t h e  g e n e r a l  i n t e r e s t  of t h e  A l l i e d  and 
A sso c ia ted  Governments t h a t  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  l i f e  of Germany be
I
not so d i s o r g a n i s e d  as t o  a f f e c t  a d v e r s e l y  t h e  a b i l i t y  of 
Germany t o  per form t h e  o th e r  a c t s  of r e p a r a t i o n  s t i p u l a t e d  f o r .
Machinery ,  equipment ,  t o o l s  and l i k e  a r t i c l e s  of a 
commercial  c h a r a c t e r  in a c t u a l  i n d u s t r i a l  use  a r e  n o t ,  however,  
t o  be demanded of Germany u n l e s s  t h e r e  i s  no f r e e  s tock  of such
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a r t i c l e s  r e s p e c t i v e l y  which i s  not in use  and i s  a v a i l a b l e ,  
and then  no t  in excess of t h i r t y  per c e n t ,  of t h e  q u a n t i t y  of  
such a r t i c l e s  in use  in any one e s t ab l i s h m en t  or u n d e r t a k i n g .
The Commission s h a l l  g ive  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  
German Government an o p p o r tu n i ty  and a t im e  t o  be heard as t o  
t h e i r  c a p a c i t y  t o  f u r n i s h  t h e  said  m a t e r i a l s ,  a r t i c l e s  and 
a n im a ls .  The d e c i s i o n  of t h e  Commission s h a l l  the reupon and at  
t h e  e a r l i e s t  p o s s i b l e  moment be communicated t o  t h e  German 
Government and t o  t h e  s e v e r a l  i n t e r e s t e d  A l l i e d  and A ssoc ia ted  
Governments.  The German Government u n d e r t a k e s  t o  d e l i v e r  t h e  
m a t e r i a l s ,  a r t i c l e s  and an imals  as s p e c i f i e d  in  t h e  sa id  
communication,  and t h e  i n t e r e s t e d  A l l i e d  and A ssoc ia ted  
Governments s e v e r a l l y  ag ree  t o  accept  t h e  same, provided t h e y  
conform t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  g iv e n ,  or  a r e  n o t ,  in  t h e  judgment 
of th e  Commission, u n f i t  t o  be u t i l i s e d  in  th e  work of r e p a r a t i o n .  
5 . The Commission s h a l l  de te rm ine  t h e  v a l u e  t o  be a t t r i b u t e d
t o  t h e  m a t e r i a l s ,  a r t i c l e s  and animals t o  be d e l iv e r e d  in 
accordance  with  t h e  f o r e g o in g ,  and th e  A l l i e d  or A ssoc ia ted  
Power r e c e i v i n g  t h e  same a g r e e s  t o  be charged w i th  such v a l u e ,  
and t h e  amount t h e r e o f  s h a l l  be t r e a t e d  as  a payment by Germany 
t o  be d iv id ed  in accordance  w i th  A r t i c l e  237 of t h i s  P a r t  of 
t h e  p r e s e n t  T r e a t y .
In cases  where t h e  r i g h t  t o  r e q u i r e  p h y s i c a l  r e s t o r a t i o n  
as above prov ided  i s  e x e r c i s e d ,  t h e  Commission s h a l l  ensure  
t h a t  t h e  amount t o  be c r e d i t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n  
of Germany s h a l l  be t h e  f a i r  v a l u e  of work done or  m a t e r i a l s
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su p p l i e d  by Germany, and t h a t  t h e  c la im  made by t h e  i n t e r e s t e d  
Power in r e s p e c t  of t h e  damage so r e p a i r e d  by p h y s i c a l  
r e s t o r a t i o n  s h a l l  be d i s c h a rg e d  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  of t h e  p ro p o r t i o n  
which t h e  damage th u s  r e p a i r e d  bears t o  t h e  whole of t h e  damage 
th u s  claimed f o r .
6.  As an immediate advance on account  of t h e  animals
r e f e r r e d  t o  in Paragraph 2(a )  above,  Germany unde r ta kes  t o  
d e l i v e r  in equal  monthly i n s t a l m e n t s  in t h e  t h r e e  months 
fo l l o w in g  t h e  coming i n t o  f o r c e  of t h e  p r e s e n t  T r e a t y ,  t h e  
f o l l o w in g  q u a n t i t i e s  of l i v e  s to ck :
(1) To t h e  French  Government
500 s t a l l i o n s  (3 t o  7 y e a r s )
30.000 f i l l i e s  and mares ( l 8  months t o  7 y e a r s ) ;  
t y p e :  A rdenna is ,  Boulonnais  or Belg ian ;
2.000 b u l l s  (18 months t o  3 y e a r s ) ;
90.000 mi lch cows (2 t o  6 y e a r s ) ;
1.000 rams;
100.000 sheep;
10.000 g o a t s .
(2)  To t h e  Belg ian  Government
200 s t a l l i o n s  (3 t o  7 y e a r s ) ,  l a r g e  Belg ian  t y p e ;
5)000 mares (3 t o  7 y e a r s ) ,  l a r g e  Belg ian  t y p e ;
5.000 f i l l i e s  ( l8  months t o  3 y e a r s ) ,  l a r g e  
Belgian  t y p e ;
2.000 b u l l s  (18 months t o  3 y e a r s ) ;
50.000 mi lch  cows (2 t o  6 y e a r s ) ;




The animals  d e l i v e r e d  s h a l l  be of average h e a l t h  and 
c o n d i t i o n .
To t h e  e x ten t  t h a t  an imals  so d e l i v e r e d  cannot  be 
i d e n t i f i e d  as an imals  t a k e n  away or s e i z e d ,  t h e  va lue  of such
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animals  s h a l l  be c r e d i t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  o b l i g a t i o n s  
of  Germany in accordance  w i th  paragraph 5 of t h i s  Annex.
7. ‘Without  w a i t in g  f o r  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  of t h e  Commission
r e f e r r e d  t o  in Paragraph  4 of t h i s  Annex t o  be t a k e n ,  Germany 
must con t inue  t h e  d e l i v e r y  t o  F rance  of t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
m a t e r i a l  r e f e r r e d  t o  in A r t i c l e  I I I  of t h e  renew al  dated  
Janua ry  16, 1919» of t h e  A rm is t i c e .
Annex V
1. Germany accords  t h e  fo l lo w in g  o p t io n s  f o r  t h e  d e l i v e r y
of c o a l  and d e r i v a t i v e s  of c o a l  t o  t h e  undermentioned s i g n a t o r i e s  
of t h e  p r e s e n t  T r e a ty .
2. Germany u n d e r ta k e s  t o  d e l i v e r  t o  France  seven m i l l i o n  
t o n s  of c o a l  per  y ea r  f o r  t e n  y e a r s .  In a d d i t i o n ,  Germany 
u n d e r ta k e s  t o  d e l i v e r  t o  France  a n n u a l ly  f o r  a per iod  not  
exceed ing t e n  y ea rs  an amount of coa l  equa l  t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  
between t h e  annual  p ro d u c t i o n  b e fo re  t h e  war of t h e  coa l  mines 
of th e  Nord and Pas de C a l a i s ,  des t royed  as a r e s u l t  of t h e  war ,  
and t h e  p ro d u c t io n  of t h e  mines of t h e  same a re a  du r ing  t h e  
y e a r s  in q u e s t i o n ;  such d e l i v e r y  not  t o  exceed twenty  
m i l l i o n  t o n s  in any one y e a r  of t h e  f i r s t  f i v e  y e a r s ,  and e igh t  
m i l l i o n  t o n s  in any one yea r  of t h e  succeeding  f i v e  y e a r s .
I t  i s  unders tood  t h a t  due d i l i g e n c e  w i l l  be e x e rc i s e d  
in  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  of t h e  d es t ro y ed  mines in t h e  Nord and t h e  Pas 
de C a l a i s .
3. Germany u n d e r ta k e s  t o  d e l i v e r  t o  Belgium e igh t  m i l l i o n  
t o n s  of coa l  an n u a l ly  f o r  t e n  y e a r s .
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4.  Germany u n d e r ta k e s  t o  d e l i v e r  t o  I t a l y  up t o  t h e
fo l lo w in g  q u a n t i t i e s  of  c o a l :
J u l y 1919 t o June 1920 a m i l l i o n t  ons
11 1920 I f 1921 6 11 I f
11 1921 11 1922 7i 11 11
1! 1922 11 1923 8 11 »1
1« 1923 11 1924 )
and each of t h e  f o l l o w in g ) 11 11
f i v e  y ea rs  )
At l e a s t  t w o - t h i r d s  of  t h e  a c t u a l  d e l i v e r i e s  t o  be 
l a n d -b o rn e .
5 .  Germany f u r t h e r  u n d e r t a k e s  t o  d e l i v e r  a n n u a l ly  t o  
Luxemburg, i f  d i r e c t e d  by t h e  R epa ra t ion  Commission, a q u a n t i t y  
of c o a l  equa l  t o  t h e  p re-war  annua l  consumption of German coa l  
in Luxemburg.
6.  The p r i c e s  t o  be paid f o r  c o a l  d e l i v e r e d  under  t h e s e  
op t ions  s h a l l  be as f o l l o w s :
(a)  For over land  d e l i v e r y ,  i n c lu d in g  d e l i v e r y  by b a rg e ,  
t h e  German p i thead  p r i c e  t o  German n a t i o n a l s ,  p lu s  t h e  f r e i g h t  
t o  French ,  B e lg ian ,  I t a l i a n  or Luxemburg f r o n t i e r s ,  provided 
t h a t  t h e  p i t h e a d  p r i c e  does not  exceed t h e  p i thead  p r i c e  of 
B r i t i s h  co a l  f o r  e x p o r t .  In t h e  case of Belg ian  bunker c o a l ,  
t h e  p r i c e  s h a l l  not exceed t h e  Dutch bunker p r i c e .  R a i l road  
and barge  t a r i f f s  s h a l l  no t  be h ig h e r  t h a n  t h e  lowest  s i m i l a r  
r a t e s  paid in Germany.
(b)  For sea  d e l i v e r y ,  t h e  German export  p r i c e  f . o . b .  
German p o r t s  or t h e  B r i t i s h  expor t  p r i c e  f . o . b .  B r i t i s h  p o r t s ,  
whichever  may be lower .
7. The A l l i e d  and A ssoc ia ted  Governments i n t e r e s t e d  may
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demand t h e  d e l i v e r y ,  in p la ce  of c o a l ,  of m e t a l l u r g i c a l  coke 
in  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  of 3 to n s  of  coke t o  4 t o n s  of c o a l .
8.  Germany u n d e r ta k e s  t o  d e l i v e r  t o  F ra n c e ,  and t o  t r a n s p o r t  
t o  t h e  French f r o n t i e r  by r a i l  or by w a te r ,  t h e  fo l low ing  p ro d u c t s ,  
d u r in g  each of t h e  t h r e e  y e a r s  fo l low ing  t h e  coming in t o  f o r c e
of t h i s  T r e a t y :
Benzol  35,000 to n s
Coal t a r  50,000 "
S u lp h a t e  of ammonia 30,000 "
A l l  or p a r t  of t h e  c o a l  t a r  may, at  t h e  op tion  of t h e
French Government, be re p la c e d  by co r respond ing  q u a n t i t i e s  of
p ro d u c ts  of d i s t i l l a t i o n ,  such as l i g h t  o i l s ,  heavy o i l s ,
a n t h r a c e n e ,  n a p h th a len e  or p i t c h .
9.  The p r i c e  paid f o r  coke and f o r  t h e  a r t i c l e s  r e f e r r e d  
t o  in  t h e  p reced ing  pa ragraph  s h a l l  be t h e  same as th e  p r i c e  
paid by German n a t i o n a l s  under  t h e  same c o n d i t i o n s  of shipment 
t o  t h e  French f r o n t i e r  or t o  t h e  German p o r t s ,  and s h a l l  be 
s u b j e c t  t o  any advan tages  which may be accorded s i m i l a r  
p roduc ts  f u rn i s h e d  t o  German n a t i o n a l s .
10.  The fo reg o in g  op t ions  s h a l l  be ex e rc i s e d  th rough  t h e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  of t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission, which,  s u b je c t  t o  
t h e  s p e c i f i c  p r o v i s io n s  h e r e o f ,  s h a l l  have power t o  d e t e rm in e  
a l l  q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t i v e  t o  procedure  and t h e  q u a l i t i e s  and 
q u a n t i t i e s  of p r o d u c t s ,  t h e  q u a n t i t y  of coke W'hich may be 
s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  c o a l ,  and t h e  t im es  and modes of d e l i v e r y  and 
payment.  In g iv in g  n o t i c e  t o  t h e  German Government of t h e  
fo r e g o in g  op t ions  t h e  Commission s h a l l  g iv e  a t  l e a s t  120 days*
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n o t i c e  of d e l i v e r i e s  t o  be made a f t e r  J anuary  1, 1920, and 
a t  l e a s t  3^ d a y s ’ n o t i c e  of d e l i v e r i e s  t o  be made between t h e  
coming i n t o  f o r c e  of t h i s  T r e a t y  and January  1, 1920. U n t i l  
Germany has r e c e iv e d  t h e  demands r e f e r r e d  t o  in t h i s  pa rag raph ,  
t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  of t h e  P r o to c o l  of December 25> 1918 (Execu tion  
of A r t i c l e  VI of t h e  A rm is t i c e  of November 11, 1918),  remains 
in  f o r c e .  The n o t i c e  t o  be given t o  t h e  German Government of 
t h e  e x e r c i s e  of t h e  r i g h t  of subs t i tu t ion  accorded by paragraphs  
7 and 8 s h a l l  be such as t h e  R epara t ion  Commission may c o n s id e r  
s u f f i c i e n t .  I f  t h e  Commission s h a l l  de te rm ine  t h a t  t h e  f u l l  
e x e r c i s e  of th e  f o r e g o in g  op t ions  would i n t e r f e r e  unduly  w i th  
t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  r equ i re m en ts  of Germany, t h e  Commission i s  
a u t h o r i s e d  t o  postpone or t o  cance l  d e l i v e r i e s ,  and in so doing 
t o  s e t t l e  a l l  q u e s t i o n s  of p r i o r i t y ;  but  t h e  c o a l  t o  r e p l a c e  
c o a l  from des t royed  mines s h a l l  r e c e i v e  p r i o r i t y  over o th e r  
d e l i v e r i e s .
Ann ex VI
1. Germany accords  t o  t h e  R ep a ra t io n  Commission an op t ion  t o  
r e q u i r e  as  p a r t  of r e p a r a t i o n  t h e  d e l i v e r y  by Germany of such 
q u a n t i t i e s  and k inds  of d y e s t u f f s  and chemica l  drugs as  t h e  
Commission may d e s i g n a t e ,  not  exceed ing 50 per  c e n t ,  of t h e  
t o t a l  s tock  of each and every  kind of d y e s t u f f  and chem ical  drug 
in Germany or under  German c o n t r o l  a t  t h e  d a t e  of t h e  coming 
i n t o  f o r c e  of t h e  p r e s e n t  T r e a t y .
This  op t ion  s h a l l  be ex e rc i s e d  w i th i n  s i x t y  days of t h e  
r e c e i p t  by t h e  Commission of  such p a r t i c u l a r s  as  t o  s tocks  as
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may be cons idered  n e c e s s a r y  by t h e  Commission.
2.  Germany f u r t h e r  acco rds  t o  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  Commission an 
op t ion  t o  r e q u i r e  d e l i v e r y  d u r ing  t h e  pe r iod  from t h e  d a t e  of
t h e  coming i n t o  f o r c e  of t h e  p re s e n t  T r e a t y  u n t i l  January  1 ,  1920,  
and d u r in g  each per iod  of s i x  months t h e r e a f t e r  u n t i l  J an u a ry  1,  
1925, of  any s p e c i f i e d  kind of  d y e s t u f f  and chemica l  drug up 
t o  an amount not exceeding 25 per c e n t ,  of t h e  German p ro d u c t io n  
of such d y e s t u f f s  and chem ica l  drugs d u r in g  t h e  previous  s i x  
months p e r i o d .  I f  in any case  the  p roduc t ion  d u r in g  such 
p rev ious  s ix  months was,  in t h e  opin ion of  t h e  Commission, l e s s  
th a n  normal ,  t h e  amount r e q u i r e d  may be 25 per  c e n t ,  of t h e  
normal p ro d u c t i o n .
Such op tion  s h a l l  be e x e rc i s e d  w i t h i n  f o u r  w'eeks a f t e r  
t h e  r e c e i p t  of such p a r t i c u l a r s  as  t o  p ro d u c t io n  and in  such form 
as may be cons idered  n e c e s s a r y  by th e  Commission; t h e s e  p a r t i c ­
u l a r s  s h a l l  be fu rn i s h e d  by t h e  German Government immedia te ly  
a f t e r  t h e  e x p i r a t i o n  of each s ix  months p e r io d .
3 . For d y e s t u f f s  and chem ica l  drugs d e l i v e r e d  under  
parag raph  1,  th e  p r i c e  s h a l l  be f ix e d  by t h e  Commission having 
rega rd  t o  p re-war  net  expor t  p r i c e s  and t o  subsequent  i n c r e a s e s  
of c o s t .
For d y e s t u f f s  and chem ical  drugs  d e l i v e r e d  under  
pa ragraph  2,  t h e  p r i c e  s h a l l  be f ixed  by t h e  Commission hav ing  
r e g a rd  t o  p re-war  ne t  expor t  p r i c e s  and subsequen t  v a r i a t i o n s  
of c o s t ,  or t h e  lowest  ne t  s e l l i n g  p r i c e  of  s i m i l a r  d y e s t u f f s  
and chem ica l  drugs t o  any o th e r  p u r c h a s e r .
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4.  A l l  d e t a i l s ,  i n c lu d in g  inode and t im e s  of e x e rc i s in g  
t h e  o p t i o n s ,  and making d e l i v e r y ,  and a l l  o th e r  ques t ions  
a r i s i n g  under  t h i s  ar rangement  s h a l l  be de termined  by t h e  
R e p a ra t io n  Commission; t h e  German Government w i l l  f u r n i s h
t o  t h e  Commission a l l  n e c e s s a r y  in fo rm a t ion  and o th e r  a s s i s t a n c e  
which i t  may r e q u i r e .
5 .  The above e x p re s s io n  '’d y e s t u f f s  and chemica l  d r u g s ” 
in c lu d e s  a l l  s y n t h e t i c  dyes and drugs and in t e r m e d i a t e  or o th e r  
p ro d u c ts  used in connec t ion  w i th  dye ing ,  so f a r  as  t h e y  a r e  
manufactured  f o r  s a l e .  The p r e s e n t  ar rangement  s h a l l  a l s o  
apply  t o  cinchona bark and s a l t s  of q u in i n e .
Annex V II
Germany renounces on her  own b e h a l f  and on b e h a l f  of 
h e r  n a t i o n a l s  in  favour  of t h e  P r i n c i p a l  A l l i e d  and Associa ted
Powers a l l  r i g h t s ,  t i t l e s  or p r i v i l e g e s  of whatever  n a t u r e  in
t h e  submarine cab le s  s e t  out below, or  in  any p o r t i o n s  t h e r e o f :
Emd en-V igo 
Emd en-B res t  
Emd e n -T e n e r i f  fe  
Emden-Azores(l )  
Emden-Azores(2) 
Azores-New York( l)  
Azores-New York(2) 
T en e r i f fe -M onrov ia  
Monrovia-Lome
from t h e  S t r a i t s  of Dover t o  o f f  Vigo;  
from o f f  Cherbourg t o  B r e s t ;  
from o f f  Dunkirk t o  o f f  T e n e r i f f e ;  
from t h e  S t r a i t s  of Dover t o  Fayal ;
f t I!  t t  t t  t t  t t  t l
from F aya l  t o  New York
from F aya l  t o  t h e  l o n g i t u d e  of H a l i fa x ;
from o f f  T e n e r i f f e  t o  
from about  ( l a t .  :
*( l o n g . : 
t o  about  ( l a t .  :
* ’ ( l o n g . :
and from a b o u t ( l a t .  : 
( l o n g . :
o f f  Monrovia;
2°30 N.;
7°40 W. of Greenwich; 
2°20 N.;
5°30 W, of Greenwich;
3°48 N.;
0 °0 0 ,
t o  Lome;
Lome-Duala : from Lome t o  Duala;
Monrovia-Pernambuco: from o f f  Monrovia t o  o f f  Pernambuco; 
C o n s ta n t in o p le -C o n s t a n z a :  from C o n s ta n t in o p le  t o  Constanza; 
Yap-Shanghai ,  Yap-Guam, and Yap-Menado(Celebes): from Yap Is land  
t o  Shanghai ,  from Yap I s l a n d  t o  Guam I s l a n d ,  and from Yap 
I s lan d  t o  Menado.
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The va lue  of t h e  above-mentioned c a b l e s  or  p o r t i o n s  
t h e r e o f  in so f a r  as t h e y  a r e  p r i v a t e l y  owned, c a l c u l a t e d  on 
t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  o r i g i n a l  cos t  l e s s  a s u i t a b l e  a l low ance  f o r  
d e p r e c i a t i o n ,  s h a l l  be c r e d i t e d  t o  Germany in t h e  r e p a r a t i o n  
a c c o u n t .
R E P A R A T  I O N  
S e c t io n  II  
SPECIAL PROVISIONS
A r t i c l e  245
W ith in  s i x  months a f t e r  t h e  coming i n t o  f o r c e  of t h e  
p r e s e n t  T r e a ty  t h e  German Government must r e s t o r e  t o  t h e  French 
Government t h e  t r o p h i e s ,  a r c h i v e s ,  h i s t o r i c a l  s o u v e n i r s  or works 
of a r t  c a r r i e d  away from France  by t h e  German a u t h o r i t i e s  in  
t h e  co u r s e  of t h e  war of 1870-1871 and d u r ing  t h i s  l a s t  war ,  
in accordance  with  a l i s t  which w i l l  be communicated t o  i t  by 
t h e  French Government; p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  French f l a g s  ta k e n  in 
t h e  cou r se  of t h e  war of 1870-1871 and a l l  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  papers 
t a k e n  by t h e  German a u t h o r i t i e s  on October 1 0 , 1870, a t  t h e  
cha teau  of Cercay,  near  Brunoy ( S e i n e - e t - O i s e )  be long ing  a t  t h e  
t i m e  t o  Mr. Rouher, fo rm e r ly  M i n i s t e r  of S t a t e .
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W ith in  s ix  months from t h e  coming i n t o  f o r c e  of th e  
p r e s e n t  T r e a t y ,  Germany w i l l  r e s t o r e  t o  Kis M ajes ty  t h e  King of 
t h e  Hedjaz t h e  o r i g i n a l  Koran of t h e  Cal iph  Othman, which was 
removed from Medina by t h e  T u rk i sh  a u t h o r i t i e s  and i s  s t a t e d  t o  
have been p re sen te d  t o  t h e  ex-Emperor W i l l i am I I .
W i th in  t h e  same per iod  Germany w i l l  hand over t o  His
B r i t a n n i c  M a je s t y ' s  Government th e  s k u l l  o f  t h e  S u l ta n  o f 
Mkwawa w h ic h  was removed f ro m  th e  P r o t e c t o r a t e  o f  German Eas t 
A f r i c a  and ta k e n  t o  Germany,
The d e l i v e r y  o f  t h e  a r t i c l e s  above r e f e r r e d  t o  w i l l  
be e f f e c t e d  in  such p la c e  and i n  such c o n d i t i o n s  as may be 
l a i d  down by t h e  Governments t o  w h ic h  t h e y  a re  t o  be r e s t o r e d .
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Germany u n d e r ta k e s  t o  f u r n i s h  t o  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
L o u v a in ,  w i t h i n  t h r e e  m onths a f t e r  a re q u e s t  made by i t  and 
t r a n s m i t t e d  t h r o u g h  th e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f  t h e  R e p a ra t io n  
C om m iss ion , m a n u s c r ip ts ,  in c u n a b u la ,  p r i n t e d  b o o k s ,  maps and 
o b je c t s  o f  c o l l e c t i o n  c o r re s p o n d in g  in  number and v a lu e  t o  
t h o s e  d e s t ro y e d  in  t h e  b u r n in g  by Germany o f  t h e  L i b r a r y  o f  
L o u v a in ,  A l l  d e t a i l s  r e g a r d in g  such re p la ce m e n t w i l l  be 
d e te rm in e d  by t h e  R e p a r a t io n  C om m iss ion.
Germany u n d e r ta k e s  t o  d e l i v e r  t o  B e lg iu m , th ro u g h  t h e  
R e p a r a t io n  C om m iss ion, w i t h i n  s i x  months o f  t h e  coming i n t o  
f o r c e  o f  t h e  p re s e n t  T r e a t y ,  i n  o rd e r  t o  e n a b le  B e lg ium  t o  
r e c o n s t i t u t e  two g r e a t  a r t i s t i c  w o rk s ;
(1 )  The le a v e s  o f  t h e  t r i p t y c h  o f  t h e  M y s t i c  Lamb 
p a in te d  by t h e  Van Eyck b r o t h e r s ,  f o r m e r l y  in  t h e  Church o f  
S t .  Bavon a t  G h e n t ,  now in  t h e  B e r l i n  Museum;
(2 )  The le a v e s  o f  t h e  t r i p t y c h  o f  t h e  L a s t  S upper, 
p a in te d  by D i e r i c k  B o u ts ,  f o r m e r l y  in  t h e  Church o f  S t .  P e te r  
a t  L o u v a in ,  tw o  o f  w h ich  a re  now in  th e  B e r l i n  Museum and tw o
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